G E N E R A L   O R I E N T A T I O N

.Few things are more fascinating for the student who seeks a
truly Christian perspective on the field of sociology than
opening a book of one of the better-known sociologists in our
American world and witness his struggle for 'the identity of
sociology'. Don Martindale's The Nature and Types Of Sociological
Theory lends itself quite well to such an undertaking.(1) We
begin our orientation with a summary of the first chapters of
this book.

"If we are to talk sensibly about sociology, we must first
find out what it is that we are talking about." To define
sociology as the science of man's interhuman life does
not satisfy for it leaves us in the dark with reagrd to
the criterion with which to distinguish between sociology
and other social disciplines. We must start with the
realization that sociology is part of that great evolution
of thought in Western civilization which passes from religion
through philosophy to science. Standing in this point we
compare, first of all, sociology with folk wisdom and
theology. In every society one finds "common-sense thinking"
about the interhuman life. People reflect upon their work,
their play, their love and what not. This common-sense folk
wisdom is bound by time and place, and, consequently, it
falls short of science. Every society knows also of things
which fall beyond the ordinary everyday course of life:
accidents, death, frustration of one's plans and good
fortune for others. "Man must explain and accomodate himself
emotionally to the tragic, the unexpected, and frustraging
events that take place within and around his life ... and
religions seem to be collective institutional solutions to
these problems." Besides folk wisdom we find thus another
type of thinking, with various subtypes of magical,
theological and mixed forms. Theology comes already closer
to sociology than folk wisdom but it still falls short for
sociology seeks the maximum freedom from value suppositions.
The step in thought from theology to philosophy was an
important step the human mind achieved. Thought has been
under the control of sacred sanctions and the result was
that the criterion of acceptability was external, i.e.
outside thought itself, but all this changed when the
reasoning process began to take place outside religious
institutions. Viewpoints multiplied for no established dogma
sets itself up against thinking and claims to be the
standard against which to measure thought. Most important
of all, ideas are forced to stand upon their own merits.
It becomes necessary to find criteria for the acceptability
of ideas within the thought process itself. This is the
heart of the matter: "...the imperishable ideal of the
West was the rational proof." Man discovered that truth is
a property of the proper conduct of the thought process and
he realizes that anyone "can establish truths". Man found
at the same time that he was able to create a purely

deductive system resting on undefined terms: the
mathematical proof. Still, the reign of philosophy
restricts! This reign was broken by science. Separation
of sociology from philosophy was anticipated by the
departure of natural sciences from philosophy. The
fundamental object of science is the advancement of
empirical knowledge, the extension of knowledge of the
facts of the actual world. The rational proof of
philosophy is now subordinated to this primary task of
extending empirical information. With the advent of
science the mathematical achievements of philosophy cease
to be an end of knowledge and become instead a means of
empirical investigation. In its elaborate search for
a general method of verifying statements about the
empirical world science came across the experiment.
This performed the service for science which the
rational proof has performed for philosophy. Science was
thus emancipated by a discovery equivalent to the one
that had freed philosophy from theology! Galileo, Newton
and Bacon did their job and "the full mastery of nature
and the betterment of mankind was visualized and the
possibility of a social science was conceived." Two
basic conditions must be fulfilled, however, before a genuine
social science can be born. First, the doctrine must be
accepted that all phenomena can be explained in terms
of cause and effect sequences occuring in the world of
nature and at once relevant to the social phenomena.
Second, systems of ethical evaluation have to be
bracketed if not ignored altogether to permit the
examination of social relations apart from values.
Deism, nationalism and capitalism created an atmosphere
in which "naturalization" of social life could take
place and in which social life could be prepared for
scientific study. The 18th century established the
assumptions of the lawfulness and naturalness of social
phenomena; the 19th century made them empirical. The
social sciences were transformed into genuinely
empirical disciplines. August Comte attempted to
establish a general science of human life and he called
it sociology. Herbert Spencer made the transition to
conceptions of social subsystems. The social sciences
emerged as a family of disciplines: developments in one
area were almost immediately picked up and carried for-
ward in other. The lines between the social sciences are,
consequently, fluid. The primary differences lie in the
subject matter of the disciplines. Some have claimed that
sociology is the general social science encompassing
all others but this is probably incorrect. Sociology
must be, somehow, a discipline in its own right...

Martindale's first chapters from his profession of faith, an
interpretation and statement of what he b e l i e v e s . There
is nothing wrong with beginning a book in this manner, on the
contrary, as long as one does not do so under the pretense of
being "value free" or "neutral". Martindale believes passionately
in the autonomy of theoretical, scientific thought. That is

obvious. He does not tire of saying so in not uncertain terms.
Man comes from his primitive manner of thinking to theology and
from theology to philosophy and from philosophy finally to science
and now he is able to establish truth: the autonomy of independent
thinking man.

What strikes us in this approach, however, is the embarrassingly
unscientific treatment of Martindale's in his discussion of
'common sense thinking'. After all, it i s a serious scientific
blunder to forget to ask the question what precisely the structure
is of naive experience as compared to theoretical or scientific
thought. The blunder becomes even worse if one builds his whole
scientific house upon it!! Martindale does not even bother to
a s k the question what an analysis of the structure of these
two kinds of thought might be. This is not just a lack of truly
scientific precision and accuracy and neither is it something done
only by Martindale. Virtually all sociological publications on
our contient show the same embarrassingly serious lack of scholarly
precision and honesty. Embarrassing, for it is usually from these
very circles that criticism is directed against those who would
take their Christian faith seriously also in their scientific
work: the usual statement is that those people who confuse 'theology'
and science' are not very scientific!!! What intrigues us is not
this peculiarly pasionate criticism on the part of these scientists
but the question what lies behind this scientific blundering on
the part of men who certainly deserve the name scientist: what is
the cause of this strange blindness of these men?(2) The answer is
obvious. Once one has committed oneself to faith in the autonomy
of theoretical thought and begins to regard clear theoretical
thought as the source of truths one must go on and begin to
interpret everything else, naive experince included, from this
accepted stand point. Naive thought then cannot be seen anymore
in its own, peculiar structure but must be interpreted as primitive
thought, i.e. thinking of an inferior kind, a stage to be overcome.
Misconception must then follow upon misconception but also scienti-
fic blunder upon scientific blunder; the structure of naive thought
is no longer something to be analyzed, theology is confused with
religion and philosophy with the search for the good life (as
Martindale does, for example) and the name science is reserved for
that kind of theoretical thought only which bases itself in
religious commitment to the ideal of autonomous theoretical
thought only. That the precision which may be required from the
scientist with regard to his terminology is lacking and must be
lacking now is obvious: Martindale's first chapters belong to the
large body of introductory materials where this lack of precision
shows up almost continuously. His presuppositions, e.g. as to the
time-transcending nature of theoretical thought in contrast to
the time bound nature of theology and of naive thought, make him
juggle with terms in a thoroughly irresponsible manner. It is
perhaps especially with regard to terminology that the student who
enters the field of sociological enterprise on this continent must
be on his guard.(3) The unscientific confusion of theology and
religion, of scientific method and valuefree procedure etc. occurs
in virtually all present day sociological publications here. The
student of sociology does well therefore to be aware of the
inevitable coherence between terminology and ideological commitment:
it is simply impossible, and it would mean making the same

scientifically irresponsible mistakes, to accept the current
use of terms in sociology without a good deal of reservations.

The same reservations must be made with regard to the
solutions offered in the discussion of the question what sociology
really is. To many sociologists it is an open question what this
science is essentially all about. In Martindale's first chapters
we find the typical hesitation which is characteristic for
virtually all modern publications. In our discussion this
question therefore ought to be dealt with first: it is really
somewhat peculiar to discuss sociology without knowing what
sociology really is! That Martindale left us in the dark as
to the precise nature of sociology cannot be due to his respect
for the actual task of philosophy, the theoretical enterprise
which, among other things, specifically deals with the place and
task of each one of the special disciplines in science. We
remember Martindale's pronouncement that sociology had freed
itself from philosophy! (All the same: the discussion by Martindale
was thoroughly philosophical!!) In a well-known book, edited by
Georges Gurvitch and Wilbert E. Moore, Twentieth Century
Sociology Huntington Cairns presents a number of excuses why
present day sociologists are still uncertain as to what the
discipline they study and teach actually is.

> "First, the subject matter of the social sciences is
> unusually intricate, in the sense that it so far has defied
> organizations at anything like the level achieved in the
> organization of the subject matter of the physical sciences."
> "Second, sociologists have never agreed on the domain of
> their subject matter nor on their attitude toward it."
> "Until sociologists themselves define the object of
> their study it will have to be asumed that sociology is
> what the men who call themselves sociologists write
> about... Insofar as it may be caught in a single phrase,
> the sociological attitude seems to represent an emphasis
> upon the facts of human activity in general, in which the
> role of specific factors such as geography or economics
> is given full recognition, but the activity is not seen
> exclusively from the point of view of any one of them."(4)

Half an hour looking through some of the major sociological
works in a College library will be sufficient to be convinced of
the fact that Cairns is not the only one on the American
sociological scene who feels uncertain as to what now really
sociology is! It is at this point that the Christian student of
sociology has a distinct advantage over most of his colleagues.
The work of Abraham Kuyper gave a tremendous impetus to a
Calvinistic, Word-bound theoretical reflection, not only in
The Netherlands and other European countries but also on our
continent. Especially the work of Herman Dooyeweerd is for the
sociologist of the greatest significance. In the third volume
of his opus magnum, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, he
has presented a thorough discussion of matters which are
directly important for the discipline of sociology.(5) Studies
by men as J. Dengerink (6) and R. van Dijk (7), recognizing
the perspectives opened by Dooyeweerd, are extremely valuable
but are only accesible for those who understand the language
in which they were written.

1. Don Martindale, <u>The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory</u>
        (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960)

2. This the more remarkable because a man as Martindale gives
   evidence in his publications of his tremendous sociological
   abilities. The book from which the quotes are taken is
   undoubtedly one of the more excellent sociological reviews
   available on the American market nowadays.

3. The matter of terminology is always one of the more difficult-
   to-understand experiences through which the college student,
   especially in his first two years or so, has to find his
   way. Terminology, scientifically speaking, is almost half
   the work to bem done in science: one who has found the right
   and precise terms has reached already one of the major
   goals which the scientist sets himself! It is, probably,
   for this reason that scientists differ so widely in their
   use of terms! As long as the student finds himself wondering
   why not all scientists use the same, or at least almost
   the same, terms, he may regard this as a certain sign that
   he is still at the very, very beginning of his scholarly
   pursuits and that he'll do well to start reading what he
   can! For a while he'll feel (lost!?) confused by what seems
   an endless diversity of terms and terminology but once he
   has become accustomed to such diversity he will undoubtedly
   begin to see the issues hidden in the very terminologies!

4. Georges Gurvitch and Wilbert E. Moore, <u>Twentieth Century</u>
                <u>Sociology</u> (New York: The Philosophical
                Library, 1945) pp. 4-18

5. H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought
        (Amsterdam: H.J.Paris, 1957)

6. J. Dengerink, Cristich-historisch onderzoek naar de
                sociologische ontwikkeling van het beginself
                der 'Souvereiniteit in eigen kring' in the
                19de en 20ste eeuw (Kampen: J.H.Kok, 1948)

7. R. Van Dijk, Mens en Medemens, Een einleiding tot de
                algemene sociologie (Wageningen: Zomer &
                Keuning) n. y.

INTRODUCTORY SOCIOLOGY

To page through a number of currently used sociological textbooks is a somewhat frustrating affair. One does not only find in those textbooks a seemingly endless number of topics treated - though generally in a frustratingly superficial way - but one is struck by the obvious lack of agreement among the textbook writers of today with regard to what precisely constitues the field of investigation of the science of sociology. and what precisely to deal with of that field in the introductory course in sociology. A summary of what a number of the most widely used textbooks deal with may help us gain an idea, at least, of what generally is being discussed in this course.

An often used textbook for our course is Robert l. Sutherland, et al. eds., Introductory Sociology (Chicago: J.B.Lippincott Company, 6th edition 1961). The book is divided into seven parts as follows: 1. Society and Culture; 2. Personality; 3. Social Process; 4. Human Collectivities; 5. Population and Communities; 6. Social Institutions; 7. Social Changes. Under these heading the following main subjects are discussed: human society, culture, cultural processes, personality and culture, social roles and culture conflict, personality development, interaction and social processes, accomodation and social organization, groups and small group research, collective behaviour and mass communication, stratification and mobility, race and race-conscious groups, ecology and community, population, characteristics and trends, the contemporary urban community, familial institutions, institutionalized education, social structure in economic and political life, health and welfare organization, organized religion, the changing social world, and similiar matters.

Other textbooks give us the following subjects which are being discussed: culture and biological factors, heredity, racial classifications, familial ancestry, environmental development, natural and social selection, folkways and mores, technicways, cultural diversity and similiarity, cultural ethnocentrism, kinds of groups, social interaction, competition, custom as cultural heritage, national subcultures, male and female subcultures, factors in cultural diffusion, inventions, cultural inertia, cultural lag and cultural survivals, culture molding the personality, conscious and unconscious, acculturation, assimilation, adjustment to cultural change, personality disorganization, personality reorganization, conflict, socialization and personality, primary and secondary groups, formal and informal groups, crowd behaviour, mob behaviour, the social self, status seeking, isolation, transitional shock, adolescents's quest for satisfaction, teenagers' relationships with adults, adolescent adjustment, class structures, caste systems, social mobility, open class society, privilege, personal growth, personality traits, mental hygiene, personality integration, rationalization, projection, daydreaming, procrastination, repression, group expectations, informal controls, the great society, individuality and conformity, population movement, urbanization, mechanization and industrialization, secularization, social planning, social policy, and so on and so on, apparently without end !

