


The Structure of Herman Dooyeweerd's Thought

by

Peter J. Steen



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Toronto, Canada

This book was accepted in 1970 as a dissertation presented to Westminster Theological Seminary in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Theology. The original title of the dissertation was "The Idea of Religious Transcendence in the Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd, with reference to its significance for Reformed Theology."

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Wedge Publishing Foundation, 229 College Street, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5T 1R4

ISBN 0-88906-016-9

to my wife Jan
and my parents
for their support through the years

PREFACE

This dissertation is not intended to repudiate Dooyeweerd's basic position. It is rather an attempt from within his own school to seek to analyze a problem which is admittedly a difficult problem. Much of the criticism is really only at a beginning stage, but on the basic point of criticism, namely, that Dooyeweerd has accommodated his thinking to the nature-grace religious ground-motive on the issue of created eternity or the supra-temporal, it is hoped that the reader will be persuaded.

The study of Dooyeweerd is urgent for Reformed theology if it is to continue to do its work reformatively. Many theologians have dismissed Dooyeweerd's thinking because of their disagreement with him concerning his idea of supra-temporality. It is hoped that because of this dissertation this can no longer be done, and that the way might be opened for renewed attention for the importance Dooyeweerd's thinking provides.

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PART I: CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF DOOYEWEERD'S THOUGHT
AS IT IS RELATED TO THE IDEA OF RELIGIOUS TRANSCENDENCE

CHAPTER 1

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

1. Introduction: My Personal Development.

In this introduction I feel it is important to show how my personal development in respect to Dooyeweerd's writings has changed, because it will enable the reader to get the true sense and intention of the method and scope of the dissertation, and also that the reader might put the more severe criticisms in the dissertation in their proper perspective.

This dissertation is the culmination of ten years of more or less intensive study of the Philosophy of the Law Idea.¹ I began by specifically studying Dooyeweerd, but I slowly branched out into the publications of his school as a whole and then returned again to his works. In my master's dissertation, The Supra-Temporal Selfhood in the Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd, my focus was the interrelated workings of the system in their relations to the supra-temporal concentration point. My dealings with the philosophy and the school of Dooyeweerd were critical and unsympathetic at that time. As I tried to bring real critique on Dooyeweerd's conception of the supra-temporality of the heart, I found myself involved in problems which needed far greater critical atten-

1. H. Dooyeweerd, "Het oecumenisch-reformatorisch grond-motief," Phil. Ref., XXXI (1966), p. 14. Dooyeweerd here indicates that he would rather have the philosophy thought of as a Christian transcendental philosophy than as the philosophy of the wetsidee.
2. P. Steen, The Supra-Temporal Selfhood in the Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd (Philadelphia: Unpublished master's dissertation for Westminster Theological Seminary, 1961).

tion. I then went on to develop a series of studies on various other facets of Dooyeweerd's system. For clarification and development of these studies I was driven to consult other key members of this school, namely, K. J. Popma, D. H. Th. Vollenhoven, and J. P. A. Mekkes. The more I involved myself in these men, the more I realized, on the one hand, that these men shared some of my criticisms of Dooyeweerd's systematics and, on the other hand, how much I was in the grip of the nature-grace ground-motive (to use Dooyeweerd's way of stating it). This gradual awareness of my own synthesis meant a change in my outlook on Dooyeweerd. I became increasingly critical of myself in terms of Dooyeweerd and his school. The real importance of Dooyeweerd and his school appeared to me as I slowly divested myself from some of this synthesis. At the same time the increasing importance of this school for Reformed theology became my burden. At that point, I was criticizing Reformed theology from the point of view of the school rather than vice-versa. The fact that Popma, Vollenhoven, and S. U. Zuidema deal a little more explicitly with theology and Scripture also helped to satisfy my objections against Dooyeweerd. These objections came out of classical, conservative, Reformed theology, which being deep in synthesis, stands suspiciously against philosophy and its influence on theology. It is particularly these men and their works that enabled me to move toward the real reformational importance of Dooyeweerd. As a result of this, I felt I could continue developing the points of disagreement I felt with Dooyeweerd, only now under the guidance of these other publications of the school. In recent years there has been increasing debate over internal problems within the school and this has enabled me to be more specific in my objections. From the beginning I had been taught how the thinking of

Dooyeweerd hangs together. My own experience of this in studying him has made my critique of him more difficult, especially as I came to appreciate more and more of his system. As I delved more deeply, my concern became to hold on to more and more of the thought of Dooyeweerd, with the result that now I am able to make a provisional step as to the nature of the problem in Dooyeweerd and to delineate its limits more precisely.

An important facet of the problems to be dealt with in this dissertation is that they are the same problems which are important in Reformed theology. The *Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee* has not been very successful in bringing its reformational thinking to bear on the Reformed theological community because to a great extent there remains a lack of clarity on certain points within the school itself. The double purpose of this dissertation then, is to bring clarity to these problems in Dooyeweerd, and at the same time, to point out some new directions for Reformed theology.

In order to do justice to Dooyeweerd's thought I acquired, with just a few exceptions, all his works, including his legal works. I started tracing his development as a whole and especially focused on the development of those areas which were of real critical concern to me. This type of genetic, historical study has yielded interesting methodological considerations for the study of Dooyeweerd, and has annulled many of my initial objections. Also, I can specify my criticisms and perhaps be of some benefit to the school of Calvinistic philosophy as well as to many Reformed theologians who do not consider themselves close to the school. In criticizing Dooyeweerd I will try as much as possible to use the material brought against him by other key figures

in the school. My contribution, I hope, will be a pulling together of many of the critical statements of others into a critical picture which will bring some clarity to key points. It might be said that lack of agreement and clarity on these points not only stifles progress in respect to theology but also threatens the school as a school of philosophy.

2. The Problem.

Anyone who has a thorough knowledge of the large corpus of Dooyeweerd's writings on law and general philosophy cannot help but notice the importance given to the idea of the Archimedean point or concentration point. The problem which will concern us in this dissertation is that Dooyeweerd constantly stresses that this concentration point has a time-transcending or boventijdelijk character.³ To put it more strongly, it is not even to be found within the temporal horizon. Immanence philosophy can be characterized as that philosophy which makes that which is within the temporal horizon into its hypostatized concentration point.⁴ The concentration point for Dooyeweerd is more than the individual supra-temporal human heart, but it is to be found in Christ as the new root of the reborn human race in which our individual heart participates.

The problem then centers around the notion of supra-temporality as Dooyeweerd uses it. Supra-temporality is ascribed to religion. It is Dooyeweerd's idea of religion as a supra-temporal sphere that seems to bring out the problem in the clearest way. As one goes deeper into the matter one sees immediately that this is interwoven with the nature

3. H. Dooyeweerd, "Het dilemma voor het Christelijk wijsgeerig denken," Phil. Ref., I (1935), p. 77ff. In this first article in the Phil. Ref. he stresses this as that which distinguishes the Calvinistic position from immanence thinking in all its forms. This emphasis is worked out still more clearly in his second article, "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën op het immanentiestandpunt," Phil. Ref., I (1935), pp. 65-66.

4. H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Vol. I. (Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1953), pp. 13-14. Here the following definition of immanence philosophy is given, "In the widest sense all philosophy that seeks its Archimedean point in philosophic thought itself...."

of time as a brekingswet, the transcendental direction of time, the nature of created reality as meaning or creaturely dependence, his idea of creation as a supra-temporal act, and the transcendental critique with its idea of inter-modal synthesis. The idea of created supra-temporality is tied to the Archimedean point in many ways, and this Archimedean point is the key idea in the system.

The term boventijdelijk is not really acceptable any longer to Dooyeweerd. He would prefer to use the term "transcendence." This change in his terminology so late in his career, after he has employed it in all his writings in a central way, indicates the profound criticism, and from his point of view, misunderstanding which has arisen in relation to this term and to the complex of ideas involved.⁵ Although he has changed the terminology he is by no means willing to change the ideas which the term denotes.⁶ If there had been a radical change in his thinking on this point this dissertation would have lost its justification. That there is sufficient justification for writing a dissertation on this point can be seen from the amount of criticism in respect to this point. This criticism will be taken up in detail in a later section. For now I will just mention a few instances. J. M. Spier in Tijd en Eeuwigheid seeks to revise Dooyeweerd's idea of time as a refraction law (brekingswet) and substitute a religious time for Dooyeweerd's idea of religion as a supra-temporal sphere of religion.

5. H. Dooyeweerd, "Van Peursen's critische vragen...", Phil. Ref., XXV (1960), p. 137. Here he suggests that perhaps the term boventijdelijkheid should be abandoned.

6. In a personal interview with Dooyeweerd it became very clear to me that by substituting the term "religious transcendence" for supra-temporality he had by no means changed the whole structure to which the former term applied. By Dooyeweerd's own admission there was no need for changing what the term signified since that was too central.

K. J. Popma throughout all his writings exercises critique and clarification on the notion of religion, and has various criticism of supra-temporality especially in Levensbeschouwing.⁷ One of the most important critiques is the radical and revisionary critique of Vollenhoven.⁸ To these three can be added many comments by various writers testifying to dismay, mystification and lack of understanding as to Dooyeweerd's idea of supra-temporality as he applies it to religion, the heart, etc. In personal conversation with van Riessen and Zuidema I found their concern and disagreement with this problem to be very evident. Zuidema characterized the problem of supra-temporalness (boventijdelijkheid) as "a difference of thought in the bosom of the W.d.W. which threatens the whole movement."

There are good reasons why this problem has not received more attention within the school of Calvinistic philosophy. First of all, hardly anyone agrees with Dooyeweerd on his formulation of supra-temporality. From almost every quarter there is reinterpretation of Dooyeweerd on this point, so that, in the thinking of most members of the school implicit correction has already been made on this point. A second factor is that few have studied Dooyeweerd's writings systematically and that, therefore, many are not aware of the centrality of the notion that the concentration point, the heart, religion, and the Word, must be characterized as supra-temporal. It seems to me that the second factor is the most important one for understanding why this problem has not been given more attention. In my opinion any attempt to play down the centrality of this problem by seeking to re-interpret

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7. Both Spier and Popma will be handled separately at a later point in this dissertation.
 8. References from Vollenhoven will be given later in the section dealing with the critics of Dooyeweerd.

Dooyeweerd in a more favorable light (meaning favorable in the light of an almost completely different view of the problem by the defenders of Dooyeweerd) indicates lack of knowledge of the systematics of Dooyeweerd. For example, to say that one holds that the heart, while in time reaches out beyond time to God, and yet to defend Dooyeweerd's formulation of religion, time, concentration point, and his transcendental method is simply, in my opinion, the result of not knowing Dooyeweerd's systematics on these points. It is for this reason that Spier, Popma, and Vollenhoven have been forced to revise some of the most central features of Dooyeweerd.

This dissertation will be an attempt, then, to focus the problem and show the relation of the other facets of his systematics to this idea of supra-temporality in such a way that no one will be any longer able to treat this problem as secondary. It is then hoped that the problems involved here will be dealt with in team fashion so that there might be more unity of conviction on these points.

3. Approach, Method, and Scope.

Unlike some dissertations, the treatment of approach, method, and scope is not a superficial addendum to the main body of the dissertation. With the treatment in this section I am already thrust into the main stream of the dissertation. From Dooyeweerd, especially, I have been made aware of the necessity of setting forth the problem correctly (probleem-stelling), in other words, the importance of asking the right questions. The Christian transcendental, critical method, whatever one's final judgment concerning it in details and importance, makes one keenly and rightfully aware of the importance of central boundary (grens) and foundational (grond) questions and their place and importance in philosophical thinking. Philosophy in general, and Dooyeweerd's thinking in particular, make one aware of prolegomenal problems in all the special sciences, and in theoretical thought as such. That the importance of boundary and foundational questions is most acute for philosophical thought, which is concerned with a view of the totality of the created cosmos, is the constant stress of Dooyeweerd from the very beginning of his theoretical writings. This is clearly seen in the fact that as the years went by, Dooyeweerd continued to sharpen and stress the transcendental critique of theoretical thought.⁹ His most recent eval-

9. This development has been traced by various individuals: O. J. L. Albers, Het Naturrecht Volgens de W.d.W. (Nijmegen: Gebr. Janssen, 1955), pp. 55-59; M. Fr. J. Marlet, Grundlinien der Calvinistischen "Philosophie der Gesetzesidee" als Christlicher Transzendentalphilosophie, (München: Karl Zink, 1954), pp. 36-48; A. L. Conradie, The Neo-Calvinistic Concept of Philosophy (Natal: University Press, 1960), pp. 36-64; Peter Schouls, Man in Communication (Toronto: A.R.S.S., 1968), pp. 38-51, 65-66; Ir. H. van Riessen, "Over de betekenis van de wetsidee in de wijsbegeerte," Phil. Ref., XXX (1965), pp. 159-166; V. Brümmer, Transcendental Criticism and Christian Philosophy (Franeker: T. Wever, 1961), pp. 13-39, 197-221, 235-251.

uation of its importance makes the point clear.¹⁰

The stress on the importance of philosophy as the encyclopedia of the sciences and, therefore, the stress on prolegomenal questions is for Dooyeweerd to a great extent the continuation of Kuyper's work, especially as that came to expression in Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid. This stress in Kuyper as well as in Dooyeweerd is very much needed in the field of theology today. If the influence of the religious ground-motive of nature-grace is to be broken in Reformed theology it will be necessary for it to recognize that the questions of the terrain, scope, method, and nature of theology must be critically analyzed. Prolegomenal questions are the need of the day for theology. It is my conviction that theology is a special science, but also that it has a unique place in the arrangement of the sciences. The theoretical discipline which deals with the arrangement of the sciences is philosophy. Theology needs a philosophical totality view, since it does not deal with the created world as a totality, nor does it deal with the interrelation of the special sciences. Rather, it has a specific aspect of investigation. To help determine the relation and nature of its specific aspect in relation to other aspects, it is bound to call upon philosophy. These facts are not commonly recognized by Reformed theology and the failure to recognize them has been devastating. Reformed theology, not seeing the need for an equally reforming and Christian philosophy, yet nevertheless structurally dependent on philosophy as an encyclopedic totality-science, has implicitly and explicitly used other non-reformational philosophies. The history of the relation of theology and

10. H. Dooyeweerd, "Het oecumenisch-reformatorisch grond-motief," Phil. Ref., XXXI (1966), pp. 14-15.

philosophy is only understood in the light of the fact that theologies have continuously borrowed from philosophies, and nevertheless have sought to control the influence of philosophy and gain ascendancy over it.

Theologisms of all sorts are present in Christendom today, and these are not to be avoided by seeking to minimize the scope and pretension of theology, by emphasizing that theology should be conceived as Biblical, theological, or historical exegesis primarily, by making theology the humble handmaid and servant of the church, or by emphasizing theology as the reflection of believing faith. All these attempts, despite their good insights and intentions, fail to break the hegemony which theology has traditionally exercised over the sciences, church, philosophy, and Scriptures. This hegemony of theology has held true more or less from the Reformation on, and of course it was true during the Middle Ages. The traditional views of the place and importance of theology in all other circles other than those of Calvinistic philosophy have not been able to uncover the influence of the autonomy of theoretical thought as it is more or less operative in theoretical method and exegesis, and in the place and nature which is ascribed to theology in classical Reformed theology. Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd emphasize the importance of naive, everyday experience, and the faith life of believers in the direct relation to the Scriptures and have succeeded in breaking the strange mediatorial position which theology has often taken between the Scriptures and the people of God. By stressing the importance of religion and the idea of the central religious choice or position of the heart of man before God's word, as going before all theology as well as philosophy, and hence, as all

controlling, it becomes clear that there must be Christian scriptural philosophy.¹¹ Once this philosophy was developed in its main systematic lines and the history of philosophy was investigated, clarity was brought to the nature and place of theology. It is extremely clear for advocates of Calvinistic philosophy that if theology does not see the importance and urgency of working with a Christian philosophy, this is due to the influence of the nature-grace religious ground-motive on its scientific theological work. Theology, seeking to go it alone without an explicit dependence and relationship, not only to the other sciences, but also to a Christian philosophy, is simply conceiving of itself in the line of a theologia supranaturalis. This point will be dealt with in greater detail in this dissertation, but it is necessary to mention it at this point to show the main purpose of this dissertation. When Christian theologians and Reformed Christian philosophers see themselves as mutually dependent on the powerful, redirecting Word of God, and when each discipline fulfills its proper place in subjection to the Scriptures, then each will recognize the central, religious, commitment to Christ which directs all Christian, theoretical activity. When both disciplines realize their interdependence and proper place in relation to one another, and especially their mutual dependence on the authority of the Scriptures, then although each holds a critical freedom with respect to one another in order to be open to the Word of the Lord, there is a joyful upbuilding together of systematic, Christian thought which will give rise to a far more cohesive bulwark than Christendom has ever known before against the forces of unbelief. In this sense

11. D. H. Th. Vollenhoven, Het Calvinisme en de Reformatie van de Wijsgeerte (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1933), pp. 14-24. In his first major work Vollenhoven lays great stress on the Scriptural character of his philosophy.

the work of theological apologetics must be fulfilled in a much more comprehensive enterprise and with a total Christian philosophy so that what the defense of a more narrow, theological apologetics could give to the science of theology will look very insufficient in comparison to a total philosophically thetical and critical treatment of the whole scientific enterprise.

Dooyeweerd has contributed greatly to the unraveling of the complex network of problems which surround the relation of theology and philosophy and the influence of scholastic nature-grace constructions on both philosophy and theology. The importance of his work cannot be overestimated. Nevertheless, it is precisely on his conception of the most important areas of concern for both theology and philosophy that critique will be given. In respect to the central points of religion, time, the consummation, eternity, heaven, history, the heart, and the transcendental method there appears to be clear traces of the nature-grace ground-motive. This critique is offered as a Calvinistic philosopher from within the school. It is in the spirit of this philosophy that it is continually reforming itself by critical reflection and in its subjection to the Scriptures.

It is an attestation of the lively character and freshness of the school, that there is increasing refinement of the central points of the philosophy from within the school. It must not be looked at, in the least, as a victory of Reformed theology over or against Calvinistic philosophy. Many theologians rightly have reserve precisely in respect to the points which are being criticized, and one hopes that a better feeling and rapprochement might be possible between Reformed theologians and philosophers than has been true up to this time. Reformed theology

is in dreadful need of the reforming influence of a Christian philosophy and it is in the interest of making this clear to Reformed theology that an endeavor is here made to take away some of the stumbling blocks to theologians in the thought of Dooyeweerd. This is the purpose of this dissertation in its broadest range. For this reason the dissertation must be limited in various ways. First, the rather strong historical relations of Dooyeweerd to Kant,¹² the neo-Kantian phenomenology,¹³ his relation to the historical school of jurisprudence, etc., cannot be dealt with in any detail. This, important as it may prove to be, would be a dissertation in itself and would range too far from what is of interest to theology.

Second, in this same line, the unique dependence of Dooyeweerd upon Abraham Kuyper, particularly on points here under critique, cannot be dealt with in any detail because of the tremendous scope of Kuyper and the lack even today of an original work dealing comprehensively with the philosophical influences on Kuyper. Kuyper can only be dealt with in concentrated, cursory fashion. However, it must be said that the full weight of this critique can only be seen in the light of further investigation of Dooyeweerd's great devotion to Kuyper, even though in his earlier years he stood at a distance from Kuyper.¹⁴

Third, the dissertation plunges right into the critical evaluation and does not first present Dooyeweerd's thought in broad lines, simply

12. See particularly Brümmer's development of the relation of Dooyeweerd to Kant. Brümmer, op. cit., pp. 13-39. Also, Steen, op. cit., pp. 8-12.

13. R. D. Knudsen, Reflections on the Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd (Philadelphia: mimeo, available at Westminster Theological Seminary, 1968), pp. 9-31.

14. J. Veenhof, In Kuyper's Lijn (Goes: Oosterbaan & Le Cointre, 1939).

because this has been done often enough already by others, but chiefly in this case, since my master's dissertation sought to do this. This presupposes then a fairly thorough acquaintance with Dooyeweerd's, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought.

As one explores Dooyeweerd comprehensively and deeply one discovers many important aspects of his systematics, especially in his legal works, that have not had enough exposure and critical review, some of which are important to theologians. Some examples are his systematics on cosmic time, his doctrine of analogical concepts (especially as he formulates his position over against the Thomistic idea of substance), his various works on history and in particular the sections on primitive cultures, the model he provides for the building up of the special sciences exemplified in his legal works, his work in Greek philosophy¹⁵ his more popular review of western civilization in his earlier Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde articles,¹⁶ Vernieuwing en Bezinning,¹⁷ as well as his philosophy of societal relations. All of these have not gotten nearly enough attention. One is simply overwhelmed by the scope and amazing command of Dooyeweerd over historical periods as well as his ability for historiography, e.g., in his treatment of the sources of positive law,¹⁸ history of the encyclopedia of law,¹⁹ and Netherlands' law.²⁰

15. H. Dooyeweerd, Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte (Franeker: T. Wever, 1949).
16. H. Dooyeweerd, "In den strijd om een Christelijke staatkunde," Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde I (1924-25), II (1926), I (1927). (driemaandelijksch orgaan).
17. H. Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning (Zutphen: J. B. Van den Brink, 1963).
18. H. Dooyeweerd, Encyclopaedie der Rechtswetenschap, Hoofdstuk V (Amsterdam: Bureau Studentenraad Vrije Universiteit, 1962).
19. Ibid., Deel I.
20. H. Dooyeweerd, Dictaat Oud-Vaderlandsrecht (Amsterdam: Studentenraad Vrije Universiteit, 1964).

In order to make this dissertation of more importance to theologians it is best not to get too overly involved in the philosophical systematics. For example, the problem surrounding the gegenstand relation which is being modified slightly and other facets of epistemology as they are related to transcendental critique and method will not get the attention they deserve. Facets of anthropology like the unconscious, and the act structure with its three directions, all of which present difficulties of one kind or another, also cannot be dealt with in a comprehensive fashion. As P. Schouls points out,²¹ there are quite a few important areas that need consideration but this must be done in team fashion.

Even the problems which will be focused on, such as religion, time, and law are sufficiently central so that they cannot be dealt with in anything like the systematic detail with which one finds them presented in Dooyeweerd. It is necessary to focus even on particular facets of these problems and their interrelations. For example, the problem of cosmic time is so rich and complex in Dooyeweerd that it has not been employed and exploited to the extent that is possible, especially as it relates to the special sciences, so that to go into it in any great detail would mean a too lengthy central systematic and critical section.

There appears to be almost common consensus from various quarters, especially from within the Calvinistic school, concerning the problematic character of Dooyeweerd's formulation concerning supra-temporality and the place of created eternity in relation to cosmic time, as well as cosmic time itself, therefore one is necessitated to present some kind of reconstruction of these central points. This emphasis on re-

21. P. Schouls, Man in Communication (Toronto: Association for Reformed Scientific Studies, 1967), pp. 65-66.

construction will be explained in detail in the second part of the dissertation. This has meant that attention to the finer points of systematics and comprehensiveness of the analysis, even of the major points under critique, will be limited somewhat. Although there is less attention to the details which might make the dissertation of less value to those especially schooled in this philosophy, it will, nevertheless, be of greater interest to Reformed theologians.

In line with reaching a broader hearing from the theological side, the insights of lesser known figures of the Calvinistic philosophy, especially Popma, Vollenhoven, A. Troost, and J. M. Spier will be brought in. These men have dealt more with problems that are of interest and concern to the theologian, but little or nothing of their work has been translated. It will be tried, as much as possible, to bring into relation to these problems insights of Reformed theologians to show the importance of the teamwork approach to a philosophy among philosophers and theologians on these points. The insights of J. Murray, G. Vos, B. Holwerda, K. Schilder, H. Ridderbos, G. C. Berkouwer, H. M. Kuitert, M. Kline, E. Clowney, O. Jager and others who work with redemptive historical methodology and Biblical theology will be brought into relation to the topics at hand. Much has been gained from the works of these men, especially on the problems of God's eternity, heaven and the new earth. However, in general the conclusions on these topics are not of a theological nature, rather they are more the expression and refinement of the central, religious ground-motive of Word-revelation in respect to the re-creation, kingdom, consummation, and the eschaton. The thoughts on God's eternity, time, the new earth and heaven are foundational considerations lying at the bottom of both theology and philos-

ophy because they integrally direct the Christian world-and-life view of which both philosophy and theology try to give a theoretical account.

In the footnotes an example of teamwork approach to the critique found in the Calvinistic school itself will be given by presenting the critical insights of the other lesser known members of the school in the hopes that the Reformed, theological community might be drawn closer toward seeing the great need of working in a closer conjunction with Reformed Christian philosophy.

In this connection some attention will be given to questions of great importance to both theology and philosophy, such as the nature of theology, the church, religion, the interrelation of theology, philosophy, and religion as it relates to time, eternity, history and eschatology. It is obvious that each of these problems could be dealt with at great length, but it is important that before this can be done, some consideration of them in general is given in order to present new directions of emphasis. Therefore, the reconstruction must be rather general, but there is value in seeing the interrelation of these pressing problems rather than focusing on one or another of them and putting their interrelation in the background.

This leaves a few methodological considerations. Since for Dooyeweerd the "law of the exclusion of antinomies" applies more to the ascertaining of the proper place of the modal aspects, there will not be much attention given to this method. The concern is much more with central problems and more the nature of boundary and foundational questions (grens en grond vragen).

An immanent critique is more suited for showing the non-Christian, within his own specific area of interest, the hidden religious assumptions

using the terminology and jargon of the thinker involved.²²

The transcendental critique of theoretical thought could not be employed in the way Dooyeweerd insists that it should, simply because of the problems that are present in Dooyeweerd and which are directly involved in the transcendental critique and the method itself. For example, the religious position of the selfhood as transcending the antithetical gegenstand and also as a pre-condition for the possibility of intermodal synthesis is vitally related to cosmic time as refraction law and to the idea of supra-temporality in general as it applies to the heart of men, religion, the new mankind, and the concentration point. The idea of created eternity is intrinsically related to cosmic time, religion, and therefore to cosmic intuition, theoretical intermodal synthesis, and to the transcendental method and critique.

The method here used will be more or less to present a different, theoretical, philosophical vision of these central points and to be more directed by the Christian ground-motive of Word-revelation as it directs us on these central controlling problems. It will be setting a synoptic vision along side of Dooyeweerd's on these points to see if some of these long-standing difficulties can be brought into focus and thus be disentangled. There is great heuristic value to Dooyeweerd's theoretical vision, especially in his idea of the prism, the supra-temporality of the heart, religion, the concentration point, and the body of Christ. It centralizes these basic problems and brings out

22. For good examples of an immanent critique on Karl Jaspers see J. P. A. Mekkes, Teken en Motief der Creatuur (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1965) and R. D. Knudsen, The Idea of Transcendence in the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1958.)

in a striking way, precisely because of the way he has formulated them, the great importance of these boundary and foundational questions both for philosophy and theology, for the other sciences, and for the Christian world-and-life view. Undoubtedly the reconstruction has been influenced quite a bit by Dooyeweerd's formulations on these points, nevertheless an alternative reconstruction to these points, especially one using the insights of theology in recent years might help in the area of the interrelation of theology and philosophy. Although it is very much in line with Dooyeweerd's idea of the role of Christian philosophy that it listen to the results of the special sciences, in the case of the science of theology, there is an obvious lacuna. There is hardly any working with the richness of exegetical insights made available in the last thirty to forty years from the side of theology. In Popma, for example, we see a wholly different attention being paid to the revolution taking place in the theological sciences. It may be that much of the influence of nature-grace in Dooyeweerd's thinking is due to a rather harsh reaction against the older forms of Reformed scholasticism. In all quarters today the theological sciences are trying to rid themselves of the influences of the scholastic, nature-grace tradition. This means there has been a rich rediscovery of the Scriptures which is of continuing importance for Calvinistic philosophy. Dooyeweerd has not been appreciative enough of this development, with the result that he has not been able to free himself of the scholastic theological influences on his own thinking, particularly as they related to God's eternity, heaven, and the future after the judgment day, etc. The reflection of the believer on the scriptural view of the kingdom, as he is gripped by the ground-motive of Word-revelation, is a continual

task involving daily conversion, as Popma has so frequently stressed. Theology can enrich and be of levitical service in the life of the believing community as it is engaged in reforming the cosmos in Christ. Dooyeweerd's vision of the kingdom, the eschaton, has not profited nearly enough from continual perusal of the Scriptures in respect to these points.

In summary, the method used in this dissertation is a presentation of Dooyeweerd's position and formulation of these central points in their interrelation, with critical analysis, and a presentation of an alternative theoretical vision of these central points as directed by the ground-motive of Word-revelation and by careful perusal of the Scriptures using the insights of Reformed Biblical theology and Calvinistic philosophers. It is philosophizing out of commitment to Christ in dependence on his Word, from which ground theoretical thinking on these central questions is directed. It is freedom in Christ and the central dependence on his Word that enables one to view these central boundary and foundational questions without using explicitly transcendental critique as formulated by Dooyeweerd. The method recognizes the central thrust but is trying to critique on questions which are very difficult, if not impossible to formulate.²³

23. Vollenhoven gives expression to this difficulty especially in relation to the problem of the heart and religion, "College systematiek - het probleem van de tijd," (Amsterdam: Aantekeningen J. C. Vanderstelt, mimeo, 1963), p. 12.

4. Review of Critics of Dooyeweerd.

In order to show the importance of the problem and also the complex of difficulties surrounding it some of Dooyeweerd's critics will be briefly presented and the areas emphasized where they have focused their critique. From this review it will appear that the problem area being dealt with in this dissertation is worthy of attention and that it is a problem generally recognized by the critics despite their varying points of view and background.

K. J. Popma will be excluded from this section since he has written so extensively on this subject and therefore his contributions will receive special attention later.

In general it will be shown that the critics have focused on the ideas of supra-temporality as it applies to the heart and also its more general significance, cosmic time (especially as refraction law) but also its more general aspects, and finally the question of meaning.

Dr. J. M. Spier, after being a long-time exponent of Dooyeweerd's idea of supra-temporality, more or less suddenly felt that Dooyeweerd's whole construction on this point had to be severely modified. In his book, Tijd en Eeuwigheid, he takes up the problem quite extensively.²⁴ Next to Popma, Spier's revision of Dooyeweerd is the most worked out. Of importance for this critique and reconstruction is that Spier lays particular emphasis on the fact that supra-temporalness (boventijdelijkheid) of the heart is tied up closely with cosmic time as a refraction law (brekingswet).²⁵ He also sees that the reconstruction of the notion

24. J. M. Spier, Tijd en Eeuwigheid (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1953), especially p. 6, also pp. 141-165, 218-225.

25. Ibid., pp. 141-143, 162-165.

of supra-temporality involves more than the changing of its application to the individual heart, but also that this reconstruction of the scope and meaning of the notion of supra-temporality must extend to the applications of that notion in respect to both the meaning totality of the whole cosmos and to the human nature of Christ.²⁷

Spier also stresses what he calls a radical duality (radicale dualiteit) in human existence between supra-temporal heart and temporal body (tijdelijk lichaam).²⁸ Spier tries to replace these points with a notion of "religious time" in which the heart of man, as well as the totality of meaning are temporal. His reconstruction is not on all points satisfying, and more specific areas of disagreement will be referred to later.²⁹ He also stresses the fact that time does not cease with the judgment day³⁰ and also that the heavenly created³¹ is temporal. These points are very important to reconstruction. In general it must be said that Spier's book is of central importance for the reconstruction in this dissertation, and that in my main lines his basic critique and reconstruction are followed. It is one of the most thorough critiques of the important problems surrounding religion and time, and also attempts a reconstruction.

Vollenhoven's special lecture on time³² is also of great importance for this dissertation, particularly because he focuses on his differences with Dooyeweerd. In general one can agree with Vollenhoven's critique

26. Ibid., 141-143, 162-165.

27. Ibid., pp. 151-152.

28. Ibid., p. 160.

29. Ibid., his reconstruction, including a survey of what the Scriptures say concerning time and eternity, is quite extensive; pp. 143-181, 220-228.

30. Ibid., pp. 218-225.

31. Ibid., pp. 221-225. By the "heavenly created" all senses of the word heaven, including angelic heaven, are intended.

32. D. H. Th. Vollenhoven, op. cit.

of Dooyeweerd and side with him on his view of the relation of religion and time, over against Popma and to some extent, Spier. Since Vollenhoven's lecture will be referred to extensively throughout this dissertation a few salient points will be mentioned in this section. One of Vollenhoven's main points of criticism in respect to Dooyeweerd's idea of time is that time is not a time order of modalities.³³ Involved with this is Vollenhoven's rejection of the idea of the time order as a prism.³⁴ He also rejects the position of the heart or soul as supra-temporal and therefore between the world and God.³⁵ He feels that the heart is completely temporal. He also thinks that Dooyeweerd with his notion of the modalizing of cosmic time is forced into substantializing the modal functions to a certain degree.³⁶ He differs quite radically on the idea of the self and consciousness and their relation to the body.³⁷ These are just some of the points, but one immediately sees that there is a similarity of focus and emphasis between Spier and Vollenhoven.

Vincent Brümmer in his dissertation, Transcendental Criticism and Christian Philosophy, concentrates his critique of Dooyeweerd on the idea of meaning,³⁸ cosmic time,³⁹ intuition, and especially intermodal

33. Ib.d., pp. 2, 3, 6, 14.

34. Ib.d., p. 6.

35. Ib.d., p. 6. Interesting in this connection is Vollenhoven's suggestion that when the subject is between God and the world, as it is in Dooyeweerd, this is either a priority theory or the position of the late Aristotle. Later we shall see the position of priority found in Dooyeweerd.

36. Ib.d., pp. 7, 13.

37. Ib.d., pp. 6, 10, 11.

38. Vincent Brümmer, Transcendental Criticism and Christian Philosophy (Franeker: T. Wever, 1961), pp. 164-196.

39. Ib.d., pp. 51-56, 71-76, 161-164.

synthesis.⁴⁰ Brümmer brings an array of critique to bear on Dooyeweerd's idea of cosmic time as a refraction law. He particularly does not like the idea of cosmic time as the principle which guarantees the structural diversity of the cosmic order.⁴¹ In this connection he focuses on Dooyeweerd's idea of the supra-temporal selfhood which he regards as "highly questionable" and "self-contradictory."⁴² This dissertation of Brümmer is a very clear and accurate presentation of Dooyeweerd's transcendental method and critique. His reconstruction, however, has been rightly criticized by J. P. A. Mekkes.⁴³ As a whole his criticism fails to see the nature-grace background of Dooyeweerd's idea of supra-temporality, and thus his critique of Dooyeweerd's idea of meaning and intermodal synthesis does not fully succeed.

O. T. L. Albers in his dissertation, Het Natuurrecht Volgens de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee,⁴⁴ presents a valuable survey of Dooyeweerd's thinking concerning natural law, both in respect to the development of his thinking⁴⁵ and a clear summary of the systematics involved in some of Dooyeweerd's legal theory.⁴⁶ Albers focuses his criticism on the

40. Ibid., pp. 77-83, 151-164.

41. Ibid., p. 162. Brümmer mentions other critics of Dooyeweerd's notion of supra-temporality and the idea of time as refraction law: Ph. A. Kohnstamm, "Paedagogiek, personalisme, en wijsbegeerte der wetsidee," Feestbundel Aanboden aan Prof. Dr. J. Waterink (Amsterdam: Holland, 1951), p. 103, and I. A. Diepenhorst, "Een reformatorische filosofie getoetst," Gereformeerd Theologisch Tijdschrift, LIII (1953), p. 45.

42. Ibid., p. 162.

43. J. P. A. Mekkes, "Wet en subject in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee," Phil. Ref., XXVII (1962), pp. 126-190. This article criticizes Brümmer, Van Peursen, and Conradie and is extremely important for clarifying Dooyeweerd's position.

44. O. T. L. Albers, Het Natuurrecht Volgens de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (Nijmegen: Gebr. Janssen, 1955).

45. Ibid., pp. 3-54.

46. Ibid., pp. 55-138. Of value is his treatment of rechtsbeginselen, pp. 115-137, and rechtsbegrip en rechtsidee, pp. 76-77, 88-91.

idea of meaning⁴⁷ and the idea of the supra-temporal religious center.⁴⁸ In criticizing Dooyeweerd he clearly shows his Roman Catholic position but he seems to lay his finger on a sore point in Dooyeweerd. From out of a nature-grace position which clearly tends to confuse structure and direction, he tries to show that Dooyeweerd's view of the heart as center of the creation and as the supra-temporal root unity of meaning tends to reduce structure to direction. In his criticism he only partly succeeds since he himself operates with a nature-grace scheme. This comes out in his working rather uncritically with terms like "ontological and physical order" and "religious-ethical."⁴⁹ He sees somewhat what Vollenhoven sees, that the duality of the supra-temporal heart and temporal functions does not allow Dooyeweerd to do full justice to eschatology, the resurrection, and especially to the unity of man in death.⁵⁰ Although his criticism is quite obviously Roman Catholic the analytical historical presentation of the theory of natural law and Dooyeweerd's theory concerning it, is of great value. It seems strange that Albers' work has not gotten more recognition.

A. L. Conradie in her book, The Neo-Calvinistic Concept of Philosophy, focuses particularly on the question of meaning and philosophic communication.⁵¹ The book's chief value is in the fact that it documents the

47. Ibid., pp. 138-187.

48. Ibid., pp. 146-192. Interesting is his long analysis of Proverbs 4:23, a text quite often quoted by Dooyeweerd.

49. Ibid., p. 156, 158. On pp. 177-179 he tries to relate the tendency which he sees in Dooyeweerd to reduce structure to direction, to the Reformation in general, and particularly to Bavinck and Berkouwer. He also portrays his Roman Catholic view of theo-ontology by remarking that the thought course of the Reformation can be characterized by a voorbijgaan of ontological factors and he feels this comes to a consistent expression in Dooyeweerd.

50. Ibid., pp. 156-157.

51. A. L. Conradie, The Neo-Calvinistic Concept of Philosophy (Natal: University Press, 1960), pp. 126-194.

neo-scholastic reactions to Dooyeweerd. Her critique on the transcendental critique and doctrine of states of affairs⁵² is in many points valid and is presented with great clarity. There is an interesting few pages on the idea of the heart in which Conradie seeks to defend Dooyeweerd against the charge of dualism, especially as it is leveled by William Young.⁵³ Its chief value is in the footnotes which draw from sources generally not dealt with in the *Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*.

Dr. W. H. Velema in his book, *De Leer van de Heilige Geest bij Abraham Kuyper*, makes a very interesting remark concerning the similarity between Dooyeweerd and S. G. de Graaf and of both of these men to Kuyper. He says, "Een dergelijke structuur vinden we ook bij Dooyeweerd, wanneer hij spreekt van de boventijdelijke religieuze wortel der schepping in Christus Jesus als hoofd van het herboren mensengeslacht."⁵⁴ In the light of Velema's critique of Kuyper this remark indicates that Velema feels that Dooyeweerd has not overcome the nature-grace ground-motive which he so amply points out in Kuyper. This book of Velema is indispensable as a background for much of Dooyeweerd's thinking. The critique which will be developed in this dissertation finds striking confirmation in the work of Velema. There are several clear ties in ideas and terminology between Kuyper and Dooyeweerd which come out clearly throughout this book. It is striking that it is Dooyeweerd's idea of the concentration point that receives critique by Velema. He rightly points to the fact that Dooyeweerd has not penetrated sufficiently⁵⁵ into the

52. Ibid., pp. 126-194.

53. Ibid., pp. 90-95.

54. W. H. Velema, *De Leer van de Heilige Geest bij Abraham Kuyper* ('s-Gravenhage: Van Keulen, 1957), p. 238.

55. Ibid., p. 81, footnote.

center of Kuyper's thought in the article, "Kuyper's wetenschapsleer."⁵⁶ It will be shown later that this oversight by Dooyeweerd allowed him, after he had done a great deal of revision of Kuyper, to misconstrue the concentration point, which in its main lines comes from his clinging to a semi-Kuyperian conception.

In van Riessen one finds also a fundamental difference with Dooyeweerd concerning cosmic time. In his book, Op Wijsgerige Wegen, he suggests that time essentially has to do with change, and that its place is in the third law sphere.⁵⁷ In personal conversation with van Riessen he indicated to me his disagreement with Dooyeweerd's idea of supra-temporality (boventijdelijkheid). It is obvious from this that he rejects the notion of cosmic time as a refraction law (brekingswet), and therefore as a principle of cosmic diversity. Van Riessen also expressed his disagreement with the gegenstand relation as it is formulated by Dooyeweerd. It will be shown later that this is increasingly becoming a subject of contention also. This follows because intermodal synthesis is intrinsically related to supra-temporal religious self-reflection in Dooyeweerd.