In Joseph S. Roucek and Roland 1. Warren, <u>Sociology</u>, <u>An</u> Introduction (Paterson: Littlefield, Adams & Co, 1961) an attempt is made to combine in one handy volume all that material which is covered in the most widely used textbooks. They come with the following division: culture, personality, personality disorgani- zation and personality reorganization, fundamental social processes, social groups, crowd behaviour, communication, public, public opinion, social status systems, population, rural commu- nities, urban communities, institutions,family, governmental institutions, economic institutions, religious institutions, social problems, social control, social change and sociology as a science itself.

Already from the given enumerations it is obvious that in many cases the consequences are being felt of the lack of a clear insight into what sociology essentially is and ought to do. It seems, however, hardly possible to discuss sociological matters in any kind of intelligent and scientifically responsible way tithout having established clearly what sociology is and what its function and task is. To give some insight into these matters is the aim of this stencil.

Special stencils on various sociologically significant matters will be made available from time to time. Among them a summarizing survey of the history of sociological thought. But the introductory sociology sourse is meant first of all to get acquainted with sociology, its task, its field, its approach, its problems, its theorizers and their publications, its methods and its perspectives. The student is advised therefore to give serious attention to his reading assignments. A few titles may serve him to find his way in the bookstore and the library. (For pecuniary reasons only paperbacks are mentioned here!)

Ferdinand Tönnies, <u>Community & Society</u>, <u>Gemeinschaft</u> und <u>Gesellschaft</u> (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965)

Reinhard Bendix, <u>Max Weber</u>, <u>An Intellectual Portrait</u> (Garden City: Doubleday & Company Anchor Books, 1962)

David Riesman, <u>The Lonely Crowd</u> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, 15th edition)

Margaret Mead, ed., <u>Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive People</u> (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966)

Pitirim A. Sorokin, <u>Contemporary Sociological Theories</u> (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964)

Lewis A. Coser, ed. <u>Political Sociology</u> (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966)

Otis Dudley Duncan, <u>William F. Ogburn On Culture And Social Change</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago,Press, 1964)

W. Lloyd Warner, <u>Social Class In America, The Evaluation Of Status</u> (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960)

MAN AND SOCIETY

Sociology concerns itself with society. It is for this reason that the sociologist is deeply interested in the question who man really is. He cannot get away from this question. After all, society is society of human beings, mutually related and bound together by a thousand and one strings of societal relationships. Who are these human beings? Is science able to show their unique essence and to make clear who man really is? The answer is more obvious than many seem to be willing to admit. Theoretical or scientific thought is <u>not</u> able to tell who man is: the very nature and the very structure of theoretical thought makes this impossible; the very abstractions which are essential to theoretical thought prevent this thought from turning man into a so-called Gegenstand of scientific investigation! The actual nature of man escapes man's theoretical inquiries.(1) The question who man is, consequently, requires a pre-theoretical answer. This pre-theoretical answer, will it at least be satisfactory, will inescapably include an answer to another question: who or what is man's Origin? In other words, the question who man is compels one to put one's heart upon one's tongue, or to reveal, implicitly or explicitly, one's deepest religious commitment.

The Christian sociologist, from his heart-commitment to the God and Father, of Jesus Christ Who has revealed Himself to us in this temporal world in His Word, being in the all-encompassing grip of the Word of God, knows himself and all human beings to be created. He realizes that man does not exist in and by himself in imaginary freedom and independence but that man, in his very existence, is there only through God and for God his Creator. He knows from the same Word of God that man was created to be the image of God and placed from the very beginning under the mandate to serve God with his undivied heart and life in subduing creation to the revealed and ever-active Will and Law of God.(2) He knows from the same Word that man is unique in this sense that God has 'given' him this position of 'mandataris' in distinction from all other creatures. His life is religion and it is precisely here that man can be said to transcend in his heart, the very centre of his existence, the temporal creation, i.e. in his heart he is unbreakably 'related' to the Creator. It is in man, therefore, that creation receives its meaning, or in other words: shows its meaningfulness. If man falls into apostasy all creation will fall with him. If man reaches his destiny all of creation finds its meaning fullness also. cf. Romans 8. Man is, however, not to be regarded as something like the 'individual' of humanistic independence dreams. God's revelation shows God's covenant with man as a covenant relationship in which all individual human beings are bound together into a Root: the relationship with other human beings is essential. The mandate is to be fulfilled by man in the constant whole-hearted commitment to God his Creator, in the continuous search for understanding of the Will and Law of God, in the uninterrupted, responsible subjection of mankind itself and of the rest

of created reality to this Will or Law, and in unbreakable coherence and relationship of man and fellow-man in this world.

The Christian sociologist realizes also that his God has spoken to him and to this World of sin and apostasy which have entered created reality. He knows fully that sin cannot be eliminated from his theoretical pursuit: he cannot - if he wishes to be worth his salt as a sociologist and not deserve to be named a naive dreamer or a fool - do in his sociological studies as if sin were something that the science of sociology simply could disregard. He will therefore be on the look out for various forms of religious commitment which attempt to assign man a place in the created reality - especially the social relationships - which is on the one hand possible under the order for creation which God maintains in Jesus Christ (3) but which on the other hand distorts both man and his relationships with others. He will refuse to identify the existing and present place or position of man in a given society with one of the 'sources' from which to determine what precisely the place of man in society and what the relationship between man and society ought to be. He will also be extremely careful in his description of certain forms of lawfulness which seem to strike one's attention in various social situations, trying to get away from any form of identification between norm and given situation. On the contrary, he will do what he can to find the normative principles, on the basis of his faith commitment - and in this seeking to base himself upon faith commitment he knows not to be different even from those who, somewhat foolishly, claim to be neutral and, even more openly foolish, objective because they also work and theorize from such a faith commitment, be it to their 'god' - as truly normative principles which are given positive from and shape by human, essentially religious activity.

The Christian sociologist will, because of his faith commitment, realize that the work of Christ is of essential significance also for his sociological studies. Not only does he realize that everything exists in and through Christ and that the social reality therefore exists also only because of the work of Christ, but he will know fully well that in Christ the new Root of mankind has come and that this has very concrete consequences for man's place and position in society in this world.(4)

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Sociology is, unless it wishes to remain shallow, superficial and useless, forced to reflect explicitly upn the question what is the position of man in society. A discussion of this question is usually found in the various sociological handbooks under the heading : Individual and Society, or : Individual and Community.(5) The question is often presented as a problem or, even, a dilemma. The reason for this can be easily seen. Current sociology prefers to base itself upon the faith-commitment of the autonomy of theoretical thought or the neutrality postulate. The difficulty with regard to the question as to the relation between man and society is, indeed, on this stand-point that an attempt is made

to interpret man theoretically. Man mu st then be explained as an individual, an indivisible unit, self-contained, a little cosmos all by himself, independent and essentially free from any relationships, and basically self-sufficient. Or man must be explained from his relationships, e.g. the group, the state or the society as essentially independent, free and autonomous totality.

We can distinguish between two trends of thought in this connection. The one goes into the direction of placing the emphasis upon the individual human being, making a heavy use of the term individual and interpreting man's social relations and the societal structures and structurations in this world as simply nothing but accidental lines of contact between free human units which are essentially only outward connections. The other goes into the direction of explaining the human being as fully qualified and essentially determined in his very being and nature as well as in his mores and thoughts by that larger social whole which serves as the ground of all being and the source of all what goes on in human life. Most thinking, however, attempts to end up with some kind of a compromise or combination of the two starting points. That such a compromise or synthesis must remain without success is obvious: the one pole cannot be reconciled with the other for both tend and strive to be exclusive in their claim to function as interpretation-ground.(6) The fundamental mistake of both individualism and universalism is the immanence standpoint which both theories (more precisely: beliefs!) presuppose.(7) In individualism we find the attempt to deny the religious Root-unity of mankind and to replace it by the acceptance of the autonomy of the free human individual, a revolutionary dream of humanism. In universalism we find the attempt to deny the unique nature of man who in his heart 'transcends' temporal reality in its religious concentration upon the Root and in this Root upon God Himself, and to replace this by the equally religious concept of an absolutizing of a temporal secietal structuration into which man as such is lost. Whereby man's mandate to initiative and responsibility disappear in the imaginary 'will of the whole'. Christian, i.e. Biblically-bound, sociology rejects therefore both individualism and universalism (collectivistism) and also any combination attempt in which a synthesis is being undertaken and it recognizes the principle - not just the "theory" ! - of what in theoretical terms can be called the sphere sovereignty.

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1. cf. H. Dooyeweerd, In The Twilight of Western Thought (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1960) pp. 173 ff.

2. Genesis 1

3. Colossians 1 : 11-23

4. Ephesians 2 : 11-22, Colossians 2 : 4-15. See also note 3.

5. The term 'community' is one of the most worn-out terms sociology possesses. It is, therefore, always good to ask oneself carefully, when taking up another sociological study by another author, what this author means by the term: it usually gives one a good insight into what the fundamental starting point of such an author is.

6. See Dooyeweerd's discussion in A New Critique, op. cit., volume III, pp. 176 ff.

7. For a brief characterization of the immanence standpoint, see Dooyeweerd's discussion in The Twilight, op. cit., pp. 12 ff.

N O R M   A N D   S O C I E T Y

The difference between man and all other creatures in this
temporal world can never be understood unless one sees both man
and all other creatures in their subjectivity to the law of God.
It is namely in this subjectivity, this being subject to the
Law of God, that the essential difference must be sought. Only
man has the ability to analytically distinguish between himself,
his acts and actions and the law of God for created reality,
something no other creature in this world possesses. This enables
man to reflect upon the law of God, upon its significance and
its demands, and upon his existence as subject to the law.. But
this is not all. No creature has been subjected to the law of
God in such a fashion as man who is called to obey to God's law
and commandments for his life in his concrete life situation
driven by his inner faith commitment and giving full and undivided
attention to the law in that peculiar way in which it comes to
him, namely requiring man's positive forming of concrete norms.
This implies the 'possibility' of disobedience even though it
would be incorrect to state that God 'gave' man the opportunity
to disobey; disobedience is the 'impossible possibility' and sin
is non-sense and foolishness.(1) The rock, the plant or the
animal, though all subject to the law of God, function according
to the law of God without being addressed by God in the same
manner as God addresses man and without having this 'impossible
possibility' of disobedience from a religious centre, their
'heart': they do not have such a heart, such a religious concen-
tration point in which they are addressed by God. We may say of
the plant that it functions subjectively in the biotic modality,
of the animal that it functions subjectively in the psychic
modality but both plant and animal, to say nothing of rocks and
other physically qualified creatures, do not function subjectively
in the 'following' law spheres but only objectively.(2) Only man
functions in those modalities, from the analytical through the
pistical, as subject. It is these same modalities which must be
called normative modalities because the law in those modalities
is given to man in the manner of a norm principle which
requires the positivation activity of man.(3) It is in this
positivation action that the 'impossible possibility' finds an
apportunity to express and show itself.

In order to understand this process of positivation in its
significance for our sociological enterprise we must distinguish
between God's law or will for man, coming to him in the manner
of norm principles, man's understanding, insight into and
knowledge of this will, and finally the positive norms. There is
always an essential difference between God's will of law and
man's understanding and knowledge of it. Man's knowledge remains
limited not only but in the post-fall situation it must be stated
that man's knowledge remains also always hampered bythe consequences
of sin. Even there where man's heart has come in the overwhelming,
recreative grip of the Power (Word) of God sin plays its
disturbingly distorting role still in a significant degree even
though its force has been broken andman's eyes are now open for

God's revelation in its multifaceted abundance. There where
man's heart is fixing itself, in inevitable religious choice,
upon a deified, absolutized aspect or moment of created reality
(immanence standpoint) the picture of God's law - which now is
no longer recognized as G o d ' s law - has become extremely
distorted: man's religious commitment compels him to attempt an
interpretation of reality in which the law is reduced to one of
its modes not only but which also the law is identified with
its subject.(4) Man's understanding of and insight into the
law or will of God is therefore never to be regarded as iden-
tical with the law itself. This does not mean that we should
give up our attempts to understand God's law for created reali-
ty. After all, God's law is being revealed and this revelation
is no weak, hesitant gesture on the part of our God. On the
contrary. His law order has been imposed upon the reality in
which we find ourselves in such a manner that it is simply im-
possible not to be radically impressed and overwhelmed by it.
In the recreating grip of the Power-Word of God in Christ it is
aso that man begins to see the law of God more and more true,
deep and dependable knowledge. This is significant! The positive
norms in our reality namely are fully qualified by the direction
of man's understanding of the law of God. In his positivation
activity man is giving concrete, specific validity-recognition
to laws or norm-principles which he (correctly or incorrectly)
has understood. We speak of validity-recognition because the
law of God h a s validity even if man would not recognize it
and admit it. Still we use the 'word validity' in this connection
because it is also possible that man deems valid certain
principles which are simply nothing but his autonomous brain
children and not God's given law. We speak of concrete and
specific in this connection because under the order of creation
man simply must come from norm principles to concrete and specific
norms, positive norms which regulate and control his actions and
conduct. It would be impossible for man to live in our world
without positive norms which, for example, regulate and by that
same token make possible man's living together with others. Such
positive norms make it, for example, possible to go out in the
street with your car and drive home: Even though some car
driving creatures fail to stop for the red light or break the
speed limit and neglect to stay on their side of the road, you
have a chance that you get home safely only because of the
traffic laws and their recognized validity by those who with you
form society. Interwoven with such positive norms for traffic
are many other norms: norms of a jural nature which pevent, e.g.,
that your fellow student, even without thinking, decides to go
home in your car in stead of in his own jalopy; economic norms,
ethical norms etc. These positive norms must be sharply
distinguished from the norm principles. Such a norm principle,
for example,is that members of a family must love each other.
A positive norm brings in this case a concrete and specific
validity recognition in which the norm principle of love between
members of a family is given a concrete form: here in our suburban
setting in the United States one does such and such a thing and
one does not do such and such a thing in one's family, in this
twentieth century!