Dr. J. P. A. Mekkes, who could be called Dooyeweerd's greatest defender against almost all the critics,⁵⁸ particularly concerning the concentration point, supra-temporality, and Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique, intimates that there are dangers in connection with viewing

56. H. Dooyeweerd, "Kuyper's wetenschapsleer," Phil. Ref., IV (1939), pp. 193-232.

57. Ir. H. van Riessen, Op Wijsgerige Wegen (Wageningen: Zomer & Keunings, 1953), p. 82.

58. J. P. A. Mekkes, "Wet en subject in de W.d.W.," Phil. Ref., XXVII (1952), pp. 126-190. In this article the views of Conradie, Brümmer, and Van Peursen are criticized and Dooyeweerd is defended against their charges.

the heart or religion as outside of time.⁵⁹ Also of interest is his development of the notion of cosmic time which seems to carry with it some revision of Dooyeweerd. He uses the terms linear (lineair) and horizontal (horizontale) to describe time and develops an interesting notion of the existential present (existentiele praesens),⁶⁰ all of which bring, in their own way, critique on Dooyeweerd's view of the foundational direction of cosmic time. Mekkes, as usual, is very careful not to disturb the basic thought complex in Dooyeweerd.

In contrast to this we find a thorough revision of Dooyeweerd in F. Kuijper's article, "Een nadere bezinning over de transcendentale critiek in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee." It is especially in connection with Dooyeweerd's view of the transcendental direction of time that Kuijper seeks to bring reconstruction.⁶¹ The whole article is a critique on cosmic time and the supra-temporal heart. Kuijper offers some very interesting suggestions for revision of Dooyeweerd. This article is unique because it substitutes a view of the author's for the points of critique he develops, while still trying to stay within the systematics of Dooyeweerd as much as possible.

Dr. H. G. Stoker, who has been a critical adherent of many tenets of the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, although in the main has developed his own systematics which diverge quite far from Dooyeweerd, has from the very beginning focused on the notion of unity and diversity and Dooye-

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59. J. P. A. Mekkes, Teken en Motief der Creatuur (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1965), pp. 214-218. This book is of great importance for Reformed theology because it points to the deepest causes of a nature-grace religious ground-motive and its connection with theology.
60. Ibid., pp. 133-146 especially, although these distinctions are applied throughout the whole book.
61. F. Kuijper, "Een nadere bezinning over de transcendentale critiek in de W.d.W.," Phil. Ref., XXVII (1962), pp. 6-57.

weerd's idea of the time order as a prism and the necessity of speaking of the totality of meaning as supra-temporal.⁶² It would not be useful to cite the many places in Stoker where he has given attention to the points of supra-temporality, meaning, cosmic time, etc. In general he operates more in the neo-scholastic line, but his critique on these points is well taken in many places in his works.

To this list of critics many more could be added. M. Fr. J. Marlet makes an interesting comparison between Dooyeweerd's idea of the heart and the generally existentialistic-tending neo-Thomists.⁶³ C. A. Van Peursen has focused particularly on the point of supra-temporality⁶⁴ of the concentration point and the heart, and has received comprehensive response from Dooyeweerd.⁶⁵ William Young brings very sharp critique on Dooyeweerd's view of the heart and functions.⁶⁶ Ronald Nash⁶⁷ focuses on the heart in the last chapter of his small book, and is suspicious, because of Dooyeweerd's statements concerning soul as radical unity and temporal appearance, of what he calls epi-phenomenalism.⁶⁸

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62. H. G. Stoker, Die Wysbegeerte van de Skeppingsidee (Pretoria: De Bussy, 1933), pp. 1-64. In here he challenges the idea of law as the Archimedean point especially as this has been defended by Dooyeweerd. In "Iets oor kousaliteit," Phil. Ref., II (1937), pp. 65-67, he lays his finger on this sore point in Dooyeweerd especially in connection with transcendent unity and temporal diversity.
63. M. Fr. J. Marlet, Grundlinien der Calvinistischen "Philosophie der Gesetzesidee" als Christlicher Transzendentalphilosophie (München: Karl Zink, 1954), pp. 116-124.
64. C. A. Van Peursen, "Enkele critische vragen in margine bij A New Critique of Theoretical Thought," Phil. Ref., XXIV (1959), p. 166.
65. H. Dooyeweerd, "Van Peursen's critische vragen," Phil. Ref., XXV (1960), pp. 103-104, 132-134, 137, 139-143.
66. William Young, Toward a Reformed Philosophy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953), p. 143.
67. R. H. Nash, Dooyeweerd and the Amsterdam Philosophy (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962), pp. 91-94.
68. Ibid., p. 93.

In summary, we have seen that the problem of religious transcendence centered in the idea of the supra-temporality of the heart has been under attack from all sides. Besides this, there has been recurring criticism of points which are closely related to this, namely, cosmic time as refraction law (brekingswet), meaning, the transcendental direction of time, supra-temporality in general (and especially as it relates to the concentration point), the transcendental critique especially in respect to the gegenstand relation, intermodal synthesis and the idea of undeniable states of affairs. All these points indicate aspects of a rather unified picture of synthesis which will be unfolded in more detail. Suffice it to say that the problems here reviewed point to the centrality of the problem in Dooyeweerd's thinking and that it cannot be corrected just by doing away with the term "supra-temporality" since the whole complex of ideas associated with the term are too central and intrinsic to Dooyeweerd's position.

CHAPTER 2

A SYNOPTIC VIEW OF MY CRITICISM

1. A Synoptic View of the Influence of the Nature-Grace Ground-Motive on the Thought of Dooyeweerd.

This section will be followed by an oversight of the history of nature-grace thinking on the questions of God's eternity, man's eternity, and time as well as some of the problems that relate immediately to these questions. There will also be a section dealing with specific evidence from Dooyeweerd's works which will try to substantiate what is here presented generally and synoptically. In the part of this dissertation dealing with reconstruction alternatives to the criticisms in these sections will be presented. Because the criticisms as well as the positive alternatives that follow will be detailed and specific it is good for the reader to see in advance the direction of the unfolding criticism as a whole.

Problems in Dooyeweerd's thinking in respect to supra-temporality as well as those points which have been most emphasized by his critics are in the last analysis due to the influence of the nature-grace ground-motive upon his thinking. It will be shown that what seems to restrict the reformational direction in his thought is the influence of this ground-motive at central points, and that these points are in desperate need of reformation. In the next section it will be shown that the restrictive influence of the nature-grace ground-motive takes specific form in a Greek ontology type. This ontology type further restricts the dominating reformational influence of the Christian ground-motive of the

Word of God in Dooyeweerd's work. Failure to spot the influence of nature-grace on his thinking at these points drives Dooyeweerd into employing a specific ontology type. Therefore a general presentation of the influence of the nature-grace motive must precede a general description of the ontology type which is present. Throughout this section it must be borne in mind that the contentions will not be proven in this part, but that a section of detailed proof for what is here stated will follow. By seeing the general direction and purport of the criticism in advance, the reader will be in a better position to judge the evidence without getting lost in the details of the criticism.

First of all, it would seem that Dooyeweerd works with a scholastic view of the eternity of God, conceived of as an eternal present. Because Dooyeweerd is a transcendental critical thinker and opposed to all metaphysics and especially theoretical speculation concerning the nature of God, this view of the eternity of God does not often come to explicit expression.

Relating closely to this notion of God's eternity is a notion of the heavenly created as eternal in distinction to the earthly created as temporal. His hesitance to deal at all with the heaven of the angels and the created eternity of man is not simply to be explained by the emphasis in his thinking on being transcendental and critical. This is true to a certain extent, but it is just as certain that he regards heaven, the place of the departed saints and angels and the ascended Christ in his glorified human nature, to be subject to a different order. Cosmic time does not apply to this other realm but is limited to the earthly temporal horizon and this has the consequence that all that happens beyond the limits of cosmic time is out of bounds for theoretical thought. For this

reason Dooyeweerd differs markedly with Popma and Vollenhoven in respect to his view of heaven. It is my contention, in agreement with Vollenhoven and Popma, that there is nothing created that is beyond the limits of cosmic time. The created heaven, including the world of the angels, the departed saints, and Christ in his glorified human nature, is subject to the same cosmic time, is involved in the same cosmic becoming process (grote wordings process), and partakes in one history, the history of heaven and earth. On the contrary, Dooyeweerd speaks of the fact that "in this eschatological aspect of time faith groups the eschaton and in general that which is or happens beyond the limits of cosmic time,"¹ and considers it according to the order of time as it is found in the faith aspect. In line with this he stresses the supra-temporal as the central sphere of occurrence in sharp distinction from the historical aspect of time.² In addition, he contends that created cosmic time must always be seen to be in need of correlation with created eternity. This created eternity is not only to be thought of in respect to the individual hearts of men, but is an order, a sphere, a realm in and to which the categories of cosmic time cannot be applied. In conjunction with this, Dooyeweerd also speaks of the heart or soul at death as leaving this life and going into eternity.

From these and other considerations it is clear that Dooyeweerd has fallen into accommodation with the nature-grace ground-motive. This whole notion of heaven as eternity has been developed in Reformed scholasticism

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1. H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, I (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1953), p. 33.
 2. Ib'd., I, pp. 32-33.

and is part of the nature-grace ground-motive itself. His failure to see that this view of heaven is a constituent ingredient in nature-grace thinking is just more evidence that he has not purged his thinking on this point.

The importance for Dooyeweerd of supra-temporality, created eternity and eternity in general is caused by another theme of nature-grace thinking which is present in Dooyeweerd. The notion that time and history come to an end, that time and history cease at the judgment day, is a common feature of nature-grace thinking. That "time is for a time" is generally accompanied in nature-grace thinking with the addition that after time ends, eternity begins. The event which brings an end to cosmic time is the judgment day. This emphasis is also present in Dooyeweerd but only comes out explicitly in a few places. What is very clear however in Dooyeweerd is his tendency to verticalize eschatology. The term "verticalize" presents a problem in itself, but let it suffice at this point to say that verticalizing is a tendency to over-emphasize the direction of created reality to God's eternity. This can be made clear if one thinks for a moment what horizontal would mean. If it is true that cosmic time and the created law order never end, never cease, but last and endure everlastingly, that succession of events, duration as it relates to individual things will never come to an end, then cosmic time, including heaven and earth, has endless horizons which continually open up before us. This is what is meant by the term "horizontal." On the other hand, if one thinks that cosmic time will cease, then this endless dimension of cosmic time and God's faithfulness to his law order comes to an end with the judgment day, and the horizon of the new earth, if there is any attention given to it, and in general, the eschaton, must be di-

rected and turned in a vertical direction. That this is the case in Dooyeweerd can be seen in the fact that the consummation of meaning, sometimes referred to as the kingdom of God, is characterized as being above time or supra-temporal. As was stated before, Dooyeweerd places great stress on the supra-temporal, by which he means created eternity. He thinks of the eschaton as making up a central feature of what happens above time in the supra-temporal in general.³ This stress can only be explained by his accommodation to the nature-grace ground-motive.

It only takes a few considerations from the Scriptures on these points to show that there is something unhealthy about Dooyeweerd's views on these subjects. For instance, it is the stress of the New Testament that "the age to come" cannot only be viewed as starting with the end of this age, the period characterized by man's fallen existence. Rather, "the age to come" begins for most New Testament writers with the resurrection and ascension of Christ. "The age to come" is not in any way to be characterized as eternal, as opposed to temporal, especially if one has in mind by the term "eternal" the idea of an existence not subject to cosmic time, the created order, or the law ordinances which were laid down at creation. Eternal in the Scriptures often involves the notion of the incorruptible as opposed to the corruptible. In this sense, eternal can be somewhat opposed to temporal, but then temporality is synonymous with the corruptible and the eternal with the incorruptible. "The age to come," centered in heaven where the glorified Christ in his human nature is present, is dated like life on earth. This notion of "the age to come" is slowly becoming the common consensus of theologians

3. Ibid., I, p. 33.

who hold fast to the authority of the Word of God, and also of the theological world in general, since Oscar Cullmann. This is not however just one theological view among others but is part of the biblically Christian ground-motive of Word-revelation in respect to the kingdom of God and the consummation.

Another consideration is the fact that eternal life as the possession of believers is not something entered into at death or at the resurrection, but is given to one by faith. Eternal life is the present possession of all believers which comes to the fullest expression at the resurrection of the dead and in the life on the new earth. As a consequence, eternal life has nothing to do with a non-temporal life or one which is eternal in the sense of not being subject to successive unfolding, or development, but rather, eternal life is dated. Popma especially has dealt with the biblical notion of eternal life in contrast to the many scholastic positions of nature-grace thinking.

It can be said that Dooyeweerd does not give these important facets of the biblical ground-motive sufficient emphasis and attention, but beyond that it will be shown that he has distorted this rich biblical perspective in a definite way. This distortion can be seen to be the influence of the religious ground-motive of nature-grace on his thinking.

Because Dooyeweerd did not purge his thinking of these common features of nature-grace in respect to God's eternity, created eternity, and time, the reformationally Christian ground-motive of Word-revelation which he, to such a great extent, rediscovered for the Christian community failed to bear rich fruit in these respects. Instead, distortions arose and controlled his thinking. In this complex of ideas

there is quite a clear depreciation of cosmic time. This can be seen in his over-emphasis on the transcendental direction of cosmic time toward that which is above time. By this he has in mind not only God but also created eternity. This notion of created eternity is a distortion of the biblical ground-motive. Dooyeweerd's construction of religious transcendence and the concentration point are involved in this verticalization of time and the eschaton.

Implicit in his system is more than one created cosmic order; an earthly temporal one and a heavenly one, and this feature of more than one created cosmic order is constitutive of the nature-grace motive. Popma has brought out the importance of the old Reformed biblical emphasis that the re-creation adds nothing new to the creation, in the sense that a new set of ordinances are created to govern the world of re-creation. Dooyeweerd also has emphasized this point by stressing, like Kuyper before him, that the fall in sin did not affect the creation ordinances, but God in his faithfulness maintains these creation ordinances in the re-creation, bringing them to fulfillment and to proper expression through the Mediator, so that nothing of the creation is lost. This great reformational insight of Dooyeweerd and his out-working of it, e.g., in the norm of cultural revenge, is not carried through in respect to the future, however. Popma has pointed out that this emphasis of the biblically Christian ground-motive carries with it that the created law-order never ceases. This means that God's faithfulness comes to expression through his everlasting maintenance of his creation. This explains the biblical emphasis on the resurrection of the body and the new earth. On the other hand, to say that cosmic time will cease is tantamount to saying that the creation will cease. Not to see

God's covenanted faithfulness in the present and especially the future restoration and renewal of the whole temporal cosmos, both heaven and earth, is to lack the biblical perspective on these questions.

The word "new" in the Scriptures (when applied to heaven and earth) never means a wholly new world order, where there is no time, where the original created ordinances are no longer in effect. Rather, life on the new earth is precisely to be seen in the carrying out of these ordinances in fullness forever. "New" when used as "new" creation, "new" man, etc., means the old creation purified of corruption, restored, and renewed. The renewed existence, in contrast to sinful corruptible existence, is so glorious that the prophets like to speak of the old as hardly recognizable, but the "new" always preserves the old in restored and renewed re-creation.

This biblical perspective, namely that the scope of the re-creation applies to life after the judgment and that the creation ordinances are preserved, maintained, and renewed, is almost wholly lacking in Dooyeweerd's thought. This lack accounts for his verticalizing of the eschaton and his emphasis on the transcendental character of the created reality as meaning. He lays little emphasis on what Scripture emphasizes, namely the continuity of the creation beyond the judgment day. Consequently, he does not stress the resurrection of the dead and the judgment day as the historical watershed between fallen human history and history as it will continue forever in all its periods on the new earth. The rich emphasis of heaven on earth after the judgment day, the interaction of the angelic world and heaven with earth during fallen history, all these things lose their reforming power in Dooyeweerd's thought. Dooyeweerd's stress on the transcendent character of the heart and on

the transcendent religious horizon (although containing some important implications for reforming Christianity) must be modified if the ground-motive of Word-revelation is to drive us in hope toward the consummate life on the new earth. Dooyeweerd's unwillingness to consider questions which relate to the future life of believers, as well as his unwillingness to consider the importance of the angelic heavens, is not to be explained fully by his transcendental critical emphasis which is often healthy and necessary to cut off theo-ontological speculation in these matters. It is also to be explained by the fact that there is a tinge of scepticism present in his basically good emphasis on transcendental critical thinking. This sceptical tendency robs the thinking of faith (geloof-denken) from seeing the importance of the Word-revelation in regard to the heavenly side of the created temporal cosmos, the importance of the creation and paradise history, as well as the biblical emphasis on the continued faithfulness of God to his created law-order in the life on the new earth.

This verticalizing tendency is particularly disastrous because Dooyeweerd conceives of the law order as a temporal order. This brings with it a depreciation of law order since there is a definite depreciation of cosmic time.

In the section dealing with the evidence of this nature-grace emphasis an attempt will be made to show that Dooyeweerd's idea of the concentration point as supra-temporal relates to the fact that in his thought created eternity is a substitution and correction for Kuyper's emphasis on the unity of creation and re-creation in the eternal Word. Kuyper's strong emphasis on God's eternity and of events finding their unity in God's eternal plan, in almost neo-Platonic fashion, has been

corrected by Dooyeweerd. Supra-temporality and created eternity is the substitute in Dooyeweerd for Kuyper's emphasis on the unity of creation and redemption in the eternal plan of God in the Mediator. The supra-temporal is the central sphere of unity, totality, fullness, and consummation which cannot be given in cosmic time, but on the other hand, is not to be found in the eternal mind and counsel of God. Dooyeweerd takes his concentration point in Christ as the New Root and with this somewhat supra-lapsarian, semi-Kuyperian emphasis it is not possible to do justice to the stress of the ground-motive of Word-revelation on the creation, the fall, and as we have seen already, the re-creation in its future horizon. It will be shown that a tendency toward philosophic, theoretical unity has caused a distortion of the ground-motive of Word-revelation, a misplacing of the concentration point, and a distorted notion of created eternity, all of which is due to the presence of the nature-grace ground-motive.

2. A Synoptic View of the Ontology Type in the Thought of Dooyeweerd.

The specific form which the influence of the religious ground-motive of nature-grace has on Dooyeweerd's thinking can best be exposed by the use of the problem-historical method of Vollenhoven.⁴ It seems

4. This is a very difficult, complex method in many respects but its results are most accurate and it does the most justice to the diversity of figures in the history of western thought. Unfortunately there is little of Vollenhoven translated. Of particular importance for an introduction to his method is: H. E. Runner, Syllabus for Philosophy 220 - The History of Ancient Philosophy (Grand Rapids: Calvin College Mimeo, 1958-59). This is a partial translation of Vollenhoven, Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte, I, Grieksche Philosophie (Franeker: T. Wever, 1950), with a helpful introduction by Runner, pp. 1-28. For help in fixing the categories of Vollenhoven in one's mind see Vollenhoven, "Geschiedenis van de Wijsgerige Anthropologie," (Amsterdam: gecorrigeerd dictaat door D. Zijlstra, mimeo, 1961-62). Some articles in English by Vollenhoven: "The Course of Plato's Development," Bibliothèque du Xme Congrès International de Philosophie, II (Amsterdam: L. J. Veen, 1948), pp. 1-16. "The Significance of Calvinism for the Reformation of Philosophy," The Evangelical Quarterly, III (1931), pp. 387-403, IV (1932), pp. 128-160, 398-427. "Occasionalism and Physics," Free University Quarterly, III (1951). There is a recent trend to combine somewhat the methods of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven. Zuidema has always worked rather happily with both Dooyeweerd's and Vollenhoven's methods. The most recent attempt at this is that of H. Hart, "Stellingen over het pragmatisme," Corr. bladen, XXIX (1965), pp. 23-24. Also, Hart, The Challenge of our Age (Toronto: AACS, 1968), p. 7. For an evaluation and comparison of the methods of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd see C. Seerveld, "Voor en uit de praktijk," Corr. bladen, XXIV (1960), pp. 5-10. Also, Seerveld, "Dooyeweerd's Contribution to the Historiography of Philosophy," Philosophy and Christianity (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1965), pp. 193-202. For a more elaborate comparison and critique of the two methods see Popma, Wijsbegeerte en Anthropologie (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1963), pp. 91-151. For an evaluation of the significance of Vollenhoven's method in particular see Popma, "Historicale methode en historische continuïteit," Phil. Ref., XVII (1952), pp. 95-145 (with English summary pp. 142-145); S. U. Zuidema, "Vollenhoven en de reformatie der wijsbegeerte," Phil. Ref., XXVIII (1963), pp. 134-146; Vollenhoven, "De consequent probleemhistorische methode," Phil. Ref., XVI (1961), pp. 1-34.

that after many attempts to classify Dooyeweerd in terms of the ontology types distinguished by Vollenhoven, that only one type coherently accounted for the problems which are found in his writings. At this point it is necessary to put aside the question of the place of law with its three pagan answers, objectivism, subjectivism and realism, and the question concerning the relationship of the universal to the individual with its three pagan answers of universalism, partial-universalism (higher-lower scheme and the macro-microcosm theme), and individualism. Since Dooyeweerd has done such ground-breaking work on the idea of the law and its significance for Christian thinking, any attempt to classify him in regard to the question as to the place of the law demands a great deal of analysis. In a later section some of the differences between Vollenhoven, Popma, and Dooyeweerd on the nature of the law will be dealt with. For now it will just be indicated that Dooyeweerd shows some relatively clear indications of having a realistic, or more precisely, a neo-realistic cast to his thinking concerning the question, "where is the law." The question of the zeitgeist in which Dooyeweerd must be placed will also be set aside for the moment since this is inextricably tied to the question concerning the place of the law.

The ontology type that can be seen to be present in Dooyeweerd can be described as follows: a cosmogono-cosmological monism, with the theme of priority, involving semi-contradictory contrasts.⁵ This is not a complete classification because it leaves the question of impetus

5. For further information and explanation see the index to Vollenhoven's Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte, and "De consequent probleem-historische methode," pp. 19-22. Also, "Ennoetisme en 'ahoristos dyas' in het praeplatonische denken," Phil. Ref., XIX (1954), pp. 58-59, 146-168, (English summary on pp. 165-168); "Plato's realisme," Phil. Ref., XXVIII (1963), pp. 106-110.

theory and the further specification of instrumentalism vs. vitalism undecided. Later on some attention to these questions will be given but for now the facets of the ontology type which are most clearly present in the thinking of Dooyeweerd will be concentrated on.

First of all a general synopsis of how this classification seems to fit and explain the problem areas of Dooyeweerd's thought will be presented. At first sight one would think that Dooyeweerd's thinking should be classified as dualistic rather than monistic. This would appear to be the case because Dooyeweerd places a great deal of stress on distinctions like supra-temporality and cosmic time, heart and functions, root unity above cosmic time and relative unities within cosmic time, religion as supra-temporal, central sphere and temporal modal spheres, etc. It was Dooyeweerd's unique stress on the fact that the heart is transcendent and above time in its participation in the concentration point of our cosmos, that makes it appear to be a dualism in his thought. Another indication of this dualism might be said to be Dooyeweerd's distinction of two kinds of generation in respect to man: temporal bodily and central spiritual (geestelijk).⁶ Almost all of Dooyeweerd's critics have focused on these pairs of ideas. However,

6. H. Dooyeweerd, "De leer van den mensch in de W.d.W.," Corr. bladen, 7 (1942), p. 143. Here he says, "De schepping van den mensch naar lichaam en ziel, die volgens de Schrift volkomen voltooid is, werkt zich creatuurlijk uit in den weg der generatie. Deze generatie heeft zoowel een lichamelijke als een geestelijke (religieuze) zijde. Naar de eerste, die in den kosmischen tijd verloopt, is de menschheid uit éénen bloede geworden. Naar de tweede, die niet in den tijd verloopt, zijn wij het 'geestelijk zaad' van Adam en deelen diensvolgens in zijn zondeval. De natuurlijke lijn der geestelijke generatie wordt echter doorbroken door de nieuwe generatie uit den Heiligen Geest of wedergeboorte. Deze generatie uit den Heiligen Geest heeft echter de natuurlijke lijn der geestelijke generatie uit Adam tot voorwaarde, niet tot richtsnoer (de 'natuurlijke' mensch, de anthroopos psychikos, is eerst, daarna de 'Geestelijke' mensch, de anthroopos pneumatikos.)" Also found in Sola Fide, VII/2 (1954), pp. 8-18.

one is also very much struck by Dooyeweerd's attempt to overcome all dualism in his thinking especially as it relates to the Thomistic, scholastic idea of the soul as a rational substance, or anima separata. From the beginning of his career, Dooyeweerd has placed a great deal of stress on the unity of man and constantly warns both against viewing the heart or soul of man as a substance and against substantializing tendencies. His emphasis on the integral, radical character of human experience, his stress on the heart as a center of direction (which can only be understood in its three religious relations: to God, to the world, and to our fellow man) all militate strongly against a dualistic classification. In addition, Dooyeweerd has stressed the meaning (zin) character of created reality which embraces and over-arches all categories in his system⁷ and certainly seems to speak against a dualism. Dooyeweerd also stresses the idea of dynamic refraction of created reality from a totality or fullness into a rich diversity of temporal aspects and temporal individuality structures. It would seem that one cannot think of root unity, totality, and fullness of meaning on both law and subject sides as in any way actually separate from their modal and typical temporal expressions.

According to Vollenhoven, in all dualistic positions there is the primal distinction of transcendent and non-transcendent. This division indicates two realms, each of which has its own origin, so that the dualist must be thought to have two equally ultimate principles or ori-

7. Brümmer emphasizes the importance of the all-embracing character of the category zin or meaning. Transcendental Criticism and Christian Philosophy, pp. 50-62, 163-165. See also my master's dissertation, pp. 17-36, 93-103.

gins corresponding to the two realms. The monist on the other hand is said to answer the question of origin by pointing to only one origin for reality. For this reason Vollenhoven sharply distinguishes a dualism from a duality, since a duality only indicates two sides or dimensions of one thing, whereas dualism denotes two equally ultimate principles or origin.

Instead of having two realms, the transcendent and the non-transcendent, the monist seeks to account for diversity in the cosmos by speaking of a bifurcation of contrasts from one single origin. From the one origin there bifurcates two major contrasts, one of a higher species and the other of a lower species. The monist, therefore, generally has a more difficult time explaining the problem of evil, since evil must also proceed from one origin. But the real problem for the monist becomes the relation of the two major contrasts. Vollenhoven distinguishes various monistic positions which deal with this relation and which have arisen in connection with the question of movement in the cosmos. Of interest here is the theme of priority. This theory asserts that of the two contrasts, higher and lower, influence is exercised by the higher on the lower but not by the lower on the higher. In parallelism, in distinction from the theme of priority, the two primal contrasts run parallel to one another not influencing each other. In interactionism both species, lower and higher, exercise mutual influence upon each other.

In the theme of priority the cosmos is viewed as semi-contradictory, the contrasts being in tension as distinguished from and opposed to purely contradictory and non-contradictory monists.⁸

8. See footnote 5 of this chapter for discussion of the theme of priority.

Now as we keep some of these basic distinctions in mind the tangled problems in Dooyeweerd's thinking become unraveled. The basic contrasts in his thinking are now to be seen in those pairs of contrasts which were mentioned earlier. Those who see a dualism in Dooyeweerd have focused on these.

A. The Basic Contrasts:

Within created reality in respect to man the basic contrast is between the created eternity of the heart of man and his temporal function mantle, the human body. This same basic contrast of supra-temporal and temporal runs through Dooyeweerd's thinking from beginning to end. An example of this is to be seen in the contrast between the supra-temporal transcendent fullness, totality, and root unity of created reality on the one hand and its temporal diversity and revelation within cosmic time on the other. Dooyeweerd contrasts religion, as the central supra-temporal sphere, with the modal aspects which are temporal revelations, manifestations, and refractions of the integral undifferentiated central sphere (which on the subject side is the fullness of all man's temporal functions concentrated in a unity of direction upon the origin of the cosmos). A further example is his distinction between the unity, fullness, and totality on the law side in the law of love which is supra-temporal, on the one hand, and structural law which is temporal and relates to the diversity and coherence of our cosmos on the other. These basic contrasts are most globally seen as contrasts between the earthly temporal cosmos and the heavenly side of the cosmos, between the supra-temporal soul or heart and the temporal cosmos, between supra-temporal root unity, totality, and fullness on both subject and law sides and temporal diversity on law and subject sides.

Before we get to the origin of these mutual primal contrasts, some clarifications are necessary. Dooyeweerd clearly states that the boundary between the sovereign Creator and the created is the law. This must be kept in mind so that the central contrasts are not misplaced. He rightly shows that both subjects and objects are subjected to law. This correlation of the law with created reality which is subjected to it, must definitely be maintained. The primal contrasts within the cosmos however, relate to root unity, totality, and fullness in the higher contrast and cosmic time with its law and subject sides guaranteeing diversity and coherence in the lower contrast. It also must be made clear that the primal contrasts cannot be regarded to be between the modal aspects and typical structures of individuality. This point must be made, because Vollenhoven has pointed out that Dooyeweerd, because he views cosmic time on its law side as a time order of modal aspects, with each aspect having its particular aspectual expression of cosmic time, has substantialized the modal functions.⁹ The accuracy of Vollenhoven's criticism must be evaluated in greater detail later, but for now it can at least be said that Dooyeweerd shows a clear tendency to substantialize the modal functions. Due to his emphasis on the idea that the constant governing types and modal functions are always realized in concrete things and events and therefore are never to be thought of as occurring in reality as separate,¹⁰ it seems that the substantializing tendency must be explained differently. This means

9. Vollenhoven, "College systematiek - het probleem van de tijd," pp. 2, 7, 13, 14.

10. This is especially clear in Dooyeweerd's article, "Schepping en evolutie," Phil. Ref., XXIV (1959), especially p. 127, also pp. 146, 148-149.

that the primal contrast cannot be regarded as running between modal and typical structures in the temporal cosmos. Just as we noted that it could not be seen to run between the law and subject sides.

In order to trace the one source from which these primal contrasts have bifurcated or proceeded, one is helped by turning to the article by Dooyeweerd, "Schepping en evolutie." In this article he draws attention to a very important distinction in his thinking. This concerns the difference between the finished supra-temporal work of the Creator and the great becoming process.¹¹ Dooyeweerd stresses that God's acts of creation cannot be regarded as having taken place within time in temporal succession as Spier has attempted to show, but rather, all temporal descriptions (for example those found in Genesis 1) presuppose the creation of cosmic time itself. Consequently the creation acts of God are not temporal events. Dooyeweerd also has a rather unique position which is placed in sharp contrast to the scholastic notion of psycho-creationism, in which there is thought to be a continuous special creation of human souls in time after God's creation in six days was completed. He lays a great stress upon Genesis 2:1-4, where emphasis is placed on the finished character and completion of God's creative acts. All of God's created activity is complete and it concerns not only the first pair of human beings but the totality of created reality.¹² Genesis 1 speaks of the finished character of God's creating work which relates to the totality and fullness of all created reality. God can never again be said to create. This creation of the totality of the cosmos, heaven and earth, is said to

11. Ibid., pp. 115-116.

12. Ibid.

be the work of God "in the beginning." Genesis 1:1 refers consequently to the supra-temporal creative acts of God as they relate to the totality, unity, and root of the cosmos.

Dooyeweerd then speaks of the temporal becoming of the finished work of creation. All created reality unfolds or becomes according to the creation order. The creation order in a certain sense must be distinguished from the temporal order. The creation order in God's work of creation can only be approximated in the structures of time. In the beginning of this article Dooyeweerd stresses the importance of distinguishing between the finished creation of God which is supra-temporal and cosmic time in which the great temporal becoming process takes place. He says, "De gehele tijdelijke orde met het gehele wordingsproces dat zich daarbinnen zou voltrekken was ongetwijfeld in de schepping begrepen, maar slechts als creatuurlijk resultaat van Gods voltooide scheppingswerk."¹³ Dooyeweerd goes on to distinguish creation and becoming as they relate to man.

De schepping omvat n.a.w. de totale mens in zijn centrale afhankelijkheid van God, als beelddrager van zijn goddelijke Oorsprong; de formering en het ontvangen van de levensadem is de uitwerking van Gods scheppend woord in het tijdelijke wordingsproces, overeenkomstig de ordeningen en structuren door God in de orde des tijds gesteld. De schepping zelve gaat alle menselijk begrip en alle menselijke voorstelling te boven, omdat zij geen tijdelijke gebeuren is, maar het werk Gods 'in den beginne'.¹⁴

From this quotation and the surrounding context it would appear that Dooyeweerd simply distinguishes between the work of creation by God and the great cosmic temporal becoming process according to the order of time. Cosmic time was created itself, and the totality and

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

fullness of God's created work now "becomes" successively according to the order of cosmic time. God's supra-temporal acts of creation are incomprehensible to theoretical thought and revealed to ordinary experience in terms of time, accommodated to our faith function. These acts should be seen as the transcendent religious presupposita of all temporal succession and becoming. From this the twin primal contrasts are not yet evident. In this article there is only talk of the great cosmic temporal becoming process. This process is in the lower contrast only, and this comes clearly to the fore when we compare this article, "Schepping en evolutie," with another, "De leer van den mens in de W.d.W.," in which he sets forth ideas concerning his view of philosophical anthropology.¹⁵ Here Dooyeweerd distinguishes between a temporal cosmic becoming or generation in respect to man's body and a supra-temporal spiritual (geestelijk) generation.¹⁶ Here we have the higher primal contrast. From God's creation "in the beginning" of the totality of the creation comes two contrasting generations. The higher generation relates to the becoming or generation of the hearts of men and the generation in the lower contrast relates to temporal generation of man's body. These must be seen in strict correlation. Mankind is created as a totality "in the beginning" and then this created mankind unfolds in two contrasting but always strictly correlated generations. Since the finished creation of God refers to man as a whole man and as an individual member of the whole human race, created as a unity and totality "in the beginning" by God, he can never be thought of as a composite of two substances or as separate entities

15. Dooyeweerd, "De leer van den mens in de W.d.W.," pp. 134-143.

16. See footnote 6 of this chapter.

but rather must be seen as a unity in duality of supra-temporal heart and temporal function mantle.

Since these primal contrasts, created eternity or supra-temporality and temporal reality, are always in strict correlation, neither contrast can be thought to exist before the other. Therefore God's acts of creation are neither in time or in created eternity but are the cause and condition of both. Therefore when Dooyeweerd speaks of man being created as a unity or totality by God this must have reference to man before both temporal bodily generation and spiritual supra-temporal generation have begun. In this way the unity of man is more original or basic than the duality in man, and for this reason also Dooyeweerd cannot be thought to be dualistic.

The creative acts of God are the origin of both created eternity and cosmic time and therefore neither can be applied to the character of God's creative acts. The two contrasts, especially as they relate to the mutual generations of heart and body of the individual man, are strictly correlated and therefore in this respect, neither contrast is primary.

This is not all that can be said at this point. Dooyeweerd speaks of the "voltooide scheppingswerk" in which "de tijdelijke orde met het gehele wordingsproces dat zich daarbinnen zou voltrekken was ongetwijfeld in de schepping begrepen, maar slechts als creatuurlijke resultaat,"¹⁷ but in a footnote on the same page he tries to guard against viewing the creative calling into existence through God's Word as an ideal pre-existence of the created in God's Spirit.¹⁸ One is driven because of this and other statements by Dooyeweerd to wonder about the

17. Dooyeweerd, "Schepping en evolutie," p. 116.

18. Id., p. 116, footnote.

character of this finished creation which is the totality of all created things. As a finished or completed totality of created reality it must be thought to exist as the result of God's creative acts. But this existence can neither be characterized, on the one hand, as an ideal pre-existence of the creation in God's Spirit, nor, on the other hand, can its existence fail to be sharply distinguished from the temporal becoming of this created totality. There are some reasons for designating the character of the existence of the total created reality from which all temporal becoming proceeds as supra-temporal. This would seem to place a primacy of some sort on the supra-temporal higher contrast in distinction to the strictly correlated character of created eternity and time as they are related to man. The further working out of this problem will be postponed so that the rest of the general synopsis may be presented.

The strict correlation of the supra-temporal heart and temporal body in which the duality of contrasts come to clear expression must be seen to be the result of their original root unity found in God's creative work from which the contrasts proceed. It would seem that Dooyeweerd's emphasis on strict correlation gives a continual reminder to this original root unity. The stress on correlation does imply that there has been bifurcation and, to some extent, separation which then is overcome through correlation. Correlation would seem to imply two correlata. The duality is always kept in strict correlation for otherwise man would fall apart into central heart and temporal functions. Dooyeweerd lays great stress on the correlation of the supra-temporal heart and the temporal body. His whole idea of cosmic intuition, the act structure, theoretical analysis and synthesis as related to religious

supra-temporal self-reflection, rooted in the heart and root of consciousness, the selfhood, constantly shows the importance of never being able to separate these two contrasts and strongly attests to their strict correlation.

Dooyeweerd has stressed the fact that cosmic time cannot be understood except in strict correlation to created eternity.¹⁹ When Dooyeweerd made this statement he was referring to more than the individual human heart in correlation with its temporal body. Rather, created eternity has reference to that which is central, unified, and fully in contrast to what becomes in time according to the order of time. The root of the cosmos, first in our head Adam and later in Christ, according to his human nature, subjected to the central unity of law, is regarded as supra-temporal. The created and fallen human race participates in their hearts in the fallen supra-temporal root of the created cosmos. The created and fallen human race is the central religious supra-temporal root community. The individual selfhood, as supra-temporal, participates in this root community of mankind, the hearts of which participate in their covenant head Adam. The new re-created and reborn humanity is a supra-temporal root community of hearts participating in the new root of the re-created cosmos, Jesus Christ according to his human nature, subject to the central law of love. In this sense all that is central, unified, religious, concentrated, and undifferentiated partakes of the

19. In a small sectional meeting of the W.d.W. on March 21, 1954, in Amersfoort, M. C. Smit brought up the question of time and eternity in respect to history. Dooyeweerd stressed at this point that cosmic time must always be thought of in strict correlation to created eternity and that his notion of time could not be understood without this correlation. Re the a priori relation of the temporal to the supra-temporal in general, see Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, I, p. 31, footnote.

character of created eternity which is, of course, in strict correlation to the temporal becoming of this root community in its manifold forms, temporal manifestations, and revelations.^{20 21}

This root community, however, is in its created eternal character, very dynamic. As we have seen, Dooyeweerd speaks of a spiritual supra-temporal generation of man's heart. It is impossible to conceive of what a supra-temporal spiritual generation would involve since this whole higher contrast must be thought to possess the nature of created eternity and is not directly subject to the cosmic earthly temporal order. In this sense the hearts of men are beyond law if law is seen to be the temporal law spheres and typical structural laws which govern temporal functions and temporal individual things and events. Man in his heart is subject to the law as central in distinction from the diversity of laws which apply to the diversity of his temporal functions. In this sense the primal contrast runs through both the law and subject sides since the unity of the law side and the root unity on the subject side are created but supra-temporal while the diversity of laws and diversity on the subject side are temporal. Not only must created eter-

20. Dooyeweerd uses the term openbaren when referring to the fact that the supra-temporal expresses itself in the temporal. The fullness of meaning, the totality of meaning reveals itself in rich temporal diversity. It manifests itself, expresses itself, but generally he uses the term "reveals." This is a rather strange use of the idea of revelation. One would normally think of the counsel of God revealing itself in the creation and history of the world, but this is not what Dooyeweerd has in mind. It is the created fullness and totality which is revealed.