It must be seen clearly that there are more moments in the positivation process by which man comes from the norm principles to the positive norms than mentioned so far. Man is in all of his life qualified and directed by the central religous commit- ment of hist heart and, consequently, also in his positivation activity. But there is more. The positivation is also qualified and determined in its effect by the measure of understanding of the norm principles. In other words, we shall have to be ware of this peculiar phenomenon in our world that . man's under- standing over the centuries changes: e.g. the understanding of the norm principle of retribution in our western civilization during the Middle ages, resulting in the lack of understanding of a number of traits typical for a non-differentiated society (just to mention one moment out of a large number) changed to an indeed wider understanding a few centuries later. The cultural ideal (5) plays a role of importance therefore, and also the concrete cultural or historical situation.(6) One cannot simply begin with norm principle and a sincere desire to positivation: there is always a situation in which one must begin. Moments in this situation are, for example, the comples of positivations which are already enjoying validity recognition in certain realms, the prevalent world and life view or Lebenanschauung in a society, specific crises in certain cultural realms, etc. Among these moments but not simply alongside of those mentioned we must also recognize the irresistible and irrepresssible 'force majeure' of the order for creation: man cannot get away from being social, economic, moral etc. subject! and he cannot get away from the subjectivity of all sides of created reality even though its frustration of his autonomy dreams may irritate him no end! One las factor must be mentioned now. In the positivation process we find that the positivation activity is not simply done by every human being individually but within specific societal relationships and societal constellations by those who hold within such structurations a position of authority or leadership. We shall see later that there is a wide variation and differentiation of this authority and leadership but for this moment is it sufficient if we see that the positive norms are being formed by 'leaders' and, in a variety of ways, are being imposed upon others within a certain societal constellation. These men hold key positions in civilization.

Positive norms are mutually interwoven in the given positive order under which a society finds itself at a given moment. This interwovenness limits therefore at the same time the positive norms in their direction and claims which they received from the men in the key positions. But there is still more. In a given society the positive order may be, sometimes, even radically different from the personal convictions, or the inner readiness, of the people who live under this order. The positive order can be willingly followed but also rather hesitantly or even unwillingly. It is essential that we see this clearly for it prevents us from making serious mistakes in our use of theinformation which we gain in our description or registration of people's concrete behaviour in a given society and of people's concrete thinking about their behaviour and their positive norms. It is because of utter confusion on the part of a great number of sociologists

with regard to the correct distinctions to be made here that
present day sociology and especially sociography is suffering
from a serious lack of direction and precision.

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1. Sin is not-sense, that is: there is no ' reason' for sin,
    no 'basis' for apostasy. Sin cannot be interpreted or
    explained in any other terms either: apostasy is ...
    apostasy for no reason at all but for apostasy itself.

2. See stencilled notes Philosophy 101.

3. idem.

4. Romans 1 : 22, 23, 25

5. The cultural ideal is based in man's religious commitment.
    It is, however, not to be regarded as an ideal which one
    individual human being dreams up from his individual
    religious choice but, indeed, as a gradually froemd and
    formulated set of ideals which people ' recognize' as in
    harmony with their own Lebensanschauung or world and life
    view and to which people at a given time and in a given
    situation begin to render allegiance in their cultural
    activities.

6. The cultural situation is therefore to be understood not
    from adding up into a sum total an endless number of
    incoherent, abstracted 'facts' or details but from the
    cultural ideals which, in the various cultural realms,
    possess a position of cultural power.

SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND THE IRREDUCIBLE MODAL ASPECTS

All of created reality is subject to the ever-active Will or Law of God the Creator. Not everything in creation functions, however, in the same manner under God's law: there is a differentiation which, obviously, corresponds with the differentiation within God's law for His creation. Consequently we can and must distinguish between various modes of existence or various law spheres. Every aspect of reality therefore possesses a modal law side and a modal subject side. Each aspect possesses thereby its unique modal structure which is of such a nature that in it the unbreakable coherence with all other aspects of reality is expressed. What must be seen clearly is that these modal structures are not variable but constant: the constant structures make the variable forms or structurations within them possible! This must be - and this is only possible in the faith standpoint in Jesus Christ, knowing God as the Creator of created reality Who rules this creation after His own will - recognized as consequence of the pre-scientific knowledge of him who engages in theoretical pursuit in this field.

The (social) scientist cannot be satisfied with an insight into the nature and structure of these modal aspects however. Modal aspects, namely, do not exist in and by themselves but - the term modal says it already - only in concrete things, creatures, as their aspects or modes or functions. The ethical is not something one meets somewhere out in the street all by itself but only as one aspect of a concrete thing, plants, animal, events, relationship, etc. alongside all other aspects into which the law of God differentiates itself. Every creature functions in all modal aspects, possesses all modal aspects. The scientist will therefore search now first of all after the manner in which all these irreducible and unique modal aspects express themselves in mutual coherence in the many different things, plants, animals, social relationships, etc.(1) Yet, he can only do this after he has acquainted himself with the structure of the modal aspects.

The invariable, constant aspects of created reality are ordered by God in an irreversible order. Certain aspects are of a foundational nature as to other aspects, form a substratum for the other ones. Other aspects follow in the cosmic order which God created as superstrata. This is important for the nature and structure of each of the aspects: the cosmic coherence expresses itself now in the structure of each of the aspects! Obviously now there is one aspect in which we shall not find a 'referral' to a superstratum. The structure of various aspects can now be described as a meaning nucleus, a moment which gives this particular aspect its irreducible character, around which we can find other moments of either an anticipatory or retrocipatory nature. These so-called analogical moments are qualified byt the meaning nucleus of the aspect in which we find them but they refer clearly to moments (either the nuclear

or the analogical moments) in other aspects.(2)

It is essential in this connection to gain a clear insight
into the so-called opening process. As long as a certain aspect
shows itself in reality only in its coherence of meaning nucleus
and retrocipatory moments we must say that it is in a closed,
unopened state. (cf. psychic life of animal) The aspect is
opened in the unfolding of its anticipatory moments in temporal
reality. (psychic life of man, for example) The unfolding-possibilities
of an aspect are always present in the aspect but they show them-
selves only and unfold themselves only under the leadership of
the aspects to which the anticipatory moment can and will refer.
These anticipated aspects tehmselves must, however, if they are
to give this leadership to the unfolding of the anticipatory
moments of the preceding aspects, be opened to some degree,
obviously. Consequently the whole unfolding process is dependent
upon the leadership of the 'last' aspect, namely the pistical.
And, this in the second place, unfolding is founded in cultural
development: the development or unfolding of the normative
aspects (and of the normative anticipatory moments in the pre-
analytical aspects) requires (and it therefore based upon) the
unfolding of the cultural aspect.(3) The unique meaning of the
cultural aspect can be indicated as free formative mastery or
as mastery after a free (in this word free we find the moments
of initiative and responsibility) design or plan. Mastery is
connected with and unbreakable connected with power, but this
mastery-power must be conceived of as mandate-power or office-
power whereby must be reminded of the mandate or office which
man received from God. In the cultural aspect we see already in
its unopened state the mandate to power acquisition over the
natural aspects of created reality. Man positivizes this norm
principle of free formative mastery or mastery after a free
plan or design in his technique, his technical control of the
natural aspects of creation. The unfolding of the cultural aspect
is necessary, however, as basis for the unfolding process in the
other aspects which are of a normative nature. As long as there
is no acquisition of cultural power and no gaining of power to
form after a free design it is simply impossible that a positi-
vation of norm principles into positive norms (something cha-
racteristic, we remember, of the normative aspects) would take
place: positivation i s based upon the presupposition that
those who positivize the norm principles possess cultural mastery-
power in the realm in which they are engaged in the positivation
activity! After all, the norm principle cannot be positivized
into a positive norm unless one possesses indeed the power to
positivize the norm. Where there is no possibility in one or more
the cultural realms (qualified by the modal aspects) to positivize
the norm principles of a certain aspect there that aspect will
remain closed.(4)

Now the question must be answered in which manner the
invariable and irreducible modal aspects coherently are woven
together in the concrete creatures whom we know in created
reality, and whom we see in their concrete totality in naive
experience. There are a great many differences between a tree,
a church and the social relationship which exists between two
neighbours but the question which intrigues us is what precisely

and essentially this difference is. On the standpoint that
reality as we experience it the result and outcome is of a
historical process it is not only impossible to point out
essential differences between different societal structures but
it is even practically impossible to point out any essential
differences between suchrelationships and any other created
thing. Reformed philosophy has shown the way here. Not all
created thing function under the law in the same manner. A
rock functions in all law spheres and possesses consequently
all aspects. A plant and an animal, a societal relationship
or for example history itself function also in all law spheres
and possesses also all aspects. But there is an essential
difference in themanner in which all these created realities
function in these law spheres. The tree, for example, functions
in a different manner in the biotic law sphere than in the
economic aspect. In the first law sphere it functions as a
subject but in the latter law sphere it functions exclusively
as an object (an economic object as object of human thrift
for example or as a means to an end etc.) The last aspect in
which a given thing functions as a subject shows the typical
peculiarity of that thing: we call it its qualifying function.
This qualifying function can also be called its end-function
in the case of the tree and at the same time its leading function.
The aspects which precede the biotic are opened in their
anticipatory moments and arranged and directed in such a manner
that the typical function of the tree is served: the tree is
tree because of this particular arrangement, this specific
structure. The same holds true, mutatis mutandis, for all other
creatures. This holds good also for societal relationships.(5)

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1. It has always been recognized already by christian and non-
   christian thinkers that there are modes or modalities. These
   terms, moder or modality, are not unknown in sociology, on the
   contrary, What is not recognized, however, is that the modes
   in which things etc. exist must be interpreted and that it is
   precisely in their interpretation the the deep religious
   commitment of every thinker comes out into the open! The
   Christian knows, because of his faith insight into the radical
   subjectivity or subjectedness of created reality to the Law of
   God, that in these modes he is dealing with aspects of God's law.
2. An illustration: in"cultural life" we find the moment of life,
   which reminds you of the biotic modality, but no biologist must
   conclude that therefore he is called upon to discuss it in his
   class for cultural life is typically the area of culture; cf.
   also social distance, cultural change etc.
3. The terms anticipations or anticipatory moments and retroci-
   pations or retrocipatory moments are common good in many
   sciences, The difficulty is, however, that it seems that every
   other scientist uses these terms in a different sense. Such
   confusion is,perhaps, the scientist's fate but it would
   certainly be a big help if someone could come up with other
   terms which say the same thing in an equally clear manner but
   which at the same time would be less often used in a different
   ways. Any smart student around who could do this ?
4. That is: at least relatively.

5. For a penetrating discussion of the matters indicated
   here one must go to fundamental works as Dooyeweerd's
   A new Critique, Unfortunately, only this work discusses
   the indicated matters in English. An abundance of
   materials in other languages wits to be translated. Our
   Christian community could be really grateful if some
   young scholar would devote a large part of his life
   time to translation into English much of what has been
   written in Dutch, French and German.

THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

In the preceding paragraph we found that 'things' are not accidents or simply products of a mysterious formation process whereby the one thing flows forth from the other in, apparently endless, succession but that 'things' are what they are because of their being in the grip of the law of God in a specific manner. The grouping or structuration of the modal aspects consequently became of prime importance. Every thing (in the sense of everthing in and of created reality) possesses a given structure, an order along the lines of which it is built, and an order in which the various aspects or modalities find their typical coherence. This structure or structural order is it what makes the 'thing' something not only more but also essentially different from the sum total of the parts which compose it! It is obvious that it is this phenomenon which the sociologist is really after: the <u>structure</u> of the social relationships which is typical for this particular relationship and which makes the one relationship different from the other even in cases where two social structures may be mutually inter-woven in a manner which makes it extremely difficult for the sociologist to distinguish. It must be remembered now that the structure is the structure f o r the 'thing', the relationship etc. The structure could be called, consequently, the law for the given 'thing', relationship, etc. But before we define our terms it is necessary to reflect a little more upon the matter of the structures of created reality.

We shall call the structures of which we are talking here individuality structures: the structures appear to us in the individual things, events, etc. and mark the peculiar and typical existence of the one created thing in distinction from the others. The individuality structure has a typical leading or end function which is characteristic of the structure. It is possible now to make a few essential distinctions. The typical end function of an individuality structure namely possesses within its modal aspect an individuality type. In the multitude of individuality structures we begin to see some order when we keep in mind that the 'first and foremost difference between the structural types is determined by the modality of their typical leading function, which gives the structural whole its typical qualification and internal destination. This criterion delimits the ultimate <u>genera</u> of the structures of individuality, which, as such, are not enclosed in higher generic types. Because of their elementary and fundamental character they circumscribe invariable structural orbits of individuality whose further typical articulation is dependent on them. We shall designate these elementary <u>genera</u> by the term <u>radical types</u>, and the structural orbits of thing or other individual totalities encompassed by them we shall <u>kingdoms</u>.'(1) There are, to begin with, three such kingdoms: (a) that of inorganic kinds of matter, things and events, all of which have a typical qualification in the energy aspect; (b) that of plants and their bio-milieu, which kingdom has a typical biotic qualification;

(c) that of animals, inclusive of their typical symbiotic relationships, their form-products and animal milieu, a kingdom which is typically qualified in the psychic aspect.(2) It must be seen now further that the individuality structure (e.g. of a social relationship) does not only have an, end function but also a foundational function which together with the end function form the so-called radical functions of the structure. This is the case when the end function of a structure does not show original individuality as in the case of the individuality structures of the three kingdoms mentioned earlier. The individuality of a plant, for example, which is biotically qualified, does not originate with any of the preceding aspects: the individuality of the plant has a biotic originality therefore. This now is not the case with all individuality structures. In various cases, it is so that the individuality type of the end functions lack this original character and refer back to original types of individuality in preceding aspects in which one must find the real, nucleus-type of the individuality structure. This aspect is then the foundational aspect. A clear illustration of this can be found in the social relationship which we call the family. The individuality structure of the family relationship is undoubtedly qualified by the end function of the ethical love. A family consequently is an ethically qualified relationship between parents and children. These ethical relationships which we find in and which form the family are, however, clearly founded in the biotic aspect: the parents are parents of the children and the children are children of these parents and the ties which bind are blood-ties. Still, blood-ties as such do not really make the family but the family remains ethically qualified. This happens in such a manner, however, that the individuality of the family relationship cannot simply be found in the ethical in an original way but that within the group of all ethically qualified relationships this relationship's individuality shows itself in the nucleus-type of the biotic.(3) The family love refers back to and reminds of the biotic relationship between parents and children.

It is now possible to see that within the encompassing radical type we must distinguish between sub types and even these in other sub types, etc. The particularization meant here takes place on the one hand on the basis of internal structural differentiation - the particularization rests then on the internal structural differences between individuality structures - and on the other hand on the basis of external factors - the particularization then has to do with the enkaptic intertwinement of a certain structural type with that of another radical type for example. In the first case we speak of genotypes and in the second instance we speak of variability types. This distinction is essential for a clear insight in the field of investigation of sociology. Before we discuss this further, however, we must now mention that apart from the three 'kingdoms' which were mentioned earlier there are - as became evident already - other such 'kingdoms' or regna: animal formations (in the sense of products of formation by animals), human formations or formgivings, and also the radical types of

the societal structures, the social relationships.(4) In human life we find certain regna or kingdoms of scietal structures which possess the same radical functions e.g. the radical type of the ethically qualified and biotically founded relations, or the economically qualified but culturally founded structures of individuality, etc.(5). Under such a radical type we find then the particularization of the genotypes, e.g. within the regnum of the ethically qualified and biotically founded relationships we find marriage, family and Groszfamilie (relatives), etc. Variability types we find there where various kinds of enkapsis have taken place e.g. the family church of certain English noblemen, etc.

One preliminary remark must be made at this point about the so-called enpasis. By enkapsis is meant the intertwinement and interwovenness of essentially different individuality structures in such a manner that the identity of these structures, their sphere sovereignty, is left undisturbed and unhindered. There are various forms of enkapsis. It is obviously a different kind of enkapsis when we compare the close interwovenness of family and marriage (one side enkapsis) with the interwovenness of family and state (correlative enkapsis). Territorial enkapsis we find in the interwovenness of all societal structures in the state. Enkapsis does not turn individuality structures into the role of parts of other individuality structures: it is essential not to confuse the enkapsis relation with the part/whole relation!(5)

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1. The term 'kingdom', it be readily admitted, is not the most fortunate term one could possibly select. Dominion would sound better perhaps. Anybody for a better term?!

2. The matter whether we must speak of a human 'kingdom' is discussed by various authors. See e.g. J. Dengerink, op.cit., pp.182 ff.

3. The family structure will be discussed later in more detail.

4. see H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, op.cit., vol.III especially

5. The term 'enkapsis' may be seen as an illustration of the search for terms, which are not charged already with a variety of different meanings. As soon as one uses terms as objective, anticipations, modalities, functions, etc. one runs the risk of being misunderstood by those who do not take the time or the trouble to ask themselves what one means by such terms. Often one cannot get away from using such overly-sued and differently-charged terms, however. The selection of a term as enkapsis has this advantage that it compels the reader to ask what precisely is meant and that it, consequently, prevents misunderstanding. The disadvantage, namely that it concerns a term here which is really little used by scientists, is that it prevents the non-scientifically trained reader from following the line of the argument. Mathematics, for example, with its to the laymen highly peculiar language of symbols and formulas, has accepted this disadvantage. So have other disciplines, as economics, statistics, etc. We prefer the term enkapsis over interwovenness or intertwinnement because in these two last terms the idea of

sphere sovereignty is not necessarily implied: the
selection of a term as enkapsis enables us to include the
connotation of intertwinnement-without-obstruction-of-
sphere-sovereignty. The objection that sphere sovereignty
itself is already a theoretical concept we must firmly
reject as incorrect: what is expressed in the espression
sphere sovereignty is directly Biblical and consequently
pre-scientific even though the term may sound somewhat
'scientifically'.

THE SCIENCE OF SOCIOLOGY

We shal now first discuss what the nature of sociology as a
science really is. The discussion of various theories about the
nature of sociology we postpone till later. A concise summary
of sociology, its nature, its task, its field of study and
investigation, is an order at this point of our introduction
to give us an idea of where we are heading.

Sociology investigates the various constant and invariable
structures which are basic to all social life and which make
social life in all its variable forms possible. Sociology does
not only (studies, investigates, discusses etc. mean the same
thing in this connection, namely the theoretical opposition
of Gegenstand and analytical function in order to gain theore-
tical knowledge in the theoretical synthesis, cf. (1) discuss
the nature and structure of the social relationships in the
sense which became evident in preceding paragraphs but it
studies also the mutual coherence and relationship between the
various societal structures. It gives the theory of the norma-
tive social structures (structure types). As such sociology is
a special chapter of philosophy.(2) When treated separately
from other chapters of philosophy it is still necessary to
speak of Philosophical sociology for example or of Philosophy
of sciety.

This philosophical sociology must be distinguished from what
we can call the positive sociology. This positive sociology is
the theory of the positive social forms and investigates the
variable forms in which the invariable and constant structures
for social relationships realize themselves in the concrete
situation of temporal reality. It studies these positive,
variable forms (variable in connection with time and place etc.)
in their nature, their mutual relationship and intertwinnement
as well as influence, as outcome of human activity and under
the leadership of man's faith commitment and world and life
view. It asks the question of the coming into existence of
certain positive social forms and also the question of the
manner of their existence in given situations.

Positive sociology encompasses two special theoretical
activities. On the one hand sociography, that part of the
sociological enterprise which records, registers and describes
in sociolologically accurate and fitting terminologies, the
concrete sociologically relevant data in social life in this
temporal world. Positive sociology in narrower sense generalizes
synthesizes systematizes and orders the sociologically relevant
data, formulates the sociological terminology, and orders the
theoretical knowledge tus acquired in a systematic fashion.

What has been described so far can be captured under the
heading of General Sociology for there is also another field
of sociological studies which can be captured under the title
of Special Sociology. The Special sociology comprises the so-
called aspect sociologies. The aspect sociology directs its
theoretical attention to one of the various special realms of

life which we may call the cultural realms, the realm of morality, of art, of worship, of law, etc. Thus we can distinguish between as many aspect sociologies as there are cultural realms.

Still other field of sociological study must be mentioned here. In the first place that essential part of the science of sociology called Social History in which the sociologist investigates the social structures as such and in their mutual interwovenness going through a process of change and developement. To be distinguished from the Social History is the History of Sociology, the study of sociological thought, its contents and significance and its development. And finally there is the chapter of the methods of sociology in which the sociologist studies the methods peculiar for sociographic research, etc.etc.

A few remarks regarding the nature of the aspect sociology are in order at this point. That the aspect sociology directs its attention to a specific cultural realm does not mean namely that sociology suddenly takes it upon itself to study a specific modal aspect different from the social aspect. Obviously it directs its attention to that particular aspect but with the following qualifications. It studies the social relationships, the socially relevant actions and events which are qualified by that particular modal aspect. Thus it studies, for example, the peculiar nature of the social relationships of and in an economically qualified social relationship, a bank, a store, a factory etc. It asks itself thereby the question what the place and function is of this particular aspect in such relationships, actions and events. It goes even further and asks also the other question what the place and function is of this particular aspect in such social structures, events and actions which are obviously qualified by other modal aspects than this particular one. The aspect sociology cannot be satisfied with all this yet however. It investigates also the influence which a modally qualified cultural realm undergoes from the totality of society and, in reverse order, the influence which this realm exercies upon the social whole of society. It is obvious that confusion with regard to the precise nature of the aspect sociology easily leads to transgression against the legitimate order between the various sciences: the sociology of law can easily deteriorate in a somewhat awkward attempt on the part of the sociologist to play the student of law, etc.(3)

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1. cif. stencielled notes Philosophy 101

2. df. for example H. Dooyeweerd, op. cit. volume III, in which the structures of individuality of society are discussed in a philosophical manner. It is possible to discuss these in sociological studies obviously: many socioclosts in our country do just that! To treat them in sociological studies does not, however, make such treatment less philosophical! It must be clearly seen that Talcott Parsons, Merton, and a regiment of other sociologists in our country do, indeed, devote much time and space in their publications to philosophical discussions, unfortunately not always frankly admitting this.

3. Much of this amateurish treatment of topics which are really in the field of other disciplines by sociologists is constantly irritating American scientists in the other disciplines. The sociologists of our time run the risk, especially by writing endlessly on social problems and by discussing under that heading largely issues which are the immediate concern of other disciplines, of being called 'journalists'. Obviously there is nothing wrong with being a journalist ... if that's what one really is. Riesman's Lonely Crowd and Whyte's Organization Man, to mention just two studies, appear to walk precisely on the borderline: (By the way: in spite of all this, these two studies are certainly worth reading!)

NON-DIFFERENTIATED SOCIAL RELATIONS

Before we can begin our discussion of the various social relationships which we find and in which we find ourselves in our present day world it is necessary to reflect upon a peculiar phenomenon in created reality, namely differentiation. Dr R. Van Dijk gives the following characterization of a non differentiated social relationship:

> "A non differentiated social community is every social communal relationship which encompasses in the complex unity of its organization all or a larger number of real human communal relationships as its non-independent parts, and which as a homogeneous unity and totality exercises all the functions which in differentiated social types (types of social life) are exercised by separate relationships."(1)

He gives a number of illustrations which we shall briefly describe here because of their clarity.(2)

The Chinese patriarchical 'family' is not only more but also essentially different from the family which we know and in which we find ourselves today. It comprises all those persons who live in the family house and its connected buildings. These persons are the following: the patriarch himself, all who descend from him in the male line except the daughters and granddaughters etc. who marry into another 'family', the wife or wives of the patriarch, the wives of his sons and grandsons etc., and all the servants who live with the others in the family building(s).

What now qualifies this 'family'? Not the biotic relationship or the love relationship. The 'family' namely is first of all a religious community: it is the community of all those who revere the 'spirits' of the ancestors (who are, by the way, still present in the family house in the form of a 'soul'tablet' on the house altar. In this community of worship the patriarch is the priest and leader. This worship must not be regarded, however, as limited to such acts which we would recognize as such at first sight only: almost all rules of conduct, including those which we'd call economic or moral or even something else, and all customs and traditions must be interpreted as expressions of the family worship. Marriage, for example, is intended first of all to produce male descendants to the ...'family': the wife who does not have male children can be rejected without much ado. Apart from this religious qualification, the 'family' could also be qualified as a moral, a jural or an economic societal relationship. It is namely so that the 'family' is the unity of unconditional all-out family loyalty to the parents and fellow members of the 'family' in the sense of ethical love or troth. It is also a jurally qualified community for the patriarch has an unconditional right and authority over good and life of all

the members of the 'family': absolute jurisdiction. But let's
not forget the economic qualification: the 'family' is an
economic unity. No member of the 'family' works for himself
but work for the 'family' and aim at increasing the 'family'
possessions etc.

It is not possible to point out one specific leading
function or foundational function in this peculiar social
relationship called the 'family'. In other words: what is
lacking here is the differentiation between the various
functions or aspects which could be distinguished in our
search for the typical traits of this individuality structure.