21. This use of the idea of created eternity in which more is obviously in mind than the eternal character of the heart of the individual man presents some problems. How this broader use of created eternity is related to the totality of created reality as the result of God's creative acts from which the cosmic becoming process proceeds is not always clear. It would seem that this totality including the heart is to be regarded as being in a status of created eternity. This will be dealt with in greater detail later.

nity or the supra-temporal which is the higher contrast be thought of as being dynamic, since a spiritual generation takes place, but being central it is called the central realm of occurrence.²² Here Dooyeweerd definitely sets off his idea of supra-temporality from any static view of supra-temporality. For this reason Dooyeweerd cannot be thought to be a dualist in the line of Xenophanes, for instance.²³ Vollenhoven, in speaking against Dooyeweerd's view of the self, is recorded as saying, "Tijd en verandering zijn correlaat; raakt heel de mens. Pas op voor het dualisme in de zin van: transcendente is onveranderlijk and niet-transcendente is veranderlijk-tijd."²⁴ But this view of transcendent and non-transcendent, which was characteristic of the purely cosmological dualist, Xenophanes, cannot be applied to Dooyeweerd. As we have seen, Dooyeweerd stresses the dynamic character of the supra-temporal or created eternity and even speaks of a spiritual supra-temporal generation which could hardly be done if he conceived of the transcendent horizon as unchangeable like Xenophanes. As to what this dynamic character is, however, Dooyeweerd in line with his critical transcendental thinking will not say, precisely because it transcends our temporal horizon which is the boundary for theoretical thought.²⁵ Dooyeweerd's thinking in these respects can only be viewed as a monism with higher and lower con-

22. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, pp. 32-33.

23. Vollenhoven, Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte, I, pp. 59-66; Popma, Wijsbegeerte en Anthropologie (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1963), pp. 11-88; Popma, "De eeuwigheid Gods volgens Boethius," Phil. Ref., XXII (1957), pp. 35-51.

24. Vollenhoven, "College systematiek - het probleem van de tijd," p. 6.

25. Dooyeweerd, op. cit., I, pp. 32-33. Here he rejects the phrase "central trans-cosmic time" as applying to the supra-temporal in general because it would not be serviceable to cover both realms. It is said in line with the question of criterion for the use of terms. To apply this phrase to the supra-temporal would leave one "entirely in the dark."

trasts which are always kept in strict correlation since they proceed from the creation work of God "in the beginning."

One last consideration before the theme of priority is taken up is the relation of the heavenly created to the earthly temporal cosmos and to created eternity. We can formulate the question somewhat like this: is created eternity, which Dooyeweerd emphatically insists must be seen in strict correlation to cosmic time, to be identified with the heaven of the angels and departed saints? Dooyeweerd distinguishes clearly our earthly temporal cosmos from the heavenly created as it has relation to the angelic world.²⁶ It would seem from a host of different considerations, which will be presented in greater detail later, that Dooyeweerd thinks of created eternity and heaven as very closely related, and it would appear that in places they are even identical, although he does not speculate much concerning this. From other statements it would appear that he distinguishes somewhat between created eternity and heaven as eternity. In general, however, we can say that created eternity and heaven, being the place of departed saints and angels as well as the ascended Christ, are related closely enough to be considered as making up the higher contrast of his monistic position.

B. Theme of Priority:

Central for understanding the vision of Dooyeweerd as a whole is the presence of the theme of priority. My judgment about the character of Dooyeweerd's concentration point, its transcendence above time, and the nature of supra-temporality (boventijdselijkheid) in its many applications is pulled together and confirmed when the complex of problems summarized by the term "supra-temporality" is viewed in the light of the

26. Ibid., II, p. 53, footnote.

theme of priority. The defenders of Dooyeweerd on this point have emphasized the unity in Dooyeweerd's view of man, in particular that of heart and temporal body, and religion and its functional and typical expressions. It is particularly when the fact is emphasized that the heart of man is not in cosmic time, but exists above time, and that this is one of Dooyeweerd's central ideas, that defenders of his system come to his defense. It is in answer to these defenders that the theme of priority is of supreme importance.

As was briefly mentioned before, it is unique to the theme of priority as it is found in many monists, e.g., St. Augustine's third period, that influence is always exercised on the lower contrast by the higher contrast and not by the lower on the higher. The lower is directed by the higher. Particularly in those who hold to the impetus theory among these advocates of the priority theme, movement is started in the lower only after an impetus from the higher contrast, as opposed to those defenders of the priority doctrine without impetus in which movement is present in the lower but steered by the higher as a rider steers a moving horse.²⁷

It seems to be the case that in Dooyeweerd direction, influence, and movement are always exercised by the higher contrast in general, the supra-temporal upon the lower contrast, that is, all which transpires within the cosmic earthly temporal horizon rather than in the reverse direction from the lower upon the higher contrast. This state of affairs which will be seen immediately following from different angles seems to

27. See footnote 5 of this chapter for more about the priority doctrine.

explain why Dooyeweerd speaks of the heart of man as transcendent,²⁸ of religion as transcendent,²⁹ and of the supra-temporal body of Christ as transcendent.³⁰ This word "transcendent," as used by Dooyeweerd, carries with it the implication that the heart, the concentration point, is permanently above time, and can never be regarded as in time. It means consequently that transcendence is not to be considered the result of an activity in which the heart of man is thought to move from within time to above time, but rather the term "transcendence" is a description of the permanent status or position of the heart and the concentration point because of its nature as transcendent, i.e., above cosmic time. This means that Dooyeweerd can often speak of the heart as residing in a central transcendent sphere, i.e., religion; of the heart as participating in a transcendent supra-temporal religious community, the body of Christ; and, because of this transcendent position the heart is provided with a still more all-embracing horizon, i.e., the transcendent religious horizon of created reality, rather than only the earthly temporal transcendental horizon.

This theme of priority comes to rather clear expression in two terms used frequently by Dooyeweerd. These terms are "expression" or "revelation" (openbaring) or "breaking" and "concentration." Dooyeweerd uses the term "expression" when referring, for example, to the fact that all man's temporal functions are expressions of the transcendent unity of

28. I was once challenged to show that Dooyeweerd applied the term "transcendent" to the supra-temporal. There are numerous places in which this term is used. In respect to the heart see Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," Phil. Ref., V (1940), pp. 179, 197, 209, 222.

29. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, II, pp. 552, 562-564, 570, 572, 578, 596, 598.

30. Ibid., III, pp. 214-215, 537.

man, the heart.³¹ The heart on the subject side is the unity, totality, and fullness of all man's temporal functional life and all these functions must be thought to come from this heart. They must be said to come from the heart because the heart is the individual root unity of those functions in which all the functions are present in an undifferentiated way. That these temporal functions can be said to be present in the heart as undifferentiated and therefore indistinguishable, is clear from his idea of cosmic time as a prism. This prism concept has the signification of refracting into rich diversity that which before the refraction was an undifferentiated unity or fullness, e.g., light. This clearly applies to the heart of man and there is no sense to the analogy if one does not think of the functions as proceeding from the transcendent heart of man in some sense.

It would seem that Dooyeweerd can speak of the heart as the whole man before God, because all the functions are present in the heart before their refraction.³² This comes to light in what he says concerning the creation of man. "De schepping omvat m.a.w. de totale mens in zijn centrale afhankelijkheid van God, als beelddrager van zijn goddelijke Oorsprong; de formering en het ontvangen van de levensadem is de uitwerking van Gods scheppend woord in het tijdelijke wordingsproces,

31. Dooyeweerd, "Individualiteits-structuur en Thomistisch substantiebegrip," Phil. Ref., IX (1944), p. 33. Here he says, "Het is dan de integrale tijdelijke uitdrukkingsvorm van den geest des menschen, die zich uit geen der modale aspecten van den tijdshorizon laat uitsluiten. Zoals het zonlicht door het prisma gebroken wordt in de zeven kleurengammas van het lichtspectrum, zoo breekt zich de geestelijke wortel-eenheid van 's menschen existentie door den tijdshorizon in de rijke verscheidenheid van modale aspecten en individualiteits-structuren van het lichamelijk bestaan."

32. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, III, p. 88.

overeenkomstig de ordeningen en structuren door God in de orde des tijd gesteld."³³

Although Dooyeweerd nowhere in this whole section explicitly speaks of the heart as the whole man before God it seems that from the context one is almost forced to conclude that this is the case. Whether it is here the case is particularly important in this context since he is clearly speaking of creation as distinguished from becoming and of cosmic temporal becoming as proceeding from the completed creation work of God. Man as a totality is created and stands before God. If a case can be made that man as created totality before temporal becoming is the whole man in his heart then we have a clear picture of how functions have come forth from the heart, even genetically, and also a clear example of what Dooyeweerd means by refraction. This is an essential point, because many of his students have focused on the heart's concentration of its functions upon itself, or concentration, and neglected to see the equally important notion that temporal reality depends on the supra-temporal and is the expression in time of the higher supra-temporal contrast.

This interpretation is brought out by what Dooyeweerd says of the bodily forming process. He says,

Onder invloed van het dualistisch vorm-materie motief van de griekse wijsbegeerte was hier de centraal-religieuze zin van het bijbels scheppingsmotief uit het oog verloren. Want hoe kon de mens binnen de tijdelijke orde tot een "levende ziel" worden, wanneer God niet in den beginne Zijn scheppend woord gesproken had, dat het gehele mensdom in zijn totaliteit, gerepresenteerd in zijn stamvader en stammoeder, tot aanzijn riep, een aanzijn dat zich eerst in

33. Dooyeweerd, "Schepping en evolutie," p. 116.

het wordingsproces binnen de tijdsorde zou uitwerken? Of meent men dat de voltooiing van de schepping van de mens slechts op twee menselijke individuen zou slaan en dat hun nakomelingen niet in het voltooide scheppingswerk van God begrepen waren? Maar ook de eerste mensen, die binnen de tijdelijke wereld op aarde verschenen, waren onderworpen aan het lichamelijk formeringsproces, waarvan Gen. 2:7 spreekt, en waarin zij tot "levende ziel" werden, doordat God hun de "levensadem inblies." Formering nu, hoezeer ook uitwerking van Gods scheppend woord, is zelve geen schepping, maar vormgeving aan een reeds eerder in de tijdelijke orde aanwezig materiaal, dat ook zelve eerst door het goddelijk scheppingswoord tot aanzijn kwam, evenals de "levensadem."³⁴

Certain things can be said on the basis of this quotation. The temporal bodily forming process follows upon the finished creation of mankind. As we have seen, this creation embraces the "totale mens in zijn centrale afhankelijkheid van God, als beeldrager van zijn goddelijk Oorsprong." The becoming process is a becoming of what is created totality, i. e., nothing becomes temporally which was not first created. This comes out clearly when Dooyeweerd stresses that the creative work of God embraced not only the first two individuals but mankind in his totality. Although in this context Dooyeweerd nowhere says explicitly that the hearts of all men represented in their ancestors Adam and Eve (stamvader en stammoeder) were created and then become in the temporal process according to the order of time, this seems to be what is implied. He speaks of a temporal bodily forming process which would clearly seem to distinguish what is dealt with in Genesis 2:7 from the hearts of men. In many other places, especially when Dooyeweerd speaks of the heart of man as concentration of all functions, the heart is looked at as the whole man with all the functions undifferentiated because they are concentrated. That Dooyeweerd views this created man-

34. Ibid., pp. 115-116.

kind as totality, as really existing before its subjection to the temporal becoming process, comes out clearly from what Dooyeweerd says in a footnote in this context. He says, "alzo werd de mens tot een levende ziel. Deze uitspraak spreekt duidelijk van een wording van de mens tot een tijdelijk levend wezen. Deze wording van de mens tot een levend wezen onderstelt dat de mens reeds geschapen was. De mens stond reeds voor God door het Woord dat hem tot aanzijn riep."³⁵ This becoming of man to a living being presupposes that man already was created and gives clear indication that becoming follows creation. The temporal becoming embraces a bodily forming process and "body" for Dooyeweerd indicates an enkaptic whole of all man's temporal functions which are expressions, refractions of a root, undifferentiated unity and fullness. The body, the functiemantel, finds its concentration point in the heart. That it is the heart as the not yet temporally refracted and differentiated totality which Dooyeweerd has in mind as created by God in the beginning, seems to come out, in this context. In speaking of the fact that the revelation concerning the creation cannot be identified with the creation itself he says,

Die openbaring richt zich primair tot het menselijk hart, het religieuze centrum van ons bestaan, waarin God "de eeuw" gelegd heeft, en waarin door de werking van Zijn Geest alles wat in de tijd geschiedt in centrale relatie tot Hem wordt gevat. Maar zij gaat als openbaring ook in de tijdshorizon van onze ervaring in, om de mens binnen de tijdsorde in het geloof aan te spreken. Binnen de tijdsorde nu spreekt de Woord-openbaring over God zelf vaak in termen van de tijd, maar dit wil niet zeggen dat God en zijn scheppingsdaden in die tijd zouden zijn besloten.³⁶

Two things appear from this quotation. First, he is talking about

35. Ibid., p. 115, footnote.

36. Ibid., pp. 116-117.

the heart as the religious center and is also viewing this center in its strategic importance as the point to which God primarily directs the revelation of his creation. Second, it appears that this religious center cannot be regarded as being in the time horizon or subject, as religious center, to the time order. If this were not true, revelation concerning the creation would not also have to go into the temporal horizon to speak to man in faith nor would it need to be addressed to the temporal faith function of man. The higher-lower contrast comes forth clearly here when one notices that revelation concerning the creation is addressed to man in his religious center, in which God has laid eternity, and to man in his temporal faith function within the time horizon and under the time order.

In this same quotation we notice that revelation has two sides corresponding to the higher and lower contrasts in man. This point will be dealt with later when we treat the Incarnation and the concentration point.

Dooyeweerd's way of speaking about the heart and the image of God seem to point up the fact that when he says, "De schepping omvat m.a.w. de totale mens in zijn centrale afhankelijkheid van God, als beelddrager van zijn goddelijke Oorsprong," he is referring to the heart of man viewed as the whole man. In another article Dooyeweerd refers to the image of God in man as "het centrale zetel van het beeld Gods." He says,

Slechts in de ontsluiting van ons hart voor Gods Woordopenbaring worden wij aan ons zelf ontdekt en onthult zich de ware wortel-eenheid van onze existentie, die, als de centrale zetel van het beeld Gods, de tijd in zijn kosmische zin-verscheidenheid transcendeert, omdat, naar de scheppingsorde al het tijdelijke in haar op de eeuwigheid in haar bijbelse (niet Griekse) zin diende te worden geconcentreerd. In de afvallige richting van het menselijk hart is dit beeld Gods geheel verduisterd, maar in Christus Jezus is het ons in zijn

ware zinvolheid geopenbaard. En slechts in en uit Hem leren wij in de gemeenschap van de H. Geest verstaan, in welke zin wij in het centrum onzer existentie de tijd te boven gaan, ofschoon wij tegelijk binnen de tijd besloten zijn.³⁷

In this same article he speaks about the image of God in man and about the heart. "Niet uit ons lichaam, maar uit het hart onzer existentie komt de zonde voort en niet ons lichaam, maar ons hart moet wedergeboren worden. In bijbelse zin is het menselijk lichaam de 'tempel' van Gods Geest, maar niet het centrum en de radix van onze naar Gods beeld geschapen menselijkheid."³⁸ In these two quotations we see the way Dooyeweerd views the image of God in man and the heart. In one place it even appears that the image is identified with the heart, in other places only as the central seat of the image, giving the impression that the image is more than the heart.

To sum up the case, it appears that Dooyeweerd is saying that the human race as a totality represented in Adam and Eve (stamvader en stammoeder) was created by God in the beginning. All that will unfold and be subject to the temporal process of becoming is present here as finished creation. There would seem to be a root community of hearts represented in the heart of the first representative root, Adam. Since the heart appears to be the image of God for Dooyeweerd, God is represented as creating the total man in his central dependence on God as image bearer and with all men as image bearers in Adam. Since Dooyeweerd can speak of the heart as the whole man, the whole human race can be said to be created. This created human race unfolds and becomes in rich diver-

37. Dooyeweerd, "Van Peursen's critische vragen," Phil. Ref., XXV (1960), p. 103.

38. Ibid., p. 133.


sity according to the temporal order.³⁹ The whole man becomes both body and heart since both are subject to generation, the body to a temporal generation and the heart or soul to a supra-temporal generation process. From the created whole man, that is, the heart, the whole man becomes. The temporal body functions comprehended and undifferentiated in the created heart now unfold in their rich diversity in the temporal becoming process. On the other hand, all the individual hearts of men created in their first representative become by a supra-temporal generation. In this way we see that all reality as it exists now is the expression or openbaring of its prior existence as created undifferentiated totality. Dooyeweerd intimates that reality as it exists through temporal becoming and supra-temporal generation had a pre-existence. He tries to set his idea of reality's pre-existence as finished creation apart from an ideal pre-existence of the created in the Spirit of God. He says, "Men hoede er zich daarom voor op speculatieve wijze het scheppend tot aanzijn roepen door Gods Woord als een ideeële van het geschapene in Gods Geest te vatten. Ook dit is een ondeuidelijke poging van het menselijk denken om tot de verborgenheid van Gods scheppingswerk door te dringen."⁴⁰ Here Dooyeweerd warns one against viewing the creation work of God in the beginning as a temporal event on the one hand and as an ideal pre-existence of the creation in God's Spirit on the other hand. The existence of the created is not an ideal pre-existence in the Spirit of God; it exists as created, as

39. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, III, p. 88ff. For the idea of the breaking of the spiritual root unity into rich diversity of modal aspects and individuality structures of bodily existence see "Individualiteits-structuur en Thomistisch substantiebegrif," p. 33.

40. Dooyeweerd, "Schepping en evolutie," p. 116, footnote.

the finished creation. It is this finished existing creation that now becomes in the great becoming process. Here, then, we see the monistic origin of both generation processes on the one hand, and also, since it is the heart or root which is created and therefore becomes, we see how the priority is given to the higher contrast. The lower temporal becoming is directed from the higher but it also is a becoming of the created in its pre-existent root unity and totality. The lower contrast does not influence the higher but is the developed expression of it.

It can be diagrammed something like this:



The theme of priority appears most clearly in Dooyeweerd's idea of concentration. In line with the theme of priority, concentration is always concentration from the lower towards the higher, as this lower is directed, guided, or concentrated to the higher. This theme comes out in many facets of Dooyeweerd's thought. For example, his whole transcendental critique depends on his idea of the transcendent starting point being beyond the temporal horizon.⁴¹ The dependence of the transcenden-

41. Theoretical thought cannot overcome the anti-thetical relation set up in the analytical gegenstand relation unless it is directed above itself to a transcendent supra-temporal concentration point. The

tal critique on this supra-temporal transcendent starting point means that intermodal synthesis can be accomplished. Because the center of consciousness is supra-temporal, transcendent, not in time, synthesis can be completed. Immanence thinking is forced, on the other hand, to

point to see is that the concentration is the point from which the concentric direction is initiated and given to theoretical thought and that it is helpless without the higher. Dooyeweerd says, "Nowhere, hence not in the logical aspect either, does cosmic time in itself offer a concentration point that could serve as a point of departure for philosophic thought. In time meaning is broken into an incalculable diversity, which can come to a radical unity only in the religious centre of human existence. For this is the only sphere of our consciousness in which we can transcend time." A New Critique, I, p. 31. On the same page in a footnote he states this even stronger, "Even the idolatrous absolutizing of the temporal cannot be explained from the temporal horizon of human existence. For the latter nowhere provides a point of contact for an idea of the absolute, unless it be related apriori to the supra-temporal. This act of concentration presupposes a supra-temporal starting point in our consciousness." See also Dooyeweerd, Verkenningen in de Wijsbegeerte... (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1962), pp. 31-46; also "Het dilemma voor het Christelijk wijsgeerig denken," Phil. Ref., I (1936), pp. 7-14. In "Del Vecchio's Idealistic Philosophy of Law," Phil. Ref., XXII (1957), p. 15, Dooyeweerd says, "This endeavour to synthesize the antagonistic motives of nature and freedom was uncritical of theoretical thought. For a theoretical synthesis presupposes a starting point in human consciousness which transcends the antithetical basic relation of the theoretic attitude of thinking. This starting point is only to be discovered in the transcendental way of concentrating our theoretic act of thinking on the I. But this concentric direction of theoretic thought is not to be explained from the intrinsic structure of the latter which, on the contrary, binds it to the divergence of the antithetically opposed modal aspect of our experiential horizon. It can only originate from the religious basic motive which rules the I-ness as the religious concentration point of human existence." It appears from these quotations and countless others that theoretical thought cannot initiate the concentric direction. The lower is moved by the higher, and this means that theoretical thought is helpless without the ego in the higher, in fact it is the ego that thinks and thinking without its relation to its center and transcendent drawing-together-point (betrekkingspunt, point of connection) is an abstraction. The act of thought is an expression of the ego in the temporal horizon which the ego initiates and self-reflection in the concentric direction is the return movement of the thinking ego to itself which is also only initiated by the transcendent ego. The whole transcendental critique depends on this theory of priority.

complete the synthesis by taking one of the poles in the intentional-antithetical gegenstand relation. This antithetical relation of theoretical thought is set up in theoretical analysis. Theoretical analysis must move by its inner nature to theoretical synthesis. But the antithetical relation is caused by the intentional opposing of the logical function to the nonlogical function of our real act of thought. This intentional opposition, set up through analysis, cannot be overcome by taking either side of the opposed aspects. A point must be found above the diversity of the functions opposed to one another. The condition of functional diversity is precisely cosmic time as breaking or refraction law. Therefore the point of synthesis must be beyond cosmic time. It is the transcendent center of consciousness in its I-ness or selfhood that proves to be the hidden player behind the scenes. It completes the act of synthesis by directing the functions to itself or by concentrating them in itself. In this way, through concentrating or directing the opposed diversity to itself as concentration point above the diversity, the diversity is seen in its deeper unity and intermodal synthesis is accomplished.⁴² Ultimately, all functions are functions of the selfhood and analysis is initiated by the transcendent self and is overcome in synthesis by re-direction back to selfhood. The selfhood as transcendent to the lower pulls or draws the lower to itself. The lower is thereby given concentric direction since the higher is defined as a focus point, concentration point, betrekkingspunt, etc.

All of the lower is directed by the higher contrast. The compre-

⁴². Dooyeweerd's distinction of the concentric and divergent directions of consciousness is of great importance because it lends support to this analysis of the presence of priority. This will be dealt with in a later section.

hensive character of this direction of the higher contrast by the lower comes out clearly in Dooyeweerd's answer to a question from Van Peursen.

He says,

Maar als hij zijn bedoeling nader tracht te verduidelijken door de toevoeging, dat de eeuwigheid meer moet worden gezien als "vanuit de tijd intensief op God gericht zijn," dan heeft hij blijkbaar niet bedacht, dat Gods "eeuwig zijn" in geen geval in de religieuze relatie van de mens tot zijn Schepper is te vatten. Anderzijds kan de tijd zelf niet "religieus gekwalificeerd" zijn, omdat "kwalificatie" juist een immanent tijdelijke bepaling is. Maar de tijd is naar zijn immanente zin-dynamiek wel "religieus gericht," d.w.z. intrinsiek betrokken op het religieuze concentratiepunt der menselijke existentie. Want slechts de mens staat in de centrale religieuze relatie tot God.⁴³

It is apparent that Dooyeweerd holds that time in its immanent meaning-dynamics does not direct itself; it is directed. The use of the passive is very characteristic of Dooyeweerd, e.g., the lower is moved, is directed, is concentrated. This is possible because the lower is intrinsically related to the transcendent supra-temporal center in the higher contrast.

To say that time in its immanent meaning-dynamics is religiously directed implies and sums up many facets of Dooyeweerd's thinking. For example, the whole historical opening process is led and directed by the heart through its temporal faith function. The opening process is one that is directed from above in the transcendent religious sphere of human existence. Another example is the important stress which Dooyeweerd gives to the transcendental direction of time. The transcendental direction is the anticipatory or concentric direction of all temporal reality to the transcendent (in the higher contrast) concentration point in which the individual human heart participates. Temporal

⁴³. Dooyeweerd, "Van Peursen's kritisch vragen," p. 140.

reality is meaning and this signifies that it points to the transcendent root unity and from the root unity to the 'αρχή' of all meaning. It points to the unity because it is directed to the unity by the root unity. Temporal reality is meaning because it is pulled from above towards a unifying point. Temporal reality without reference to this unifying transcendent root unity is incalculable diversity. It proceeds from created totality and becomes rich modal and typical individual diversity and is pulled back to its root unity from above by this root unity and 'αρχή' from which it has proceeded.

Just as all temporal societal structures are expressions of a supra-temporal religious root community, so they are all directed by this supra-temporal root or religious community, the body of Christ. The being directed by is always accomplished by being directed to. Only in this way is reality religious, that is, concentric, unified, and meaning-(full). Without this concentric direction of the lower by the higher contrast through the transcendent supra-temporal concentration point, the lower temporal reality cannot be related to God. Without this directedness toward God by the transcendent root it tends to fall into meaninglessness, into nothingness, although God's grace keeps this from happening since in Christ he maintains the created order.

This theme of priority also comes out clearly in Dooyeweerd's idea of idolatry. The selfhood turns from its true Creator-directed worship toward worship of the temporal. The selfhood is above the temporal because it directs the temporal toward itself, but the selfhood does not stand in itself, it is ex-sistent, it must concentrate itself on an origin. But having turned from its true Origin the apostate selfhood turns to the lower, relative, earthly, temporal, and created and seeks

to find rest in the temporal diversity by absolutizing some aspect or facet of it. This whole process of apostasy depends on the fact that the lower is directed by the higher contrast to its Origin so that this structural process continues to be present even in apostasy, although now the directions are changed. The higher, the transcendent selfhood, directs its immanent functioning towards itself, and then from this higher point of relation it turns toward the lower and absolutizes it, instead of directing the lower beyond itself to its Origin. This process can only be redirected by a pulling from the true Origin. The concentration of the heart upon its lower temporal idol can only be overcome by its being redirected from the still higher Divine Origin which pulls it away from its temporal allegiance of absolutization of the lower.

In summary, we have seen in a few important ways how the theme of priority works in Dooyeweerd's system. All of these will be dealt with in detail at a later point. One consideration is necessary at this time, however. The terms "transcending" and "concentrating" cannot be thought as if the heart in the temporal transcends or moves from the lower temporal to the higher temporal. Concentrating or transcending is an act of the selfhood which is always transcendent, that is, above time. The temporal transcends by being directed by the supra-temporal, by being pulled above itself, by being drawn like a magnet towards one point. This transcendent position of the selfhood and the concentration point is caused or is possible because it exists in a central relation to the Divine eternal Origin. This Divine Origin draws the concentration point out of itself, that is, from resting in itself; towards its final resting point, the $\overset{2}{\alpha} \rho \times \overset{1}{\eta}$ which alone stands in itself. Temporal di-

versity is drawn and directed to and by a supra-temporal root unity which is again drawn to and by a supra-temporal root unity which is again drawn to and by the Divine Origin. The apostate selfhood loses its actual transcendence when it directs itself from its transcendent sphere of existence toward a pretended Origin in the non-transcendent, i.e., the immanent temporal. This absolutization and consequent loss of actual transcendence cannot be explained unless the selfhood is located in a transcendent position, unless it has a supra-temporal sphere of existence, a supra-temporal structural central relation to the Divine $\alpha\pi\alpha\rho\chi\eta$ beyond the creation.

To summarize thus far, we have seen that movement in the lower in all cases is due to initiation from the higher contrast. It is at the impetus or initiation from the higher that the lower temporal points beyond itself and receives concentric direction. It is only when temporal reality is directed and moved from above that it is meaning, because it does not stand in itself and it has no root unity.⁴⁴ This is the theory of priority.

As was said at the beginning of this section, Dooyeweerd seems to use an ontology type which was described as being cosmogono-cosmological, monistic, employing the theme of priority and being, therefore, semi-contradictory. Vollenhoven has shown that this theme of priority is only

⁴⁴. In De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, II (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1935), p. 27, Dooyeweerd says, "... zoo kan de vraag; wat is zin? Niet worden beantwoord zonder ons te be-zinnen op den oorsprong en eenheid van allen tijdelijken zin. Geen enkele tijdelijke zin-structuur bestaat 'an-sich'. Dat wat haar eerst tot zin maakt ligt boven de tijdsgrans in de zin-volheid van onzen kosmos. Zin is 'ex origine' de samentrekking van alle tijdelijke zijden van het bestaan in een boventijdelijk brandpunt en dit brandpunt is, gelijk wij vroeger zagen, de religieuze wortel der schepping, die slechts zin en daarmede aanziin heeft krachtens Goddelijke, souverain scheppende zin-geving."

found in positions which are semi-contradictory.⁴⁵

C. The Semi-Contradictory Feature:

The semi-contradictory feature of the ontology type in Dooyeweerd's thinking is of course modified by the presence of the Christian ground-motive of Word-revelation, but it seems that there are still clear traces of this theme at various places in his thinking.

Dooyeweerd, in describing created reality's mode of being as zin or meaning, does not hesitate to speak of the effects of sin upon created reality in such terms as meaninglessness, a tendency towards nothing, meaning loss, dispersion (verstrooidheid), etc. To be added to this is his use of the notion of sin as a privation of meaning.⁴⁶ Although he seeks to guard himself from a speculative use of this idea, he nevertheless feels quite justified in using it. This is quite strange since this notion has grown up and is part of the Greek theo-ontological tradition and has generally been rejected by Reformed thinkers. Now, as has been said before, Dooyeweerd lays great stress on the fact that in Christ nothing of the created reality is lost and that God holds the created law order intact through the fall and in spite of the sin of man. In discussing the effect of sin on the positivization process, as that process is influenced by apostate man, Dooyeweerd is seeking to do justice particularly to the effect of the religious misdirection of

45. See footnote 5 of this chapter.

46. Dooyeweerd, "The Secularization of Science," (tr. by R. D. Knudsen) International Reformed Bulletin, IX (July 1966), p. 5. "That is also why human existence, in its religious center, is subject to a law of religious concentration, which has not been abrogated by the fall. All the power of the devil is based on this law of concentration in human existence, because without this law idolatry would be impossible. Sin is a privation, a lie, a nothingness; but the power of sin is something positive, which is dependent on the created goodness of reality." Also, A New Critique, II, pp. 32-36.

apostasy on the historical forming and positivizing work of man. This is a deep point in Dooyeweerd's thinking and the use of the notion of privatio in this context is to a certain extent understandable.⁴⁷ The unique place of positivization in Dooyeweerd's thought and the influence of apostasy on this process might justify some resuscitation of the old pagan notion of evil as privatio.

We have seen that the theme of priority is apparent in the fact that the direction and influence between the two contrasting realms are always exercised by the higher on the lower. The traces of semi-contradictory emphases come out most clearly in the way Dooyeweerd pictures idolatry.

There are two forces operative on the sinful heart of man. Dooyeweerd likes to speak of the rich diversity of the modal functional aspects as tempting the apostate man, who, because of the in-created existent character of the selfhood with its concentric tendency, must restlessly find a ground. The universality in its own sphere of all the temporal functional aspects allow illusory full scope to the absolutizing, continuity desiring, and restless character of the apostate supra-temporal selfhood. In apostasy the selfhood is drawn toward the rich diversity of temporal reality. In the end, any absolutization of a sphere of temporal reality, because of its universality in its own sphere in which a cross section of the whole temporal cosmos is ex-

47. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, II, p. 33. "Is sinful reality still meaning? Is it not meaningless, or rather the adversary of meaning, since meaning can only exist in the religious dependence on its Origin? Here we indeed touch the deepest problem of Christian philosophy. The latter cannot hope to solve it without the illumination of Divine Revelation if it wants to be guaranteed from falling back into the attitude of immanence-philosophy." See also pp. 330-337, 362-365 in this same volume.

pressed, proves to be only one among many possible absolutizations. Apostate man is confronted with an "embarrassment of riches," by the many possibilities for "isms" and by the diverse aspects which all lend themselves to similar absolutization. Cosmic time relativizes all the modal functional aspects by directing them to their fullness of meaning in the transcendent supra-temporal consummation and fullness of meaning.⁴⁸ Each functional aspect is in the last analysis only a relatively sovereign refraction of a transcendent supra-temporal fullness of meaning, lost sight of in apostasy. Apostasy is described as a loss of the true concentric direction towards the true Origin. The redirection is a pulling of the selfhood by the divine drawing (trahere) away from the temporal diversity upon which it has concentrated its attention, with which it is bedazzled, to which it has directed itself, and in which it is seeking to find rest. The Word of God is described as a central driving power (drijfkracht), Kracht, a dunamis, a power. It is also, however, a pulling or lifting power, for it pulls the selfhood away from its temporal absolutizations. It pulls and attracts the selfhood toward its true Origin so that the true concentric direction of the self upon its true Origin can be regained. This is a Divine redirection in which the unity of direction of the selfhood is restored. The dispersion (verstreoidheid) of the selfhood in which the selfhood is broken and lost in the diversity of functions and lost in the incalculable *ἄπειρον* of cosmic temporal individuality is overcome. The selfhood can go in two directions, either from the supra-temporal or transcendent religious sphere toward the temporal diversity in the temporal horizon or toward its eternal resting point in its true Origin. The rightly

48. Ibid., II, pp. 3-4, 489-490, 540-541, 560-561.

directed selfhood directs its functions by pulling them in self-reflection toward itself as their transcendent unity. The concentric direction of meaning is centered in the selfhood which must direct its temporal functions, as well as all of created reality by its transcendental boundary (grenz) function, faith, toward itself as the root unity of the cosmos and thence to the Origin of the cosmos. The transcendental anticipatory direction of the cosmic time and the pointing character of cosmic temporal meaning in a concentric direction above time to the root unity and Origin, is a structural state of affairs which is held in effect despite the fall of man by the transcendent Origin in the higher. This explains the concentration on and absolutization of the temporal by the selfhood in apostasy. This also figures strongly in the leading of the opening process by the apostate faith. Nevertheless, the meaning character of created reality is made so dependent upon the direction of all temporal reality by the selfhood, which is transcendent to it, that when apostasy occurs in the root, mis-leading and even meaninglessness arises. Dooyeweerd insists that this loss of meaning even influences the law side in the process of positivization.

The integral radical character of the selfhood as the image of the integral radical Origin⁴⁹ is seen in the similar way in which both concentrate and direct. The selfhood in the concentration point concentrates or pulls toward itself its diverse functions in which it is involved through its cosmic intuition. It pulls and directs as a magnet all its temporal expressions toward itself and it is directed and pulled out

49. For interesting usage of these important terms see Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning (Zutphen: J. B. Van den Brink, 1963), pp. 28-42.

of itself toward its Origin. It directs the lower temporal toward itself by being pulled or drawn by the Divine Origin. It is concentrated by being drawn by the power of the Divine drawing (trahere). By this power from the Origin it gives concentric direction and meaning unity to the restless temporal diversity which has lost its fullness of meaning by having been refracted through the prism of cosmic time. The temporal is restless because it no longer has unity, fullness, and a ground, and it continues to be such until it returns in the transcendental anticipatory direction toward the unity and fullness of meaning from whence it was refracted. This is all gained by its being drawn and directed from above by the concentration point. It does not find its fullness without its being directed by the root unity of the cosmos towards the $\hat{\alpha} \rho \times \eta'$ or Origin which is a pre-condition for the temporal meaning aspects finding their unity and rest. The temporal meaning dynamics "get stuck"⁵⁰ in the last aspect of the cosmos, the faith aspect, if the selfhood in the transcendent realm has lost its direction toward the $\hat{\alpha} \rho \times \eta'$. The temporal meaning dynamics cannot be fulfilled and reach rest if the root is broken and is directed towards the temporal meaning itself. The meaning dynamics is turned back on itself, but it, by its created structure, does not stand in itself but points and shows its dependence precisely by its being drawn by the Origin toward himself.

Dooyeweerd stresses the fact that sin is a transgression of God's law but also stresses the fact that sin is loss of meaning, a privation.

Another way in which Dooyeweerd pictures man's apostasy indicates

50. For the use of this expression see A New Critique, II, p. 189.

the semi-contradictory tendency in his thought. To be completely in the temporal horizon is to be enstatically dissolved in the incalculable diversity of time.⁵¹ The animal world is closed up in time and man's uniqueness is particularly shown by the fact that the human act-structure is an individuality structure which has no qualifying or typical function, not even the faith function.⁵²

The fact that man has no typical qualifying function expresses for Dooyeweerd the fact that man has an eternal destination and no temporal destination like the animals. Therefore, to have one's selfhood in time would automatically mean loss of transcendence above the animals and also brokenness. To place the selfhood under cosmic time as an eternally or everlasting ordinance, as will be shown later must be done, is simply impossible for Dooyeweerd.⁵³ This would immediately imply from Dooyeweerd's point of view that there can be no intermodal synthesis, no time-consciousness, and no unity, because there is no root unity within the temporal diversity but only above the diversity. Time is something that must be transcended if unity is to be gained. There seems to be

51. Ibid., I, pp. 33-34.

52. See the note by Dooyeweerd where he mentions that the view that the body of man was once defended by him as being qualified by the faith aspect, but that he has definitely thrown this view over. Inleiding tot de Encyclopaedie der Rechtswetenschap (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, n.d.), p. 114, footnote 1.

53. In another context Dooyeweerd also stresses this fact. He says, "Maar naar onze beschouwing, de Christelijke opvatting der persoonlijkheid, kan evenmin het 'individuele ik' in den tijd worden gezocht en daarmee nemen wij principieel tegen de 'geesteswetenschappelijke sociologie' positie, die zulks met de geheele immanentie-philosophie juist wel doet. De individuele zelfheid is door en door religieus, boventijdelijk. In de kosmische tijdsorde kan nòch aan den individueelen mensch, nòch aan het verband zelfheid, ikheid toekomen. Dit is het cardinale uitgangspunt voor iedere wezenlijk Christelijke beschouwing der tijdelijke samenleving." De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer (Amsterdam: W. Ten Have, 1931), p. 113.

involved in the notion of cosmic time as a breaking law, a depreciation of time. Popma has shown this tendency in many forms. It might even be implied in the figure of the prism which Dooyeweerd loves to employ.⁵⁴ Despite the fact that Dooyeweerd says it is only an image and should not be fought over,⁵⁵ it figures too centrally in Dooyeweerd's thought to be replaced. He calls cosmic time a brekingswet (refraction law) and the nuclear moments a brekingspunten (points of refraction). All his systematics on cosmic time presuppose the figure of the prism and there is no image that could be conceived of that could replace this. The moment this image is changed many features of Dooyeweerd's system do not fit well.⁵⁶ The image seems to be more than just an image in Dooyeweerd's thinking.

For man to be completely temporal, that is, to have both heart and functions in time, is not only inconceivable for Dooyeweerd, but it would mean that man would have lost his eternal destination, would be condemned to restlessness and would not be any different than the animals.

Therefore Dooyeweerd pictures apostasy as a verstrooidheid,⁵⁷ as a

54. In "Disqualificatie van den tijd," Corr. bladen, XVII (1954), pp. 24-25, Popma speaks of the Greek background of this idea. "Men zou de vraag kunnen stellen of deze brekingsidee niet enigermate door de antieke wijsbegeerte is beïnvloed; en ook of de wijsbegeerte der wetsidee in haar brekingsgedachte wel geheel aan een disqualificatie van de tijd kan ontkomen." See also "De loochening van den tijd," pp. 26-28; "Geloof en geschiedenis," pp. 28-31; "Tijd en geschiedenis," pp. 12-16. All of these articles are in this same issue of Corr. bladen.

55. Dooyeweerd, "Van Peursen's critische vragen," p. 139

56. See the interesting article of van Riessen where he uses the figure of the circular staircase. "Systematiek - de werkelijkheid in den toren," Corr. bladen, VI (1941), pp. 81-82.

57. Dooyeweerd, op. cit., p. 103. "Binnen de kosmische tijdshorizon vindt de menselijke existentie geen wezenlijk concentratiepunt, maar blijft ze verstrooid in de verscheidenheid van modale aspecten en typische individualiteitsstructuren."

loss of unity, as a loss of time consciousness, as being restless, driven to and fro by the dynamics of temporal meaning, and as being lost in the time horizon.

To be completely in time, it seems, cannot be seen as meaning loss or loss of unity or time-consciousness, simply because the root unity or the concentration point found in the new human race in Christ, the second Adam, the new man under the central law of love, can be given in time. The totality and unity of the created can never be conceived of as given in cosmic time for Dooyeweerd. This brings with it a depreciation of the everlasting holding character of cosmic time as created ordinance, for the future on the new earth. Still more, it drives him to seek transcendence in an eternal central sphere of created meaning in which the root unity and the consummation of meaning can be achieved. He is forced to view the created cosmos as a correlation of created eternity and the temporal. This implies two orders and means that some of the created is not temporal, a notion which we shall see is a typical feature of nature-grace thinking. There is a semi-contradictory pull on the selfhood, toward the temporal in which it is involved and in which it participates in its temporal expressions and temporal function mantle or body, and toward the eternity of God above the created. This tension of two directions is overcome by the Divine trahere or pulling power of the Word of God as dunamis from above. In the reborn human race there continues to be this tension between concentration and direction toward the temporal, which must constantly be overcome by Divine grace which in general is expressed as the concentration on the eternal Origin.⁵⁸

58. The precise nature of this tension will be dealt with in a later

Dooyeweerd can talk about aeuum as the state which must be constantly actualized, because without this actualization in which the selfhood is turned from concentration on the temporal, the selfhood falls away into meaning loss and even meaninglessness. Therefore, there is the necessity for continual Divine grace and reliance on the redirecting central power of God's Word and upon the temporal Scriptures by the faith function. The faith function is the "window to eternity." Without this window, temporal reality is closed off from its $\alpha\rho\chi\eta'$, root unity, and tends toward meaninglessness. The central importance of this "window to eternity" is not limited to God's eternity, but also to the created eternity in which the root unity of the cosmos is located, and through which all the temporal is directed to God from this one point in the higher, by God and by man. Created eternity is a structural, but not static, condition or state or status of the selfhood, but it must be continually directed to its $\alpha\rho\chi\eta'$ and must concentrate itself on its Origin. It does this concentrating necessarily because it is structurally made to do this by the religious concentration law which is not lost in apostasy. The actualization, however, only happens when the selfhood is directed and directs itself away

section. In discussing the three relations in which the ego must be conceived if it is not to resolve itself into nothing, Dooyeweerd says, "The first relation, namely, that of the human ego to the temporal order of the world, in which we are placed, cannot lead us to real self-knowledge, so long as it is viewed in itself alone. The temporal order of human life in the world, with its diverse aspects, can only turn away our view from the real center of human existence, so long as we seek to know ourselves from it." In the Twilight of Western Thought (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publ. Co., 1960), p. 182. Here we see somewhat this tension since the ego is bound to time, enters time enstatically via its intuition in order to know its body as its own, is consistently concerned with time because it concentrates the temporal on its self and directs the temporal to itself, yet he says that the temporal order of aspects can only turn away our view from the real center of human existence, so long as we seek to know ourselves from it.

from the temporal, by directing its temporal diversity toward itself.

One could almost say that as the selfhood directs the temporal to itself, it is simultaneously directed by its Origin. Not to be concentrated on one of the temporal aspects is to be concentrated on the $\dot{\alpha} \rho \times \eta'$. The importance of seeing the distinction between structure and direction; i.e., religiously being in a right or wrong direction; i.e., toward or against God, which is emphasized by Vollenhoven, is somewhat confused in Dooyeweerd. It might be said that structure tends to be reduced to direction. Meaning-fulfillment is transcendence of the temporal and is a loss of temporal diversity (in the sense that diversity is no longer distinguishable) in the unity above time, the converging center of direction toward the $\dot{\alpha} \rho \times \eta'$ of all the temporal meaning dynamics in its restlessness. Structure is transcendentally-directed meaning. Meaninglessness, nothing, and meaning loss tend to occur when this direction is lost. The structure is almost its pointing character. The abiding significance of the cosmic creational ordinances, their holding for the future after the judgment on the new earth, is lost sight of.

This tendency to reduce structure to direction which is found in Dooyeweerd's idea of meaning, despite the great importance of this idea of meaning for cutting off all substantialization of created meaning, is an expression of the semi-contradictory theme in his thinking. When the direction to the $\dot{\alpha} \rho \times \eta'$ is lost, the structure tends to privation of meaning. Even despite the grace in Christ there is some privation of meaning.

As was said before in discussing nature-grace, there is a verticalization of the eschaton. The tendency to reduce structure to direction is caused, in the last analysis, because of a scholastic view of cre-

ated eternity. The future horizontal linear character of cosmic time is blocked. The endless character of cosmic time and the everlasting or eternal validity and holding character of the creational ordinances beyond the judgment day is not reckoned with. Re-creation expresses centrally God's faithfulness forever to his original creational ordinances. If there is the implicit idea that eternity begins at the judgment day, the idea of the structural constancy of all creation ordinances including the idea of cosmic time with its "forever" or everlasting character is lost. Structure comes to an end. For Dooyeweerd all that is earthly is governed by cosmic time and all aspects are aspects of time and are intrinsically temporal. All individual temporal unities are temporal. Thus when one does not think of time as endless and of the re-creation as the fulfillment and maintenance of creation ordinances on the new earth, then, on Dooyeweerd's own basis, there is bound to be a total lack of treatment of the problem or a complete ignorance about the future after the judgment because eternity must be a whole new structural order, everything of this earth being intrinsically temporal. On the basis of Dooyeweerd's own position concerning the temporal character of earthly reality and the general importance of cosmic time it would seem natural to insist on the continuity of cosmic time after the judgment day. It is necessary to so insist on this if the created is to continue to exist in anything like its present structuration. It is precisely Dooyeweerd's lack of emphasis on this fact and Popma's correspondingly great emphasis on the importance of this point of the everlasting character of the created ordinances, which show the nature-grace influence which restricts the reformational direction of the ground-motive of Scripture concerning the kingdom of God and the consummation

in Dooyeweerd.

Because the future constancy of the structure of temporal created reality after the judgment day is blocked by a second wetsidee or order idea, that of eternity in nature-grace fashion, the consummation and eschaton is forced in a vertical direction. The verticalization, as the tendency to reduce structure to direction, is caused because there is no future for the present created structure after the judgment day for Dooyeweerd. In a discussion with Dooyeweerd,⁵⁹ I once asked him whether he thought that the fact that Paul speaks of faith abiding in I Cor. 13 after the judgment day, had any bearing on whether the function of faith would abide after the judgment. Dooyeweerd gave an interesting reply. First he said, "faith turns into sight and therefore faith passes away." When I mentioned the fact that Paul emphasizes that faith abides, he stressed the fact that we know really nothing about the future after the judgment. When I then asked how it would be possible to conceive of a resurrected man without all the functions and the law spheres holding, he seemed to reconsider his previous statement and agree that I was laying my finger on an important point. The general fact that Dooyeweerd has not laid emphasis on the constancy of ordinances for the future is simply not understood unless one sees that he uncritically has taken over and works more or less implicitly with a traditional scholastic view of heaven as eternity, the eternity of God as present, and also the idea that time ceases. It was probably in the interest of avoiding theologism and speculative metaphysics in his own thinking that Dooyeweerd failed to see the all important influence which the speculations in nature-grace on these points exercise on the think-

⁵⁹. At his home in Amsterdam, June, 1964.

ing of Christendom. It is also probably because in all of these areas we know so little and because there has been so much speculation concerning God's eternity, heaven as the place of departed saints and Christ now, and also concerning the future after the judgment day, that Dooyeweerd thought he could best deal with these areas by not dealing with them. But this is an important type of oversight. The Bible sets itself over against all manner of speculation on these points, against views which were struggling to gain power over the lives of the early Christians. The Stoic, the Hellenistic-Judaistic, and the Sadducean views of God's eternity, heaven, and the future, are polemicized against by the New Testament authors. Popma brings this out very clearly.⁶⁰ It is in accordance with the ground-motive of Word-revelation that we must be directed properly in our thinking concerning these issues and that we must continue to see the reformational Christian ground-motive of Word-revelation as pointing us away from all mythical notions of heaven, God's eternity, and the future. That we should seek to set off the true position from the false positions on these points is one of the chief tasks of Christian philosophy, just as it is one of its chief tasks to be led by the Biblical motive concerning the creation and to set itself off from false mythical views of the beginning of the world. Because, then, the future is blocked and there is no idea of the future for the structure, the structure is given significance and meaning only when it points beyond itself to the created supra-

60. Popma, "Burgerschap," Phil. Ref., VII (1942), pp. 98-122.

temporal⁶¹ and to the Origin. It cannot be denied that created reality shows its dependence on God and in this sense does not stand in itself. The fact that the world was created shows its dependence on God as its Origin. Meaning, as dependence on its Origin is one thing, but dependence on created eternity for fullness, root unity, and the consummation of meaning is another. The eschaton, the unity, the consummation, all these are fulfilled in the central sphere of occurrence or the transcendent religious horizon, which is supra-temporal, beyond time. Beyond time signifies not only God in his exalted eternity above the created cosmos, but also the created central realm or the transcendent horizon or created eternity. The idea of meaning as dependence has a great deal of significance because God is the great goal of the creation. But the kingdom is fully come only when God dwells with his people on the new earth forever as the Mediator, whom the peacemakers will see face to face because they will see the face of his Son, Jesus, in his glorified flesh, whom to see is to see the Father. The consummation, the glory of God and the kingdom are according to the ground-motive of Word-revelation, fully realized when God comes to the earth in judgment and comes to dwell on the earth, making heaven on the earth because

61. Dooyeweerd, De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, II, p. 27. "... zoo kan de vraag: wat is zin? niet worden beantwoord zonder ons te be-zinnen op den oorsprong en eenheid van allen tijdelijken zin. Geen enkele tijdelijke zin-structuur bestaat 'an-sich'. Dat wat haar eerst tot zin maakt ligt beven de tijdgrens in de zin-velheid van onzen kosmos. Zin is 'ex origine' de samentrekking van alle tijdelijke zijden van het bestaan in een boventijdelijk brandpunt en dit brandpunt is, gelijk wij vroeger zagen, de religieuze wortel der schepping, die slechts zin en daarmede aanzijn heeft krachtens Goddelijke, soeverein scheppende zin-geving." This article which we have quoted before, stresses the importance of the new earth but also deals with the place of heaven and traces in Hellenism and Judaism the views current in respect to heaven and earth, time and eternity, and how there is a conscious polemic in authors of the N.T. to avoid the speculative currents.

of his abiding presence. It can never be verticalized into a seeing of God in which faith will no longer be necessary, having turned into sight in some vertical heavenly eternity in which time and temporal created functions no longer apply; rather, it is consummated in the faithful seeing and believing of the resurrected mankind as it listens to and obeys the word of Jesus which is spirit and life and which is fulfilled in eternal life on the new earth.

D. Cosmogono - Cosmological:

Another problem in which Vollenhoven sees ancient pagan thought addressing itself to is the place of the myth. The myth was a substitute for Word-revelation and one's relation to it in paganism was all determinative for the structure of one's thinking.

Vollenhoven distinguishes three basic answers to this question which were all found before Socrates. These are theogono-cosmogono, cosmogono-cosmological, and purely cosmological or purely structural thinkers. The theogono-cosmogono thinkers are also called mythologizing thinkers by Vollenhoven.⁶² They had views of the origin of the gods as well as of the origin and genesis of the cosmos.⁶³ These views were couched in myths which were pagan substitutes for divine Word-revelation concerning the creation and genesis. These mythologizing thinkers

62. See footnotes 4 and 15 of this chapter.

63. For the importance of myth in its relation to theogony and cosmogony see Popma, "Myth en wijsbegeerte," Phil. Ref., XXIX (1964), pp. 68-102; Wijsbegeerte en Anthropologie, pp. 1-75, 91-151; Ni denken over de Tijd (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1965), pp. 238-260; Levensbeschouwing, VII (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1965), p. 388 (this index, under "myth" and "mythologie," gives a general survey of Popma's thoughts on myths contained in his 7 volumes); "Threskeia," Corr. bladen, XXIII (1959), pp. 1-4; "Nythe," Corr. bladen, XVII (1953), pp. 9-10; "De nabijheid Gods," Corr. bladen, XXIV (1960), pp. 1-5. See also, Mircea Eliade, Das Heilige und das Profane (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1957); Patterns in Comparative Religion (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1958).

were especially represented in six types of Orphic theologies.

In reaction to these mythologizing thinkers and to myths of popular religion were the purely cosmological thinkers and cosmogono-cosmological thinkers. The harshest reaction and repudiation of myth was found in the purely structural thinkers. Not only did they reject the myth but also de-emphasized any idea of genesis or development of the gods or the cosmos. Rather, they emphasize the structural constancy and eternity of the present structure and for them development or unfolding was denied or made insignificant for understanding the structure of the cosmos. This thinking is often present in empiricistic thinkers and quite often among the natural scientists who seem to have no eye for the history of their specialty and the history of theorizing.⁶⁴ This type of thinking is also current in the present linguistic analytical movement with its de-emphasis on the history of philosophy and its emphasis on metaphysical problems regardless of their development.

Cosmogono-cosmological thinkers were also against the myth but tried, in contrast to purely cosmological thinkers, to do justice to the genesis historical evolving character of the cosmos. They did not concern themselves with the gods. For these thinkers structure can best be seen in its historical unfolding from simple to complex in its genesis. In this connection it is interesting that all evolutionists are cosmogono-cosmological thinkers (according to Vollenhoven).⁶⁵

64. See Popma, Nadenken over de Tijd, pp. 7-98.

65. Vollenhoven, "Hoofdtrekken der wijsgerige problematiek in de hedendaagse mens-beschouwing," (Amsterdam; mimeo, n.d.) p. 7; "Cursus 1959-1960, onderdeel III, wisselwerkingstheorie," (Amsterdam; mimeo, 1960) p. 1; "College systematiek- het probleem van de tijd," pp. 6-8, 13-14.

Dooyeweerd certainly could not be called a theogono, cosmogono thinker since he stands firmly on the Scriptures and repudiates mythologizing thinkers. For him speculation about God is totally out of bounds. There might be a touch of mythologizing in his view of the supra-temporal but he always stresses that his view of aevum is taught throughout the whole of Scriptures. Nor does Dooyeweerd elaborate upon supra-temporality in any detail as one finds in mythologizing thinkers who try to account for life in terms of elaborately fantasized tales.

Nor could Dooyeweerd be called a purely structural thinker. Although Dooyeweerd has a distinct predilection for eternity in which there is rest, harmony, and unity,⁶⁶ he has this because he emphasizes unfolding, development, differentiation, and time. Dooyeweerd has always been concerned with doing justice to the insights of historicism and evolutionism. Over against rationalism he has stressed the insights of Von Savigny and the German historical school. Dooyeweerd has been concerned with historicism from the beginning and this emphasis and involvement must certainly be seen as providing at least a partial motivation for his emphasis on the supra-temporal character of the heart and the concentration point and also his general desire to transcend the temporal horizon.

This emphasis is also seen in Dooyeweerd's idea of differentiation. Kuyper, before Dooyeweerd, loved to speak of created reality as an organism which developed from seeds which contained the whole in potency and in an undifferentiated state. In his early years Dooyeweerd used this

66. This point is very important and will be dealt with later in survey fashion in which the data in which the predilection comes to the fore will be reviewed.

Kuyperian terminology much more than in the present. He exercised critique on Kuyper for his German-idealistic organological thinking.⁶⁷ Nevertheless one can see in Dooyeweerd much of the same terminology. The terms "undifferentiated" and "differentiated," "inner" as opposed to "outer," "inner development," his stress on "potentiality," and phrases like "unfolding process," "the great cosmic temporal becoming," all show that Dooyeweerd is not a purely cosmological thinker. To be added to this is his use of the term "refraction" or "splitting" in which as light, the totality of meaning is broken into a rich diversity of temporal structures. It must always be kept in mind that time also is a principle of cosmic temporal coherence as well as a principle for diversity and of the refraction of meaning. Refraction never is a fracturing in the sense of making things completely separate. What develops in time is in a cosmic temporal coherence and the modal aspects can have their existence by being interwoven and realized in temporal relative unities or individual things, acts, and events. What is refracted in diversity is immediately positioned relatively in a cosmic temporal coherence of meaning in which nothing can be regarded as totally separate, unrelated to anything else, but rather it is interwoven in a network of relations of dependency, the whole of which is dependent on a transcendent root unity and origin of meaning. This comes very strikingly to the fore in his third volume of A New Critique, especially in his ground-breaking idea of enkapsis. It is also evident in his idea of individuality structures as a whole and especially in his stress on the integral character of naive experience. So much does

67. Dooyeweerd, "Kuyper's wetenschapsleer," Phil. Ref., IV (1939), pp. 193-232.

Dooyeweerd emphasize the coherence and development of created temporal reality that the importance of the idea that cosmic time is the principle of diversity and a law of refraction has often gone unnoticed although it plays a key role in his thinking. For this reason Dooyeweerd can talk about temporal unities, totalities, wholes, and their factual duration according to the time order, but these are always relative unities, totalities, and wholes because they are temporal refractions of the fullness of meaning and therefore in need of root unity and fullness above time. All these considerations show quite clearly that Dooyeweerd puts a great deal of emphasis on history, development, unfolding, differentiation, all of which are necessary for understanding and seeing the structural law side of reality which is always realized in changing, factual, and concrete things and events. He is definitely not purely structural or cosmological. These considerations only generally place or type Dooyeweerd, but there are also a few other things which tend to show traces of cosmogono-cosmological thinking in Dooyeweerd.

Earlier we saw that Dooyeweerd stresses that the higher contrast, the supra-temporal or eternity in its created sense, is to be seen as dynamic rather than static.⁶⁸ It is thought of as the central realm of occurrence in distinction from the historical aspect and the temporal manifestation of occurrence. We also noticed earlier that he speaks of a spiritual (geestelijke) supra-temporal generation of hearts in contrast to temporal bodily generation and becoming. There is consequently genesis in both contrasts, the higher and lower. A problem

⁶⁸. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, pp. 32-33.

seems to arise here in that this characteristic of the dynamic, which involved occurrence and generation, would appear to conflict with the characteristics of unity, fullness, totality, and undifferentiation also ascribed to this realm of the supra-temporal. This difference between the dynamic and static or eternal character in the traditional sense of the supra-temporal will be accounted for later.

Generation in the higher contrast has been emphasized to show that the cosmogonic emphasis in Dooyeweerd affects the whole created universe in its temporal and eternal sides. This brings us to the most important consideration. It relates to the temporal diversity of the law side of the cosmos. Dooyeweerd stresses the intrinsic temporal character of the law side of the cosmos both in its modal and typical laws. Both modal and typical immediately imply diversity and Dooyeweerd regards the unity of law as strictly supra-temporal and not temporal while the diversity of law is strictly temporal. This temporal character of the diversity of law does not mean that it is not constant. Constancy can be temporal and this constancy which is ascribed to the law side is the apriori structural framework for all changing factual things and events on the subject side which is always individualized and subject to duration. This comes out rather clearly when Dooyeweerd says,

We must further observe, that all the basic structures which we shall discover in temporal reality in the course of our inquiry, the modal structures of the various aspects as well as the typical totality-structures of individuality, are grounded in the order of cosmic time. They are all specific structures of time and as such necessarily related to the factual duration of transitory beings, events, processes, acts, social relationships and so on.

The entire empirical reality in its overrich diversity of structures is enclosed and determined by universal cosmic time. In each of its modal aspects, the latter expresses itself in a specific modality of meaning with respect to temporal order as well as duration.

But its cosmic character discloses itself precisely in

the indissoluble inter-modal coherence of meaning into which it fits the modal structure.

This order discloses its temporal character, namely, in the empirical opening-process of the modal aspects of reality. In this process, anticipatory structural moments come to be developed; and these moments disclose their inner coherence of meaning with the modal aspects that are later in order. The complex of anticipatory structural moments is, for example, lacking in the as yet closed structure of the logical aspect as we discover it in the pre-theoretical attitude of thought. Anticipatory structural moments find expression within this aspect only in the theoretical attitude of thought. Only in the latter is disclosed the inner connection with the historical, linguistic, economic and later aspects. Thus, to give another instance, in a closed primitive jural order, the anticipating connection with morality, as expressed in the principles of equity, good faith, good morals, punishment according to guilt, etc., is absent.

The opening-process, intended here, has temporal duration and comes out according to the inter-modal temporal order of the aspects.⁶⁹

Another indication of this is found in the following quotation.

All these modal aspects are interwoven with one another in a cosmic order of time which guarantees their coherence of meaning. As we shall see below, time order is necessarily related to factual time-duration. And only this indissoluble correlation of order and duration can be called cosmic time, in distinction from all its special modal aspects.⁷⁰

Still another time Dooyeweerd discusses this.

We have said in an earlier context, that all structures of temporal reality are structures of cosmic time, and as structural law they are founded in cosmic time-order and are principles of temporal potentiality or possibility. In their realization in individual things or events they have time-duration and actuality as transitory, factual structures.⁷¹

In Vollenhoven's lecture on time this feature of Dooyeweerd is brought to attention. Vollenhoven insists, in contrast to Dooye-

69. Ibid., I, p. 29.

70. Ibid., I, p. 24.

71. Ibid., I, p. 105. See also "Van Peursen's critische vragen," p. 113, footnote. He says, "Ik heb nergens gezegd, dat de wetten boven de werkelijkheid verheven zijn. Onze ervaringswereld bestaat slechts in de correlatie van haar wets- en subjectszijde, m.a.w. de wetszijde behoort tot de empirische werkelijkheid."

weerd, that the central religious law as well as structural law is both temporal and supra-temporal in distinction from the positive law which is temporal'only. It is supra-temporal because it relates directly to God and temporal because it relates to that which is subjected to and correlated with it.⁷² Dooyeweerd denies that modal and typical laws are supra-temporal and that the central religious law is temporal. The idea of time for Dooyeweerd is the presupposition for diversity of law and not the reverse. Time itself is a law for the diversification of law. Time is therefore called a boundary and this boundary is distinguished from the boundary character of the central law of love. This is the boundary between Creator and creature, but time as a boundary does not affect the created center of man since the heart is transcendent to this boundary. There are two boundaries in Dooyeweerd which again give indication of what we mentioned before, that there are two law orders indicative of a nature-grace influence. Law in its temporal diversity is therefore subject to this cosmogono-cosmological process of becoming in a way which could not be said of Vollenhoven, for instance. This problem will be taken up in more detail later but this general section gives some indication of a rather unique view of law and its entwinement with time and genesis.

E. The Universal and Individual:

Another important facet of the typology is how Dooyeweerd addresses himself to the problem of the relation of the universal and individual in the cosmos. This is central in Dooyeweerd and so complicated that it will only be mentioned at this time in order to note its importance.

72. Vollenhoven, "College systematiek - het probleem van de tijd," p. 14.

For example, the fact that time is the principle of cosmic diversity and that totality, fullness, and root unity can never be given within cosmic time (and are therefore supra-temporal and transcendent) are all-controlling ideas which lie at the basis of the whole system. A question arises as to what precisely is the difference between a principle of individuation which Dooyeweerd disclaims because it is always involved in false problematics, and the notion or idea of time as a law for cosmic diversity. Dooyeweerd's stress on a root unity above and never in time bears on this question. This question is tied to time as a prism, the idea of created eternity, the idea of the transcendent horizon, and many other considerations. Not until clarity is gained on this point can there be any reconstruction of Dooyeweerd or penetration into his transcendental critical thinking. Therefore it is not possible at this time to classify him as either a universalistic individualistic, or a partial universalistic.

F. Neo-Realism:

Earlier it was suggested that Dooyeweerd seems to manifest a neo-realistic tone to his thinking concerning the problem of the place of the law in the cosmos.⁷³ One of the characteristics of realism is that the law for the cosmos is placed in a world behind the temporal world. Dooyeweerd's stress on created eternity and supra-temporality as a central sphere of occurrence, the fact that Dooyeweerd found that the term

73. For clarification of the term "neo-realism" see Vollenhoven, "Cursus 1959-1960, onderdeel III, wisselwerkingstheorie," pp. 3-4, where this term is defined. To my knowledge this is the only place in Vollenhoven's work where this is found. For background relating directly to neo-realism see "Addenda: Gesch. anthropologie colleges, 1952-1963," (Amsterdam: mimeo, 1963) pp. 2-5. See also footnotes 4 and 65 of this chapter.

"central, transtemporal," could not apply to this realm or sphere, indicated somewhat that there is the character of another world beyond this temporal world. Dooyeweerd speaks of it frequently as the "transcendent horizon," or "the life beyond or above." It is only as our starting point is found in this sphere or realm in which there is totality, fullness, and root unity that one can see a true notion of time.⁷⁴ Unless one participates in the totality of meaning which is only given in this realm, temporal diversity cannot be known,⁷⁵ and no content can be given to the transcendental ground-idea and idealism cannot be avoided.⁷⁶ There is some stress at least on the greater reality of the transcendent realm in contrast to partiality, relativity, diversity, and manifestations in the temporal.

The realist position was discovered by Vollenhoven by the fact that it stressed both subject and object and it saw both governed by law, in opposition to subjectivism and objectivism. It also was discovered by Vollenhoven that realists have an emphasis on both the universal and individual sides of the cosmos in the temporal cosmos which is then distinguished from a notion of the universal in the higher world. In other words, there are two kinds of universals.⁷⁷ Dooyeweerd seems to fit this feature of realism since he lays due emphasis on individuality and universality in the temporal earthly cosmos. But as was noted before, he thinks of the unity of the law as only supra-temporal. Added to this is his stress on the fact that totality, fullness, and root unity

74. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, pp. 8, 11-12, 15-21.

75. Ibid., I, pp. 8, 56, II, pp. 53-54.

76. Ibid., I, p. 88.

77. Dooyeweerd, Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte (Franeker: T. Wever, 1949), pp. 252-304.

are only given and existent as supra-temporal and eternal, and that the oversight of the earthly cosmos can only be gained by participation in this central sphere. It was also noted before that there is a pre-existence of all of the finished creation by virtue of God's creative acts which are the presupposita for all temporal manifestation and becoming. The idea that all men exist as created before they become an temporal existence is very reminiscent of Plato's Phaedo, although in Dooyeweerd it is obviously modified by his Christian ground-motive. This idea of participation in a transcendent starting point, as well as transcendence above the temporal, is the only way to meaning and understanding of the earthly temporal and without this transcendence, real understanding is impossible. It seems obvious that Plato thought that this was an intelligible world accessible only to the intellect through scientific theoria. Dooyeweerd regards this central realm of supra-temporality and of occurrence as a religious realm or world.⁷⁸ Participation in this realm is a religious participation and is not achieved by theoretical thought. If this is a form of realism, which appears quite possible, it certainly is a "Christianized" realism. The concentration point is only given in its unity, fullness, and totality in this central supra-temporal realm.⁷⁹ Christ, the new root of the reborn human race, must be participated in, and life comes from our rootage in him. All that is given here is one, radical, and integral. In this realm there is one headship, one sin, one law.⁸⁰ This claim demands substantiation, but from all that has been said in this

78. The term "world" would probably be objected to by Dooyeweerd, but he leaves all kinds of room for confusion on this point.

79. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, pp. 1-5, 106.

80. Ibid., I, pp. 60, 102.

section on the ontology type in Dooyeweerd this classification of some form of realism seems to fit quite well. It also explains why the question of the universal and individual is so complex and hard to fix, as well as the problem of the place of the law.

It has been designated as neo-realistic because it is obviously a realism modified by the Christian ground-motive. Dooyeweerd sets himself off quite clearly from a neo-Platonic, neo-realistic position in dealing with ideas in the Divine mind.⁸¹ He will not have any part of a doctrine of apriori eternal ideas or a lex eterna à la Aquinas and the patristic and scholastic fathers. But the created eternal side of the created cosmos takes on many of the features of realism. The term "neo-realism" is a looser designation for different kinds of Christian synthesis with the realism of Plato and the early Aristotle.

G. Dooyeweerd and Augustine:

Augustine is classified by Vollenhoven as middle Platonic, neo-realistic, monist, cosmogono-cosmological thinker, with the doctrine of priority, semi-contradictory, macro-microcosm theme, impetus theory, and instrumentalist. It is possible to see the importance of the order and law idea as a ground hypothesis running through all of Augustine's work.⁸² It is especially the theory of priority that reminds one of Dooyeweerd's construction of the heart as influencing but not influenced by the lower contrast. Dooyeweerd's stress on the eternal and changeless, and the need for transcending change in the heart are very

81. Ibid., II, p. 559.

82. Zuidema, "De orde-idee in Augustinus' dialoog de ordine, twee werelden," Phil. Ref., XXVII (1963). Popma, Nadenken over de Tijd, pp. 42-46, 66-76, 106; "Opstanding en anthropologie," Corr. bladen, XXXII (1968), pp. 1-5. The importance of the law idea was also brought to my attention by H. E. Runner in his address on the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences at Trinity Christian College, Jan. 2-3, 1969.

close to Augustine. Dooyeweerd's ideas on the will and the struggle for the right direction of the will was a feature which he recognized to be very important in his early estimate of Augustine.⁸³ The supratemporal as the central realm of occurrence out of which issues the struggle between the city of earth (civitas terrena) and the city of God (civitas Dei) and his general estimate of Augustine's book, The City of God, for a Christian philosophy of history show Dooyeweerd's dependence on Augustine.

The restless character of meaning and especially temporal meaning are re-echoed by Dooyeweerd. Augustine's famous sentence about the restlessness of the heart in Book I of the Confessions is often quoted by Dooyeweerd to show the meaning character of created reality as well as the religious concentration law and transcendental direction of meaning. When Dooyeweerd quotes this statement from Augustine he feels he is carrying forth the true spirit of Augustine's reformational insights. Zuidema puts more emphasis on the neo-Platonic (which should probably be changed to middle Platonic) character of this statement from Book I of the Confessions.⁸⁴

To be added to these similarities is the notion of sin as a privation of meaning which Augustine held central in his thinking, and Dooyeweerd's high estimate of Augustine's idea of creation as a creation "in the beginning" as distinguished from temporal becoming. However, this high

83. Dooyeweerd, "In den strijd om een Christelijke staatkunde," Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde, I (1925), pp. 19-25, 71-72, 77-79, 112, 111; for the primacy of the will in Augustine as specifically Christian, see p. 171.

84. Zuidema, op. cit., p. 3.

estimation does not go without some criticism from Dooyeweerd.⁸⁵ Diemer in his book Natuur en Wonder, in developing the idea of creation in W.d.W. fashion, speaks of the creation "in the beginning" as a creation in the Word.⁸⁶ This formulation bears close resemblance to Augustine who identified the phrase *ἐν ἀρχῇ* with Christ, the Word of God. Dooyeweerd nowhere disapproves of Diemer's construction, rather, he heartily recommends it. If pressed on this construction of Diemer's, Dooyeweerd might renege because he does hold himself off from any notion of an ideal pre-existence of the created in God's spirit. With Diemer's Christianized, Augustinian idea of creation, Dooyeweerd might very well have no quarrel. If this is true, it unlocks the mystery of Dooyeweerd's and Diemer's rather unique distinction between creation and becoming. Dooyeweerd's emphasis on unity and harmony in the eternal cannot be explained without a clear dependence on Augustine.

Noting these similarities and others one can see why William Young has characterized Dooyeweerd as a neo-Augustinian.⁸⁷

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85. Dooyeweerd, "De idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch substantiebegrip," Phil. Ref., VIII (1943), p. 87; IX (1944), p. 37, footnote; X (1945), pp. 39-48. Also, "De verhouding tussen wijsbegeerte en theologie en de strijd der faculteiten, II," Phil. Ref., XXIII (1958), p. 68.
86. J. H. Diemer, Natuur en Wonder (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1963), p. 13. There is a clear neo-realism in Diemer and an evident speculative view of God's eternity as an eternal present. There are some similarities between Diemer and Dooyeweerd on the idea of eternity and supra-temporality, although it must be said that Dooyeweerd is not as speculative, therefore, something like Diemer's views on these points must underlie Dooyeweerd's view of supra-temporality. See Diemer's treatment of Augustine, pp. 109-117; his positive estimate of Augustine's idea that God created all things at once in the beginning - a view he seems to share with Dooyeweerd, pp. 112-113, 115-116; p. 164 has Dooyeweerd's evaluation of Natuur en Wonder.
87. William Young, Toward a Reformed Philosophy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953), p. 86.

It is well known that Augustine's idea of time and eternity formed the matrix for much scholastic speculation on these points. Augustine's idea of God's eternity as an eternal present, heaven as eternal, and the idea of time ceasing at the judgment day are all at least implicitly present. On all these points there is a great deal of similarity, and anyone who has read Dooyeweerd knows his fondness for quoting Augustine's famous statement about the mysterious nature of time. All these factors make it clear that Dooyeweerd employs a similar ontology as Augustine and can be said to be in Augustine's line.

This still leaves the questions of the presence of the impetus theory and instrumentalism in Dooyeweerd to be considered as well as the more general question into which *Zeitgeist* Dooyeweerd is to be placed.

H. Instrumentalism and Impetus Theory:

If one starts from what seems to be clearest, that is, instrumentalism, one is working then with the hypothesis that there is also a doctrine of impetus present, since exponents of instrumentalism are always exponents of impetus theory. There seems to be fairly good evidence for saying that Dooyeweerd fits into this classification. Dooyeweerd says,

Even on the immanence standpoint the choice of the Archimedean point proves to be impossible as a purely theoretical act which prejudices nothing in a religious sense. In truth the selfhood as the religious root of existence is the hidden performer on the instrument of philosophic thought. Only, it is invisible on the basis of the immanence-standpoint. [Underlining mine]

Actually, philosophic thought in itself offers us no Archimedean point, for it can function only in the cosmic coherence of the different modal aspects of meaning, which it nowhere transcends.

The immanent Ideas of the inter-modal coherence of meaning and of the totality of meaning are transcendental limiting concepts. They disclose the fact, that theoretical thought is not self-sufficient in the proper field of philosophy, a point to which we shall return.

No other possibility for transcending the inter-modal coherence and the modal diversity of meaning is to be

found, except in the religious root of existence, from which philosophic thought also has to receive its central direction.⁸⁸

Here the instrument idea comes quite clearly to the fore. The selfhood as the religious root is the hidden player on the instrument of philosophic thought. The higher uses the lower as its tool or instrument,⁸⁹ and on the other hand, philosophic thought is quite impossible without this transcendent starting point. The priority idea also comes out in the phrase, "that philosophic thought receives its direction from this hidden root." The impossibility of philosophic thought without this starting point in the transcendent comes out clearly when Dooyeweerd says,

We can thus provisionally summarize our point of view with reference to the limits of philosophy. The religious presupposition of philosophy, toward which the ground-Idea as transcendental foundation of philosophy is directed in its contents, toward which as Idea it points, is of a transcendent nature; whereas philosophic thought is itself of a transcendental character. The choice of the Archimedean point necessarily crosses the boundary line of the temporal coherence of our world. Philosophy itself, though directed by its ground-Idea, remains within this boundary

88. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, p. 21.

89. Ibid., II, p. 302. Here Dooyeweerd speaks of the function of faith "as an instrument of God's grace in Jesus Christ." The terminal aspect of faith and its strategic position in his system comes out clearly here in the fact that he calls faith the "open window" through which the light of God's eternity should shine into the whole temporal coherence of the world. It is in this context that he speaks of faith as the instrument of God's grace. Notice here the emphasis on light. Dooyeweerd likes to use the light metaphor, e.g., in the expression "the light of God's eternity," the prism figure and its many applications. Another example, Vol. II, p. 561, "The transcendent light of eternity must force its way through time.... The light of Divine revelation refracted through the prism of time...." P. 571, "The light of truth shines forth through the temporal horizon into human experience." For other references see pp. 563, 564, 572, 573, 578. The similarity to Augustine is obvious and it also points out the importance of the prism idea in Dooyeweerd. The light figures are close to a neo-realist light metaphysics. At this point there is also a similarity to Kuyper who also used a light figure.

line, because it is possible only by virtue of the temporal order of the world.

Transcendent and transcendental, taken in this sense, are thus no 'either-or'. For the actually transcendental direction of theoretic thought presupposes the transcendent and central sphere of our consciousness from which this direction starts, since this starting-point is not to be found in theoretic thought. [underlining mine]

Only in this view as to the relation of transcendent and transcendental conditions of philosophy is the original and critical meaning of transcendental thought given its due.⁹⁰

From this we see that the true movement in philosophic thought, the direction toward the transcendent presupposita which fill and make philosophic thought possible, is instigated by an impetus from the higher. In the anthropological section of the third volume Dooyeweerd speaks of the temporal body of man as the expression field of the heart, and dwells on the fittedness in general of man's body as an instrument.⁹¹

The impetus idea can only truly be seen when one keeps in mind that the dynamics of meaning are caused by the refraction of the totality and fullness of meaning which refraction drives the diversity to seek again its fullness, unity, and consummation above and beyond itself. The movement in the lower is given impetus and is started after it has been forced through the prism of the time order which causes its restlessness.⁹² The questions of impetus theory and instrumentalism will be discussed in more detail later, but in general this classification seems to fit.

90. Ibid., I, p. 88.

91. Ibid., III, p. 88. He says, "But man is created after the image of God, as the lord of the 'earthly' temporal world. Therefore his body lacks any trait of specialization which would bind it to a specific milieu. The erect gait, the spiritual expression of the human face, the human hand formed to labour after a free project, testify to the fact that the human body is free plastic instrument of the I-ness, as the spiritual centre of human existence." [underlining mine]

92. Ibid., I, pp. 3-4. "The coherence of all the modal aspects of

I. Zeitgeist:

The particular Zeitgeist which Dooyeweerd has been most influenced by will be dealt with in the section about the genetic historical development of Dooyeweerd's thinking. For now it can be said that neo-idealism in its rationalistic neo-Kantian form formed the primary motive in his earlier years with the emphasis being on the law idea, and then a slow shift to irrationalistic existentialism with the stress being on the religious transcendence of the heart as inaccessible to theoretical thought and as the only point from which historicism and immanence thinking could be overcome. Dooyeweerd's development of the ontology type

our cosmos finds its expression in each of them, and also points beyond its own limits toward a central totality, which in its turn is expressed in this coherence. Our ego expresses itself as a totality in the coherence of all its functions within all the modal aspects of cosmic reality. And man, whose ego expresses itself in the coherence of all its temporal modal functions, was himself created by God as the expression of His image." In a footnote on p. 4 he says, "We shall subsequently see why this deeper totality necessarily transcends the mutual coherence of all modal aspects of temporal reality, just as our selfhood transcends the coherence of its functions in these aspects." Here we see the idea of the expression of the totality in the lower which gives to meaning its restless, dependent structure and character. Movement is started in the lower by an impetus from the higher through refraction of the totality through the prism of time. The return of the totality is directed and caused again by the higher. Here the theme of priority is also clear as well as impetus which starts movement and is restless, pointing in the lower. On p. 5, Vol. I, the theme of priority is again clear and like the previous quote comes in the context of explaining meaning. "This abstraction from the actual entire ego that thinks may be necessary for formulating the concept of philosophical thought. But even in this act of conceptual determination it is the self that is actually doing the work. That ego is actually doing the work. That ego is actually operating not merely in its thought, but in all the functions in which it expresses itself within the coherence of our temporal world. There is no single modal aspect of our cosmos in which I do not actually function.... In this whole system of modal functions of meaning, it is I who remain the central point of reference and the deeper unity above all modal diversity of the different aspects of my temporal existence."

must be seen particularly against the background of these movements of the times (spirit of the times, streams of time, tijdstroomingen).

The use of an ontology type to classify Dooyeweerd is at the most a hypothetical work. There are many facets that might not fit the classification, however, the case against Dooyeweerd in its totality does not rest upon precision in all points of this classification. This method of Vollenhoven is only a helpful tool in bringing together important features and emphases in Dooyeweerd's thinking in an interesting way.

3. A Global Survey of Certain Aspects of Nature-Grace Thinking.

This survey of nature-grace thinking on the questions of God's eternity, man's eternity, and time, is background for the critique of Dooyeweerd on these questions which will follow in the next chapter. In the last analysis, the key to the many problems surrounding Dooyeweerd's idea of religious transcendence is the influence of the nature-grace ground-motive on his thinking. No one more than Dooyeweerd has penetrated to the depth of this motive in Christian thinking, but it seems that he himself has not sufficiently purified his thinking of its influence.

As Dooyeweerd has pointed out so clearly in his articles "De idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch substantiebeprip,"⁹³ the scholastic accommodation of the Christian ground-motive to the form-matter motive of Greek thinking resulted in a misconceiving of the nature of the creation order and cosmic time. Dooyeweerd points out the effect of this accommodation on the notion of creation,⁹⁴ and to some extent, on the scholastic notion of the eternity of God,⁹⁵ the eternity of man,⁹⁶ and the interrelation of these two to time.⁹⁷ Dooyeweerd has also laid bare the connection of the teleological, eschatological, beatific vision (visio Dei) of nature-grace to Aristotle's entelechy and the neo-Platonic hierarchy of being. An interesting hiatus in his treatment of the scholastic ground-motive is his neglect of eschatology in scholastic thinking.

93. Dooyeweerd, "De idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch substantiebeprip," Phil. Ref., VIII (1943), pp. 65-99; IX (1944), pp. 1-41; X (1945), pp. 25-48; XI (1946), pp. 22-52.