The striking fact is now that the various individuality
structures which we can distinguish in our modern world rebel
in this non-differentiated societal unity against this non-
differentiated state of affairs. There are continuous
tensions within the 'family', for example tensions between the
daughters in law against the mother(s) in law in which we
can detect the rebellion of the marriage structure against the
structure of the 'family', etc. The position of supremacy
of the religious authority of the patriarch keeps the 'family'
what it is but when this authority breaks down (e.g. in
'secularization') the end of the 'family' comes in sight
(e.g. after missionary work, more intensive contact with
other nations, etc.)

A peculiar situation, in which we can see how complicated
things can become, is found among the Minankabau people of
Central Sumatra. Here we find the person of the matriarch
in stead of the patriarch. The family (called parut)
comprises all who descends along the female line from the
matriarch: the matriarch, her sons and daughters, the
children and grandchildren of her daughters, etc. Not in the
parut are the children of the sons! These namely descend in
the female line from another matriarch. The men to whom the
daughters are married are also excluded from the parut and
stay in their own parut but the children of these men remain
in the mother's parut again. The conflict between the social
parut unity and the family structure shows itself for example
in the struggle about the inheritance of the property of the
man: according to the parut regulations these goods must
fall to his sister's children (that way they stay in the
parut) and not to his own children. That this makes for
continuous trouble is obvious.

Non differentiated relationships can be found also in the
old village structure. The dessa on the island of Java or Bali
gives a good illustration. The dessa or village community is
the societal relationship of all those who are connected
with the village territory, a piece of ground where the huts
or houses are, the fields closeby and a piece of forest or
jungle. The dessa now does not know what we'd call private
property as far as this territory is concerned. The dessa
people work the grounds etc. for the village community: even
there where can be distinguished between what the one 'owns'
in land or fields the rule is that the other people of the
dessa have an unchallenged right to a large percentage of the

profits. Yet, the dessa is not only an economic unity but a
totality relation: e.g. homogeneous religious community,
originally orientated to the worship of the ancestors who
established the village community and worked the ground first;
homogeneous moral community expressing itself in mutual care
and common loyalty to established rules under the leadership
of the 'elders' of the village; homogeneous community of a
jural nature: village-head as primus inter pares, and village
officials for specific functions for the whole, forming also
the village 'court' and village 'policy' - setters. In one
typical set of rules, the adat, tradition etc. was unified
as economic, religious, social, etc. village order.(3)

The examples can be multiplied. Interesting especially
are the studies about the social structurations of the
medieval guilds and the medieval towns which in their own
way show the same non differentiated characteristics. But
not only the far past or the far East gives us examples of
a non differentiated situation. Many 'left overs' can still
be found in our so-called modern society.(4) There is a
significant difference, however, between a situation in our
modern differentiated society in which a certain societal
relation assumes a kind of exclusive leadership over a number
of other societal relationships and attempts to take over
its functions in each case, e.g. a state taking over the
function of worship community, business community, etc., and
the so-called primitive society. The difference can be seen
when we take a close look at the internal structures. In the
modern society we find societal relationships which exercise
specific functions which are indeed typical for such relation-
ships: their very structure is directed to the exercise of
such functions. It is true indeed that the modern state can
'go into business', e.g. by setting up its own publishing or
telephone company. Such a company remains, however, in its
inner structure a company, in spite of its connection with
the state. In other words, the differentiation stays even
though legitimate questions may be asked regarding the task of
the state and its limitations. In the primitive society things
are different. There we find that a differentiation has not
taken place to the degree it has taken place in our present
day world. A certain, rather peculiar societal constellation
exists which as constellation exercises all or many of the
functions at once. Structurally this means that the various
functions or aspects have not 'parted ways', have not, to be
more precise, been opened up. The historical process of
differentiation, as has been made clear by Dr Dooyeweerd, makes
the difference here. The non differentiated societal constel-
lation can be understood as existing only on the basis of non
differentiated authority on the part of those who hold power
in the primitive constellation. Differentiation requires
power formation in such realms which after differentiation
will be opened up: such power formation is prevented in the
primitive society and this makes for the tendency to slow down
the process of differentiation(5) In the so-called primitive
society it is ultimately one individuality structure positivation

which fulfills the leading role: its leader holds the non
differentiated power. In the concrete primitive societies
which we must not forget the essentially important role which
sin and apostasy play: such a primitive society transgresses
against the principle of sphere sovereignty.(6) Cultural
differentiation breaks through the primitive constellation.(7)

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1. Don't blame R. Van Dijk for the translation: it seems to me
   that what Van Dijk said is reflected better by this
   somewhat awkward translation than by a smooth running
   one.

2. R. Van Dijk, op. cit., pp. 101 ff.

3. The word 'adat' can function as a useful technical term which
   can be applied to other but similar situations. Many
   European sociologists do so indeed.

4. Think of the European and Asiatic towns and villages with
   their old mores and customs which, although no longer
   fully understood by those who keep them, still are
   enforced.

5. emphasis upon 'slow down; the process is not brought to
   stand-still.

6. the term 'primitive' is highly unsatisfactory; we use it
   for lack of better one, but we wish to underline that the
   term makes only for misunderstanding

7. constellation: the peculiar manner in which in the primitive
   or non-differentiated society the structures are folded
   together.

CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Every attempt at classification of social relationships must begin with an open eye for the law of God under which social relationships function in their own, typical way. Failure to recognize God's law and law order can only result in confusion and an essentially distorted view of the social reality.(1) Division and distinction between social relationships will consequently have to be made in accordance with what we have found regarding the normative structures of the social relationships. In the first place we must thus recognize a structural functional criterion as the criterion of distinction, e.g. we distinguish the social structures which are qualified by the economic aspect from those which are qualified by the ethical aspect, etc. and also those relationships which are structurally founded in the biotic aspect from those structurally founded in the cultural aspect, e.g. the family from the labour organization, etc. We remember, however, that structurally there was another, peculiar trait, namely the interwovenness or enkapsis, which plays an extremely significant role. Enkaptically interwoven individuality structures may never be confused with imaginary social structurations, e.g. a state church remains a church, in spite of its connection with the state, Another structural peculiarity we find when we take notice of the dofference between such social relationships in which persons are joined together as members of a whole of a unique identity which exists, aften, to a certain degree independent of the change of joining persons, e.g. a state, a church, etc. (We call these societal constellations communities (2) Structurally there is again another distinction necessary at this point between communities, namely between non-authoritative and authoritative communities.(3) On the one hand and such social relationships in which the persons or societal relationships are not joined and arranged together into such a communal whole but find themselves with the others (resp. other societal groupings) in a relation of co-ordination. This coordination can be of variable form: cooperation, opposition, neutrality, assistence, etc. We call these societal structurations from now on further free societal relationships. Thus we find three main groups of societal relationships using this last criterion: the authoritative communities, the non authoritative communities, and free societal relationships. This distinction is of such significance, that it is worth while to reflect a little more on the nature of each of these three groups.

The authoritative communities are collectivities which possess their own, internal communal character, their own inner solidarity and unity which gives them a manner of existing which is maintained regardless of a certain degree of variability of the persons who are the members of this community, and which have structurally built in them as far as their inner and life is concerned a relationship of authority and subjection, be

it that this communal authority is exercised in autoritarian
manner or in a more communal fashion. The non-authoritative
community differs from the authoritative community in the
authority and subjection relationship. In the discussion of
the circle of relative this point will be stressed more. The
free societal relationships can be described more elaborately
as externalrelations in which people etc. function in coordinated
correlation in which we do not find a unity of solidarity
character but in which we find a differentiated multiplicity.
Authority relationships tith corresponding subjection
relationships are lacking in these structuration. Individual
differences in age, status, position, influence etc. have their
effect in these societal relationships and accentuate the
individual diversity in societal relations but do not work in the
direction of integration or unification.(4)

Dr R. Va. Dijk has pointed out that the distinction between
communities and free societal relationships is only a rather
general one yet, requiring itself a more precise and articulate
subdivison, illustrating this by referring to the following
possibilities for a community: a community can be natural or
organized, simple or complex, encompassing more realms of life or
specific and related to only one sector of human life.(5) Van
Dijk also gives a preliminary draft of classification of societal
relationships from which we gain a good insight into this
matter of classification. With a few omissions and a correction
here and there we take over his 'chart' on the next stencilled
page.(6)

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1. The difficulty of classifying social relationships without
   insight into the normative structures of the social relation-
   ships becomes obvious when one goes to the various handbooks
   for sociology. There we find either much confusion and
   certainly not a trace of agreement on the criterion to be
   used for classification.

2. The term 'community' must be distinguished sharply from what
   the same term means in, for example, the School of Human
   Ecology. We shall use the term exclusively in the sense
   indicated in the text.

3. One of the most influential studies which must be mentioned
   here is Ferdinand T"onnies, Community and Society, Gemeinschaft
   und Gesellschaft (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963)
   The book was written by Tönnies in 1887 in German and, even
   though it was not translated before 1957 into English it has
   exersised an influence which can hardly be overestimated. In
   other words: a real 'must' for the student of sociology
   today. cf. Dooyeweerd's discussion of this book in op. cit.
   pp. 184 ff.

4. ...unless of course, they are such that they are experienced
   as 'giving the good example' etc.

5. Van Dijk, op. cit., p. 49

6. idem, pp. 52-53.

Structural/ functional criterion:	authoritative communities:	non-author. communities:	free societal relationships:
'natural'	(family)	(marriage, relatives)	(wider circle of relatives)
non-differentiated	(clan, tribe)	(unorganized tribe)	('total' enemies in tribal war)
DIFFERENTIATED:			
pistical	(church, political party)	(sectarian group)	(clergy-layman, brother-brother)
ethical	(society for care of the poor)	(hospital personnel)	(donor-receiver stepfather-stepchild friends)
jural	(state)	(fellow directors of jail, jury, nation)	(judge-accused lawyer-client)
aesthetic	(choral society)	(choir, band)	(art public, concert audience)
economic	(labour organization, stock exchange)	(stockholders)	(buyer-seller competitors, employer/employee)
social	(tennis club, student organization)	(fans)	(competing hockey teams, coach/players)
symbolical	(propaganda organization)	(correspondents)	(signal giver/ signal receiver)
cultural	(ships crew, group of fighter planes)	(research team)	(boss/workman)
analytical	(Academy of Science)	(faculty)	(professor/ student, debaters in sc. debate)

<u>NOTA BENE</u> :

The various individual social structurations will be
discussed more elaborately in a different context. At this
point it is sufficient when we limit ourselves to a brief
description of a few of the most striking characteristics of
each of the main groupings of societal structures.

The natural communities and free societal relationships
all show a typical foundation in the biotic aspect and a typical
ethical qualification in the end function. Marriage, for
example, can be described as the bi-unitary, permanent
(i.e. for the life time of the persons who form the community;
death of one of the two persons terminates the existence of
the relationship) bond between a man and a woman, structurally
founded in the biotic aspect of love, namely in the sexual
union, and qualified by what specifically must be called
conjugal love. The family, to give another example, can be
described as the intimate community of love (in the sense of
family love) between parents and children, structurally founded
in the biotic aspect of life, namely the genetic relationship,
resp. blood relationship between the members of the community.
Authority and subjection relationships are built in into the
family in the narrower sense: the parents have the positivation
task and authority regarding the family-norm.The circle of
relatives encompassing parents, children (brothers and sisters)
and grandchildren is a non-authoritative communal relationship,
founded in the biotic aspect and also ethically qualified.

An example of communal relationships not founded in the
biotic aspect of life but in the cultural aspect is the state.
Van Dijk describes the state as the communal relationship of
the public societal order of government (public authorities)
and subjects (citizens) on the basis of the monopoly of the
power of the sword over a given cultural territory, in accordance
with the norm of the harmonization of the private interests
into a just harmony in the care over the public interest in the
sense of justice.(1) Van Dijk describes another differentiated
communal relationship, the church, as follows: the church is
the faith and cultu community of Christ believers, based as
community upon the demant of God's Word revelation, in the
unity of creed and worship (creed in the sense of the action
of profession) and under the leadership of instituted offices
to the administration of the Word (and sacraments) and to the
service of mutual love.(2) His description of the business
enterprise or business is : the communal relationship in which
labour and capital (technical apparatus) are rationally
organized for the production of useful goods and services.(3)
Of the group of communal relationships to which church, state
and business (in the described sense) belong must be said,
according to Van Dijk and Dooyeweerd, that they are institutional
communities: they encompass the temporal human existence
in an intesive fashion permanently or at least for a long
period of time regardless of man's individual decision. The
non-institutional communities are characterized by the
voluntary nature of one's participation in them. To the last
group belong communal relationships as societies for various

ends and aims, clubs, organizations etc.(4)
    Examples of the free societal relationships have been
given in the chart.(5)

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1. Van Dijk, _Vrijheid en Gebondenheid_, (Wageningen: Zomer&
                                        Keuning,n.d.) pp.86 ff.

2. id., pp. 51 ff.

3. id., pp. 63 ff.

4. id., pp. 104 ff.

5. We have followed mainly Van Dijk in the chart on the
   previous page but have made a few changes which we thought
   would increase the clarity.

ENKAPSIS AND INTEGRATION

Before we can discuss the various individual societal
relationships in greater detail we must first ask ourselves
another question. All of created reality is and functions under
the grip of the law of God. All social forms also are under
this law. They function, each in their own unique and peculiar
fashion, in all the law spheres and possess, consequently, all
modal aspects. One of these aspects is the social aspect or
modality. The meaning of the social law sphere shows itself
now also in the universal intertwinement and interwovenness
of all social forms and relationships. The question we ask is
now what precisely the nature of this interwovenness of the
social forms and phenomena.

To answer this question correctly it is necessary to
distinguish clearly betweenthe relation which exists between a
whole and its parts on the one hand and the relation between
individual structures, which essentially are structural norms,
and individual structures which are joined together in such
a manner that the various structural norms are essentially
retained in their position of norms. The term with which we
point out this last relationship of interwovenness must not
give any suggestion in the direction of the whole-parts
relation. We use therefore the name enkapsis. To be precise:
we shall use the term enkapsis exclusively for the described
form of interwovenness and employ the term integration for
that process/activity which leads to various forms of enkapsis,
the intertwining itself.

Enkaptic structural interwovenness is a unique kind of
intertwinnement. The social relationships which function in
such an interwovenness have and retain their own internal
structural law which is not eliminated or paralyzed as a
result of the enkapsis. The enkaptic intertwinement does not
constitute a brand new normative societal structure with its
own structural law which would replace the structural laws of
the interwoven societal structures. We speak in this connection
of the sphere sovereignty of the individuality structures.
Enkapsis can be described then as the kind of interwovenness
whereby the sphere sovereignty of the interwoven structures
is retained.

In the primitive situation we find that one societal
communal relationship has assumed the leadership in an eclusive
fashion in such a manner that the authority within this
community is non-differentiated and the community exercises
functions which essentially must be exercised in and through
specific and typical societal constellations. This situation
of non differentiation must not be regarded as an example of
enkapsis for it is rather the relation of whole and parts, even
though the expression whole/parts would not really be adequate
to make this primitive state of non differentiation thoroughly
clear.(1) Yet, enkapsis is never fully absent even in the
primitive situation: marriage and family are not totally

absorbed in the non differentiated community, but are enkaptically
interwoven with the clan, tribe, village community etc., and
also the institutional community of organization of labour
and 'capital', fully embedded asi it usually may be in the
community of non differentiated nature, is not always
necessarily simply a part of the whole but shows already
something of the enkaptic intertwinement. Even the primitive
community knows its free societal relationships and these also
are enkaptically interwoven in the non differentiated community.
It is therefore incorrect to suppose that certain communal
relationships, e.g. the family, function as the foundation
of all other, i.e. free societal relationships: communal and
free societal relationships even in the non differentiated
community are interwoven in a correlative enkaptic manner.
(cf. marriage and family, communities which are foundationally
enkaptic interwoven: no family without marriage but cf. the
institution of marriage in paradise: the first marriage did not
rest upon being born from another marriage) This correlative
enkapsis must be recognized over against theories which state
that all societal relationships, e.g. the free societal rela-
tionships of and the non-institutional communities, flow
forth from the natural relationships of marriage and family.
To summarize: a. there is a correlative enkaptic interwovenness
of the biotically founded, natural communal relationships with
the free societal relationships: the latter do not come forth
in a genetic way from the former but possess their own
individuality structure, their own structural norm. b. the
non-institutional communal relationships, however, can come up
only on the basis of unfolded, differentiated free societal
relationships; they are enkaptically interwoven with these,
therefore, in a foundational manner; c. the unfolded institu-
tional communities, e.g. the state, etc., are enkaptically
interwoven in a correlative manner with the unfolded free
societal relationships: the state is not the origin in a
genetic sense of such free societal relationships, for example,
vice versa. It is essential to see these forms of enkapsis and
their peculiar nature to understand clearly the cultural
differentiation process. But so far we have only directed our
attention to the structures of the societal relationships in
the enkpasis: the next question to be answered is now in what
manner the enkapsis is executed, realized. It is at this
point that we must think of the integration therefore. How
does integration take place?
   We must keep in mind that societal structures as structural
norms or normative principles require positivation, formation,
forngiving by man. It is this forngiving which provides us
with the clue to the understanding of the process of
intertwining and integration. The form giving and positivation
can only be done namely in such a manner that the unbreakable
coherence of internal and external structural moments of
functions is expressed. A few illustrations can clarify this.
A marriage can function only concretely and positively according
to its internal structure principle in our present day society
when and if the external functions of the marriage are fulfilled
also, e.g. in the registration of the marriage in the state

community, the church community, in the circle of friends, in
the legal responsibilities as to shared properties, etc.
Another illustration is provided by the modern forms of
traffic. The inner structure of traffic is indeed of the
nature of a free societal relationship. This inner structural
principle can only be given positive form, in other words
there can only be traffic in concreto, if the free societal
relationship structure is enkaptically interwoven with the
authoritative communal relationship structure of an organized
nature, e.g. in such communal relationship forms which are, as
a business enterprise, providing the means of transportation,
bus companies, car producers, etc. In other words, the enkapsis
is brought about, beings to express itself, in the giving of
positive form to structural norm principles.(2)
    Van Dijk distinguishes between various kinds of integration
and his distinctions are interesting enough to describe them
here briefly. After having asked attention for the two main
tendencies in our modern social life, differentiation and
integration, he states that three aspects of integration
require reflection: a. structural interwovenness. b. unity and
direction of norms in society, and. c. man, group and mankind
as integration factor.(3) In the structural integration the
distinction is made of vertical and horizontal integration.
Vertical integration is there where intertwinnement takes
place from the activity of certain authoritative communities,
i.e. under the leadership of organized positions of power. The
intertwining takes place in this case from the authority in
the community over the members and parts of the community.
Horizontal integration takes place in the area of correlation:
in the horizontal contact between free societal relationships
and realms of relationships. In the primitive society vertical
integration is almost exclusive even though horizontal
integration is never fully absent. Horizontal integration
beings to play a much more prominent role as soon as the
primitive community loses its non differentiated character
in the social intercourse and contact with other, possibly
larger, social constellations: the immediate result of such
contact is the expansion of the free societal relationships
between the members of the previously isolated communities,
and also between the communities themselves, e.g. in market,
etc. The ensuing horizontal integration makes for an ever
wideing interwovenness. For example in what we today know as
the world market, international fashions, international unions,
international churches, United Nations, etc. Vertical
integration is not absent in this differentiated situation.
The United Nations is an illustration of political vertical
integration especially, and the Roman Catholic Church or the
Word Council of Churches also. Van Dijk points out that in
our situation of the 20th century it is still possible to
speak of the nation as the territorial enkapsis of great
significance. To be precise in our terms: the state community
integrates vertically in its territory into a territorial
enkapsis, but this does not mean that people and their social
relationships now would become parts of the state: on the
contrary. The national is the territorial enkaptic interwoven-
ness of the totality of all the persons and relationships on

the territory over which the state, as one societal relationship
alongside of many others, reaches out in its typical manner,
(nation to be taken here in the sense of national society)

Attention for the norms and complexes of norms in society
gives more insight yet in the integration process. (what was
discussed above in the form giving or the positivation of
structural principles) Van Dijk stresses especially the point
that every societal relationship and every form of social
constellation is regulated by a typical norm complex, peculiar
to that particular relationship. In the totality of social life
we find therefore an extremely large number of norms and
complexes of norms. Every social relationship type possesses and
positivizes its own norms but in the positivizing it is only
relatively unlimited and enjoys only limited opportunity to
initiative: there is always the other societal relationship and
its positivations within the same territorial enkapsis and there
is always the given positive forms from the preceding generation,
forcing people to realize, even in the simple matter of setting
up for example a chess club, that they never make a really first
beginning! The norm complexes are thoroughly interwoven, keep
each other, as it were, in balance and, at least to a certain
degree, in harmony. What this means can become more clear yet
when we now also look at man as the central point of reference
in the integration. After all, it is man whose relationships
we find here in their enormous multiplicity, and it is man who
positivizes the norm principles. Especially in his positivations
of the norms will his place in the integration show itself. Man's
positivations are not simply the result of a cold mechanical
exercise but in all his positivizing man is continuously
directed by the human religious central point, his heart. The
direction and the basis choice of his heart will irresistibly
drive him to the harmonization attempt of the norms and
positivations in such a fashion that these come in one line with
the direction of his heart. It is simply impossible for him to
resign to a situation in which he follows one direction in the
one relationship and another in another relationship. It must
be remembered thereby that man is not an 'individual'. Man
himself stands never alone, not even in his deepest religious
decision. The 'individual' is the dream of the distorted
humanistic mind. In his religious choice he seeks the root of
his existence. It may be that this root is found in the choice
of apostasy but even there man cannot become the 'individual'
he wishes to be: to be independent and to be a real 'individual'
is essentially impossible. In the very integration proces in
our world we are confronted therefore by the reality of the
antithesis between Christ and apostasy. It is one of the
dangers of the theoritic-thought-has-neutrality belief in
sociology that this antithesis is no longer recognized and
that it is not seen that by that very token the peculiar nature
of the concrete integration process in our society is radically
misunderstood.(4)

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1. cf. the remark made earlier as to the term 'enkapsis'

2. Obviously this does not mean that enkapsis would be some sort of formal or neutral process! Integration processes display as such the influence of integration ideals, which, in our opinion, are essentially part of cultural ideals.

3. Van Dijk, Mens en Medemens, op. cit., pp. 137 ff.

4. Obvious examples can be found in, e.g. Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963) and William H. Whyte, The Organization Man (Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), just to mention two widely read 'bestsellers'.

S O C I O G R A P H Y

Sociography is the organized and systematic attempt to give a theoretical (i.e. qualified by the theoretical attitude of thought and abstractingly interested in a specific modal aspect of reality) description of the positive social structurations in created reality. It is essential to see that no sociography can be undertaken (which scientifically, at least, makes sense) unless in constant realization of the fact that every scientific enterprise requires pre-scientific starting points. The sociologist who recognizes the law order of created reality will look for other and different matters and use a different criterion in his selection of what is indeed sociologically and sociographically relevant than his colleague who believes in the neutrality postulate for example. One who believes in the genetic origin of social relationships of present day society, namely from what we have called the natural relationships, will probably use his sociographic methods to derive from what he 'finds' in the primitive situation and from what he 'finds' in modern society the 'norms' (which then will only enjoy a very limited, both in time and geographically, validity) for social life.

It is a good start for anyone in sociography to use various means to familiarize oneself with the concrete situation in the society which one wishes to study. After all, sociography makes abstractions and it is a good thing to know from what one is abstracting! Still, looking around and familiarizing oneself i healthy but not scientific yet. Besides, which sociographer, looking about in an automobile factory, gets more than a somewhat vague taste of what the athmosphere is in the factory. A thousand significant details will escape his attention: how many of those must be know and how many can he simply disregard and what is the criterion to be used in this choice? One who wishes to study a village does well to look around in the village but he does better not to ask too many questions before he knows precisely what questions to ask! And, to determine the right questions is sociographically one of the most important matters. In this paragraph we take a brief look at a number of the most striking facets of sociographic methods, and we do this in a schematic way which can serve us best in the class discussions.

A. ORIENTATION

    a. the danger of asking questions; people give 'pleasing answers' or 'interesting' answers which confuse the actual aim of the sociographer; only harvest: some people said this or that...

    b. use of existing descriptions, diaries, almanacs, year books, travel guides, newspapers, records of government agencies and private businesses (insurance etc.) novels; films, libraries, collections, musea, etc.;

c. journalistic sources; (journalism: publicity, periodicity,
   commercial aim, suggestive power, superficiality, lack
   of source references, mirror function of public taste,
   apodictical, undocumented) registers social climate
   changes;

d. other sociographical studies, monographies, etc.; the
   necessity of critical analysis of aim, plan, method,
   source material and terminology of such studies;

B. THE METHOD OF COMPARING

a. comparison in sociography is legitimate only if the
   specific and typical nature of comparing is recognized:
   comparing presupposes comparability which is nothing
   but a placing alongside each other of individual
   structuration or social phenomena with full recognition
   of their function under the various modal aspects of
   the law; thus a comparison can be made between the
   manner in which two or more parts of created reality
   function in the same modal aspect, or, for example,
   between the manner in which one individual structure
   functions in the one law sphere with the manner in which
   it functions in the other, or, for example, between two
   human positivations of the same normative structural
   principle, e.g. of marriage, etc.;
b. comparing in this attitude and this manner in sociography
   seeks to gain clear insight into a given socially relevant
   situation, e.g. a village, a society, etc. by pinpointing
   its relatively unique and characteristic traits;
   similarity and difference with other comparable situations
   namely lead to the search for the specific factors and
   forces which determine (co-determine) such peculiar
   functioning under the law order as is found in this
   given social situation;
c. in the method of comparing it is esential to know where
   and what the comparability lies and also to understand
   what comparing sociographically is: the factors of
   social place, social identity, social form, etc. must be
   seen, and it must be remembered that comparing can only
   be done intelligently if only one factors in the comparison
   is variable during the comparing procedure; the
   positivation of the marriage structural principle among
   the Australian aborigines in their primitive society
   cannot really be compared with the positivation of the
   structural principle of a free societal relationship,
   e.g. the salesman/customer, in Los Angeles in 1968; in
   general must be remembered that comparison of this
   nature can take place: $N - L - T' / T''$, whereby N stands
   for Norm principle, L for location (social place or
   location is not identical with geographical place!), and
   T for (social) time; more complex comparisons are
   possible indeed but only as compositions of this basic
   rule, e.g. $N - L' / L'' - T' / T''$ is possible via two
   preceding steps, etc.

d. comparisons do not themselves form ground for other
conclusions than that some specific phenomena (often can)
go hand-in-hand; for example the following steps lead to
an intriguing question: N' - N'' - T - L and Na' - Na'' -
T - L bring N'/N'' comp. Na'/Na''; if N is a certain
moment in the social structuration of the church community,
e.g. membership of a given church or denomination, and
Na is a certain moment in the social relationship of the
family, e.g. births of children, it is possible to
compare the differences between churches (one church N'
another church N'') with the number of births in the
one church (na') with the number of births in another
church (na''); such a comparison stimulates our curiosity
but can, obviously, not lead to hasty generalizing
conlusions! our curiosity is sharpened, however, and
specifically directed to certain phenomena.