94. Ibid., VIII (1943), pp. 85-89; IX (1944), pp. 28-29, 34-40; X (1945), pp. 25-48. Also Reformatie en Scholastiek, pp. 35, 358-381, 490.

95. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën," pp. 2-4; Reformatie en Scholastiek, pp. 399-406.

96. Ibid., pp. 2-4; ibid., pp. 399-406.

97. Ibid., pp. 2-4; ibid., pp. 399-406. Cf. Popma, "Tijd en religie," Phil. Ref., XIV (1949), pp. 126, 145.

In contrast to Dooyeweerd's lack of treatment of this point, attention is focused on his treatment in his own systematics of supra-temporality and creaturely eternity (aeuum as it is called in an early work),⁹⁸ and on his statements of the necessary correlation of eternity (eternity here meaning creaturely eternity which he sharply distinguishes from God's eternity) and time. By critical intuition one feels that something is wrong with these points. Since many investigators are under the grip of the nature-grace ground-motive at this point, one can be led through Dooyeweerd's treatment of this motive to see the effects of this motive on one's thinking, especially one's view of Scripture and theology. Through this process of purification one's attention can be increasingly focused upon scholastic thinking in respect to the questions of eschatology, time, and eternity. Of great help in this regard is the definitive work of Okke Jager, Het Eeuwige Leven,⁹⁹ and especially the works of K. J. Popma. The unity of conception on these issues in nature-grace thinkers will quickly become evident. Even more startling is Dooyeweerd's lacuna in his treatment of these issues in Protestant and Catholic scholastic thinkers.

A general description of these points of consensus in nature-grace thinkers will be given in order to set the stage for our critique.

First, and all-controlling, is the theo-ontological¹⁰⁰ speculation concerning God's eternity, in which God's eternity is conceived of as an

98. Ibid., pp. 3-5.

99. Okke Jager, Het Eeuwige Leven (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1962). See also my book review of this book in The Westminster Theological Journal, XXVII (Nov. 1964), pp. 60-66.

100. For the meaning of the term "theo-ontology" see the index of Levensbeschouwing, VII, p. 402.

eternal now or eternal present.¹⁰¹ The formulation of Boethius, at the conclusion of his Consolation of Philosophy, has played an important part in this speculation. Almost without exception this formulation has been taken over into scholastic thinking. Reformed scholastic theology operated almost exclusively with this conception. It is possible to find this definition present in Kuyper,¹⁰² Schilder,¹⁰³ Bavinck,¹⁰⁴ Geerhardus Vos,¹⁰⁵ and Louis Berkhof.¹⁰⁶ This definition however, is not the property of conservative Protestant and Roman Catholic thinkers. It occurs uniformly in old Protestant liberalism, as well as in neo-orthodox thinkers like Barth, Brunner, and in neo-liberals like Bultmann. Okke Jager, Popma, and Kuitert have also pointed out how, via the nature-grace thinking, this formulation of God's eternity penetrated into the early and later rationalistic, humanistic thinkers such as Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Kant. Popma has traced at great length the formulation of God's eternity in which past, present, and future are conceived of as in an eternal present, back beyond Boethius to the pre-Socratics. Without a doubt this notion is present in many Greek thinkers, e.g., Aristotle, Plato, Parmenides, and in the pre-Socratics at large. Although not all

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101. Popma, "De eeuwigheid Gods volgens Boethius," Phil. Ref., XXII (1957), pp. 21-51; Popma, Nadenken over de Tijd, pp. 98-122, 143-146. Also, J. Stellingwerff, "Kritiek op K. Schilder als filosoferend dogmaticus," Phil. Ref., XXVII (1962), pp. 106-125; Jager, op. cit., passim; Kuitert, De Mensvormigheid Gods (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1957), p. 85.
102. Popma, Nadenken over de Tijd, pp. 122-130.
103. See footnote 100 of this chapter.
104. H. Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, Tweede Deel (Kampen: J. H. Bos, 1908), pp. 153-154.
105. G. Vos, Dogmatiek, I, p. 11, where his definition is almost a direct quote from Boethius; see also pp. 74, 75, 79-100.
106. L. Berkhof, Systematic Theology (London: Banner of Truth Trust, 1941), pp. 60, 63, 104.

Greek thinkers maintained this view of God's eternity, there is an amazing conformity. The fact that there is not a complete uniformity comes out clearly and with great importance for reformational thinking in the conception of Oscar Cullmann in his book, Christus und die Zeit.¹⁰⁷ The titanic wave of influence that this book had and still has for modern theology and philosophy¹⁰⁸ can only appear when we see that Cullmann's conception of God's eternity as linear, was in stark opposition to the power which the traditional view of God's eternity, as nunc aeternum, had exercised on thinkers until that time. The view of God's eternity as a long line was not, however, a reformational, biblical conception. It has, as Popma points out, a scholastic background¹⁰⁹ and can also be traced to Greek thinking. Cullmann's alternative, which seemed to leave much more room for the redemptive historical interaction of God with Israel, his people, brought about serious revision in many quarters. This influence can be seen in the work of G. C. Berkouwer¹¹⁰ and especially in Kuitert.¹¹¹ Both views of the eternity of God are used by scholastic nature-grace thinkers, and both are rooted deeply and intrinsically in the theo-ontological pagan tradition.¹¹² But the formulation of Boethius ruled western thinking up until the epoch-making appearance

107. Cullmann, Christus und die Zeit (Zurich: A. G. Zollikon, 1948).

108. See especially Karl Löwith, Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949); R. R. Niebuhr, Resurrection and Historical Reason (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1959).

109. Popma, Levensbeschouwing, II, pp. 313, 316, 331; VI, p. 58. In Wadenken over de Tijd, pp. 110-115, there is an interesting comparison with Cullmann in Popma's comments on the remonstrant theologian, Philippus à Limborch.

110. Berkouwer, Dogmatische Studien: De Wederkomst van Christus, I, pp. 35-52, 62-63, 69, 92-95; II, pp. 185-186, 240-243. Berkouwer, Geloof en Rechtvaardiging, Hoofdstuk VI, pp. 143-176.

111. Kuitert, op. cit., passim.

112. See footnote 100 of this chapter.

of Cullmann, after which the other line started to gain ascendancy.

Second, correlated with this idea of God's eternity is another idea which has exercised tremendous power on western thinking as a whole; the idea of an eternal heaven as opposed to the temporal earth. This means heaven in the sense which Scripture refers to it when it speaks of Christ in his glorified human nature. This heaven is the place of the angels and departed saints, as distinguished from what Scripture calls the cloudy heavens, the starry heavens, etc.¹¹⁴ It is the heaven where believers go after death when they are said in some mysterious way to be "with Christ" or dead in Christ, as distinguished from their being in their graves waiting for the resurrection. Heaven in this sense must be distinguished from heaven after the judgment day. Heaven after the judgment day, is, in some scholastic conceptions, distinguished from heaven as the place of the departed believers, the angels, and Christ, before the judgment day. In this view, heaven before the judgment day is held to be eternal, i.e., non-temporal. From this speculation, tied in very closely with the idea of God's eternity as an eternal now, comes all manner of speculation. For example, Kuyper held that dead believers with Christ have no time consciousness but have a heavenly eternal perspective on the nearness of the parousia.¹¹⁵ From

113. For the general influence of Cullmann on Berkouwer and the present scene in philosophy and theology, see Jager, op. cit., passim.

114. For the various senses of the word "heaven" in the Bible and for a study of all the facets which have played a part in the history of scholastic theology, see the index of Levensbeschouwing, VII, under hemel, hemel tegenover aarde, hemels, hemelse dingen. See also Scheenhoven, The Wrath of Heaven (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966), passim.

115. Popma, Levensbeschouwing, I, pp. 248ff.; III, pp. 36, 98-99; VII, pp. 236ff.. Popma, Nadenken over de Tijd, pp. 122-131, 278, footnote. Jager, op. cit., pp. 199-207.

this scholastic perspective the notion of the heavenly eternal perspective of God and the saints serves as a hermeneutic for interpreting all the New Testament statements about the consciousness of the Christian in respect to the nearness of the parousia. The speculative thinking denies the time consciousness of angels and demons (fallen angels), although Scripture uniformly witnesses to the opposite.¹¹⁶ Since angels and demons are supposed to have inhabited the eternal supernatural heavenly world they have the view of eternity, or what, speculatively, is often called "God's point of view."¹¹⁷ God's point of view is his point of view of his eternal present in which there is no succession from future to past, and this point of view is in an analogical fashion applied to angels, demons, and departed saints, always of course in a creaturely mode.¹¹⁸

In this conception the important relation of heaven and earth in Scripture is radically misconstrued. In this way the Christian ground-motive of Word-revelation in respect to the creation, as a cosmic law order and cosmic time, is restricted drastically to the temporal earthly horizon. Cosmic time and the cosmic law order are not seen as enforcing and holding for¹¹⁹ all the created, both heavenly and earthly, creatures.¹²⁰

116. Pepma, op. cit., pp. 228ff.; Levensbeschouwing, VII, p. 236.

117. Pepma, Nadenken over de Tijd, pp. 125-131, 285ff.

118. Stellingwerff, op. cit., passim. On p. 116 the analogy idea between God and man's eternity is criticized. His article is a good summary on the subject as a whole and the footnotes introduce one to the labyrinth of questions involved.

119. For the significance of the phrase "holding for" see Vollenhoven, Leofdlijnen der Logica (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1948), pp. 27-29.

120. This important stress in Vollenhoven has been in contradistinction to Dooyeweerd from the beginning. See Vollenhoven, College Dictaat, Isagogè Philosophiæ (Amsterdam: THEJA, n.d.), pp. 15-16, 38-90. Jager, op. cit., passim, especially "Bijbels licht over het eeuwige leven," pp. 455-578. Also, Schoonhoven, op. cit., passim.

The idea of an eternal heaven in contradistinction to a temporal earth implies the acceptance of two world orders, generally also called natural and supra-natural. This latter conception is completely foreign to the ground-motive of Word-revelation in respect to creation. In the scriptural revelation concerning creation, the creative world-ordering Word of God, with its ordinances, commands, and laws, embraces the heavens and the earth as one cosmic order and subjects all created beings to time. Heaven, in Genesis 1:1, embraces all possible senses of the word "heaven" as it is further explicated and revealed in Scripture. In all of Scripture, heaven and earth and their interrelations are seen as directed by and subjected to one Word of God which orders, directs, and holds as law for all created. The creation account points to this central ground-motive of creation and gives direction and content to the theoretical ground-idea of law which is the central hypothesis for theoretical thought. This cosmic scope of the created world-order and time can never be restricted to holding only for the temporal earthly cosmos. The scriptural ground-motive of creation directs our thinking to see heaven and earth as involved in one all-embracing cosmic time, with one cosmic genetic unfolding process (het grote wordingsproces),¹²¹ having one history.¹²² The wide influence of nature-grace thinking, in which heaven is conceived of as eternal in contrast to earthly temporal existence, is found in many places. The word "spiritual" quite often has the

121. Dooyeweerd, Inleiding tot de Encyclopaedie der Rechtswetenschap (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, n.d.), p. 79.

122. For this stress see Levensbeschouwing, VII, index under "tijd," pp. 409-410, "paradijs," p. 394, "geschiedenis," p. 369, "hemel tegenover aarde," p. 373. Also, Popma, Calvinistische Geschiedsbeschouwing (Franeker: T. Wever, 1945), passim.

idea of eternity with this heavenly sense involved in it.¹²³ Consequently, a spiritual resurrected body came to be conceived of as a non-fleshly, heavenly-adapted eternal body,¹²⁴ sexless,¹²⁵ unable to eat,¹²⁶ like the angels,¹²⁷ that is, eternal, supra-natural.

The most important single consequence of this view of heaven as eternal is the all-controlling direction that was exercised by this nature-grace ground-motive on the reformational ground-motive of the Word of God in respect to the kingdom of God, the hope of believers, and in eschatology or last things. Eschatology and the kingdom of God were verticalized and supra-naturalized. The creational cosmic law-order and cosmic time with their future perspective of the new earth and new heaven were relativized, restricted, and transcended in an other-worldly, heavenly, eternal direction. The second heavenly supra-natural world-order also transformed the biblical ground-motive of redemption as restoration and renewal. In this second unbiblical world-order eschatology culminated in the beatific vision of God in a heavenly eternal sense. This vision could be attained immediately at death, when man was to become

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123. It is interesting to note the frequency of use of this term throughout Dooyeweerd's writings. In this broad usage he shows his close relationship to Kuyper.
124. For a critique of this view and a biblical perspective see Lynn Biliek, The Resurrection of the Flesh (Amsterdam: Jacob van Campen, 1962); Levensbeschouwing, passim; Vollenhoven, Het Calvinisme en de Reformatie van de Wijsbegeerte, p. 45; Popma, "Bestaat er een Bijbelse doodsproblematiek?" Corr. bladen, XXV (March 1961), pp. 1-5.
125. Stellingwerff, op. cit., p. 111.
126. Ibid., p. 111; Popma, "Maag en spijs," Corr. bladen, XX (June 1956), pp. 5-7.
127. In this connection Matthew 22:30 has been the source of all manner of speculation in which man was viewed as being like an angel at the resurrection, rather than in the precise respect mentioned by our Lord. Nature-grace thinkers regard angels as created eternal spirits without bodies, and therefore man's body must become angel-like, "spiritual," non-fleshly, at the resurrection. Popma, Levensbeschouwing, II, pp. 304-308; Popma, "Uitbreiding van het wetenschaps 'begrip'," Corr. bladen, XXV (March 1961), pp. 14-19.

eternal. Since eternity was reached immediately at death, this meant that the perspective of the resurrection of believers at the judgment day tended to be regarded as an unnecessary addition to this state, and thus it became secondary. The meaning and ground-motive of Word-revelation in respect to the restorative, renewing cosmic significance of Christ's resurrection for man, the earth, and heaven, was lost.¹²⁸ For example, the problem which the Thomistic thinker has in relating the resurrection of the body to the beatific vision (which problem in no way eluded Protestant scholasticism) betrays this verticalizing of eschatology. Popma has shown most convincingly how this view of creaturely eternity, as applied to the realm of heaven, filtered into the life of Christendom (e.g., in hymnology and in cherished expressions of Christians, "he died and went to his eternal abode," or "he died and went to eternity").¹²⁹ Popma also points out in great detail how this view of eternity always involves a depreciation of time as a creation of God. This view, in one way or another, identifies time with corruptibility and imperfection, and contrasts it with the incorruptible, angelic, changeless, and perfect eternity of heaven, before the judgment day. In this way, heaven before the judgment day is given attributes which in no way allow for the perspective of Word-revelation in its ground-motive of redemption

128. Popma, "De zin der geschiedenis," Corr. bladen, XXIII (March 1959), pp. 19-26; Popma, "Tijd en geschiedenis," pp. 12-16; Popma, "Geloof en geschiedenis," Corr. bladen, XVIII (Dec. 1954), pp. 28-31.

129. Dooyeweerd, "Ter nagedachtenis van mijn vriend Prof. Dr. Ph. Kohnstamm," Mededelingen van de Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte, (Sept. 1952), p. 11. Dooyeweerd says, "Midden in zijn arbeid nam God hem op 76 jarigen leeftijd weg, zonder ziekbed, zonder doodstrijd in een haast onmerkbaar overglijding uit het tijdelijk naar het eeuwig leven."

and restoration of the earthly creation. In this way eschatology is superraturalized, veiled, and made almost ineffective. Vollenhoven and Popma have pointed out that this tendency to depreciate time is rooted deeply in pagan antiquity.

Since succession and change, in this scholastic view, are identified with corruption and imperfection, the temporal earthly cosmos is not conceived of as man's everlasting final home. Rather, true "spirituality" and piety is to be seen only in desiring one's eternal, incorruptible home. In this sense all the references in Scripture in respect to these matters are made ineffective and are not re-forming in their direction; e.g., "laying your treasures in heaven," "citizenship in heaven," etc.¹³⁰ This revamping and redirecting of the biblical ground-motive concerning the kingdom of God and the future, is of great importance for Christian philosophy and especially relates to Dooyeweerd's views of the direction of cosmic time. This leads us into a third general corollary of the consensus which can be found in nature-grace thinking in respect to eternity and time.

The third corollary is directly related to the eternity of God and the eternity of heaven, but functions in different ways for different scholastics. It deals with the idea that "time is for a time," the idea that time and history will cease at the judgment. In this view eternity is thought to begin immediately after the judgment. This is found almost uniformly in all nature-grace thinkers and is correlated immediately with eternity as heaven. Nature-grace accommodating thinking is here trying to re-interpret, minimize, and even do away with the

130. Popma, "Eurgerschap," Phil. Ref., VII (1942), passim.

ground-motive of Word-revelation, which points to the present and future restoration and renewal of the whole cosmos; the earth (including the kingdoms of animals, plants, things, and man) and heaven, in all its senses. The state immediately succeeding parousia is identified with the state which believers have at death in heaven. The two stages of history are mythologically melted into one. An exception to the view that time and history cease at the judgment day is the view that time goes on endlessly as a place of judgment. This view, which occurs very infrequently, is found in Boethius. Boethius, in semi-mystical fashion, enables man to transcend time through intellectualistic contemplation¹³¹ to the heavens which are above the controlling bands of fate¹³² that endlessly rule time on earth. Here eschatology is completely verticalized, time is the realm of soul-less bodies in hell-like punishment.¹³³ This thinking of Boethius, that time goes on endlessly as a kind of hell, is apparently tied to his purely cosmological, dualistic thinking, in which he seems to think of time as without beginning, as well as endless.¹³⁴ But this conception of Boethius is not at all the view of most nature-grace thinkers. For the vast majority of them, time and history cease with the judgment day and created eternity continues or begins.

Some interesting variations present themselves at this point. In some Reformed scholastics, who in contrast to Roman Catholic scholastics, emphasize the future dimension of the eschaton and depreciate the present realized dimension, the complex of ideas involving cessation of time

131. Popma, Nadenken over de Tijd, pp. 116-122, 125-126. Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1962), pp. 104, 114.

132. Boethius, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

133. Ibid., pp. 39, 82-87.

134. Ibid., pp. 65, 70, 92, 115-116.

and history and the beginning of eternity at the judgment have played a great role.

The eternity that is thought to begin at judgment day for man is often without duration and always a successionless, eternal present. The notion of change as in the second corollary is here also identified with corruptibility and therefore eliminated.¹³⁵ All historical development or unfolding of any kind is eliminated.¹³⁶ The whole cosmic law order and cosmic time is replaced by a world-order which is eternal in character and radically discontinuous with the creational law order and

135. Popma gives a survey of various Reformed scholastics who have held this view; "De zin der geschiedenis," pp. 19-26; Levensbeschouwing, II, pp. 309-344; Wijsbegeerte en Anthropologie, pp. 69, 241-283; Nadenken over de Tijd, p. 134. Also found in Jager, op. cit., passim.
136. This view is present in Geerhardus Vos. For the influence of the late Aristotle on Vos see Grace and Glory (Grand Rapids: The Reformed Press, 1922), chapter 6, "Heavenly Mindedness," pp. 133-155. Here the use of the word "transcendent" shows the dualistic, purely cosmological thinking. For his use of eternity and time see The Pauline Eschatology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953), pp. 40-41, 71, chapter 12, "The Eternal State," pp. 288-316. On p. 290 there is a good emphasis of allowing for duration and divisibility of time units, but Vos consistently eliminates all change and development from the eternal state and so runs into problems with his own good emphasis. On p. 331 there is a good emphasis but betrays somewhat of the tension. In ISBE (International Standard Bible Encyclopaedia) James Orr, ed. (Chicago: Howard-Severance Co., 1915), Vol. II, p. 990, Vos' view of heaven is tied too much with his idea of the supra-natural and transcendental and so the perspective of the new earth suffers. The tension is manifested in his regarding too much under the term "heaven" by which he has in mind changelessness, although he is forced to recognize eternal life as involving endless time and the new earth. The tension between nature-grace and the reformational line comes out when he says, "The central abode of the redeemed will be in heaven although the renewed earth will remain accessible to them as a part of the inheritance" (p. 991). He depreciates the new earth and temporality as the future horizon by lifting it to the supra-natural, changeless, transcendent, heavenly sphere. In "The Eschatological Aspect of the Pauline Conception of the Spirit," Biblical and Theological Studies, by members of the faculty of Princeton Theol. Seminary (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912), pp. 235-259, the supra-natural heavenly is definitely regarded as another world order which is a sure sign of nature-grace influence.

cosmic time. The reformational ground-motive of God's faithfulness to the law order and cosmic time in the process of redemption and re-creation, despite the fall of man, is suppressed. The new earth, in typically 17th and 18th century Lutheran scholasticism, is not a restored, renewed, and refined old earth.¹³⁷ A good feature in some of these Reformed scholastics is that the term "heaven," in practice, often means the new earth subjected to a radically new world order having hardly any continuity to the creation and time. This feature is good because it is less of a spiritualization than is found in those conceptions in which heaven means eternity, as no longer on earth, as in the second corollary.

Some attempts have been made by Reformed scholastics to soften this notion of a timeless successionless, eternal existence on the new earth after the judgment day. Very recent attempts try to describe the notion of this existence as a "duration without succession." Popma has subjected this description to a devastating critique in many of his works, but especially in Nadenken over de Tijd.¹³⁸ After pointing out that duration can never occur without succession, he points to the evidence that this notion of duration without succession is very characteristic of psychotic pathological experience uncovered by psychotherapy. It must be said, however, that it at least holds to an endless duration although it is immediately made meaningless by the fact that it is said to be without succession.

137. For a discussion of this and striking confirmation of the view being presented here see Berkouwer, Dogmatische Studien: Wederkomst, I, Hoofdstuk VII, "De nieuwe aarde," pp. 266-299.

138. For critique of K. Runia who advocates this view of "duration without succession," see Popma, Nadenken over de Tijd, pp. 102-132.

From certain texts in Scripture, especially Revelation 10:6, where it is said that "time shall be no more," nature-grace thinkers of all varieties have inferred that cosmic time will cease. This text has no bearing on this point, but rather, has reference to the fact that the time of postponement of the judgment will be no more, as can be seen clearly from the context.¹³⁹

The more the futuristic dimension of the eschaton is emphasized, the more catastrophic is the discontinuity between history before the judgment and existence on the new earth. The biblical idea of sojourning and suffering is falsely emphasized, and the kingdom with its cosmic perspective, having its "official inauguration day" at the resurrection and ascension of Christ, and driven during this present stage of history before the judgment day by the powerful, redirecting, life-giving Word of God, is lost sight of.¹⁴⁰ Increasing stress is correspondingly laid on the scholastic view of the institutional church, giving rise to different types of tensions.¹⁴¹ In some cases the view of eternity, as beginning on the new earth at judgment, is put in tension with eternity as being in heaven after death as in the second corollary, so that the so-called interim (tussentoeestand) is practically eliminated. B. Telder, who emphasizes endless time and the unity of man in healthy reformational fashion, in stressing the future dimension of the eschaton, feels compelled to deny that there is any existence of believers in

139. See Vos, Pauline Eschatology, pp. 290-291; Okke Jager, op. cit., p. 513.

140. J. Douma, Algemene Genade (Goes: Oosterbaan & Le Cointre, 1966), pp. 344-356 for a faulty limitation of the cultural task and over-stressing of sojourning.

141. J. Olthius, "Must the Church Become Secular?" International Reform-
ei Bulletin, X (Jan. 1967), pp. 14-31.

heaven with Christ after death, before the judgment. For Telder, man is one, and therefore the whole man is said to be in the grave, sleeping in Jesus, awaiting resurrection.¹⁴² The unity of heaven and earth under one cosmic law order and in one cosmic time and history is here lost sight of somewhat. Telder's position is a refreshing breeze, with its stress on the reformatational ground-motive of redemption in its cosmic perspective, in the midst of a literal jungle of misconception. Its great value is that it confirms the thinking of Berkouwer, Popma, Jager, and Scheenhoven. Mention is made of his unique emphasis on the interim state (tussentoeestand) in order to underscore the increasing tension that is arising as men break with the verticalized eschatology of Thomistic scholastics and stress the futuristic, more historical dimension of the eschaton.¹⁴³

In general, the first, second, and third corollaries have a view of eternity in common. Reformed scholasticism, which emphasized the future idea of eternity developed in the third corollary, never placed as much emphasis on the second corollary as did Roman Catholic and Lutheran scholastics. Due to the rise of Biblical theology, by which is meant, exegetical theology with a redemptive-historical emphasis, increasing attention has been placed on eschatology. With the re-examination of eschatology, and with it the historical dimension of Revelation, the view of eternity present in all three corollaries has become suspect. It is generally recognized at present that eschatology has a strong

142. B. Telder, Sterven...waar om? (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1963); Sterven... en dan? (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1960). See Popma's answer in Levensbeschouwing, III, pp. 191-235.

143. For a tracing of the shifts from present to future emphases and vice-versa as they relate to the question of time and eternity see Okke Jager, op. cit., passim.

present and future aspect. This presents Reformed scholasticism, which in general stressed the third corollary and the future dimension, with the need for a great deal of reconstruction. In the views in which the first and second corollaries were emphasized and correspondingly the present dimension of eschatology, redemptive-historical exegetical considerations have also necessitated reconstruction. In these views eternity beginning with the judgment day was generally conceived to be the natural continuation or completion of the eternity of heaven which man enjoyed after death in the beatific vision. This view in general is still the dominant one among the "plainfolk" of Christendom. In this view the future dimension of the eschaton is more spiritualized, supernaturalized, with the consequence that the new earth was for all practical purposes disregarded and heaven conceived of as a final, eternal, supra-natural home in the sky. Here the horizontal future dimension of endless, eternal life on the new earth is reduced to the vertical, supernaturalized eternity of heaven.¹⁴⁴ Reconstruction is being done on the future dimension of eschatology so long neglected in these views. Many questions are being raised about the view of eternity and time which lies at the basis.

¹⁴⁴. The importance of the new earth as the everlasting horizon for God's people has been emphasized by various members of the W.d.W. Vollenhoven, in Isagoge Philosophie, p. 90, says, "Ook na den dood wacht de ziel de opwekking van het lichaam, ook daarin verschillend van die engelen. En het ideaal van den Christen is dus niet 'wederkeer naar het vaderland der zielen.' Maar het bewonen van de nieuwe aarde, waarop gerechtigheid woent." A more recent statement is in "College systematiek - het probleem van de tijd," p. 11. Zuidema stresses that Occam's eschatology does not allow for the scriptural perspective of everlasting work on the new earth. De Philosophie van Occam in zijn Commentaar op de Sententien (Hilversum: 1936), p. 138. Van Riessen, in "De werkelijkheid in den toren," Corr. bladen, VI (Dec. 1941), p. 81, modifies eeuwigheid to oneindigheid. The transcendental direction of cosmic time and faith function point to oneindigheid and not to eeuwigheid as in

In summary, we see that the idea of the Greek view of God's eternity, as an eternal present, penetrated the church, finding classical theosophical expression in Beethius' definition. It serves as a perspective from which man views created eternity both in heaven (second corollary) after death and where time is not present and heaven as eternity after time ceases in the future. In the second and third corollaries the view of eternity in relationship to man and cosmos wipes out the cosmic character, i.e., including heaven and earth, of created time and the cosmic law order, and conceives of a new world law order and existence to which the eternity of God is applied by the principle of analogy of being, to man and cosmos. The eternity of cosmos and man is therefore seen in the pagan perspective of a creaturely eternal present. In this way the law-boundary between Creator and creature is broken by this theosophical thinking. This general survey of the question of eternity and time in nature-grace thinking supplements Deeyeweerd's analysis of the nature-grace ground-motive. These supplementary considerations can only be seen in their full significance in the light of the autonomy

Deeyeweerd. It is in striking contrast to this and to the work of Popma that Deeyeweerd never mentions the new earth in all his works. The kingdom of God is always the eternal and heaven. This, in light of what we have seen, is an indication that he has not extricated himself from the nature-grace perspective on these points. The work of Okke Jager, *op. cit.*, is definitive in this whole area and especially pp. 459-578 in which many questions relating to these three areas are dealt with with a wealth of Scripture present. K. J. Popma has dealt with this subject throughout his life and has had much influence. Berkeuwer, in *Wederkomst*, I, Hoofdstuk VII, is also confirmatory and is at points very original. Scheenheven, *op. cit.*, confirms from a slightly different perspective. There is also a wealth of material in the old stand-by, Patrick Fairbairn, *The Typology of Scripture* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, n.d.), pp. 328-361. By surveying these men and their writings a staggering case can be made against the views mentioned and described in the first, second, and third corollaries.

natural reason, its speculative metaphysical-theo-ontological speculation concerning the being of God, its idea of the soul as a substantial, rational form, etc. These latter points and many others have been thoroughly developed by Dooyeweerd,¹⁴⁵ and are necessary for seeing the background of the nature-grace views of eternity as they apply to God, man, and the cosmos, as well as to time, eschatology, and history.

Obviously the description given here of these views is influenced by an elaborate view of these matters on our part. In the thetical part of this dissertation a systematic presentation of our views on eternity, time, etc., will be given, at which time it would be well to refer back to this section. A general survey of the nature-grace thinking on these points was necessary to show the background for the critical points in Dooyeweerd, since he shares the nature-grace thinking presented here. Before evidence is given to this it is necessary to emphasize the wide-spread character of these views so that Dooyeweerd's synthesis on these points might be put in proper perspective.

¹⁴⁵. See footnote 93 of this chapter.

CHAPTER 3

SPECIFIC CRITIQUE AND EVIDENCE OF SYNTHESIS ON THE PROBLEM OF GOD'S ETERNITY, MAN'S ETERNITY, AND TIME

The transcendental critical thinking of Dooyeweerd is founded in a vision concerning God's eternity, creaturely eternity, and time, and his vision on these points is controlled by the religious ground-motive of nature-grace. There is no quarrel with the central thrust of the transcendental critique, i.e., that theoretical thinking is not autonomous, and that the autonomy of theoretical thought is the result of an absolutizing of theoretical thinking, which absolutization is caused by a prior religious, central commitment. The central choice of position which controls the direction of our theorizing is of a religious character. However, the transcendental critique itself in its steps and three basic problems as Dooyeweerd outlines them, cannot be followed any longer. The very statement of the details of this critique betrays the influence of nature-grace. It could be agreed with Dooyeweerd that the gegenstand relation is of central importance and must always be clearly distinguished from naive experience. But to some extent, even in the formulation of the gegenstand relation, the nature-grace influence comes to expression. Vollenhoven has recently stressed the importance of the gegenstand relation.¹ This is important since he sees clearly the nature-grace influence on Dooyeweerd. Although he does not refer to his criticism in these terms, his thinking differs precisely from

1. Vollenhoven, "College systematiek - het probleem van de tijd," pp. 6, 11, 14.

Deoyweerd's at the points where it seems that the nature-grace influence is the strongest. Vollenhoven clearly rejects the transcendent, supra-temporal character of the selfhood and yet wants jealously to maintain the gegenstand relation of theoretical thought. This is totally impossible for Deoyweerd. The third part of the transcendental critique especially, presupposes a transcendent point above the temporal horizon with its cosmic diversity, if self-reflection and a totality view, time consciousness, and intermedial synthesis are to be achieved. It is to be one of our theses that to work in terms of the transcendental critique the way Deoyweerd sets it up involves one in the nature-grace influence in his thinking. This critique compels one to accept his nature-grace vision on the points of created eternity and time. The setting or placing; or formulation of the problem (probleemstelling) of the transcendental critique must be challenged since it presupposes nature-grace thinking in Deoyweerd.

Transcendental critical thinking serves two basic uses in Deoyweerd. First, it serves the reformatational use of seeking to expose, "lay bare," the religious ground-motive behind the autonomy of theoretical thought. It seeks to show immanence thinking from the inner nature of theoretical thought itself, that theoretical thought has religious presuppositions and presupposita, i. e., that there is a religious choice of position and commitment directing and underlying theoretical thought, and thus it seeks to expose autonomy. Its reformatational value is consequently seen in that it seeks to cut off all speculative metaphysics and theo-ontological speculation. Christian transcendental critical thinking is anti-speculative, anti-metaphysical thinking. This is its great emphasis. It seeks to show that in its various expressions

speculative metaphysics is based on the dogmatic and uncritical postulate of the autonomy of theoretical thought. This is Dooyeweerd's intention and the reformational line.

A second use of the transcendental critique is more important for this dissertation. The transcendental critique serves to cover up the nature-grace influence on Dooyeweerd and the specific ontology type which lies at the basis of his formulation of the steps of the transcendental critique itself. Dooyeweerd, like Kant, wants to demand that theoretical thought be modest. This modesty in Kant, as Dooyeweerd has repeatedly emphasized, is a mask. It seems that there is a masking of a deeper problem via the transcendental critique which can also be found in Dooyeweerd. In other words, there is a certain amount of skepsis² involved in transcendental critical thinking as Dooyeweerd explicates it. For example, by stating that time is the transcendental horizon of theoretical thought, he protects himself from all penetration of the nature-grace motive. It could be agreed that cosmic time is the transcendental horizon of theoretical thought, but for Dooyeweerd this implies a distinct view of time which is immediately correlated to the transcendent religious horizon. Created eternity is elevated beyond the reach of thought, especially theoretical thought. Time, for instance, in our view, should not be limited to our earthly temporal horizon, but rather, it ought to be maintained that all that is created is temporal and all that is temporal is created. In Dooyeweerd's view there is an undue restriction placed on theoretical thought because his idea of cosmic time

2. By skepsis is meant an attitude of unbelief that does not make full use of the Word of God and the perspective found in the Scriptures. It unduly restricts the significance of the Scriptures for theorizing by falling into minimal biblical reflection and usage.

is limited to the earthly. In this way the supra-temporal, central, religious realm is one which increasingly takes the importance, and the temporal earthly world is only seen as the expression field of the eternal, both in its divine and creaturely sense. In this way, if he was operating with a scholastic view of created eternity, it could never be analyzed by theoretical thought, since theoretical thought is strictly limited to the temporal earthly horizon as Dooyeweerd sets it up. As a matter of fact, cosmic time is always to be seen in strict correlation to created eternity in Dooyeweerd's system. As an alternative to this, one could maintain that if what is central or religious is included in cosmic time, then that does not imply at all that it can be made into a gegenstand of theoretical thought, since theoretical thought can still be religiously directed. The heart of man is not analyzable, not because it transcends the temporal horizon, but because it is the ground³ of theoretical thinking which cannot be turned back upon by theoretical thinking; unless the ground itself be relinquished and another ground be taken. Many facets of created reality, all of which are completely subject to time and within the time horizon, are completely unfathomable to theoretical thinking, e.g., Christ in his human nature,⁴ animals,⁵

3. By 'ground' it is meant that it is the necessary basis for any concept or idea, and that one can conceive religion without being religiously determined, so that one is necessarily involved in a regressus ad infinitum. See Popma, Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1956), pp. 92-93, 110-111. Popma, in contrast to Dooyeweerd, believes one cannot even have an idea of religion (p. 93). Cf. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, p. 57.

4. Popma, Levensbeschouwing, I, p. 58, concerns the image of God in man and mystery in general.

5. Popma, De Boederschap van het Boek Job (Goes: Oosterbaan & Le Cointre, 1957), passim. Popma finds in God's pointing out to Job his stupidity, the unfathomable depth of wisdom in the animal world and the impenetrable mystery which all animals present us with. Also, Levensbeschouwing, VII, index under dierenwereld.

the heart, the church, sacrament,⁶ and angels. They are mysterious and unfathomable for different reasons. There is no need, therefore, to restrict the temporal to the "earthly" as Dooyeweerd does, and also no need for correlating the temporal to the central sphere of created eternity. If we follow Dooyeweerd here, we are left wholly in the dark as to what angelic beings are like, what heaven is all about, and all of the riches of Word-revelation concerning these central points does not sufficiently direct our perspective. This is an example of skepticism that seems to be implied in the transcendental method. By holding to the importance of this central supra-temporal sphere and by calling it the central sphere of occurrence, he succeeds in hiding the nature-grace influence from being exposed. It means that Dooyeweerd, by his own principles of transcendental critical thinking, cannot speak about the central supra-temporal sphere. To this principle he is quite consistent and consequently it is very hard to detect the nature-grace influence concerning his view of created eternity and religious transcendence, since he cannot describe it theoretically according to his own principles. Dooyeweerd therefore can point to any attempt to lay his thinking open at these points as a violation of critical thinking, or any attempt to describe this transcendent realm in the past history of theology or philosophy, as metaphysical speculation. It seems, however, that he violates his own critical method enough on these points for one to see the influence at the bottom of his transcendental critique. If one compares Dooyeweerd with Diemer on these points one can see a marked

6. Popma, Levensbeschouwing, IV, pp. 48ff. This feature that things within the time horizon are mysterious and unfathomable is the stress of Popma throughout his whole 7 volumes.

difference. Whether there is a real difference between these men on the points of God's eternity, time, or created eternity, is able to be doubted. But one thing seems clear, and that is that Diemer is much more speculative on these points than Dooyeweerd would ever be. If one would try to show Dooyeweerd's views by criticizing Diemer's views on the same points, Dooyeweerd would undoubtedly disavow Diemer's views as being speculative metaphysics. Nevertheless, the same structure is in Dooyeweerd, though masked, and this masking is due to his stress on carrying forth consistently transcendental critical thinking.

In order to point out carefully the nature-grace perspective influencing the formulation of the steps in the transcendental critique, it will be necessary to hunt for small clues in Dooyeweerd's idea of created eternity and God's eternity in order to reconstruct accurately his vision. There are only clues, because as has been intimated, it is in accordance with his critical thinking not to speculate about these matters of created eternity and the new earth. Nevertheless, it will be shown that Dooyeweerd has a definite view of these matters, which although mostly unexpressed, control his transcendental critique, method, and thinking.

That Dooyeweerd has the older, more scholastic view of eternal life comes out clearly in what he writes following the death of his friend, Dr. Ph. Kohnstamm. He writes, "Midden in zijn arbeid nam God hem op 76 jarigen leeftijd weg, zonder ziekbed, zonder doodstrijd in een haast onmerkbare overgliding uit het tijdelijk naar het eeuwig leven."⁷ [underlining mine] Here we see what seems to be a scholastic view of eternal life. Eternal life is looked at here as something one enters

7. Dooyeweerd, "Ter nagedachtenis van mijn vriend Prof. Dr. Ph. Kohnstamm," p. 11.

when one leaves the temporal. It misconceives the range of the temporal. In contrast to this misconception, there is every reason also to think of the dead in Christ who are with Christ in heaven, as mysterious as it might be, to be completely subject to time and even to have time consciousness. What is more, it is the uniform testimony of the New Testament that eternal life is received through faith already before death, e.g., "Whosoever believeth in me hath eternal life and hath passed from death unto life and shall never die."⁸ Popma says that eternal life is dated. It has nothing to do with leaving the temporal. What is more, the temporal can never be left, not at death, nor on the new earth after the judgment. We shall see how this thought of Dooyeweerd fits with his idea that the heart of man is not subject to temporal death, but is, by its nature, eternal and incorruptible (onvergankelijk). Here we see the nature-grace postulate, that "time is for a time," that time ceases to be in effect at death. We could extend the application of this postulate to Dooyeweerd and say that for him the temporal functions are for a time, or the temporal function mantle is for a time. Since Dooyeweerd believes in a resurrection of the dead, the body of believers, it would seem, must be also a non-temporal body or a so-called "spiritual" or "glorified body," i.e., one fit for eternal life as opposed to the temporal which man leaves at death as he "glides over into eternal life." This alone is actually all that is needed to show the nature-grace construction in Dooyeweerd's thinking on these matters.

A very important passage which bears on this subject is to be found

8. John 5:24, 25; 6:40; 11:24-26; 3:16-18. See also Levensbeschouwing, VII, index under leven, eeuwig; leven, nieuw; for a running critique of the scholastic view of eternal life.

when Dooyeweerd deals with the meaning of "het aevum in de wijsbegeerte der wetsidee." He says,

Het is nu duidelijk, dat deze opvatting van het 'aevum' onmiddellijk verband houdt met de Aristotelische opvatting van eeuwigheid en tijd, en met de Aristotelische opvatting van 'ziel' en 'lichaam'. Is de tijd slechts de maat der beweging, dan kunnen de 'animae intellectivae' als zoodanig, d.i. naar haar wezen, niet aan den tijd onderwerpen zijn.