C. STATISTICAL METHOD

a. it is possible in sociographic pursuit to trace a large
number of similar data, i.e. descriptions of socially
relevant phenomena of the same category as for example the
birth of children in officially and publicly recognized
marriages in a precisely limited area at a given date
plus the same number at different dates, etc. (it is
essential to see that not the real live birth event with
all its unique, life changing consequences for specific
families etc. etc. is being taken up in the sociological
description but only one abstracted moment of it, namely
e.g. the increasing effect which the birth of a child
exercises upon the number of members of a family, of a
church, etc.) the collected data now can be arranged in
systematic order in such a manner that it becomes
possible to arouse our theoretic curiosity for certain
possible connections, factors etc. which co-determine
specific social phenomena;
b. Statistics is the methodical arrangement of masses of
such 'data' with the aim of tracing possible connections
and relations which (in this case) are socially
significant; for example: the connection or relation
between certain forms of positivation of the marriage
structure, e.g. under influence of Roman Catholic ideology,
and in a differentiated situation as can be found in the
United States in the post-war years, with various
structurations of free societal relationships in a given
(e.g. village-) society; e.g. political organizations
and e.g. the free societal relationships of television
producers / television viewers can be traced in their
connectedness; etc. In other words: statistics helps us
to see something of the social 'roads' along which certain
'forces' can and do exercise their influences;
c. the case-study is the counter part of the statistical
method; here the interest and attention is being
concentrated upon 'the case'; the abstraction which the
sociographer makes is different from the abstraction in
the statistical method: the socially relevant aspects

are abstracted from one particular situation (e.g. a
given family) and seen in their mutual coherence,
relation, influence, etc; statistics and case-study can
not really do without one another's services in
sociography;

d. the matter of the dependability (probability) of the
statistical materials is an extremely important one;
in general it can be said that few things are as
independable as statistical materials: among the causes:
collectors of date use different criteria, are unequally
accurate, collect at different times, make human mistakes,
make too many guesses, etc. and for the collection of data a
large number of different methods (interviews,
questionnaires etc.) is being used which makes it almost
impossible to secure precise ultimate outcomes, etc.;
(a good example is the double count of farm women who
often are being counted as 'housewives' but also as
'help on the farm' of 'employed on the farm')

e. the dependability of a sample (a limited collection of
data to gain insight into a total situation) increases
with the square root of the number of cases used in the
sample: the extent of the sample must be increased
25 times to insure an increase in dependability
(probability) of 5 times; it is obvious that usually
financial and other limitations prevent (have prevented)
accurate figures and that inaccurate figures consequently
are being used in most available 'statistics' which
companies, universities, etc. provide; sociography makes
use to eliminate some of the independable figures of the
formula of the standard deviation; e.g. the average of
the number of births in a given situation or constellation
obscures and juggles away the individual deviations but
the standard deviation formula gives a better insight:

(the sigma is the symbol for standard deviation; the $\bar{x}$ is
the average, e.g. of the number of births, the x is the

indication of each individual case, e.g. so many births
in this family of the village, the capital sigma the sum
total of the deviations, i.e. all terms x, while n is
total number of cases used; note: the(n-1) rule does not
have be used here necessarily.)

NOTE: for similar formula's used in sociographical work,
     for methods of 'mapping' and 'charting' the
   collected data, etc. see the separate stencil
     concerned.

D. DATA COLLECTING

a. The so-called interview is in sociography the conversation
   between sociographer and others in which the former, after
   a set plan and using specific techniques, seeks to be
   provided with that information which is relevant for his
   description of a given situation. It must be distinguished
   from the lists of questions which are used in certain
   sociographic investigations (lists or schedules which are
   filled in by the sociographer himself) and from the
   questionnaires (lists of questions formulated and arranged
   in a specific manner) which are being filled out by
   persons without the direct personal assistance of the
   sociographer. Both methods require a great deal of
   precision and accuracy on the part of the sociographer
   (formulating the questions is a highly intricate job!)
   and the probability of ending up with data which have a
   high degree of inaccuracy is great even if the greatest
   care has been taken to be as precise as possible. About
   some of the techniques, see separate stencil. It is
   esential to analyze the results which various sociographers
   (see the various journals and sociographical studies)
   claim from a serious analysis of their techniques and
   methods: research results which are presented without a
   detailed account of the methodsemployed are consequently
   totally wothless in sociology.
b. It is possible to study sociographically a given 'situation'
   by distinguishing between different parts of a certain
   relevant phenomenon, e.g. one who wishes to study the
   particular traits of Trinity College in the setting of the
   American Colleges will no doubt study a variety of more
   or less isolated matters as for example the study habits
   of the Trinity students, the teaching methods of the
   Trinity faculty, the use of leisure time (if any...) on
   the Trinity Campus, etc. The outcome of each of these
   separate studies is indicative for the whole, We use here
   the term indication. Indication must be distinguished from
   substitution of relevant matter for another. By substitution
   we understand the following. Imagine one has to study the
   manner in which Trinity students spend their leisure
   time. Precise information regarding, for example, playing
   pool and table tennis might be hard to find. But, records
   could possibly be found regarding participation in other
   activities which give information of the kind one is after:

this or that activity is then studied as a substitute for
the other activities. A third method, to be distinguished
from the two mentioned so far, is the sample method. This
is also called the method of representation: the results of
investigation of a limited number of cases is proposed,
under certain limitations and with certain conditions,
as representative for all cases.

The following pages give a few illustrations of how
collected materials can be graphically presented.

POPULATION PYRAMIDS

	1910		1920		difference	percentage
	male	female	male	female	1910-1920	
neighbourhood A	200	240				
- B	116	284				
-	477	667				
-	108	403				
-	142	116				
village A	total	total	total	total	total	

districts of village A

income 5000-7500

- 2500-5000

- 0-2500

M A R R I A G E

ORIENTATION

Among the many societal relationships in which man finds himself marriage holds a position of prominence. This does not mean that it appears to be immediately clear to everyone what marriage precisely is. In sociology, where the question is asked what really the internal structure of the marriage relationship is, we find much uncertainty. One popular textbook gives the following vague description:

> "Marriage is a special type of person-to person relationship, involving mutual right and duties... The marital relation-ship obtains between two <u>individuals</u> of opposite sex who have, in effect, made a <u>contract</u> between them that they shall henceforth, or <u>until the contract is abrogated</u>, fulfill toward each other <u>certain obligations</u>. The particular obligations which they assume will <u>depend on the folkways</u> of the tribe in question, but each tribe will have a more or less standard set of prescriptions concerning marital conduct which it will enforce upon those of its members who enter wedlock. The most common requirement, is, of course, that of cohabitation, and marriage is often regarded primarily as a means of regularizing sex relations. Other marital duties are concerned with child-bearing and child rearing, economic support, and exchange of affection."(1)

Robert Bierstedt makes a number of remarks which throw a peculiarly strong upon what social scientists nowadays appear to regard as intelligent discussion of the nature of marriage:

> "Male and female created he them. The male, Adam, he created first, and then, as the story goes, he studied his product, noticed certain imperfections in it, and murmured to himself, 'I think I can do better'. Whereupon he created Eve. Whether Eve was 'better' or not is a question on which both Adam and Eve doubtless had an opinion, and their descendants have been arguing it eversince. At least there is general agreement that Adam was created first and Eve second. Thus woman, made of a spare part, is God's second sex or possibility, as the philosopher Nietzsche once pu it, God's second mistake. In any event we have two sexes - not one, not three - and this is one of the brute facts of the universe. It is also, of course, one of the brute facts of society.... Although clearly never planned for the purpose, the family may serve to sanction the sexual claims of women that they would be unable to assert for themselves in a purely biological world. We do not mean to imply that women are devoid of offensive sexual weapons - quite the contrary - but only that sex is a right which they could not demant if there were no such institutions as marriage. Marriage recognizes

the reciprocal obligations of both sexes, confers a
legitimacy of expression on the part of the male, and
sanctions a claim to expression on the part of the
female. The failure to consummate a marriage by having
sex relations constitues a ground for annulment for
either spouse; each has a right to sex relations with
the other. But it is a right that, in the absence of
marriage, a male could assert by force and a female
could not. The institution of marriage, in short,
gives societalrecognition to the sexual needs of the
female."(2)

A third quotation, from a well-known study of the family by
some of the most prominent sociologists of our day, may serve to
illustrate not only some of the existing confusion but also
some of the peculiar language used in sociological circles
sometimes:

"Within the new familial collectivity the marital sub-
collectivity has the system-goal of optimizing
'tension-management- or 'gratification' of the
partners. Since it is a collectivity, however, there
must be both a differentiation of roles and the
involvement of at least two primary need-disposition
components on each side. Furthermore, as a system, we
suggest its differentiation must involve one or both
of the two elementary axes of differentiation, power
and instrumental-expressive. These considerations
give us clues to the motivational composition of the
marital roles. They constitute derivates of both sides
of the early mother-child-love-dependency relationship.
The differences from the genetically prior case derive
from two major considerations: first that the power
relationship is drastically altered and second that
now, instead of monopolizing the total personalities
of either, the components most directly involved in the
marital relation are only part of the derivatives from
these respective sources. ... The 'genital' erotic
relationship is clearly a focal symbolic factor. The
erotic need-disposition,..,is at this stage characterized
by performance or achievement orientation, by
universalism, by affectivity of course, and byspecificity
It is the prototype of 'pleasure' gratification and
important because perhaps the most generalized form of
it. It is, according to our 'genealogy', a derivative
of maternal 'care' via 'nurturance' via a universalistic
pleasure-motive. But at the same time the marital
relationship involves 'commitment' to alter as person,
'acceptance' or in this sense love of alter as co-member
of a solidarity collectivity. The 'pleasure' motive
therefore is interdependent in the personalities of both
parties with the love motive. This latter is a derivative
of the autonomy motive at the mother-child stage, via
'security' and particularistic acceptance and finally
its ascriptive sub-type, ... The fact that sex is
constitutive of (marriage) suggests that of the two

primary axes the instrumental-expressive one here
takes precedence over that of power. From this point
of view, though the general functions of this
collectivity in the superordinate systems are
expressive the more instrumental role in the sub-system
is taken by the husband, the more expressive one by the
wife... the husband is... in the first instance
'giver-of-care', or pleasure, and secondarily the giver
of love, whereas the wife is primarily the giver of
love and secondarily the giver of love or pleasure. The
husband role, that is, is prototypically closer to the
'mother' role, that of the wife to the 'child' role.
But both are mother and child to each other... When
seen in this context the symbolism of the act of
sexual intercourse is striking. The man... is thus
acting in the mother role. The woman...is acting in
the role of the loving child. At the same time, however,
the obverse aspect of the role is also symbolised.(3)

We are, in sociology, not only confronted with various
v i e w s of the marital relationship on the part of the
sociologists but also with the various forms which the internal
structure of the marriage relationship assumes in various
cultures and situations. In our western civilization monogamy
is still the accepted form. There are, however, societies where
we find other forms alongside of the monogamous marriage. We
speak of polygyny when the husband has a number of marital
relations at once. We speak of polyandry when the woman has
more than one husband. Female infanticide led in the past in
some societies to polyandry but polygyny occurs more often.
We even hear of the so-called pirrauru marriage in Central
Australia and of the group marriage in countries as Africa and
India, forms of marital life which illustrate how different
people give form to the normative internal structure of the
marital relationship.

Apart from sociologists' views and concepts, various forms
which the marital relationship can assume, the internal normative
structure of the relationship itself, and the views which people
in a given society hold with regard to what the norm for the
marriage form must be, we find when looking at the marital re-
lation also the way in which married people live, or the
'atmosphere' in a given home where married people live, their
conduct and attitudes: the atmosphere in one marriage can be
radically different from that in another marriage; the complaints
heard in the divorce court give one an idea of the astonishing
variety and diversity there is. What now must the sociologist
do with all these different matters which come to our attention?
It certainly cannot be sufficient to attempt a detailed
description of whatever can be known about the married people
in this world. Besides, would that really be the actual task of
the sociologist? Furthermore: every description - just assume
for a moment that such would not be impossible - implies
already that a certain criterion has been accepted! Whoever
describes selects and selection is only possible after having
found a criterion for selection. And whoever describes judges

- a description is never 'neutral' - and judging happens on the
basis of a given criterion. In other words: an 'objective'
description is a contradictic-in-terminis. The criterion which
the sociologist must employ when he approaches the marriage
relation - and for that matter any other societal relationship -
is the question what precisely the internal structure of this
relationship is. Only after that insight has been gained and
only after it has been established how the enkaptic interwoven-
ness of the marital structure is with the other societal
individuality structures in social reality it will be possible
to perceive correctly the diverse forms of the married life
in our world.