Op het Christelijk transcendentie-standpunt is deze opvatting moeilijk te aanvaarden, omdat hier het centrum van de menselijke natuur niet in de 'rede' kan worden gezocht en dus ook de menselijke ziel, de 'inwendige mensch' of het 'hart' van 's menschen bestaan, niet langer als hypostase van een uit den tijdelijken kosmischen samenhang geabstraheerd functiecomplex kan worden gevat.

Ik zou nechtans den term 'aevum' in den zin van een tusschenteestand tusschen tijd en eeuwigheid, gaarne willen overnemen. Ik meen, dat daartegen te minder, bezwaar kan bestaan, omdat hij in dezen zin juist in den Christelijken gedachtegang is opgekomen, die behoefte gevoelde aan een onderscheiding tusschen het beventijdelijke in creatuurlijken zin en de eeuwigheid in den zin van het zijn Gods.

In het menselijk zelfbewustzijn als centrum der religieuze concentratie aller tijdelijke functies ontmoeten wij dan inderdaad het beventijdelijke in den zin van het aevum. Dit aevum is dus als actuele toestand niets anders dan de creatuurlijke concentreering van het tijdelijke op de eeuwigheid in religieuze transcendeering van de tijds-grens.

Waar in het hart de eeuw gelegd is, behoort deze aevum-toestand tot de ingeschapen structuur van onze zelfheid, die zich telkens moet actualiseeren, wanneer ons zelfbewustzijn in religieuze concentratie werkzaam is, zelfs al openbaart het aevum-bewustzijn zich in een afvallige richting, deerdad het het eeuwige in den tijd zoekt. Immers ook de vergeddelijking van het tijdelijke is slechts in religieuze transcendeering van de tijds-grens mogelijk, al blijft deze transcendeering, als concentratie der tijdelijke functies, haar band aan die tijds-grens beheuden. In dit leven is de aevum-toestand dus steeds aan den tijd gebonden. Een speculatie over den aevum-toestand bij de scheiding van ziel en lichaam, of bij de engelen, is wijsgeerig onvruchtbaar, en 'meteorica et vacua speculatie' in Calvijn's taal gesproken, omdat het hier gaat over 'verberggheden', die ons neg niet geopenbaard zijn. Al onze voorstellingen, begrippen, en ideeën zijn in dit leven in den tijd gebonden, en ook ons zelfbewustzijn blijft op den tijds-horizon betrekken, al transcendeert het den tijd in het aevum.⁹

9. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën op het immanentie-standpunt," Phil. Ref., IV (1939), pp. 4-5.

The whole quotation has been given because it is our intention to draw more than one conclusion from this passage, and also so that the reader may see the context in which these points come out. In line with what has been stressed, we again meet the phrase, "in this life" (in dit leven). This phrase, in the light of the quotation, shows how Dooyeweerd views time. This sentence from the quotation, "In this life the condition of created eternity (aeuum-toestand) is bound... to time" has meaning only if one supposes that at some future date it will not be bound to time. We have already seen this to be the case when he speaks of "gliding over out of the temporal into eternal life." Here again we encounter the thought that the life to come is not bound to time. This definitely is a Greek idea. What also appears from this quotation is that Dooyeweerd is looking for an intermediate condition (tussentoestand) between time and God's eternity. From this article it is patent that this notion was developed by the scholastic nature-grace thinkers, and Dooyeweerd even admits the similarity of his notion to the scholastic one, although he tries to set himself off from Boethius and Aquinas.¹⁰ However, the very thought of a non-temporal intermediate condition (tussentoestand), no matter how one seeks to Christianize it, is already a nature-grace construct. It automatically brings with it the idea that something created is non-temporal and therefore eternal. This implies a restriction of the time idea, order idea, and law idea and brings another order, law, and world idea into juxtaposition with an "earthly" order idea, time idea, and law idea. Two order ideas, law ideas, and the idea of created time and created

10. Ibid., pp. 2-4.

eternity are constitutive elements in nature-grace thinking.

Deeyeweerd stresses that "in this life" the condition of created eternity (aeuum-toestand) is always bound to time. Here we see the important stress on the correlation of created eternity and time. This thought must never be de-emphasized if the true importance of created eternity in Deeyeweerd is to be understood. It means two things: first, without this correlation no time consciousness is possible for man. It is precisely from his increased eternity consciousness that man achieves time consciousness and that he can know as his own, his body, i.e., his temporal function mantle which he leaves at death and which is subject to decay and temporality. Man has a time consciousness because he has an eternity consciousness, but he would have neither if he were only in time and not (in his heart) eternal and above cosmic time. In this same article he says,

Wanneer wij in het diepste concentratiepunt van ons bestaan den tijd niet te boven gingen, dan zou ook ons bewustzijn noodzakelijk in den tijd opgaan, en daarmee de mogelijkheid der religieuze zelf-concentratie ontberen. Het zou geen tijdsprobleem kennen, want het wezenlijk probleem wordt de tijd eerst, wanneer wij distantie tegenover hem kunnen nemen in het boven-tijdelijke, dat wij in het diepst van ons wezen ervaren. Slechts omdat de eeuw (het aeuum) in 's menschen hart gelegd is, terwijl hij met geheel zijn functiemantel in den tijd besloten is, kan hij ook wezenlijk tijdsbesef hebben. Ging hij existentieel in den tijd op, dan zou hij ook het waarachtig tijdsbesef missen.

Nu is het boven-tijdelijk concentratiepunt in het zelf-bewustzijn, dat zich slechts in de religieuze concentreering van al onze functies op de eeuwigheid kan actualiseeren, nog niet zelve eeuwig te nemen.

Waar op dit punt veel misverstand in zake mijn opvatting is gerezen, dien ik daarbij een oogenblik nader stil te staan.

Reeds in de Christelijke synthesesophilosofie uit den tijd der patristiek en scholastiek werd de noodzakelijkheid ingezien tusschen tijd en ware eeuwigheid een tusschenteestand aan te nemen, een aeternitas creata, welke met den term werd aangeduid.¹¹

11. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

In a footnote dealing with the phrase in this quote, "de eeuw (het aevum) in 's menschen hart gelegd is," Dooyeweerd says, "Ik laat thans in het midden of de bekende tekst van Prediker 3:11 in dezen zin moet worden verklaard. De geheele Heilige Schrift leert ons immers, dat het eeuwigheidsbesef aan 's menschen hart is ingeschapen."¹² This eternity consciousness not only provides man with the possibility of time consciousness, but enables one, as we have seen earlier, to have a totality view of the cosmos.¹³ We have also seen that unless he participates in the totality of meaning which is supra-temporal and eternal in a created sense (i.e., characterized by het aevum) intermodal synthesis cannot be completed. To this is to be added that man would also not be able to have veritable self-knowledge since it is in the true condition of created eternity (aevum-toestand) that he is vis à vis his eternal Origin. To be added to this is the very important facet that cosmological and cosmic consciousness depend on this created eternity of the heart.¹⁴ This shows the importance of the heart being supra-temporal if man is to be man. Man's consciousness enters the temporal by means of intuition and man's body is completely enclosed in the temporal except for the one transcendent point, or center of consciousness, which never can get into time, precisely because eternity has been laid in it and its nature is to be transcendent; that this center can never be temporal is clear because it only is meaning if it is subjected to the central unity of law, the law of love which as unity

12. Ibid., p. 2, footnote 1.

13. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, p. 8, 11, 30-32, especially footnote 1 on p. 30.

14. Ibid., II, pp. 447-448, here referred to as the transcendent self-hood which we shall see is identical with the eternity in the heart of man which makes him transcendent in his center.

is the totality and fullness of the law on the law side. This means that it also cannot be temporal since all diversity of law proceeds from this transcendent unity of law precisely by being refracted through the prism of time. That the heart can never be temporal but is transcendent and only enters through intuition and has its body in time, comes out clearly when Dooyeweerd says that "de vergoddelijking van het tijdelijke is slechts in religieuze transcendeering van de tijdsgrens mogelijk, al blijft deze transcendeering, als concentratie der tijdelijke functies, haar band aan die tijdsgrens behouden."¹⁵ This should make it clear that transcending is not an activity through which the selfhood moves from within the time horizon to beyond the time horizon, so that if the activity stopped it would fall back into the time horizon. Even the deification of the temporal is done by the selfhood from its transcendent position towards the temporal. The selfhood is held in existence by its concentration law which guarantees its transcendent position even in apostasy.¹⁶ It is from this transcendent position that transcendence is possible. From the point of view of theoretical thought subject always to the transcendental horizon of cosmic time, we can see that our selfhood transcends cosmic time, that is, is above cosmic time, is transcendent. Our selfhood in the supra-temporal, and therefore transcendent, directs the temporal towards itself as root unity, that is, it concentrates it by drawing and directing its lower temporal bodily functions in creaturely concentration. This means that

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15. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën op het immanentiestandpunt," p. 5.
16. This fact comes out in his account of the opening process led by apostate faith in a disharmonious way which proves to be the result of the central tendency of the heart to absolutize. This shows that it retains its transcendent structure even when directed to the temporal. A New Critique, II, pp. 322-323.

by directing the lower to itself, the selfhood as root unity is directing the temporal to the eternal which in this case is the Origin. But the temporal is only centered or concentrated on the eternal Origin through the transcendent root unity, the selfhood, which is the individual concentration point.¹⁷ This concentration is actualized in self-reflection which is a religious act and which must be repeatedly actualized. Apostate theoretical thought fails to see its real transcendent concentration point in the selfhood because that selfhood is seeking to actualize itself by concentrating on the temporal. This means that apostate thought cannot help but absolutize one of the temporal aspects since this apostate thought is finally thought directed by the concentrating, absolutizing apostate ego or selfhood which is seeking its Origin and rest in the restless temporal meaning dynamics. Since apostate thought is not directed above the temporal it does not arrive at true transcendental self-reflection and time consciousness and seeks also its root unity as well as its Origin in an aspect.¹⁸

A second thing which is involved, because the condition of created eternity (aeuum-toestand) is bound and correlated to time in this life, is that all our "voorstellingen begrippen en ideeën" are bound to time, and therefore our knowledge of the condition of created eternity is completely limited to the time horizon. This means that "in this life" there should be no speculation concerning the condition of created eternity (aeuum-toestand) at the time of the separation of soul and body, i.e., at death when the incorruptible (onvergankelijke) soul or selfhood

17. Ibid., I, p. 59. The individual selfhood can be called a concentration point and a root unity although the Archimedean point is always individual and supra-individual.

18. Ibid., II, pp. 323-325.

glides over into eternal life, or concerning the aevum or created eternity of the angels. The reason given is that "het hier gaat over 'verborgenheden' die ons nog niet geopenbaard zijn." Here it is clear that Dooyeweerd regards the angels as characterized by the condition of created eternity (aevum-toestand), that he regards them also, as well as the soul or heart after death, as supra-temporal, eternal in the creaturely sense, but warns that as yet we do not know enough about this state since enough has still not been revealed and because we are still bound to time and in this life. Here many points dealt with so far in this dissertation come clear. It is a common constituent of all nature-grace thinking that angels are regarded as not subject to time, in spite of the clear testimony of Scripture to the contrary. Popma has repeatedly emphasized the time consciousness of demons and the un-fallen angels.¹⁹ It is simply inconceivable that one can deny that the angels are subject to cosmic time especially when one looks at the book of Revelation. Here in vision, John sees the heavenly throne from which the judgments issue and are carried out by the angels. The heavenly creatures are on tiptoe waiting for the coming wrath of God, waiting for the opening of the seals. Perhaps one of the best intimations of the strong time awareness of heavenly creatures is in Revelation 10:6. This is the text which is the locus classicus for the idea that time ceases and eternity begins at the judgment day. It speaks of the fact that "there shall be time no longer." In the context of the opening of the seals it obviously refers to the fact that there will be no more postponement of the display of God's final wrath. It is time now for the

19. See footnote 116 of chapter 2 of this dissertation.

seventh seal; there will be no more time or delay or postponement, but as the prophets have declared, the "mystery of God should be finished."²⁰ This text, which has been appealed to so repeatedly in Reformed and Catholic scholasticism, has nothing to do at all with the cessation of cosmic time so that eternity might begin. But it does clearly underscore the time consciousness of the heavenly creatures and their awareness of events, and indicates precisely the opposite of what it has been supposed to. This, along with Revelation 6:10 which speaks of the departed saints, beheaded, but asking under the altar "how long," shows unmistakably that Scripture does not hesitate in the least to think of the heavenly angels and departed saints as subjected to cosmic time and historical events and of these creatures as having a strong time consciousness in this state. It is true that these passages are not straight narrative and the book is filled with apocalyptic images, but it is the burden of this whole book to show the interrelation of Christ to his people and to history as a whole, so that his people on earth might be comforted to know that Christ directs their earthly lives and history as a whole. In the beginning of this chapter it was remarked that Dooyeweerd's critical thinking serves also the use of masking the nature-grace influence which lies hidden in his view of created eternity and time in addition to the reformational use of cutting off speculative metaphysical thinking. Here we see a good example of this. On the one hand he stresses that there can be no speculation about the aeuum condition of the angels because there is not yet enough revelation and because our "thinking, representations, and ideas are bound to time," and

20. See footnote 139 of chapter 2 of this dissertation.

on the other hand he assumes that angels are eternal, or are characterized by aevum which is clearly a nature-grace speculative notion which Scripture in no way countenances. It is speculative metaphysical in the extreme to think of angels as participants in a condition of created eternity (aevum-toestand) and thus not in time.²¹ In the history of scholastic theology the notion that angels did not have bodies and other speculative notions which were inherited from the Greek theo-ontological tradition, were said to come from the text that speaks of them as "ministering spirits."²² Popma points out that there is no reason to speak of angels as being characterized as non-bodily and the presumption is stronger that they ought to be thought of as being in possession of bodies.²³ But in any case, that they are eternal in a created sense is so interwoven with the nature-grace perspective on these points that it is astounding that Dooyeweerd did not see this. In another place in the same article we have been discussing, he speaks of Thomas' idea of the aevum of the angels without seeing the full speculative depths of the whole idea.

On the one hand, Dooyeweerd employs a speculative view of aevum and even applies it to angels, and on the other hand, he says we cannot know anything about them and that it is speculative to try. It is here that the transcendental critical method, that hides and covers and makes it difficult to pin Dooyeweerd down, now shows the second use of the method quite clearly. The emphasis on cutting off speculation concerning even angels and departed saints could be appreciated if Dooyeweerd did not make this aevum condition of the selfhood so all important

21. Popma, Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte, pp. 76-80.

22. Hebrews 1:14.

23. Popma, op. cit., pp. 14, 83-85.

for his Christian transcendence standpoint. This condition of created eternity (aeuum-toestand) controls his whole transcendental method and in turn he uses the transcendental method to cut off all access to the speculative notion of aeuum. How does he know at all that angels partake of created eternity unless, via the "in and out method" of exegesis;²⁴ he has read this into the Scriptures and then read it out again. For as Dooyeweerd himself stresses, Scripture comes to us in our temporal, integral, naive experience and speaks to us in all our functions in the language of time, and according to Dooyeweerd, according to the order of time of faith (geloofs-tijdsorde). Nowhere is there the slightest hint that aeuum applies to angels in Scripture. Here we see a hermeneutic for looking at biblical texts, one which seems to have a point elevated above the time order (tijdsorde) as it is seen in faith, the point of view of the transcendent selfhood in its immediate²⁵ relation to the eternal Origin and from which it can perceive the central nature of Word-revelation. It would seem from this point one is able to say that when the Scriptures speak to us in the language of time about angels and heaven, it is only pointing to the eternal.²⁶ This religious hermeneutic and its relation to the order of time of faith (geloofs-tijdsorde) will be dealt with in more depth later, but for now it should be clear that the transcendental method can serve the use of hiding nature-grace influence.

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24. Vollenhoven, "Nieuwe filosofie (1961-1962) Monarchianisme (voor het irrationalisme)" (Amsterdam: mimeo, 1962), p. 7. Vollenhoven Kort Overzicht van de Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte (Amsterdam: THEJA, n.d.), pp. 22-23.
25. The idea of "immediacy" in Dooyeweerd, as in Kuyper before him, is quite important and will be dealt with later.
26. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, p. 33.

So far it has been shown that Dooyeweerd operates with a typically scholastic view of eternal life, a notion which involves leaving the temporal and entering into eternal life. From what has been said in the section in which a global oversight of nature-grace thinking on these points was presented, we can see that an outline is emerging which definitely shows that he is under the nature-grace ground-motive concerning his notion of eternal life. The same applies to his idea of the restriction of time to the "earthly" cosmos and his consequent attributing of the aeuum condition to angels. The phrase "in this life" shows clearly that Dooyeweerd is operating with the general notion that time ceases and is only for this life, and that the aeuum condition, which is as yet still hidden in its fullness because of lack of revelation concerning it, only is entered into at death and in the future. The whole nature-grace complex concerning heaven as non-temporal, leaving time, and no future perspective for cosmic time because a created eternity is substituted for cosmic time, is clearly and unmistakably present. It will be shown that these notions follow from an implicit idea of God's eternity as an "eternal present" and the whole nature-grace schema will be clear.

It can now be said however that the intermediate condition (tussen-toestani) or aeuum which brings with it "eternity consciousness" is exceedingly central as a background for his theoretical, philosophic systematics and for his transcendental critique.

These points will be established in still further detail and from slightly different angles since to establish these points is vital to our whole critique. In an interesting article from his early years, Dooyeweerd says,

Achter alle subjectsfuncties, welke de mensch in de onderscheiden wetskringen bezit schuilt de religieuze persoonlijkheid of ikheid, welke het eeuwig wezen van den mensch uitmaakt (underlining mine) en ook, schoon zelve onder geen wetsbegrip te vatten, den wil draagt. De verdorvenheid van dit fundament alier subjectsfuncties maakt ons, tenzij wij door Gods geest in Christus wedergeboren zijn, onbekwaam tot eenig goed en geneigd tot alle kwaad.

De wedergeboorte anderzijds is het werk van den Heiligen Geest en evenmin als eenig ander van Gods werken onder de wet te vatten.

Toch openbaart dit werk Gods, dat den wortel van alle menschelijke subjectsfuncties verandert, zich ook in den werelddamenhang van onze bedeeing, als vrije scheppende inwerking Gods in ons dagelijksch leven en werken.²⁷

Here he clearly states that the "religious personality or I-ness constitutes the eternal essence of man." This comes at a time before Dooyeweerd had written his article in which he developed his idea of aeuum. Here, and as we shall see in further quotations from this article, he has still not developed his idea of cosmic time, and he also operates far more uncritically with his idea of created eternity. The notion that the I-ness or religious personality constitutes the eternal essence of man shows clearly, at least, that there is a clear duality in man between the eternal essence and the temporal body. It also points out the fact that at death the aeuum condition, although Dooyeweerd stresses that we know little here, applies not to the body which is subject to temporal death, but applies rather to the eternal essence of man, the religious personality or I-ness. This is mentioned now to show a basis in the text of Dooyeweerd for a conclusion which was drawn earlier (pp. 137-138) without explicit textual support in Dooyeweerd, namely

27. Dooyeweerd, "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," Anti-revolutionaire Staatskunde, (driemaandelijksch orgaan) II (1928), pp. 76-77.

that he regards the aevum condition as applying to the soul rather than the body.

In an earlier section an attempt has been made to show that one should not conclude that Dooyeweerd necessarily has a dualism because of his stress on the eternal essence and temporal body which constitute man.²⁸ It was stressed there that it is rather to be looked at as a duality since he is monistic, and that the duality is in terms of two primal contrasts which are always correlated in man. This is mentioned here because we now want to show that this rather sharp duality present in an early article continues throughout his later writing and that it has even been somewhat developed. We are seeking to confirm the basic thesis that the idea of created eternity in nature-grace fashion is a-biding, central, and present, even up to recent times.

When Dooyeweerd speaks of the scriptural view of the heart, he quite often brings to one's attention that the soul is not subject to "temporal death." For example, he says,

Waar de Schrift in praegnant religieuzen zin over de menschelijke ziel of geest spreekt, doet ze ons deze steeds zien als het hart van heel het tijdelijk bestaan, waaruit alle uitgangen van het tijdelijke leven zijn. In het tijdelijk bestaan leert de Schrift nergens een dichotomie tusschen 'redelijke ziel' en 'materielichaam', maar ze vat dit tijdelijk bestaan in zijn geheel als lichaam, dat bij den dood wordt afgelegd. Daarentegen is 's menschen geest of ziel als religieuze wortel van het lichaam volgens de openbaring der Schrift niet aan den tijdelijken (doch buiten Christus Jezus aan den eeuwig) dood onderworpen, omdat hij inderdaad alle tijdelijke dingen te boven gaat.²⁹

In another instance he writes,

De 'ziel' van 's menschen bestaan, die naar het getuigenis der Schrift door den tijdelijken dood niet

28. See pages 45-48, 56-58 of this dissertation.

29. Dooyeweerd, "De leer van den mensch in de W.d.W.," p. 135.

getroffen wordt maar ook na de aflegging van het 'lichaam', d.i. van heel den tijdelijken, in individualiteits-structuur besloten bestaansvorm, blijft voortbestaan, is de religieuze wortel de menschelijke existentie, door de Schrift ook wel de 'inwendige mensch' of het 'hart' van den mensch genoemd, 'waaruit alle uitgangen des levens zijn' en 'waarin de eeuwigheid gelegd is'. Zij is, gelijk Kuyper het in zijn Stonelezingen over het Calvinisme uitdrukt, 'dat punt in ons bewustzijn waar ons leven nog ongedeeld bleef en nog in zijn eenheid ligt samengevat'. Dat concentratiepunt ligt volgens Kuyper 'niet in de gespreide stengels, maar in den wortel, waarop alle stengels uitschoten. En dat punt kan nu niet anders liggen dan in de tegenstelling tusschen al het eindige in ons menschelijk leven en het oneindige, dat er achter ligt. Dáár alleen is de gemeenschappelijk bron, van waaruit de verschillende stroomen van ons menschelijk leven opkomen en zich verdeelen'. En dat gebruikt ook Kuyper niet alleen het beeld van den religieuzen wortel, maar ook dat van het brandpunt: 'Persoonlijk ervaren wij dan ook gedurig, hoe in het diepst van ons gemoed, op het punt waar dit gemoed zich voor den Eeuwige ontsluit, alle stralen van ons leven als in één brandpunt samenvallen, en alleen daar die harmonie herwinnen, die ze in het leven zoo talkens en zoo pijnlijk verliezen'.³⁰

Dooyeweerd gives his counterpart to the scholastic notions of the simplicity, indivisibility, and imperishability of the soul when he says,

Eenvoudig, ondeelbaar en onvergankelijk [underlining mine] blijft de ziel als transcendent geestelijk religieus centrum van het menschelijke bestaan, dat heel het lichaam in zijn tijdelijke structuur bezielt en het menschelijk karakter opdrukt. Maar deze ziel is niet als zoodanig, maar slechts in haar tijdelijke openbaringen in het vergankelijke lichaam voor wetenschappelijk onderzoek vatbaar, omdat zij voor-onderstelde van alle wetenschappelijke werkzaamheid is.³¹

These are common formulations and they occur in other places.³²

What we are seeking to establish in these quotations is that they strongly suggest that the soul is indestructible and exists on after death

30. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," pp. 181-182.

31. Ibid., p. 222.

32. Dooyeweerd, "De idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch substantiebegrip," p. 35. Also, Vernieuwing en Bezinning (Zutphen: J. B. Van den Brink, 1963), p. 42.

precisely because of its nature as created eternity. Therefore, he says that it is not subject to temporal death. These characteristics given the soul are precisely those of created eternity or of the aevum condition. One could say that the eternity or aevum, in its creaturely sense, is characterized by indivisibility, indestructibility, and simplicity. This is so because time is the principle of cosmic diversity.³³ For these reasons Dooyeweerd often speaks of religion, the transcendent sphere, as being undifferentiated, or before differentiation. It is precisely for this reason that no concept of the heart is possible since concepts presuppose the logical and the non-logical aspects, and in the transcendent root unity there is no longer present any distinction between the logical function and the non-logical bodily function.³⁴ Diversity is strictly limited to the earthly temporal cosmos and all that is above the earthly is not diversified, but rather, full, unified, undifferentiated, indivisible, simple, and indestructible, and partakes of eternity in a creaturely sense, or in the divine sense as applied to God.³⁵ We can see that when earlier Dooyeweerd spoke of the fact that the religious personality or I-ness comprises the eternal essence of man he was setting forth what was to remain an

33. Dooyeweerd, "De leer der analogie in de Thomistische wijsbegeerte en in de W.d.W.," Phil. Ref., VII (1941), p. 48. He clearly states that the time order brings the diversity of aspects into existence. Also, A New Critique, I, pp. 16-19, 1-5, 106. See also footnote 31 of chapter 2 of this dissertation.

34. Dooyeweerd, "De idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistische substantiebegrip." This article contains one of the clearest applications of the transcendental method. Also, A New Critique, I, pp. 1-5, 106.

35. Dooyeweerd uses time as a boundary line, A New Critique, I, p. 102. This is interesting because the law is the boundary line between God and man. There are two fundamental boundaries (grenzen) to his system. Time as a boundary line divides the creation into its two basic contrasts, eternity and time, while the law is the boundary between the sovereign Creator and subjected creation.

essential feature of his thinking throughout his life. When he spoke earlier of the fact that in this life we do not know what aevum will be like at the separation of soul and body and in respect to the angels because we are in this life bound to time, we clearly see that he regards the heart or soul as in possession of the condition of created eternity (aevum-toestand). We therefore do not know what this eternity of the soul will be like after death because it is beyond our concepts, but there can be no doubt about the aevum characteristic of the soul or heart after death. It is precisely because of this characteristic that it is not subject to "temporal death" and lives on without the body, and is indestructible and does not perish.

It seems that aevum in respect to the heart of man becomes "eternal life" after death for believers. In contrast to Dooyeweerd, one must maintain that the idea of "eternal life" can only be applied to believers, for it is the opposite of "eternal death." Also, it must be maintained that according to Scripture "eternal life" is the possession of the whole man already "in this life," i.e., before death, before believers go to be with Christ. Dooyeweerd too closely identifies aevum which is in contrast to this temporal life with eternal life, and he does this in such a way that it is only entered into when the soul glides over into eternal life. For him eternal death ought to be the direction of the aevum condition as it is directed away from God at death, but the Scriptures say that one who does not believe is condemned already in this life. For Dooyeweerd, however, the aevum condition is the nature of the selfhood whether it is believing or unbelieving. As a situation or condition aevum is creaturely concentrating on the eternity of the Origin, and this very concentrating is only possible because the selfhood is eternal

in a creaturely sense, that is, transcendent. Dooyeweerd explains the apostate absolutizing of the temporal, or seeking the eternal in the temporal by the presence of this condition of created eternity (aevum-toestand). Since for Dooyeweerd aevum is a structural characteristic of the selfhood of Christians and non-Christians alike, we can conclude that this aevum condition "in this life," that is, before death in the case of Christians, is not yet to be called eternal life, but rather becomes eternal life when the "indestructible" soul puts off its body at death. Then the believing man is strictly in aevum and this is the same as in eternal life. At the resurrection of the dead the "spiritual body" would then be added to the indestructible soul and thus the body would also partake of aevum. In contrast to this it has been pointed out that Dooyeweerd must maintain two directions to the aevum condition, namely, eternal life and eternal death, but this is not emphasized.

As we have seen, this idea of non-temporal, indivisible eternity applies to the soul after death, before death while still in the body, and to the angels, and thus this aevum forming an intermediate condition (tussentoeestand) between temporal diversity and God's eternity is characteristic of nature-grace thinking.

Dooyeweerd has made quite an effort to Christianize his view of the heart or soul and to set it off from the scholastic views and the nature-freedom views concerning the soul. For example, he deals at length with this point in his article, "De idee der individualiteits-structuur en Thomistisch substantiebegrip." He tries especially to set off his view from the immortality of the soul as it is related to the form-pole of the form-matter motive of Greek thinking.³⁶ He makes every effort in

36. Especially pp. 34ff. in part II of this article.

this article not to have his view of the heart confused with the idea of the substantial soul of scholastic philosophy. He simply believes that the Scriptures teach the simplicity, indivisibility, indestructibility, and the created eternity of the soul, and then not only on the basis of Ecclesiastes 3:11, but also from the whole of the Scriptures. Berkouwer, in defense of Dooyeweerd, tries to do justice to the fact that Dooyeweerd's new dichotomy has nothing at all to do with the traditional whole-part scheme and substantial soul of the scholastics. Berkouwer's emphasis on the difference of Dooyeweerd's view is fair to Dooyeweerd in general, but he views him a little too much through the light of his own position. He rightly defends Dooyeweerd against Spier's surmise to the effect that the supra-temporality of the heart would also involve some sort of super-creaturalness.³⁷ As Berkouwer has rightly seen, this is wholly foreign to Dooyeweerd. Berkouwer is also correct when he points out that Dooyeweerd does not view the supra-temporality of the heart in the sense of an added "gift" or "brow," nor does he wish a "relation" between God and an independent and self-enclosed and self-existing man, a relation which would be added to man's humanness.³⁸ He is also correct over against Popma who suggests that aeuum always implies an aeternitas participata notion.³⁹ He rightfully stresses that Dooyeweerd, in speaking of the heart, intends not a deeper part of man, but rather the whole man with all his temporal functions in his religious concentration, i. e., in his relation to God.⁴⁰ He is in error

37. Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962), pp. 260-263.

38. Ibid., p. 261.

39. Ibid., p. 262.

40. Ibid., p. 263.

though, when he says, "He (Dooyeweerd) does not mean to place eternity (aevum) and time neatly next to each other."⁴¹ However, contrary to Berkouwer, Dooyeweerd does do just this, although the word "neatly" prejudices the matter somewhat. Berkouwer does not do full justice to the scope of this idea of aevum. We have already seen that Dooyeweerd ascribes it to the angels, although he does not speculate much about this. But much more, Dooyeweerd also applies the notion of aevum to the fact of religion as a supra-temporal, central sphere of occurrence, to the fact of leaving the temporal at death, to the fact of the heart after it has laid off its temporal cloak, to the body, to the fact of man having an eternal destination, and to the fact of a supra-temporal root community. Berkouwer obviously has not studied the broader use of the term "supra-temporality" in Dooyeweerd's total writings, or he would not have dismissed this so quickly. Even with his defense he is hard pressed to defend some of Dooyeweerd's formulations concerning this point,⁴² and if he were to probe more deeply, he might be less convinced. He does not deny that Dooyeweerd speaks of the selfhood as in an aevum state or having an aevum consciousness⁴³ and so his defense does not really bear on our critique. It is true, as Berkouwer stresses, that Dooyeweerd views the heart of man only in its three central relations, but as a converging center of all the functions it is not identical with its body, for otherwise the distinction of heart and body would have no meaning. It is also true that the heart is the whole man in central relation to God, but the I-ness is only the center of consciousness,

41. Ibid., p. 263.

42. Ibid., pp. 262-263.

43. Ibid., p. 263.

otherwise there would be no sense to the term "center." It is precisely as transcendent center that the heart can be characterized as in an aeuum condition. This is not an attempt to read into Dooyeweerd's idea of the heart the scholastic view of substance, but it is not fair to Dooyeweerd to stress simply the idea of relation or the act of transcendence. The heart is under or subjected to the supra-temporal central law of love which is also the law of concentration, but it is not that law itself. Because of this the aeuum situation is a permanent state or situation for the heart, and the acts of actualization, transcendence, and concentration, as well as this permanent situation or condition on the subject side presuppose the structural permanence of the law of concentration which conditions that which is on the subject side. Berkouwer tends to represent transcendence as a "rising above" modal diversity.⁴⁴

⁴⁴. Ibid., pp. 260, footnote 39, 261. This point of rising above or "transcending" needs to be very clear. Dooyeweerd regards only the center of consciousness to be transcendent and supra-temporal. Man's selfhood only is transcendent and because of this all man's consciousness except for this transcendent center is found "in this life" within time and the temporal horizon. For this reason when one speaks of the supra-temporal heart one is not speaking in Dooyeweerd's system as if man were half in time and half in eternity. All the diversity of his acts and the whole act structure enkapitally interwoven with the other three individuality structures make the body an integral structure for consciousness to express itself. Because it is only a point, a concentration point which can hardly be called a substance in any classical sense, a point which only exists in its three relations to God, fellowman, and the temporal, and does not stand in itself, one can easily see why Dooyeweerd can speak of man transcending the diversity of his acts and functions in his heart or soul or I-ness or selfhood. This is natural since Dooyeweerd stresses that man is in time with his consciousness with all that this involves time and time again, e.g., A New Critique, I, pp. 23, 24, 31, and especially III, p. 89, where he says, "The human body is man himself in the structural whole of his temporal appearance. And the human soul, in its pregnant religious sense is man himself in the radical unity of his spiritual existence, which transcends all temporal structures." Also, II, pp. 477-479. With this stress in mind one can understand why Dooyeweerd can speak of man transcending time since man himself in his temporal appearance is in time, and yet he transcends time,

This is a false representation of what Dooyeweerd intends here. The heart transcends the diversity because it is transcendent to the diversity, in fact, the diversity of functions is a refraction of the individual transcendent root unity, the heart. From the point of view of the immanent temporal functions, the heart transcends them, but the heart is always above the diversity, it does not "rise above" diversity, for this presupposes that at some point it is in the diversity. If this were true, Dooyeweerd would never designate the heart as transcendent as Berkouwer says he does.⁴⁵ We have seen that creaturely concentrating is initiated from the starting point or point of departure (uitgangspunt) in the transcendent supra-temporal heart. It is a concentrating of the temporal functions upon the selfhood, by the selfhood itself. Dooyeweerd's whole transcendental critique rests on the fact that theoretical thought cannot direct itself because it is only temporal and it does not exist abstracted from the transcendent aeuum of the selfhood that directs it, and then redirects and expresses itself in this temporal instrument, theoretical thought.⁴⁶ It is for this reason that theoretical autonomy

that is, he is not qualified by a temporal function like other individuality structures but he has a transcendent center above time which directs him in all his diverse acts and functions. So he can be said to rise above and transcend, but, and this is the point, the center does not rise above from in time to above time. Man transcends time because he is transcendent in his root and center, i.e., heart. That heart as center can never be reduced to a function or functional complex and so can never be thought of as immanent in the temporal horizon. Man's temporal consciousness escapes (ontsnappen), as Popma phrases it in his own position, because it structurally is not wholly in it. This must be seen in all Dooyeweerd's statements in which it is stressed that man rises above, and it must always be remembered that he speaks of the heart as transcendent, and therefore, imperishable, eternal, aeuum, and as the root of all temporal functional refractions.

45. Berkouwer, op. cit., p. 260, footnote 38.

46. This appears very clearly in Dooyeweerd's De Crisis der Humanistische Staat:leer (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 1931), pp. 84-135. This is the most

is driven beyond the temporal boundary to its religious choice and starting point. If concentration is looked at as a rising above diversity in the sense Berkouwer suggests, then Dooyeweerd's aevum situation

elaborate presentation of his epistemology before the presentation of De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee in 1936. It was undoubtedly in writing this book that he formulated clearly his vision of the selfhood and time as a primum. In the article, "De structuur der rechtsbeginselen en de methode der rechtswetenschap in het licht der wetsidee," which appeared the year before (1930) we have seen one of his first presentations of his definitive vision. For his statements on time and selfhood see De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer, p. 97, where he says, "De geheele innerlijk antinomische der zgn. kritische kennistheorie ligt in deze slechts-functioneële opvatting van het zelfbewustzijn in nuce besloten. Het zelfbewustzijn draagt noodzakelijk tegelijk een den tijd transcendeerend en den tijd immanent karakter. De diepere identiteit, welke in de gelfheid beleefd wordt, is een trans-functioneële, het is het zich een-dezelfde weten in en boven alle kosmisch-tijdelijke zinfuncties en het zich zijn tijdelijke zinfuncties als eigen weten." On page 93 he says, "Ons Archimedisch punt, dat ons zelfbewustzijn (de crux van alle humanistische kennistheorie!) bepaalt, doet ons de tijdelijke werkelijkheid zien als een uiterst gedifferentieerde zinbreking van de religieuze zinvolheid van onzen kosmos door het primum van den kosmischen tijd, welken tijd wij in den religieuzen wortel van ons zelfbewustzijn, in boventijdelijke gelfheid transcendeeren, doch waarin wij met al onze tijdelijke bewustzijns- en andere kosmische functies tevens immanent verkeerden. De grondnoemer, waarin wij de diepere eenheid en samenhang aller in den kosmischen tijd gebroken zinfuncties vatten, is de religieuze boventijdelijke zinvolheid, die geen synthetische denk-abstractie, maar de concrete zinvolheid der tijdelijke realiteit zelve is." On p. 103 he says, "De mogelijkheid der zin-synthesis is slechts op te klaren vanuit de door ons vroeger summier aangegeven opvatting i. z. de structuur van het zelfbewustzijn. Het zelfbewustzijn transcendeert den kosmischen tijd, in zoverre de individueele zelfheid deel heeft aan den religieuzen wortel van het menschen-geslacht, van welks zinvolheid alle tijdelijke zin-functies (zoowel natuur-als geestesfuncties) slechts tijdelijke zinbrekingen zijn. Het is immanent aan den kosmischen tijd, in zoverre onze bewustzijnsfuncties in de kosmische tijdsorde zijn ingevlochten. De a-logische zinfuncties zijn niet vreemd aan het zelfbewustzijn. Ze zijn alle gezamenlijk eigen aan onze zelfheid. Alleen daarom kunnen wij ze in hare zin-wetmatigheid leeren kennen." On p. 113 he says, "De individueele zelfheid is door en door religieus, boventijdelijk. In de kosmische tijdsorde kan noch aan den individueelen mensch, noch aan het verband zelfheid, ikheid toekomen. Dit is het cardinale uitgangspunt voor iedere wezenlijk Christelijke beschouwing der tijdelijke samenleving. Dit beteekent tegelijk de definitieve afwijzing van iedere 'metaphysische', substantialiseerende opvatting van het kosmologisch dingbegrip. De mensch transcendeert in zijn individueele ikheid alle tijdelijke verbandstructuren, omdat hij

is being reduced to an act of transcendence, which is not what Dooyeweerd intends. The meaning of "transcends" is that the transcendent center stands above its immanent temporal diversity of functions and body, and therefore is above them, so that from the temporal looking to root unity it might be said to "transcend" or rise above.

Popma takes a much more dim view of Dooyeweerd's dichotomy. He has subjected Dooyeweerd's system as a whole to a running critique in his seven volume work, Levensbeschouwing. One of the obvious purposes of this work is to bring out into the open Popma's objections to Dooyeweerd's thinking. Dooyeweerd's view of body and soul has not gone without lengthy and frequent critique from various angles. Popma says,

Berkouwer wijst er op, dat Dooyeweerd in zijn wijsgerige anthropologie de idee van dichotomie aanhoudt. (De mens het beeld Gods, 1957, 285-293) en hij is van oordeel, dat Dooyeweerd daardoor niet een dualistische beschouwing voordraagt. Wij menen, dat Dooyeweerd aan een zeker dualisme niet ont-komt, als hij spreekt over 'de ziel' van 's mensen bestaan, die naar het getuigenis der Schrift door de tijdelijke dood niet getroffen wordt, maar ook na de aflegging van het 'lichaam', d.i. van heel de tijdelijke, in individualiteits-structuur besloten bestaansvorm, blijft voortbestaan (Het tijdsprobleem in de wijsbegeerte der wetsidee, Phil. Ref. V (1940), p. 181). ... Het ligt in de aard van de zaak, dat we ons geen voorstelling en geen begrip kunnen vormen omtrent het bestaan en de bestaanswijze van de gestorven, voortbestaende en voortlevende mens. Het is immers juist de grondfout van de idee van een anima separata, dat zij een krachtige poging is om het onvoorstelbare voorstelbaar, en het onbegrijpelijke begrijpelijk te maken. Een rest van die poging zit o.i. ook in de opvatting van Dooyeweerd, die wel de idee van anima separata verwerpt, maar alleen in haar vroeg-scholastische vormgeving, en in zijn handhaving van de term en de idee van een dichotomie er niet aan ontkomen kan, een, wel geheel anders gevormde, maar in de grond der zaak evenzeer dualistische gedachte 'ziel' dat wil zeggen

deel heeft aan den religieuzen wortel van het menschengeslacht, van welks zinvolheid heel de tijdelijke realiteit in natuur- en geestesfuncties slechts een tijdelijke zin-breking is." The whole of Dooyeweerd's vision of the transcendental critique, method and critical thinking as shown in these quotations is seen to be dependent on his nature-grace vision of supra-temporality or aevum eternity character of the selfhood.

een dualistisch schema van lichaam en ziel, vast te houden.

Ook in de boven aangehaalde these van Dooyeweerd zien wij een poging, het onvoorstelbare voorstelbaar, en het onbegrijpelijke begrijpelijk te maken. De idee van de integrale eenheid van de menselijke natuur verdraagt geen enkele vorm van dichotomie in de mens-visie. Dooyeweerd verwerpt inderdaad de vroeg-en klassiek-scholastische idee van anima rationalis separata. Maar een andere anima separata komt er voor in de plaats, nl. 'de ziel' van 's mensen bestaan, die naar het getuigenis der Schrift door de tijdelijke dood niet getroffen wordt. De idee van 'tijdelijke' dood kent de Schrift niet; bij de drie opwekkingswonderen die Jezus verricht heeft, het dochtertje van Jairus, de jongeman to Nain en Lazarus, spreekt de Heiland gestorven mensen toe en gebiedt hun te leven. Uit welke bestaanswijze ze tot hun leven terugkeren, zegt de Schrift niet. Deze bestaanswijze is onvoorstelbaar, onbegrijpelijk, en misschien 'structuurloos'....

Door het sterven, dat de 'ganse mens' betreft, wordt hij gebroken, maar hij is niet oorspronkelijk, principieel, creatuurlijk breekbaar. Daarin ligt het volkomen raadselachtige van de dood, en dat blijft er ook, wanneer we aannemen, dat de dood niet alleen een lapsarische, maar ook een creatuurlijke factor bevat.⁴⁷

In another volume he says,

Men kan het dualisme van lichaam en ziel verwerpen, zoals dat geleerd werd door de oude scholastiek, en toch in een nieuwe scholastiek belanden. Volgens het oude schema is het sterven dit, dat het lichaam sterft maar de ziel blijft leven, ze is onsterfelijk. Dat is een makkelijk schema, en het heeft alleen dit bezwaar dat het op de feiten niet klopt en volkomen onjuist is. Op zulk een wijze wordt de doorgang, waarvan antwoord 42 spreekt, tot een overgang gemaakt, waarbij aan de continuïteit geen recht wordt gedaan. Op deze manier moet men er toe komen, meer dan één tijdsorde aan te nemen en daardoor te vervallen in het oeroude dualisme van zwakke en sterke tijd. Als men het 'traditionele dualisme van lichaam en ziel' verwerpt, en dan gaat leren dat het ik, het hart, de zelfheid of hoe men het verder noemen wil, onsterfelijk is, dan is men metterdaad in de scholastiek blijven steken, of heeft men, wat op hetzelfde neerkomt, voor een nieuwe scholastiek gecapituleerd. Men kan dan gaan zeggen, dat het hart onsterfelijk is en de functies door de dood vernietigd worden, maar dit is klaarlijk een poging het onbegrijpelijke begrijpelijk te maken. Als ik zeg dat het 'ik' het menselijk 'ego' 'tijdelijk' fungeert in de onderscheiden aspecten der tijdelijke werkelijkheid', dan is geheel onduidelijk wat het woord 'tijdelijk' betekent. Is dit 'tijdelijk fungeren' een temporeel fungeren, of een voorlopig

47. Popma, Levensbeschouwing, VI, pp. 168-169.

fungeren? Is die tijdelijke werkelijkheid temporeel of voorlopig? Is het tijdelijk fungeren van een boventijdelijk ego iets, dat alleen als mysterie beleden kan worden, of is het een systematisch beschreven situatie? Wordt door het tijdelijk fungeren misschien juist de boventijdelijkheid ondersteld van datgene, dat fungeert? Of moet hier wellicht meer dan één tijdsorde aangenomen worden, met welke namen men die dan ook benoemt? Hoe dit alles zij; indien we de mens moeten zien als een samenwerkingsgeheel van onsterfelijk ego en sterfelijke functionaliteit, dan heeft het Schriftuurlijk zicht op ons sterven afgedaan.

Bovendien wreekt zich deze onderscheiding van ego en functies ook nog op andere manier in onze levens-beschouwing-en-wandel. Als ik de dood, waarop ik uitzicht heb en waar we naar toe gaan, zó opvat, dat de 'tijdelijke functies' worden vernietigd terwijl het 'ik' blijft voortbestaan (in onsterfelijkheid!), dan heb ik daarmee een dualisme in de antropologie aanvaard, dat voor dat van de oude scholastiek niet onderdoet. Men kan het schema van hart en functies aanvaarden, zonder dat men behoeft te poneren, dat de 'functie-mantel' door de dood wordt vernietigd. Het gaat er maar om, dat we niet méér willen weten dat we weten kunnen. De dood, ook de dood als rest, symbool en onderwijsmiddel, is totaal, zodat ook het hart (of, mijnentwege: ik, zelfheid, ziel, geest, of welke andere term men moge willen invoeren) daardoor wordt getroffen.⁴⁸

He broadens his critique still farther when he says,

Een dualisme van tijdelijk lichaam en boventijdelijk 'ik' kan ons niet helpen bij het nadenken over de betekenis van ons sterven; want de gehele mens sterft. Dit wordt ons nog duidelijker als we het dualisme van tijdelijk lichaam en boventijdelijk 'ik' nog wat nader bekijken. Tot het tijdelijk lichaam behoort namelijk onder meer ook de geloofsfunctie. Het woord 'geloofs-functie' heeft alleen dan zin, als het genomen wordt in de betekenis van 'tijdelijke geloofs-functie', want het woord 'functie' zelve doet al een beroep op de tijd. Hierbij moeten we bedenken, dat deze tijdelijke geloofsfunctie steeds in verband staat met de als boventijdelijk gewaardeerde religie, naar een overbelijnd schema van tijd en eeuwigheid, dat die beide scheidt en in relatie stelt. Een minder belijnd schema, dat dichter bij de ongereduceerde ervaring staat, laat zich leiden door de overweging, dat de voorbijstromende tijd een toeschouwer 'aan de oever' onderstelt, en komt zo tot een aantrekkelijke aanduiding van de relatie van tijd en eeuwigheid, die echter het nadeel heeft dat ze een subjectivistische tijdsgedachte nadert en daaraan vermoedelijk op den duur niet zal kunnen ontkomen. We vergelijken dus twee visies; de ene die tijd en eeuwig-

48. ibid., II, pp. 194-195.

heid in het menselijke in radicale scheidingsrelatie ziet en daarmee innerlijk tegenstrijdig is, een andere die dichter bij de ongereduceerde ervaring blijft, maar het nadeel heeft subjectivistisch te worden. Het is er ons uiteraard niet om te doen, een tussenpositie tussen deze twee op te zoeken. We kunnen evenmin volstaan met de nadelen van beide op te merken. Het dualisme van tijdelijk lichaam en boventijdelijk 'ik' schijnt onvermijdelijk een dualisme van twee tijdsorden te moeten aanvaarden. Want deze boventijdelijkheid kan niet gedacht worden als onttrokkenheid aan de tijd; dan ware elke verdere discussie overbodig. Ze kan alleen zin hebben als een andere, ons wellicht niet nader bekende tijdsorde.

Nu is in de eerste plaats het geloof allerminst tijdelijk, in welke zin ook. Het is niet voorlopig, het kan ook niet zonder meer temporeel genoemd worden. Een beroep op 2 Cor. 4:18 is uiteraard ongeldig; 'de dingen die men ziet, zijn tijdelijk'; zulk een beroep zou eenvoudig op biblicisme neerkomen; blijkens de context gaat het hier over de voorlopigheid van het mens-buiten-zijn, de voorlopigheid en dus onhoudbaarheid van het in-het-openbaar-zijn (vgl. Rom. 2:28v). Het geloof is noch voorlopig noch zonder meer temporeel; wie in den Zoon gelooft heeft eeuwig leven.

Aan de andere kant kunnen we aan het hart of het ik of de ziel geen exclusief boventijdelijke aard toekennen (afgedacht nog van het mythisch karakter van deze boventijdelijkheid, die haar onbespreekbaar maakt in de discussie), omdat de gehele mens in de tijd van zijn geschiedenis staat, met zijn hart en religie. Daarom spreken we van Verbonds-geschiedenis, heilsgeschiedenis en zelfs openbaringsgeschiedenis.⁴⁹

In an article in the Correspondentie-bladen he brings critique from yet another angle. He says, "Het is duidelijk, dat deze opvatting inzake 'ecclesia invisibilis' en 'ecclesia visibilis' staat en valt met het rigoureuze onderscheid tussen boventijdelijk hart en tijdelijke existentie; ik meen, dat dit onderscheid in zijn rigoureuze vorm heden door Prof. Dooyeweerd niet wordt geponseed."⁵⁰

It is clear from these quotations that Popma sees in Dooyeweerd's thinking an ontology type which is dualistic. Not only is it dualistic

49. Ibid., II, pp. 196-197.

50. Popma, "Saecularisatie en zichtbaarheid," Corr. bladen, XXII/2 (1957), p. 36.

but it is specified to be a dualism with a dichotomy in its anthropology. This is one of the basic divisions Vollenhoven sees among dualists, that is, whether or not they have a dichotomy in their anthropology, i.e., whether or not there is a transcendent element in man. In an earlier section it was mentioned that Vollenhoven suggests that since Dooyeweerd regarded the heart or soul above the cosmos, he must be regarded as an advocate of either the doctrine of priority or as in the line of the late Aristotle.⁵¹ The possibility that this other ontology type, namely, the line of the late Aristotle, might better capture some of Dooyeweerd's emphases, will be dealt with later. From the given quotations it is clear that Popma sees in Dooyeweerd a dualism with dichotomy and that he focuses his critique on the idea that the heart is supra-temporal, transcendent, in a condition of created eternity (aeuum-toestand), incorruptible (onvergankelijk), and not subject to temporal death. Popma also sees that Dooyeweerd has two orders of time. He says, "Het dualisme van tijdelijk lichaam en boventijdelijk 'ik' schijnt onvermijdelijk een dualisme van twee tijdsorden te moeten aanvaarden."⁵² This is the point we have been trying to establish thus far, namely that Dooyeweerd has two orders, time and created eternity, and that two orders of time are constitutive of a nature-grace position.

Since this is so crucial more evidence for this judgment from the text of Dooyeweerd will be presented. In line with what we have seen concerning the heart as eternal and incorruptible (onvergankelijk) we find a very important quote from an early article of Dooyeweerd, "Be-roepsmaatschap en strafvergoeding." As part of this article he has a Naschrift, "Inzake het recht der Calvinistische wetenschapsbeschouwing,

51. See p. 24 of this dissertation.

52. Popma, Levensbeschouwing, II, p. 196.

en het misverstand eener neutral^e wetenschappelijke kritiek." This is one of the first places in which Dooyeweerd speaks of the Archimedean point. In this connection he also uses the term "transcendent" in clear distinction from "transcendental;" a distinction which shall in later years prove very important. This is a key article, for up to this time he had not seen the unity of the cosmos in an Archimedean point within the creation, but had found it in the providential world plan or the eternal counsel of God. He says,

Op deze vraag kan alleen de wetsidee antwoord geven, want hier moet een transcendent standpunt worden ingenomen, een Archimedisch punt boven alle bijzondere wetssystemen van psyche, logos, ethos, recht, schoonheid, historie, enz.; het transcendentale komt niet boven de grenzen der bijzondere wetssystemen uit. Welnu, slechts in zijn diepste kern transcendeert de menselijke geest boven den tijdelijken wetssamenhang, slechts de religieuze kern der persoonlijkheid is het eeuwige in den mensch, niet zijn zedelijke, logische, psychische of aesthetische subjectfuncties, die veeleer geheel in den tijdelijken wetssamenhang zijn ingeschakeld.

De menselijke rede in den zin der humanistische immanentie-idee genomen, is niets dan een kosmische eenheid van logische en na-logische subjectfuncties. Hier is het gezochte Archimedisch punt niet te vinden.”

53. Dooyeweerd, "Beroepsmissie en strafvergoeding in 't licht der wetsidee," (met Naschrift: "Inzake het recht der Calvinistische wetenschapsbeschouwing, en het misverstand eener neutral wetenschappelijke kritiek,") Anti-revolutionaire Staatskunde (driemaandelijksch orgaan), II (1928), p. 425. Historically this is a very interesting quote. This is one of the first times he has seen the necessity of the Archimedean point. The stress on this point is reminiscent of his articles in the first year of the Phil. Ref. ("Het dilemma voor het Christelijk wijsgeerig denken," and "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën...") in which his thoughts center around the need for an Archimedean point. This quote can be called the beginning of a line of thinking which can be called his transcendental critical line. It is here that his transcendental starting point is found. It is interesting in this connection that he speaks of the "transcendent standpunt" as above all special law spheres and of the human spirit as above the temporal law coherence. In this same year in an article in the Anti-revolutionaire Staatskunde (1928), "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," he definitely did not have his view of cosmic time developed (pp. 113,

A few pages later in the same article he expresses a similar thought, although it is unique in the fact that he uses the term "im-mortal" to describe the religious kernel in man. He says,

Uit de openbaring der geddelijke waarheid over de verhouding van Schepper en Schepping, een openbaring die zich primair niet richt tot gevoel of logisch denken, tot zedelijkheids of schoonheidsbewustzijn, doch veeleer tot het eeuwige, onsterfelijke in den mensch, de religieuze kern onzer persoonlijkheid en die eerst vanuit dat religieuze centrum betekenis verkrijgt voor ons kennen en handelen.⁵⁴

We see clearly at this point the significance of the term "eternal." Deeyeweerd hardly ever refers to the religious center of man as eternal after 1936. We find in various places that he points to Ecclesiastes 3:11 to show that "eternity is laid in the heart." From 1936 he uses the term beventijdelijk quite consistently. In a later article in 1939⁵⁵ he refines his idea of eternity as applied to the religious center in man, and calls it aeuum. Another important consideration is that the word "transcendent," when applied to the center, signifies

1:6, footnote 5; 121, footnote 86). In the quotation given in the text where he speaks of "beven der tijdelijken wetssamenhang" we see that he has really broken through to his lasting vision of the transcendental method. We still do not have in the article a mention of the prism, but there is some indication of this idea being already in his mind, e.g., "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem..." p. 113. Before the quotation given in the text on p. 159 and which we have been generally discussing in this footnote, there was not a clear awareness in Deeyeweerd's thinking of the necessity of a theoretical leading idea of unity in the sense spelled out here in his writing, for what appears to be the first time. That is, up to now he had seen the theoretical idea of unity receiving its content from the biblical revelation concerning the creator's world plan. Now, however, the content of theoretical idea of unity is supplied by what he feels is the biblical idea of the religious kernel in man which is within the creation but beyond the temporal law coherence.

54. Ibid., p. 430.

55. Deeyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën op het immanentie-standpunt," pp. 2-5.

the same as eternal. Dooyeweerd's usage of the term "transcendent," as we have seen, is applied and used right up to the present, and is often accompanied by the term "supra-temporal." Dooyeweerd uses the word "eternal" in these quotes in the same way he uses the words "supra-temporal," "boventijdelijk," or "transcendent" in all his writings. Wherever he uses these terms in later writings he has in mind what in his earlier writings he definitely calls "eternal." When this is borne in mind it opens up the wide range of uses that the term "eternal" or "supra-temporal" has in Dooyeweerd. We will deal with this scope of the eternal or supra-temporal shortly.

We have seen that Dooyeweerd often describes the heart as incorruptible (onvergankelijk), and not subject to temporal death. In these quotations he comes right out and declares that the religious kernel in our personality is eternal and immortal. This use of immortality is wholly foreign to the Scriptures. This has been shown by many people⁵⁶ to be a false use of the idea of immortality, at least the way Scripture employs the term. What is of interest here is the fact that already at this stage Dooyeweerd is quite aware that his dichotomy is quite different from the Thomistic and pagan views of the soul and body.⁵⁷ As we have already seen, he will call on the Scriptures for his view of the eternal in man's center, or what he often refers to as "eternity laid in man's

56. M. J. Arntzen, "Tweelei 'spel'," Corr. bladen, VII/5 (Dec. 1942), pp. 93-94. Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God, pp. 265-278. Berkouwer puts the best possible construction on the church's use of these ideas of immortality, but finds it, nevertheless, wanting. This best possible construction must also be placed on Dooyeweerd's idea, for he seeks to set it off from the substantial soul idea. See Popma, Levensbeschouwing, I, pp. 74ff., II, pp. 194ff.

57. Dooyeweerd, "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," p. 115.

heart,' since he makes clear that his idea of aeuum is taught throughout the whole of Scripture. However, if this were the case he would never have applied the term "immortality" to the religious kernel in man's personality. Despite his protestations to the contrary, we see an example of the "in and out" method of exegesis, which is one of the chief methods of synthesis, according to Vollenheven.⁵⁸ The question has to be raised as to what Deeyeweerd is trying to get at with his description of the heart as immortal, indestructible, and eternal. It is obvious that he is seeking to account for the presence of believers with Christ in heaven after death. This is a biblical emphasis which cannot be lost. But to account for this by speaking of the eternal and immortal in man as making out the religious kernel or center of personality and then speaking of it as not subject to temporal death, but eternal death, would seem to be clear speculation.⁵⁹ However to deduce from this that Deeyeweerd has a dualism with a dichotomy in his anthropology, of transcendent eternal center and non-transcendent temporal body, does not necessarily follow, as Pepma thinks. We have already seen in an earlier section⁶⁰ that Deeyeweerd speaks of two kinds of generations, one which is temporal, bodily, and the other which is supra-

58. See footnote 24 of this chapter.

59. This speculation is still current in Deeyeweerd. He quite often speaks of generation in time, and time as that which governs what arises and perishes. Things perish because they have no supra-temporal selfhood. See A New Critique, III, p. 65. He says, "The modal aspects of reality find their deeper identity in the central religious sphere alone. But temporal things are perishable, they do not have a supra-temporal selfhood; their thing-identity is only that of a temporal individual whole, i.e., of a relative unity in a multiplicity of functions."

60. See p. 44, footnote 6 of this dissertation.

temporal, spiritual and which applies to the center of man. There is then a created eternal generation of hearts and a temporal generation of bodies and these are always correlated and, as we have suggested, these contrasts proceed out of one source.⁶¹ We shall return to this point in more detail in the next chapter where this monism will be shown to be connected to Dooyeweerd's idea of creation. Popma's view of Dooyeweerd fails to take into account the broader use of the idea of created eternity, supra-temporality (boventijdelijkheid), especially as it relates to generation, and therefore he cannot do justice to Dooyeweerd's stress that the supra-temporal is dynamic and that the religious central sphere is the central sphere of occurrence. A dualism with a dichotomy is a view which brings with it the idea that the transcendent is changeless and the non-transcendent is changeable,⁶² but, as we have just emphasized, this does not quite fit Dooyeweerd's view of the supra-temporal.

In summary thus far: assuming that what has been sketched in the section on a global oversight of nature-grace thinking (chapter 2) is correct, the following has been established: if it is true that all of the created is temporal, and all the temporal is created, and that nothing in the created can be regarded as eternal in the sense of non-temporal, then it is at least clear that Dooyeweerd regards the heart of man as created and subject to law, though not temporal, but rather, eternal in an aeuum condition and transcendent. Our view also implies that angels are subject to cosmic time and to the cosmic law order. We have shown that Dooyeweerd does not regard this to be true, but rather, restricts

61. Mention is made of monism on p. 49 of this dissertation.

62. See p. 56 of this dissertation.

time to the earthly cosmos and speaks of angels as being in an aevum state. To this supra-temporal Dooyeweerd cannot apply the designations of succession or duration since these are precisely characteristics of the temporal. Because of this supra-temporal created eternity which, in his opinion, constitutes the religious center of man, Dooyeweerd can regard man as not perishable or incorruptible, immortal, and not subject to temporal death. It has been emphasized that whatever one thinks concerning eternal life, it cannot mean non-temporal (life), since one possesses eternal life by faith the moment one believes in Christ. Eternal life is a present possession and is dateable like all other things in the creation. For this reason it is speculative to speak as Dooyeweerd does of man entering eternal life at death and as leaving the temporal. In contrast to this, it has been stressed that man can never leave the temporal behind at death, in hell, in heaven, or on the new earth, for in all historical stages he remains subject to time as an ordinance that holds everlastingly. We have also shown how this view of the eternal influences Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique. This will be dealt with in more detail later. If man can leave the temporal at death, it implies that time ceases to hold for man between death and resurrection. This way of speaking of death is so typical of nature-grace thinking that one is tempted to state right at this point that it has also been shown that Dooyeweerd regards "time as being for time," or that time ceases. That Dooyeweerd also maintains the nature-grace dogma that "time is for a time" needs further confirmation to be considered definitely established. However, it can be asserted already at this point, that when Dooyeweerd describes death in terms of leaving the temporal and angels are said to have possession of aevum,

this is, to say the least, a strong presumptive argument that Deeyeweerd thinks that cosmic time will come to an end at the judgment, and aevum will begin in its full state for man. It has been stressed that eternity for the nature-grace thinkers was almost unanimously conceived of for both man and God to be a nunc aeternum, without a succession from future to past. This was the standard definition for God's eternity, and man's eternity was patterned analogously after God's eternity. These two features still remain to be shown in Deeyeweerd's thinking. To prove this, one is immediately involved in his idea of root unity or concentration point, cosmic diversity, the breadth of the application of the term "supra-temporal" and finally his non-realism.

In the synoptic view of the ontology type which seems to be present in Deeyeweerd, the fact was spoken of that the primary contrasts in the creation are between the temporal in the lower, and the supra-temporal or created eternal in the higher. Thus far we have shown this to be true in regard to man's individual concentration point, or the center of man's temporal functioning. We have dealt with the angels somewhat, but now an attempt will be made to show still more clearly that since Deeyeweerd unduly restricts time to the earthly, he cannot regard angels as subject to the temporal horizon. It will be shown that eternity applies to much more than to the heart in his thinking, but that it constitutes the whole higher contrast in his monism, and therefore, is applied to all the created non-temporal. This involves two orders; one which governs eternity and one which governs time. This will demonstrate the influence of nature-grace on his thought.

Deeyeweerd has some interesting statements concerning angels in contexts which stress the limitation of time to the earthly. In an early

article concerned with juridical causality, which was his first real setting forth of his philosophical systematics, his idea of time is not developed and markedly differs from his idea of the prismatic idea of time of later years. In speaking of the organic coherence of law spheres in the cosmic order he says,

Uit het bovenstaande moet de noodwendige conclusie worden getrokken, dat onze wetsidee nimmer exclusief kan zijn, in dien zin, dat zij de geheele schepping omvat.

Wij kennen niet den samenhang van wetsskringen, waarin b.v. de engelenwereld is besloten.

Slechts de religieuze zin bindt onze wereld aan de wereld der engelen. Slechts de religieuze zin, die zelve niet aan een bepaalden samenhang van wetsskringen is gebonden, is het eeuwig moment in iederen kring van wetten, waaronder Gods soevereine wil ons gesteld heeft (Vgl. Christus' samenvatting van den religieuzen zin der zedewet).

Die eeuwige zin is dus niet een wijsgeerige, zooals b.v. Husserl's "Wahrheiten an sich" of Kant's noumenale wereld. De wijsbegeerte is zelve in de religie gegrond en onder de wet gesteld.

Het uitgangspunt onze wetsidee is een religieus uitgangspunt; in dien zin de volheid des zijns en geen wijsgeerige abstractie. ... Alle functies worden beheerscht door de kwaliteitskern, maar die kern ontplooit eerst haar zin in den organischen samenhang met haar functies. De kern is de garantie voor de soevereiniteit in eigen kring, de kern-functies waarborgen binnen den wetsskring den samenhang met alle andere wetsskringen.⁶³

From a later period we have a somewhat similar idea when in speaking about the principle of contradiction he says,

If anybody is to think theoretically, he ought to begin by recognizing the validity of this principle, which is in no sense absolute and unconditioned, but rather of a cosmic-temporal character. Does this mean, that other creatures, or God himself, could set aside the principle of non-contradiction in their thought? If this question is to have a meaning, one must proceed from the supposition that God himself, or e.g., angels, also would have to think in a cosmic temporal fashion. For, as a matter of fact, human thought is able to proceed in setting aside the principle of non-contradiction; e.g., the whole dialectic logic does so. But whoever would suppose this thought in the case of God and the angels, supposes at the same time, that they are in-

63. Dooyeweerd, "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem ...," p. 31.

cluded in the cosmic temporal order and that they are subjected to the laws that rule therein, although they can transgress them in so far as they have a norm-character. Quod absurdum! and with respect to the sovereign God: Quod blasphemium!⁶⁴

From this we can see two things: first, as we have seen before,⁶⁵ Dooyeweerd's law idea (wetsidee) does not view the whole creation. He goes on to point out that we do not know the coherence of law spheres in which the angels are enclosed. We have already noted that Dooyeweerd regards the angels as participating in the aeuum condition although this is qualified by him by the consideration that in this life these matters remain concealed because of lack of revelation. Here we see that he regards it feasible that the angels might be subject to some kind of coherence of law spheres, but it would apparently not resemble the temporal cosmic order of law spheres. Here we have a clear pointer to two world orders. We have stressed that cosmic time as an ordinance, holds for all creation, not just the earthly. On Dooyeweerd's own basis the Scriptures always speak to our faith function according to the time order of faith (geloofs-tijdsorde) about things beyond time. It is interesting to consider here why then he even can surmise that angels would be subject to a completely unknown coherence of law spheres and that they would partake of aeuum, since the Scriptures refer to the angelic world as subject to succession and angels and departed saints as having time consciousness. How could he know that angels are not subject to the temporal horizon from Scripture, when Scripture relates these matters only according to the faith order of time which partakes of succession and duration. It also appears that whatever would be the coherence of law spheres, it would not be a temporal coherence, since

⁶⁴. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, pp. 144-145.

⁶⁵. Ibid., II, p. 53, footnote.

that is precisely the nature of the coherence of our earthly cosmos. Dooyeweerd even adds that it is absurd to suppose that angels are included in the cosmic temporal order and that they are subject to the laws that rule therein. This would seem to be speculation. To conclude from the fact that we know only a little, via revelation, about angels, to the fact that they are not subject to the cosmic temporal order is unwarranted. Scripture gives us no clear pointer to this fact but rather underscores that all of creation, heaven and earth, and all that they contain is subject to God's ordering and creative Word and law. It is from this creative and ordering Word that all began and all was subject to development, succession of events, e.g., the fall of angels, history.⁶⁶ Also for this reason all things that are created are subject to the law spheres and the scope of these law spheres cannot be restricted to the earthly cosmos with its planetary and starry heaven. Granted, we know very little about this, nevertheless, the creation account makes it clear that we can never get behind the temporal horizon to an aeuum, created eternal, or transcendent created horizon. From Scripture it would seem we only can truly distinguish God, law, and cosmos.⁶⁷ The cosmos is completely temporal and is subjected to the law which is temporal as it relates to that which is subjected to it, and supra-temporal as it relates to God the sovereign, eternal creator and law giver. That the sovereign God is not subject to cosmic temporal order is self-evident since he is the creator and law giver of the creation. But that it is absurdum that angels are subject to the cosmic temporal order is

66. For the history of the angels before man's creation and fall, see Pepma, Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte, pp. 84-85.

67. Vollenhoven, "College systematiek - het probleem van de tijd," pp. 5, 8, 15.

a fact that Deeyeweerd must have a special revelation about, since nowhere in Scripture is there an indication that there are two cosmic coherences, one temporal, and one eternal and non-temporal. Nature-grace thinking in every one of its representatives does teach two cosmic coherences and two world orders, one being temporal and one being the created eternity of the angels and departed souls. That Deeyeweerd regards the world of angels as eternal comes out when he stresses that only the religious meaning (religieuze zin), which is the "eouwig moment in iederen kring van wetten," binds our world to the world of the angels. Some interesting features make their appearance at this point. It is obvious from this that Deeyeweerd has not developed his idea of time fully as yet in this article.⁶⁸ What does he have in mind when he says that only the religious meaning binds our world to the world

68. Deeyeweerd, "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," pp. 113-116. On p. 116, footnote 5, he says, "Tijd en ruimte zijn naar onze opvatting natuurlijk geen psychische aanschouwingsvermen in Kantiaanschen zin en nog minder logische kategorieën in den zin der Marburgerschool, doch veeleer elementen van wet kwaliteiten onder beheersching van de resp. soevereine kwaliteitskernen. Tijd en ruimte zijn in dezen zin dus geen subjecten, doch wets-elementen (in den geometrischen kring alleen is de ruimte kwaliteitskern). Waren zij subjecten, dan zoude Kant's kritiek op de realistische opvatting inderdaad hout snijden." On p. 121, footnote 86, he says, "Ik moege er in dit verband veer waarschuwen, de kosmische orde in de wet kringen zelve als al-omvattend tijdsverband veer zulk een causaalverband uit te geven. Immers als men van een kosmische tijdsorde wil spreken, moet men bedenken, dat men hier 'tijd' in een ongekwalificeerden zin gebruikt, waarvan geen begrip mogelijk is. Het organisch verband der wet kringen, uitgedrukt in onze wetsidee, kan zelve geen tijdsverband zijn, al gebruiken wij in de kosmologie de logische tijdsorde van het prius en posterius ter aanduiding van de plaats der wet kringen in de kosmische orde. De kosmische eenheid der tijdsorden bouwt zich op uit de onderscheiden gekwalificeerde tijdsorden, doch is niet zelve een tijdsorde." The first real indication of his definitive view of time, in which he employs at one and the same time the idea of the prism and the notion of the heart as supra-temporal, along with the whole idea of the root unity on the law and subject sides as a created fullness and totality which is refracted, is found in "De structuur der rechtsbeginselen en de

of the angels? This leads us to the broader use of the idea of eternity in this article. Here we see that the religious meaning (religieuze zin) is the eternal moment (eeuwig moment) in each sphere of laws. The starting point of the law idea is a religious starting point which is equivalent to saying that it is an eternal starting point. In an excursus in this article, "Het probleem van de verhouding van natuur en genade in de Calvinistische wetsidee," he says some things bearing on the meaning of religion and the eternal.

Luidt het grondprobleem der humanistische wetsidee in zijn onoplosbaren vorm: De harmonische verhouding te vinden tusschen wetenschaps- en persoonlijkheidsideaal, de christelijke wetsidee betrok van meetaf de verhouding tusschen natuur en genade in Gods wereldplan in het centrum harer belangstelling....

Zou dan de Calvinistische wetsidee tegenover dit allesbeheerschend grondprobleem onverschillig kunnen staan? Wel verre van daar! De martelende spanning tusschen natuur en genade is in deze wetsidee opgeheven, maar geenszins door elimineering van een van beide, maar door harmonische ver-

methode der rechtswetenschap in het licht der wetsidee," Wetenschapelijke Bijdragen (Amsterdam: Dagblad en Drukkerij de Standaard, 1930). See p. 233 for the first conscious use of "zin volheid." For the use of the heart as supra-temporal, p. 242; for the idea of the supra-temporal root or Archimedean point, pp. 231-232; for supra-temporality applied to meaning totality (zin totaliteit) and meaning fullness (zin volheid), p. 252. For the historical law sphere "knooppunt van heel de geestelijke dynamisch binnen onzen kosmos," p. 257; this idea had formerly been related to predestination ("Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem....," p. 61). In contrast, in "De structuur der rechtsbeginselen..." it is the faith aspect (geloofs aspect), p. 252. For Christ as head of the redeemed human race as fullness and meaning consummation, p. 234; also on p. 234 we have his idea of the concentration point. Here in contrast to "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem..." he thinks of time as a time order of earlier and later law spheres, p. 233. On p. 242 principles (beginselen) are regarded as temporal in contrast to the idea that the kernel of each law sphere is an "eternal" moment as on p. 31 in "Het juridisch...." In "De structuur der rechtsbeginselen..." we have the first publication of Dooyeweerd's definitive vision which will vary only a little, and this already in 1930, six years before the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee publication. Somewhere between the years 1928-1930 he discovered his idea of the concentration point and cosmic time. From this point his thinking starts to find real balance and symmetry, and the emphasis moves from the stress on the wetsidee toward stress on the transcendental critique.

zoening, welke aan de Calvinistische levens- en wereldbeschouwing haar evenwichtig en verheven karakter verleent. Alles - ook het schijnbaar meest geringe in de natuur - verschijnt hier onder eeuwigheidslicht....

Maar die genade is uitsluitend Gods werk en staat niet onder wetten. De religie in haar actieven zin is geen wetsskring nevens andere, gelijk recht, moraal en Logos, daar ze geheel primair en universeel aan alle wetsskringen ten grondslag ligt. Als passieve band tot Gods scheppersen onderhouderskracht, voorzoover we zien op de wetsskringen, waarin de redeloze natuur, als actieve band met God, voorzooverre we zien op die wetsskringen, waarin de redelijke natuur God dient....

Gods werk in het menselijk hart is niet aan wetten gebonden en juist daarom kan de christelijke religie niet in een wetsskring worden opgesloten, maar drijft ze den wedergeborene uit in de zondige wereld, om overal den strijd aan te binden voor de handhaving der goddelijke ordinantiën....

Natuur en genade! Hoe is hare verhouding in onze wetsidee geschouwd? Niet de natuur als voortrap der genade, gelijk in het Rooms-Katholicisme, geen heidensch fundament onder christelijk kap. Geen in wezen onverzoende breuk tusschen natuur en genade, gelijk in het Lutheranisme, maar natuur en genade in onverbreekelijken, harmonischen samenhang! ⁶⁹

A few pages later he continues,

Eerst bij de ontsluiting der anticipatiesferen ontvangen wets- en subjectskwaliteit hun zin-ontplooiing, openbaren zij zich in expansieve functie.

Die ontsluiting is slechts mogelijk met behulp van de subjectsfuncties van de geanticipeerde wetsskringen, die bij den mensch de eerste stimulans voor deze activiteit behooren te ontvangen uit den religieuzen wortel der persoonlijkheid, doch waar het hier slechts een 'ontsluiting' betreft, moeten de anticipatiemogelijkheden in de wets- en subjectskwaliteit zelve gelegen zijn.

Haar zin-voleinding vinden wets- en subjectskwaliteit eerst wanneer het proces van de ontsluiting der anticipatiesferen geheel is voltooid en de religieuze, de eeuwige zin der wetsgedachte den geheelen wetsskring heeft doortrokken, wat ongetwijfeld in deze zondige wereld buiten Christus, den vervuller der wet, niet mogelijk ware. ⁷⁰

Still further in this article he continues,

De 'ontsluiting der anticipatiesferen,' als actieve 'doorgeestelijking' van de wetsskringen, is een religieus thema in de Calvinistische levens- en wereldbeschouwing, een thema, dat

69. Dooyeweerd, "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," pp. 25-27.

70. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

zijn hoogste spanning verkrijgt door de onmetelijke kracht die in universeelen zin genomen allesbeheerschende praedestinatiegedachte. Overal, in alle wetskringen moet de religieuze zin doordringen en den zin der wetsgedachte 'voleindigen,' al wordt in deze zondige bedeeling dit ideaal nimmer vervuld, tenzij dan door Christus!⁷¹

Het behoeft niet veel betoog, dat hier slechts twee mogelijkheden bestaan: of wel men grijpt naar een transcendente instantie (het wereldbestuur Gods, of de continuïteit en eenheid van den redelijken samenhang), of wel men voegt in een volkomen zinloos verband samen, wat toto coelo van elkander onderscheiden is.

Een causaliteitsleer, die den laatsten weg zou inslaan, kan, dit behoeft nauwelijks betoog, op den naam eener wijsgeerige causaliteitstheorie geen aanspraak maken...

Zou een wijsgeerige causaliteitstheorie daarentegen naar een transcendente instantie grijpen, dan gevoelt ieder, dat zij op het gebied der wetsidee zou komen, waar de levens- en wereldbeschouwing haar soevereine rechten doet gelden. Als causaliteitsleer in eigenlijken zin kan een dergelijke wijsgeerige theorie over den werldsamenhang zich zeker niet aandienen, want ieder gevoelt, dat op dit gebied heel wat meer dan de causaliteitsvraag aan de orde komt, ja, dat hier de causaliteit nog alleen in een eigenaardigen transcendenten zin, kan fungeren, welke met een zuiver wetenschappelijk causaliteitsbegrip niets meer dan den naam gemeen kan hebben.⁷²

At the end of this article he says,

In 't licht der door ons aan ons stelsel ten grondslag gelegde Calvinistische wetsidee daarentegen, bouwen der verschillende gequalificeerde causaliteitsreeksen zich trapsgewijze boven elkander op en is geen wijsgeerige causaliteitstheorie ter wereld in staat de continuïteit van het causaal verband over de grenzen, welke de soevereiniteit in eigenkring stelt, door te voeren.

Toch moet anderzijds - en daarop dient weder de nadruk te vallen - juist deze wetsidee den kosmischen, organischen samenhang tusschen de wetskringen en dus ook tusschen de causaliteitsreeksen, welke daarbinnen verlopen, handhaven.

De 'volle realiteit' als kosmische subjectiviteitseenheid bouwt zich op in den organischen samenhang der subjectsfuncties, gelijk alle wetskringen individueel slechts straalbrekingen zijn van Gods wereldplan.⁷³

We see in these quotations that religion is not enclosed in one law

71. Ibid., p. 61.

72. Ibid., pp. 83-84.

73. Ibid., p. 113.

sphere because God works immediately in the human heart and he is not bound to laws. In the same fashion, grace is not bound to, or does not stand under, laws. Because religion is the place where God works, it is "geheel primair en universeel," the foundation for all law spheres. It is because of this centrality that it controls all the diverse law spheres. Through this type of argumentation Dooyeweerd shows that nothing in nature can be an sich because everything temporal is driven and affected and stimulated from this root. The eternal religious meaning is the service of God in obedience to the law of love. This is the abiding unity in all diversity of spheres of laws. It is the central significance of all the special law spheres, and therefore he calls it the eternal moment in all the law spheres. As eternal moment in all the law spheres it is not identical with the nuclei guaranteeing the irreducibility of these spheres. The eternal moment, present in diverse ways in all spheres of law, is service with the whole heart. God works with the human heart which, as Dooyeweerd says, is the religious personality or I-ness which makes up the eternal essence of man, and through this work in the eternal he works through man in all the temporal. God is not bound to the diverse temporal laws, is not subject to them, but works in the created eternity of man's heart and from there he drives man to bow under all his diverse ordinances. The eternal, religious, is the fullness and unity, and this eternity is continuously expressed in all the temporal until the temporal expresses the fullness contained in the eternal. The eternal moment, or religious moment, drives the temporal law sphere to unfold itself and deepen itself, and the meaning consummation or completion of law and subject qualities are only fulfilled when the process of unfolding of the anticipatory spheres is come

to an end. This happens when the religious or eternal meaning of the idea of law is exhausted in complete unfolding and development of a law sphere. All of the temporal is simply the expression of the eternal, or religious, in diversity. What was in unity and fullness presses forth to be expressed in the richest diversity that is structurally possible, and then the eternal moment in the law sphere is completed and consummated. The eternal seems clearly to have three significances: first, it is the foundational and the primary, second, it is unity before or above diversity, and third, it is undifferentiated fullness which drives for its complete temporal diverse expression. As unity it has the sense of abiding throughout its diverse expressions and, therefore, it can very easily be thought to be eternal. Just as the heart of man abides as unity through all his expressions, acts, and functioning, and is called the eternal essence of man, so religion abides throughout its temporal diverse expressions. The religious or the eternal empties itself in the temporal, but the temporal, since it is successive and diverse, cannot contain the fullness and unity of the eternal.