THE STRUCTURE OF MARRIAGE

Our everyday life experience does not grasp the concrete
created reality in an abstracting manner in which the various,
theoretically abstracted, modal aspects are placed, as it were,
in separate (Gegenständliche) positions in which they can be
analytically studied, but it grasps reality in an enstatic and
systatic manner in which the coherence of modal aspects is
recognized in the typical total structure of concrete things,
concrete events, concrete societal relationships, etc. Within
the totality structure theoretical thought finds the modal
aspects arranged in a unique and typical fashion: the totality
structure possesses a certain individuality which distinguishes
it from other individuality structures. It must be kept in
mind that in the totality structure the modal aspects are
arranged into an individual whole of a typical nature (within
created reality we distinguish therefore between various
typical totality structures which we call individuality
structures) and that this individuality structure is therefore
essentially a typical l a w structure to which the individual
and concrete things, events, relationships, etc., are subjected
and which makes the concrete existence of t h e s e   t h i n g s,
e v e n t s ,   r e l a t i o n s h i p s , e t c . ,
p o s s i b l e . The individuality structure may not be
identified, therefore, with the given concrete thing or
relationships, etc. The social relationships in which we find
ourselves, for example the marital relationship, are subject
to such structural laws. These laws do not only guarantee
their concrete existence as relationship but also their identity!
(sphere sovereignty!) Within the societal structure we can now
point out aspects or functions which are of essential
significance for the uniqueness and typicalness of this
individuality structure: the leading or pilot function and
the foundational function.

INTERLUDE ON FUNCTIONS:

Insight into the internal structure of a relationship, as
the marriage relationship, can be gained through
analysis. Such an analysis is a somewhat complicated
affair: which are the things to look for? Let's take
a concrete example: a tree. We know that as a created
thingthing a tree is subject to God's laws, but its

subjectivity differs from the subjectivity of, let's
say, an animal or a human being. A functional analysis,
i.e. an analysis in which we investigate how the tree
functions in the various law spheres which can be
distinguished, shows us that in the so-called lower
law spheres, e.g. the spatial and the physical, the
tree functions as a subject but that it functions as
an object in all post biotic law spheres. In the logical
modality (also called the analytical) the tree functions
as an analytical object, an object of analysis and
reflection. In the linguistic modality the tree
functions as a linguistic object, an object of
symbolification, e.g. name giving. In the economic mo-
dality a tree functions as an economic object, an object
of economic activity, e.g. it can be sold or used for
building a bridge. None of the pre-biotic functions,
however, qualifies the tree or gives us insight into the
actual nature of the tree. In those modalities the tree
functions as a subject: the numerical, spatial and
physical way of existing of the tree is thus that the
life or bios (Gree word for life) is served and made
possible. One thing strikes us now: in the various
modalities we find that the tree functions in them in an
individual manner. In the pre-biotic modalities we see
that the physical manner of existing of the tree is
subject to the tree-life and not for example to the
animal-way-of-life. In the post biotic modalities we
see that the tree has also an individual expression:
the tree appears in the logical modality as a analytical
object which differs from other analytical objects as
for example a dog and the difference between the dog and
the tree concept is not a logical matter but is founded
upon the individual difference between the dog and the
tree themselves. In other words, the tree has a typical
individuality which can be seen in its biotic subject
function, or, again in other words, the tree is qualified
by its biotic subject function, the last function in
which the tree functions as a subject: the modal
individuality of the object functions of the tree in the
post biotic modalities is founded upon the _original_
modal individuality of the last subject function of the
tree namely the biotic. We call this last subject
function of the tree the _qualifying_ function, therefore.
This qualifying function is, in the case of the tree, now
also the leading or _pilot function_: the internal
opening process is piloted by it, for the biotic function
makes the moments in earlier functions (numerical,
spatial, physical) which anticipate the biotic function
work in a very specific direction, namely of the tree-
life, and it _opens_ thereby those functions in a typical,
individual manner, in which the individuality of the tree
as tree shows itself. For this reason we may call the
biotic function of the tree also its _end function_: all
previous functions direct themselves to the life of the
tree, as to their end.
  Our insight into what analysis is in this connection
must be sharpened, however, by the realization that there

are essential differences between things and 'things'.
The usual example is the bird's nest. In the case of
the bird's nest it is obvious that the last subject
function, namely the biotic (the nest is made up of twigs
etc.), does not really display the meaning of the nest:
a nest is more than a grouping of twigs without any
specific sense. The qualifying pilot function of the nest
must be sought rather in the same modality in which the
bird has its end function, the psychic modality: in this
modality we find that the bird's nest functions as an
object, and, consequently, we must recognize that the
psychic object function of the bird's nest is its
qualifying pilot function. Once we have seen this it
will be obvious that usable objects as a chair, a car,
a house, etc. formed by human formation are individuality
structures which are not qualified by the physical
function (indeed the last subject function) but by their
object functions: a chair, for example, by its social
object function for it essentially serves human social
contact, etc. But here arises a complication: in the case
of the tree we find that the qualifying pilot function
indeed, in an original manner, qualifies the individuality
of the tree, or in other words the individuality of the
tree possesses a <u>biotic originality</u> and does <u>not originate</u>
with the earliermodalities as the physical or spatial
modalities. The same cannot be sadi of a usable object
as a chair, a house, etc. In the case of a usable object
we find that the individuality originates with a
different function than the qualifying or pilot function.
The qualifying function of a chair, for example, is to
be found in its social object function, we said earlier.
But the individuality of the chair does not originate
with the social function. As all other usable objects
the chair's individuality originates with human formation:
man has formed the chair and without such formation
there would not be any usable object of this nature.
In other words, here we find that some 'things' possess
an individuality which does not originate with the
qualifying function (the biotic in the case of the tree)
but with another function which we therefore must call
the <u>foundational function</u>. The two functions, the pilot
function and the foundational function, must be understood
if we are to acquire insight into the internal structure
of such 'things'. The same applies now to societal
relationships. Societal relationships have their own
individuality structure which can be understood only by
directing our attention to the qualifying and the
foundational functions. The difference between societal
structures and the structures of which we have given
examples, as a tree, a usable object etc., must be sought
in the fact that social relationships all have a subjective
structure, that means they possess subject functions in
all modal aspects. After all, social relationships are
relationships of man (and constituted by man) who is a
subject in all modal aspects and never can be made an

object in these modalities. It can now be obvious that the
structure of a social relationship must be analyzed in such
manner that first the end function or qualifying function
must be traced, that after this the foundational function
must be found, and that after this must be asked in what manner
the individuality structure expresses itself in the other
modal aspects whereby the typical correlation of pilot function
and foundational function will be displayed in its unbreakable
coherence.

It is, after this interlude, possible to be more specific.
Marriage, can now be described as a bi-unitary permanent bond
between a man and a woman, structurally founded in the biotic
aspect of life, namely the institutional (not incidental) sexual
union, and qualified by conjugal love. The term permanent must be
understood as meaning: for life, for death of one of the members
of this community terminates the temporal existence of the relation-
ship.

It will be obvious, for those who have read the quotations
above, that this description of the marriage relationship which
rests upon a structural analysis and not upon some highly
unscientific guesswork or generalization of positive forms of
the internal structure, differs essentially and significantly from
what others have been suggesting. NOt only the men whom quoted
but almost all others who write on marriage fail to begin with a
thorough and radical structural analysis. The result is that they
come up with a concept of marriage in which conjugal love plays
only a secondary role. Confusion with regard to the enkaptic
intertwinement of marriage and family and of marriage and state
then leads to an even more confused picture. Says Dooyeweerd,

"Conjugal love was thought of only as a variable and
subjective feeling, unsuitable as a basis for a permanent
life-companionship. Married affection was sometimes considered
to be a mere instrument for propagation, as the essential aim
of the conjugal bond. But the internal structural principle of
the bi-unitary bond of marriage cannot be grasped with a
juridical concept oriented to the natural (and eventually
supra-natural) aim of this institution. If the marital communi-
ty has also an internal juridical aspect, the typical character
of the latter is certainly not determined by the natural aim of
propagation as assumed by the scholastic natural law conception.
... The idea that the juridical function is the 'leading' or
'qualifying' function of this internal structure is untenable
and in open conflict with the Biblical view., cf., for instance,
Ephesians 5 : 31 ... Nor can a civil or canon legal order be
the foundation of marriage in its inner structure. This founda-
tion is of a biotic, not of a juridical character."(4)

ENKAPTIC INTERWOVENNESS

The positivation of the normative marriage structure can only
be done in interwovenness with other structurations within a given
society. The positive form of marriage is variable. It receives
its peculiar form in correlation with the social arrangements in a
given society (in other words: what kind of a society is it?

a non-differentiated society? a desintegrating society? etc.),
with the norms which have been positivized in the given
society and with the subjective aims and ends which people in
this society have. Illustrations of this enkaptic interwoven-
ness of the marriage with other social relationships in a
society can be easily pointed out. For example, the interwoven-
ness of marriage and state relationship which can be seen,
e.g., in the public registration for the law of any marriage
closed in our society: official marriages as distinct from
"free love" relationships and the ensuing shared responsibility
of the married couple in matters of public order, etc. Or,
for example, the interwoveness of marriage and church, which
can be seen, e.g., in the marriage ceremony in the case of
church members in a church service, or in the ecclesiastical
recognition of the married couple as such in the pastoral care,
etc. These enkaptic interwovennesses do <u>not</u> 'make' the
marriage: the closing of the marriage with its implications
for civil life (arrangements of a jural nature as to shared
property rights etc.) does not constitute the marriage as
social individuality structure: marriage is n o t   a contract.
The confusion which many appear to have may well originate at
this point: the nature of the enkapsis, which leaves the
internal structural principles undamaged, is not understood!
and consequently the enkaptic interwovenness is regarded as
something different from interwovenness namely: internal
characteristic.

It must also be seen clearly that the marriage structure,
which exercises its <u>inescapable</u> force majeure upon the
positive marriage form, cannot be eliminated by the subjective
aims and intentions or manners of conduct of the members of
the marital community. People can make a mess of their
marriage or use the married life for all sorts ofplans and
ideas (sexual satisfaction, companionship, economic profit)
but they will never be able to eliminate in this sort of
relationship the normative structural principle: they make
a mess of their ..... marriage!

THE OTHER RELATIONSHIPS

The other relationships will be discussed in separate stencils as will also the various major areas of sociological problematics. A few remarks with regard to a differentiated societal relationship of communal character must be made still here, however, for the obvious reason that much confusion can be prevented if incorrect views are eliminated. We mean the relationship which can be called the state.

The state is a communal relationship which is found in the differentiated society. In less differentiated societies than ours in the twentieth century we find that the state as communal authoritatve relationship is still more or less folded within totalitarian communities as tribe, guild, etc. Structural analysis shows that the normative structure of the state can be described as the community of public social order between government and citizens, on the basis of the monopoly of the power of the sword over a given cultural territory. The public order is the essential aim of this social structure. The monopoly of the 'power of the sword' is thereby required: the government which loses this power cannot function as government. It must now be recognized, and that is really the only point to be discussed here at this place, that public order is a _jural_ affair. The public _jural_ order must be established and maintained in or er to gain a good _public_ order as such. The public order, in other words, is wider than the jural order, and it is this public order which concerns the state: with the implications of social order, economic order, moral order, etc. It must be understood, however, that 'order' has nothing to do whatsoever with what for example the socialist means by the term order. He wishes to impose the socialistic, collectivistic ideology upon all of life of the members of the state and he calls that order! But mistaken he is! Order is found there where the sphere sovereignty of all normative structures is respected and recognized. A government which has no eye for the reality of sphere sovereignty is the opposite of a blessing for society. It is essential to see, therefore, that the state does not compromise people and people's lives in such a manner as to regulate their lives following some ideology or cultural ideal. Certainly, the state is a communal social relationship which includes all the people on a given cultural territory but only with regard to the public aspect of their life and activities. To identify the state with society, as is done repeatedly in various kinds of humanism, is to make the state into a _total_ structure on the one hand and to forget that society is _not_ a social _structure_ but only the enkaptic _interwovenness_ of normative societal structures. The miserable consequences of such an identification can be seen there where people begin to speak of positive social forms as 'parts' of the 'whole'.

NOTES WITH 'MARRIAGE'
1. Robert L.Sutherland,et.al.,eds.,Introductory Sociology (Chicago: J.B.Lippincott Company, 6th ed., 1961) p.249
2. Robert Bierstedt, The Social Order, An Introduction to Sociology (New York:McGraw-Hill Book Company,1957), pp.353 and 395
3. Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales, Family, Socialization and Interaction (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1955), pp.150, 151
4. H. Dooyeweerd, op. cit., Vol. III, p.307