The meaning of eternal seems to be able to be summed up like this: that which abides throughout all the diversity of expressions and yet which is not able to be exhausted in its expressions since it is the fullness and unity and totality of these expressions. Precisely because of this all its expressions desire to be reunited with it so that it alone consummates or brings unity because it abides undivided while its expressions lack this undivided and abiding character which consequently makes them temporal. This created eternity does not stand in itself, but is restless and desires to express its full potential in diversity in time, and yet its expressions never diminish its unity and fullness

since it is also totality of meaning. Angels are bound to our world because they are subject to the eternal meaning of the law as service to the sovereign God, but from the quotations given previously, it is obvious that they are not subject to the earthly coherence of diverse laws. The coherence of law spheres applicable to the angels is wholly unknown, and the only access we have to them is the fact that we in our personality are religious or have an eternal essence and therefore are not subject to the diverse law spheres in this essence. We have a bond with the angels who are eternal and not subject to our temporal world or to the coherence of diverse law spheres. Angels must partake in the eternal fullness and unity of creation to exist just as we must, but they do not exist in the diverse earthly coherence of law spheres. Our only connection with them is our own eternal essence in which God works without his being subject to laws. God works with the angels apparently in the same way. In other words, it is because of the eternal in us which constitutes our religious personality, that we have something analogous to the angels. We resemble the angels in the eternity of our essence, and therefore we have a bond with them. The similarity is in the fact that our religious eternal essence which constitutes the center of personality is not enclosed in a special law sphere. It is not subject to the coherence in the diversity of law spheres although it expresses itself in this coherence, just as the angels are not subject to this earthly coherence of law spheres. In our eternal essence we have a bond with the angels just as in our three lower individuality structures, enaptically interwoven in our bodies, we have a bond and affinity with the thing, plant, and animal kingdoms.

We can sum up our remarks on angels by saying that we have seen

that Dooyeweerd definitely says that angels partake of the condition of created eternity (aevum-toestand) which is an intermediate condition (tussentoestand) between time and God's eternity.⁷⁴ We have also seen that they belong to another world order which is unknown to us "in this life." He is certain that the temporal coherence of law spheres cannot apply to the angels and that it is absurd to think so. This shows the presence of two world orders, one of created eternity (aevum) and one of time. Despite the fact that he stresses the unknown character of this other order, we have seen that he describes it in certain ways and even states that man has a bond with the world of the angels in the religious eternity which constitutes the essence of his personality. We have also seen that he regards religion, which he equates with the eternal, to have the characteristics of unity, fullness, and centrality.⁷⁵ These notions of his come to the fore in the solving of the relation of nature and grace and in his attempt in his law idea to bring them to a "so-called" biblical harmonious reconciliation.

In order to understand more fully the breadth of usage which the idea of supra-temporality (boventijdelijkheid) has in Dooyeweerd's recent writings, and to understand its nature and how it functions in his thought, it is necessary to bring the results of our analysis thus far to bear on an article written in his early years. What we are striving to show is the nature of supra-temporality and how it relates to time, God's eternity, and the consummation, and how ultimately his views fall into the general rubrics outlined in our chapter dealing with the survey of nature-

74. See pp. 133 ff. of this dissertation.

75. Dooyeweerd, "Der structuur der rechtsbeginselen en de methode der rechtswetenschap in het licht der wetsidee," p. 49. Here the term "eternal" is applied to truth.

grace thinking and summarized there under three corollary ideas. There are some unique features to Dooyeweerd's idea of aeuum or supra-temporality (boventijdelijkheid) which must be seen before we can show the clear similarity of his thinking with traditional nature-grace thinking.

The importance of Dooyeweerd's article, "De structuur der rechtsbeginselen en de methode der rechtswetenschap in het licht der wetsidee," in terms of his total development has already been shown.⁷⁶ In it is one of the first statements of his vision which remains substantially unchanged. Yet there are some expressions present in this article which clearly show a connection with his manner of speaking about eternity before that time, and also some expressions which anticipate his manner of speaking about eternity after this article and which, consequently, bring clarity to his current usage. Dooyeweerd's use of supra-temporality (boventijdelijkheid) clearly goes together with his idea of time as a prism, as is seen in this article. Before this time he uses the word "eternal" to designate what he now calls supra-temporal (boventijdelijk). There are enough traces of the former usage to show what he intends by the term. The idea of meaning, breaking, and refraction is everywhere evidenced in this article. He says,

In het idealistische type der humanistische wetsidee,... de absolute religieuze waarheid, waarvan de 'theoretische waarheid' slechts een tijdelijke zin-breking is.... Maar de religieuze instelling heerscht omgekeerd over het waarheidsbegrip, zoo zeker als de theoretische waarheid niet an-sich bestaat, maar slechts een tijdelijke straal-breking is van de absolute religieuze waarheid over de verhouding van Schepper tot schepping....

De Calvinistische wetsidee doet heel onzen tijdelijken kosmos zien als een organischen samenhang van in eigen kring soevereine wets- en subjectsfuncties, die vanaf de getalsfunctie tot de meest gecompliceerde geestesfunctie, de geloofsfunctie, een zinsbreking zijn in den kosmischen tijd van

76. See p. 169, footnote 68, of this dissertation.

den onvergankelijken, religieuzen, alle tijdelijkheid transcendeerenden wortel van het menschengeslacht in zijn onderworpenheid aan den eeuwigen religieuzen zin der wet; den dienst van God,...

Wijl alle wetskringen gelijkelijk een zin-breking zijn van den onvergankelijken aan den eeuwigen religieuzen zin der wet onderworpen wortel onzer schepping....

Al deze -ismen zijn geworteld in een humanistische wetsidee, welke haar archimedisch punt niet in den transcendenten-religieuzen wortel onzer schepping, maar in de immanente tijdelijke en dientengevolge relatieve redefuncties kiest....

De religieus organische instelling der Calvinistische wetsidee openbaart zich primair in de aanvaarding van een kosmische orde der wetskringen, krachtens welke deze kringen naar de meer of mindere complicatie van hun generale zinstrucuur elkander in den kosmischen tijd fundeeren. De kosmische tijd is, symbolisch uitgedrukt, het prisma, waardoor de onvergankelijke, boventijdelijke religieuze zin haar straalbreking vindt in de zinfuncties der in eigen kring soevereine wetskringen....

Iedere wetskring weerspiegelt in zijn zin-structuur de zin-totaliteit van onzen kosmos, die eerst in den onvergankelijken religieuzen zin onzer schepping, gelijk ze in Christus als hoofd van het verlorene menschengeslacht is geopenbaard haar vervulling en zin-voleindiging vindt.⁷⁷

Het is niet overbodig op te merken, dat de rechtsbeginselen niet door de subjectieve redefuncties worden geschapen maar ontdekt en dat ze geen transcendente, maar immanente gelding hebben in den kosmischen zin-samenhang.⁷⁸

Het grootste gevaar, dat de gewraakte metaphysische opvatting der rechtsbeginselen voor de rechtsbeschouwing met zich brengt is dit, dat men met een devote kniebuiging voor de eeuwige beginselen 'die niet in den tijd ingaan' het tijdelijke rechtsleven beginselloos meent te kunnen vatten en een au fond utilitaristische houding tegenover de rechtsvorming inneemt. Het begrip 'boventijdelijk rechtsbeginsel' is intusschen in zichzelf tegenstrijdig. 'Beginsel' beteekent 'begin' en alle begin is in den tijd.

Niet het beginsel is boven-tijdelijk, maar alleen de eeuwige, religieuze zin, der wet en alle normatieve beginselen, ook die van logisch, historisch, sociaal- taal-, aesthetisch, economisch, moreel en pistisch karakter zijn een tijdelijke zinbreking van dien eeuwigen zin der wet, gelijk die ons door Christus is geopenbaard. De zonde in haar boven-tijdelijken religieuzen zin, is niet een zinfunctioneele normovertreding, maar raakt het hart, den

77. Dooyeweerd, "De structuur der rechtsbeginselen en de methode der rechtswetenschap in het licht der wetsidee," pp. 230-234.

78. Ibid., p. 241.

wortel van het menschengeslacht, zij beteekent een verwerping van den eeuwigen zin der wet, den dienst van God. Doch ze openbaart zich in den tijd in een opstandige houding tegen de zinfunctioneële ordinantien⁷⁹, die God de Heere voor iederen wetskring gesteld heeft.

Het moderne functionalisme vereenzelvigd in zijn strijd tegen het dingbegrip ding en substantie (in den zin der hypostaseerende metaphysica). De kosmische dingstructuur in onzen zin echter heeft met het metaphysisch substantiebegrip niets uitstaande, wijl zij het typisch-metaphysisch en hypostatisch kenmerk der boven-tijdelijkheid en onveranderlijkheid mist.⁸⁰

De idee is steeds gericht op de zin-totaliteit en wijst daarmee boven de tijdelijke werkelijkheid uit naar de boven-tijdelijke religieuze zin-volheid.⁸¹
[underlining mine in previous selections]

From these quotations it is possible to see the full development Dooyeweerd's thinking had reached in 1930, as compared to the earlier article we discussed. We see here interesting combinations of words like "absolute religious truth" set next to theoretical truth as a "temporal meaning breaking." Again, "theoretical truth" is a refraction (tijdelijke straalbreking)⁸² of the absolute religious truth concerning the relation of Creator to creature. Each sovereign law and subject function⁸³ is a meaning breaking or refraction in cosmic time of the incorruptible or indestructible religious, all-temporality-transcending root of the human race in its subjection to the eternal religious meaning of law, the service of God. All law spheres are simultaneously a meaning breaking of the indestructible root of our creation in subjection to the

79. Ibid., pp. 242-243.

80. Ibid., p. 249, footnote.

81. Ibid., p. 252.

82. Ibid., p. 233. This phrase occurs earlier in "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," (p. 113) which shows the prism idea was present to some degree, but this is the first article in which it becomes central.

83. Dooyeweerd employs the term "function" in two senses which might be confusing. Function can refer to the whole modal aspect on law

eternal religious meaning of the law. The phrase "transcendent religious root" of our creation is next to "immanent temporal," the "incorrutable" or "indestructible supra-temporal" religious meaning next to "temporal meaning functions." "Meaning-totality," "meaning fulfillment," and "meaning consummation" are found in the indestructible religious meaning of our creation in Christ, our head. Principles are not supra-temporal but alone the eternal religious meaning of the law. All normative principles are a "temporal meaning refraction" of the "eternal religious meaning of the law." Sin in its supra-religious meaning touches the heart, the root of the human race, and signifies a rejection of the eternal meaning of the law, the service of God. Yet it reveals itself in time in a defiant attitude against the meaning functional ordinances, which God the Lord has placed for each law sphere. The idea is always directed to the meaning totality and points therewith above temporal reality to the supra-temporal religious meaning fullness.

We have seen in this section that Deeyeweerd in his early years applied the term "eternal" to the essence of man which constitutes his religious personality. We have seen that he also applied the term "incorrutable" (onvergankelijk) to the center or heart of man. We have also seen that in one place he uses the term "immortal" to describe the soul of man or the eternal in man. The term "immortal" is never again

and subject sides as a meaning function of the supra-temporal religious fullness of meaning, but the term "function" can be used to designate the subject side in which subjective functions are then viewed as subjected to law spheres. As a whole the modal coherence is a functional coherence which can be abstracted and dealt with as the foundations for the typical individuality structures in which they are present in naive experience. They are always found embedded in concrete things, etc. They never exist apart from concrete things and events except ontically in thought in the theoretical gegenstand relation which is intentional.

applied to man's heart, although Dooyeweerd continues to use the adjective incorruptible (onvergankelijk) to describe the heart of man when the temporal body or mantle is left off at death. In the term "incorruptible" the term "immortal" is virtually present although he obviously tries to avoid misunderstanding with the Thomistic idea of the anima separata, and so does not employ the term "immortal."

In this article, in contrast to his previous writings, he does not refer to the transcendent subject side, either in respect to the heart or to Christ as the root of the human race, as eternal. Here he applies to the subject side the term boventijdelijkheid, which can be translated "supra-temporality" or "super-temporality."⁸⁴ From this time on Dooyeweerd remains true to this usage and very seldom applies the term "eternal" to the transcendent subject side of the cosmos. We have seen from the article concerning aeuum, however, that he clearly means by supra-temporality (when applied to the transcendent subject side), the created

84. In regard to the English rendering of the word "boventijdelijk" as supra- or super- temporal, the English translators of A New Critique, under Dooyeweerd's supervision, consistently use supra-temporal. H. Hart in The Challenge of our Age makes a distinction between supra- and super-temporal (p. 132, footnote 41). He says that the word super-temporal refers to that which is transcendent; supra-temporal rises above time to points above. As valuable as the distinction might be in itself, in Dooyeweerd the term "boventijdelijk" occurs as a synonym for transcendent and eternal in a created sense, and as a synonym for aeuum. Whether the translators should have rendered boventijdelijk as super- rather than supra- does not take away from the fact that supra-temporal means transcendent and eternal in a created sense in all Dooyeweerd's usage. There is no basis in Dooyeweerd for a distinction between supra- as referring to that which points beyond, as opposed to super- as that which is beyond time. All temporal meaning points beyond the temporal which gives expression to its meaning character. It would be confusing therefore to call temporal meaning "supra-temporal meaning" because it points beyond the temporal to the transcendent. The word "boventijdelijk" refers to that which is not temporal but to that which is transcendent and eternal. When we say it is not in time we must be careful, since all of temporal meaning is the expression and refraction in time of the eternal or transcendent. But as fullness, unity, and totality the eternal cannot be given in time, but is in time only as diversity and expression.

eternal. The significance of aevum is precisely that it is an intermediate condition (tussentoeestand) between God's eternity and time. He describes the heart as having "eternity laid in it" and for that reason, as having an "eternity consciousness." The term "eternal," however, is applied to the transcendent law side throughout this article. Of interest here also is the fact that he applies the term "transcendent" to the root and to the subject side. He also uses the term "incorruptible" to describe the root of the human race. Although this term is not used after this very often to describe the whole root community in Christ and of Christ, it is used many times to describe the individual heart of man especially in contexts in which he is describing what happens at death.⁸⁵ In describing the transcendent law side he speaks of it as "absolute," and this term is later used in various contexts in opposition to "the relative" which is always the temporally diverse. Absolute refers always to unity, totality, and fullness, and is set next to the relative referring to temporality and diversity.

We can now come to certain conclusions regarding the meaning of the term "supra-temporal" (boventijdelijk) as it is presently found in Dooyeweerd. The adjectives "transcendent," "eternal," "religious," "immortal," "indestructible," "aevum," "absolute," are used synonymously and refer to that which is not temporal. When in later years Dooyeweerd refers to the heart, the body of Christ as root community, religion, the fall, the cross, the Word of God as ground-motive, sin, the kingdom of God, the resurrection, Christ himself as root, the law, the consummation, as supra-temporal, he has in mind all these adjectives.⁸⁶ The terms

85. See pp. 144-145 of this dissertation.

86. These are some of the references found in A New Critique. There are countless examples of this usage found in his other writings.

"transcendent" and "supra-temporal" often conjoin to one another. He refers to the destination of man as "eternal" in later years, and also calls this destination supra-temporal (boventijdelijk). The eternal destination is what he calls the kingdom of God, and the kingdom of God he calls supra-temporal. To say, for example, that when Dooyeweerd uses the term "supra-temporal" to describe the heart of man or the religious root community he does not mean that they are eternal, is plainly not in line with Dooyeweerd's meaning. To say that when Dooyeweerd uses supra-temporal to refer to things above or beyond time he does not mean that they are therefore transcendent, is also plainly counter to his consistent usage of these terms.

This more consistent use of terminology relates definitely to this article in which he has found the prism figure. Once cosmic time is thought of as a law of refraction (brekingswet), Dooyeweerd has found the criterion by which he can keep his terms consistent.

Let us sum up some things at this point. From the broad usage of the terms "supra-temporal," "transcendent," and "eternal," all of which

Heart: Vol. I, pp. 20-21, 23, 31, 59, 541; Vol. II, pp. 40, 53, 57, 115, 322, 325, 469-480, 500, 531, 540, 552, 593; Vol. III, pp. 5-6, 29, 65, 88-89, 246, 296, 298-299. The body of Christ as root community: Vol. I, pp. 60-61; Vol. III, pp. 63, 169-170, 298, 303, 345, 506, 509-510, 526-527, 535, 583. Religion: Vol. I, pp. 32, 57, 328; Vol. II, pp. 148, 151, 155; Vol. III, pp. 7, 29, 246, 522, 784. Fall and sin: Vol. I, p. 102, Vol. II, pp. 363, 356. Cross: Vol. I, p. 106; Vol. II, p. 157. Word of God: Vol. I, pp. 128, 162, 175, 303; Vol. II, pp. 307, 316, 561, 563, 571, 573, 577. The kingdom: Vol. II, pp. 294-295, 337; Vol. III, p. 537. Resurrection: An application of Dooyeweerd's idea of resurrection is found in "Organic Life and the Evolutionistic World and Life View," Christian Perspectives, 1962, p. 70, by Prof. J. J. Duyvené De Wit. Christ: Vol. II, pp. 32, 34, 158, 294, 299, 305, 337, 418, 561; Vol. III, pp. 322, 525, 582, 632, 633. Law: Vol. I, pp. 60, 102, 167; Vol. II, pp. 4, 30, 35, 147, 152, 155, 156, 316, 363; Vol. III, p. 525. Consummation: Vol. II, pp. 30, 34, 35, 159, 264, 294, 335, 337; Vol. III, pp. 106, 561, 783.

are adjectives referring to the same things, we can see the breadth of this idea in Dooyeweerd. In the synoptic view of Dooyeweerd's ontology type in which we dealt with the two basic contrasts within the creation, it was mentioned that the terms "transcendent," "eternal," "supra-temporal religious" all refer to the higher contrast within the creation.⁸⁷ This is why Dooyeweerd can refer to the supra-temporal as sphere, to religion as a supra-temporal sphere of occurrence. We can clearly see from the breadth of application that it refers to the created eternal which is always "in this life" in strict correlation to the temporal. Only in respect to death can Dooyeweerd refer to man as "leaving the temporal" and "gliding over into eternal life." The angels partake of aevum and are definitely, in distinction from man, transcendent, supra-temporal, and eternal in their natures, while man is only transcendent, supra-temporal, and eternal in his center or heart. This higher contrast (the supra-temporal or eternal) is not subject to the succession of the time order.⁸⁸ As we have seen before, Dooyeweerd maintains that we know nothing of the law coherence which applies to angels, and that therefore it is absurd to apply the earthly temporal coherence of law spheres to them. This vision, as we have repeatedly said, is that of nature-grace.

We have come to a point where we must go into the heart of Dooyeweerd's thinking on these matters. What now is the nature of the higher contrast as Dooyeweerd points to it in his theoretical ground idea and as he gives content to this idea in the supra-theoretical religious answers? Why is it, as we have said before, that it is precisely the prism which causes Dooyeweerd's terminology to be consistent? What

87. See pp. 48ff. of this dissertation.

88. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, pp. 32-33.

is the relation of the eternal or supra-temporal contrast to the lower temporal contrast, and in line with this, why does he speak of the higher eternal as dynamic as opposed to a static Greek and modern view of the supra-temporal or eternal? What is the distinction between the created eternal and the eternity of God as it comes to expression throughout his system? The answers to these questions are related to one basic point. This point will show how all three corollaries spoken of previously are present in Dooyeweerd, and will also show the neo-realism in Dooyeweerd's thinking.

It is the nature of the transcendent, the supra-temporal, the eternal, in all its many applications that it is always unity, totality, and fullness. Because it is unity, it is undifferentiated, full, unrefracted, concentrated, and without diversity. It is totality and fullness, and therefore the unity is full, undifferentiated, concentrated. The only way that fullness and totality can simultaneously be unity is if they are thought of as an organism. Therefore the transcendent, supra-temporal, eternal is always a root. In a root, totality as fullness is contained in an undeveloped, undifferentiated, unrefracted way. The figure of light can also perform this unique function of unity, a unity which contains a totality and fullness. In his period up to the writing of "De structuur der rechtsbeginselen..." (1930) he used the figure of the organism, and after this publication the figure of light became more dominant than before. The figure of the organism is never lost, but is to be found in the recurring ideas of root, unfolding, differentiation, dynamics, etc. The figure of the organism gives better expression, it would seem, to the correlation of time and eternity while the figure of the prism gives clearer expression to the boundary between the two con-

trasts. Neither figure is adequate in itself, but both taken together cover all facets of his thinking and all his needs. It is interesting that he is opposed to looking at the cosmos using the model of the logical concept, which is a harmonious unity within diversity. Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven,⁸⁹ were, from the very beginning, clearly opposed to rationalism and to speculative metaphysics. The Logos speculation and the analogia entis are seen by Dooyeweerd as a logicizing of the cosmos, looking at the cosmos as if it were a concept (begrip), a unity within the diversity. Dooyeweerd, in complete dependence upon Kuyper at this point, conceives of the universe as an organism of law spheres, and the figure of light completes this.⁹⁰ Both figures were present in Kuyper and give Dooyeweerd a beautiful expression for his opposition to all logicism, rationalism, metaphysics, and analogy of being, because both figures contain the idea of a unity which is a totality and fullness above or before or beyond diversity, rather than in diversity. Unity within diversity is then simply restricted to the immanent temporal, and rationalism in all its forms is overcome. At this point one wonders, however, whether Dooyeweerd has not fallen into an organistic, light metaphysics in which all of the cosmos is grasped in terms of figures taken from the physical and biotic aspects. For Dooyeweerd all ground conceptions should be used analogously and receive their concentration in the root unity and Origin of the cosmos. It is precisely because of this that the predominance of these two analogies and figures seem to point to neo-realistic, organistic light metaphysics. These figures are simply not just

89. Vollenhoven, Logos en Ratio (Kampen: J. H. Kok, n.d.), passim.

90. For all sorts of terminological similarities between Dooyeweerd and Kuyper see W. H. Velama, De Leer van de Heilige Geest bij Abraham Kuyper ('s-Gravenhage: Van Keulen, 1957), pp. 70-97, 122-143, 144-158.

images, for they cannot be easily substituted for by other analogies. Rather, they are all-controlling metaphors.

The individual heart is the fullness, totality, and unity of its diverse functions and is called the concentration point.⁹¹ The root of the new human race is Christ,⁹² according to his human nature, and the root is a root unity, the totality of meaning, and the fullness of meaning, as well as the consummation of meaning. Both of these instances refer only to the subject side of the transcendent sphere. The law of love is the unity, fullness, and totality of all diverse temporal law.⁹³ On both the law and subject sides,⁹⁴ there is root unity, totality, and fullness, and to all these ideas the adjectives "transcendent," "eternal," "supra-temporal," and "religious" apply. In the first root, Adam, under the law of love, was comprehended the fullness, totality, and unity of all reality which was to become, generate, differentiate, and unfold. God created the fullness, totality, and unity of the creation "in the beginning." This could not happen in time because God is not subjected to the diversity of laws and to time. In the root unity, totality, and fullness of subject, under the root unity, totality, and fullness of law, all that was created was present and finished. Time itself was comprehended in this totality of creation. Therefore, God's created act could not be in time since time itself presupposes the finished total creation of the root unity, fullness, and totality of creation. Time is an order of successive refraction, and also guarantees the earthly temporal coherence of what it refracts. The totality, fullness, and unity of totality of the

91. Dooyeweerd, op. cit., I, p. 59.

92. See p. 182, footnote 86, of this dissertation.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

created can never be given in time because totality and fullness are never successively present if they are present as unity.⁹⁵ Time, becoming, generation, are concerned with diversification, individuation,⁹⁶ and actualization of what is potentially and fully present in the eternal, supra-temporal root unity, fullness, and totality on the law and subject sides. Cosmos and mankind come together in the transcendent root unity, fullness, and totality of created meaning.⁹⁷ To create Adam under the law is to create all of created reality in its unity and fullness. The fall takes place in this root unity,⁹⁸ and therefore the whole world falls. A new root unity, fullness, and totality on the subject side is immediately substituted for the created and fallen root unity, fullness, and totality, so that ontically the created will not lose its meaning character and fall into meaninglessness.⁹⁹ In the new root, the created and fallen world is saved, re-created, and redirected to its Origin. In the transcendent supra-temporal eternal central religious realm, creation, fall, and redemption are united as the fullness, totality, and unity of all events in time.¹⁰⁰ These events in the root, refract and unfold in time, so that all temporal diversity partakes of creation, fall, and re-creation. For this reason Decyweerd can refer to all three as transcendent and supra-temporal in distinction from their temporal expressions.¹⁰¹ The central, transcendent, root unity and fullness of Word-revelation is a driving power (drijfkracht) or dunamis which creates and drives the created through time to diversification, individualization and differ-

95. Decyweerd, op. cit., I, p. 106; II, pp. 5-8.

96. Ibid., II, p. 418.

97. Ibid., II, pp. 6-8.

98. Ibid., II, pp. 52-53, 548-549.

99. Ibid., I, pp. 63, 100; III, p. 525.

100. Ibid., I, p. 102.

101. See p. 182, footnote 86 of this dissertation.

entiation, as well as a driving motive-power which drives the root community of the world into temporal expression and diversity, and then re-directs the temporal world from above back to its true Origin. We will deal with the relation of the apostate ground-motives to Word-revelation a little later. What is in the higher contrast, the supra-temporal eternal transcendent, is always religious and that means integral and radical (from radix, meaning root).¹⁰² It is radical because the higher contrast possesses unity, and integral because the unity contains the totality and fullness as in a convergent or concentration point. The creation is integral and radical because Adam was the integral and radical root. Therefore, the fall was integral and radical, Christ is integral and radical, and Word-revelation is integral and radical. This is ultimately due to the fact that the root unity on the subject side is the image of the Origin which is integral and radical. Man's eternity is in the image of the Origin which is integral and radical.¹⁰³ God deals directly and immediately with the integral and radical root because he is never subject to time or diversity of law. He created, directs, and redirects the whole temporal cosmos in all its diversity of laws and subjects by creating, directing, and redirecting immediately the created root unity of the created cosmos.

The next question is the relation of the transcendent, religious, eternal, supra-temporal contrast to the temporal. As was said before, the relation of the two contrasts can best be seen under the figure of the law idea as an organism. The organism has a higher, eternal, transcendent, supra-temporal, religious side, and a temporal, diverse, individual

102. Dooyeweerd, op. cit., I, pp. 173-177.

103. Ibid., II, p. 30; III, p. 71.

side. Since the higher contrast is a root unity, the correlation between the higher and lower, eternal and temporal, is of root and branches.¹⁰⁴ No more can a root be conceived of without its diverse branches and life expressions, than can eternity, which is always the realm of root unity, be conceived of without temporal diversity of life expressions both on the law and subject sides. Eternity, as the higher contrast, is fully dynamic, and, as the root, must differentiate and unfold itself.¹⁰⁵ Eternity as fullness and totality comprehended in an undifferentiated root unity must unfold its potentiality in time, otherwise the root is dead. For this reason religion, the supra-temporal, central realm of occurrence which cannot be distinguished too sharply from the temporal historical aspect of this full occurrence, is found only in the transcendent, eternal, supra-temporal root of the cosmos.¹⁰⁶ There is no root unity in the temporal, earthly cosmos; even individuality structures are only a temporal unity within temporal diversity. Time is the principle within the cosmos.¹⁰⁷ The transcendent realm is the unity, fullness, and totality of individuality, but all individuals are only in the temporal. Time as prismatic breaking law is the pre-condition of all individualization, just as diverse modal functions are the foundation for individuality structures.¹⁰⁸ All human institutions, communities, and individuals are correlations of these two contrasts, created eternity and time. The kingdoms of things, animals, and plants have no root unity and are completely temporal,¹⁰⁹ but are meaning because they are rooted

104. Ibid., I, p. 175.

105. Ibid., II, pp. 7, 8, 418, 561.

106. Ibid., I, p. 32.

107. Ibid., II, p. 6.

108. Ibid., II, p. 415.

109. Ibid., II, p. 65.

in the eternal, supra-temporal via mankind. These three kingdoms have no eternal supra-temporal destination and can be qualified by various temporal functions, but mankind has no qualifying function, not even the pistical aspect, and so has an eternal destination.¹¹⁰

Here we come to a cardinal distinction. Not only is the higher contrast characterized as transcendent, supra-temporal, created eternal root unity, fullness, and totality of the created cosmos on the law and subject sides, but it is also the consummation of meaning.¹¹¹ As created unity, fullness, and totality it is undifferentiated and potential, and must empty itself through the prism of the time order with its breaking points (brekingspunten) in the nuclei of the time-order of aspects. Here concentration designates undifferentiation and potentiality. This must differentiate and individualize itself according to its rich temporal structures into an ἀπερίθω of individual realization on the subject side and diversity of laws on the law side. The higher reveals (openbaart), manifests, and realizes itself in rich diversity of modal functions and typically qualified individual structures which govern the actual individuals and events. But diversification and individualization as expression is loss of root unity if it is ever conceived as loose from its root unity and fullness. The more it is individualized and refracted, diversified and unfolded, manifested and realized, the more it needs integration, concentration, unity, and fullness of actualization.¹¹² This is only accomplished by the transcendental direction back to the higher contrast, transcendent fullness, and root unity of

110. Ibid., III, p. 783.

111. See p. 182, footnote 86, of this dissertation.

112. Dooyeweerd, op. cit., II, pp. 299, 335, 337.

the temporal diversity and fully individualized meaning. This transcen-
 dental direction is instigated from the transcendent root which desires
 the diversity lost because of refraction. Here is where the priority
 theme is clearly evident. The temporal diversity and individuality
 as such needs unity and fullness, for it is nothing in itself. It does
 not move itself, but is moved from created potentiality into temporal
 diversification by and from the root. It is forced to move and it is
 forced to return because it is being re-concentrated or actualized from
 above 113 Concentration in the eternal as creation in the first sense
 relates to potentiality, and in the second sense, concentration in the
 transcendental direction relates to actualization in the eternal. All
 of temporal meaning, which is nothing in itself, reaches its Origin when
 it is redirected, re-concentrated in its consummation and concentration
 point. This is done in Christ, the root unity of the kingdom of God.
 The kingdom of God cannot be given in time any more than the totality or
 fullness of the creation can be given in time. The consummation is trans-
 cendent, supra-temporal, and eternal as the creation proves to be. Any
 failure to conceive the created, eternal, transcendent, and supra-tem-
 poral out of correlation with time and out of relation to God's eternity
 as the final resting point, results in serious consequences. 114 The neo-
 Kantian value theory is criticized because in this theory values are hy-
 postatized and made supra-temporal in such a way that they can never be
 realized in time. They seek the eternal in one of the temporal aspects

113. Ibid., II, pp. 293, 303.

114. Ibid., II, pp. 335-337. Here the strictly eschatological view
 is refuted because it does not relate the supra-temporal fullness
 to the effects of sin in time and to the disharmony in the opening
 process.

because they are blinded by autonomy. The true eternity is only made known religiously in the new eternal root of the cosmos and root of mankind under the eternal religious law of love and service to God, Christ Jesus according to his human nature. The eternal fills the temporal with diversity, drives, directs, consummates, concentrates the temporal by being its root unity, fullness, totality, and consummation. A totality view is only possible by participation in the eternal root in the transcendent, for here self-reflection is possible; since here alone is the self present since the self is the unity, fullness, of actuality of all its diverse temporal functions. The truly transcendental direction is only gained by participation in the true eternal root of the cosmos, from which we can see diversity and temporality, and to which we can direct the divergent direction of temporal consciousness to what is its true transcendent foundation and presupposita. Dooyeweerd's transcendental critical thinking, critique, and method obviously are completely determined by his view of the supra-temporal, created eternal transcendent root unity, fullness, totality, and consummation in which the ego or heart of the thinker is rooted.

In order to get some insight into the idea of God's eternity, which seems to lie at the background of Dooyeweerd's idea of religious transcendence and his idea of aevum, it will be shown that J. H. Diemer, who is very similar, if not identical to Dooyeweerd, operates with the classical nature-grace notion of God's eternity as it was developed especially by Boethius. In Natuur en Wonder, in speaking of the plan of God, he says,

In dit plan is het gehele wereldverloop in de tijd door God tot in de kleinste bijzonderheden bepaald. Deze bepaling door God is echter niet van causale aard, doch betreft de dingen in hun samenhang, in hun onderling verband,

sedat datgene, wat de mens onderscheidt als het vroegere en het latere, als oorzaak en gevolg, door God tegelijk en in één als een geheel wordt overzien en gekend. De bepaling aller dingen in Gods plan is een bepaling van ewigheid af van te voren, vóóraf. Het planvol geheel, het besluit Gods gaat vooraf aan de uitvoering en is door God 'in den beginne' -- dat is in het Woord, in de wortel van al het geschapene -- als 'hemel en aarde' geschapen.

Dit 'van te voren' is echter een onderscheiding van het menselijk denken, dat het werken Gods slechts vatten kan met de begrippen voor en na, vreeger en later, eerst en vervolgens omdat het gebonden is aan de tijd. Terwijl voor God raadsbesluit, schepping en ontsluiting-in-het-tijdsverloop één en ongedeeld zijn in Zijn Woord.... Wat in werkelijkheid een samenhangend geheel is treedt voor het menselijk bewustzijn uiteen in een volg-orde van daden, waardoor dit bewustzijn een inzicht verkrijgt in de opeeuw en de gerichtheid van het geschapene.¹¹⁵ [underlining mine in all quotations taken from this book]

In comparing a human plan and the divine plan he says,

Geheel anders staat de zaak met Gods plan. Hierbij kan niet werden gesproken van een volg-erde van besluiten in die zin, dat God eerst een hoofdbesluit en vervolgens met het oog daarop een reeks van ondergeschikte besluiten neemt, die als middelen dienen om het hoofdbesluit als het eigenlijke doel te kunnen uitvoeren. Gods besluit is een geheel en dit éne besluit omvat de gehele kosmos met zijn in de wortel der natuur besloten vaste orde enerzijds en zijn aan deze orde onderworpen schepselen en gebeurtenissen anderzijds. Vanaf het begin is God bezig met de uitvoering van Zijn plan, van Zijn raadsbesluit en deze uitvoering bestaat in de zesdaagse schepping der tijdelijke wereldorde en de ontsluiting van het subjectief daarin beslotene in het kosmisch tijdsverloop, in gerichtheid op de Schepper. God stelt zich geen deeleinden die Hij eerst via bepaalde middelen kan bereiken. Zijn 'doel' ligt in Hemzelf, in eigen heerlijkheid en welkomeheid. Aan het geschapene daarentegen heeft God opdrachten verstrekt, die in het tijdsverloop moeten worden uitgevoerd en waarvoor de kracht door God gegeven wordt. Gods werkzaamheid is - niet alleen bij de aanvankelijke en de zesdaagse scheppingsactie, doch ook bij de ontsluiting en herschepping van het toenmaals geschapene - nimmer onderworpen aan de tijdsduur. Zij bestaat vanaf de rust op de zevende dag na Zijn scheppingsactie in het ontploeien en van de zonde verlossen van het in de wortel geschapene, binnen de eenmaal gestelde wereldorde.

115. Diemer, Natuur en Wonder (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1963), p. 13.

In de wortel van Gods bewustzijn schepping en herschepping één. Voor het aan de tijd gebonden bewustzijn van de mens echter staat in het plan Gods de schepping voorop en ligt hierbinnen de mogelijkheid besloten van een en van een herschepping.¹¹⁶

Dit allesomvattende geheel van het geschapene, deze 'hemel en aarde' zijn besloten in hun wortel, in het Woord Gods, in de Christus, voordat de zesdaagse scheppingsactie een aanvang neemt.

De schepping van dit alles, van 'hemel en aarde', is volgens de Schrift geschied 'in den beginne'. Wij hebben hier te doen met een tijdsaanuiding voor het geloof. De geschapen mens, die naar de oorsprong aller dingen zoekt, wordt hier gewezen op de scheppingsdaad Gods als het begin van alles, als de daad waardoor het geheel, de totaliteit van het geschapene in het aanzijn is geroepen. Deze daad nu is geschied 'in de beginne', dat is: in het Woord Gods, in de Christus, die slechts in het geloof kan worden erkend. Jezus Christus staat niet alleen aan het einde, doch ook aan het begin van alle dingen. Hij is de absolute volheid van alle tijd, het absolute begin.... Het menselijk bewustzijn functioneert echter in de tijd en kan derhelve de scheppende actie Gods slechts vatten indien deze wordt uiteengesteld in een aantal acten, aan elk waarvan een bepaald onderdeel van de geschapen tijd met daarin besloten bepaald scheppingsordeningen en concrete schepselen is toegeordend. In het scheppingsverhaal nu is de mededeling van de orde, waarin God alle dingen geschapen heeft, aangepast aan de behoeften van het menselijk verstand. De 'dagen' zijn tijdsmomenten die slechts in het geloof zijn te vatten en die de hoofdmomenten der scheppingsgeschiedenis markeren. In de 'dagen' ligt besloten wat terstond na de schepping, tijdens de ontsluiting, in het kosmisch tijdsverloop aan het daglicht zal treden. Geen enkele dezer 'dagen' is los te maken van het 'begin', waarin ze aanvankelijk alle besloten zijn en waaruit ze voor het menselijk geestesoog te voorschijn treden.¹¹⁷

In onze zienswijze wordt echter het realiteitskarakter der 'dagen' allermint prijsgegeven. Dat gebeurt juist in de eerstgenoemde, gangbare opvatting. Waarin bestaat dan dit realiteitskarakter? Zoals in het 'begin' de totaliteit

116. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

117. Ibid., pp. 16-17. For an interesting speculation concerning the nature of the days as begin momenten (beginning-moments) which are in principle undateable, see p. 17.

van het geschapene voor ons geestesoog wordt gesteld, zo in de zes 'dagen' de tijdelijke ordeningen van dit geschapene, die van de totaliteit niet zijn los te denken. Evenmin als het 'begin' zijn de 'dagen' voorbijgegaan; integendeel, ze zijn nog steeds present en actueel. Zoals het 'begin' van het geschapene continu aanwezig is in het allesomvattende geheel, zo zijn de 'dagen' present in de fundamentele structuren der verschillende rijken. Deze structuren kunnen van de concrete schepselen en hun verbanden in het tijdsverloop niet los worden gedacht.... En op deze geschiedenis wordt in het scheppingsverhaal reeds vooruitgegrepen telkens wanneer gezegd wordt - nadat éérst het scheppende Woord is genoemd - dat de aarde en de zee voorbrachten levende wezens, zich vermenigvuldigend naar hun aard. De ontwikkeling, de ontsluiting der schepselen in het tijdsverloop kan nòch van de geschapen ordeningen, nòch van het geheel worden los gedacht. Zoals de 'dagen' in de ordeningen steeds present zijn, zo is het 'begin' in de totaliteit, in de volheid van het plan Gods altoos aanwezig.¹¹⁸

In a picture which is very reminiscent of Dooyeweerd's idea of a created totality of meaning refracting itself in time, and the organism idea, he says,

Alles wat in het kosmisch tijdsverloop nieuw verschijnt wordt gedreven uit de wortel der natuur, waarin het bij de schepping is besloten. Niets van wat verschijnt kan worden losgemaakt van het geheel, van de planvolle samenhang der dingen, die zich uitstrekt van het begin tot het einde der tijden.¹¹⁹

In speaking of the view of Hugh Miller, he criticizes him for his idea of looking at the days as long periods of time. He says,

Maar daarmee doet hij onrecht aan het scheppingsverhaal, dat Gods niet aan de tijd gebonden scheppingsactie eenvoudig meedeelt in een bij de behoeften van het menselijk verstand passende vorm.¹²⁰

In criticizing what he calls the scholastic view of Conrad Martinus, he says,

Het is echter onjuist de Schepper op deze tijdstippen bovennatuurlijk ingrijpend en nieuwscheppend te laten optreden. De nieuwe orde-beginselen zijn geen onstoffelijke meta-fysische vormen, die van buiten af in de natuur komen om het

118. Ibid., pp. 17-19. For an interesting idea of "beginning" see p. 19.

119. Ibid., p. 20.

120. Ibid., p. 25.

stoffelijk gebeuren te richten, doch tijdens de goddelijke scheppingsactie gewerkte en in de wortel der natuur besloten beginselen van structuur, waarbinnen de vormontwikkeling der individuele organismen en van hun stamverbanden kan verlopen en die van de volle tijdelijke werkelijkheid der concrete organismen en van hun stamverbanden niet kan worden los gemaakt. Het resultaat der aanvankelijke en der zesdaagse scheppingsactie, in de wortel besloten, ligt als één totalitaire wereldorde ten grondslag aan de natuurlijke ontsluitingsprocessen. Wanneer de ontsluiting in het tijdsverloop voor ons geestesoog begint is de scheppingsactie afgelopen, voltooid.

Wij mogen ons dus de scheppende actie Gods nimmer voorstellen als ingrijpend in het kosmisch tijdsverloop, doch moeten ons haar denken als geschied 'in den beginne' en in de zes dagen, die aan het ontsluitingsproces zijn voorafgegaan en hiervan het tot de volle totaliteit dezer tijdelijke werkelijkheid behorende structuurfundament vormen in de wortel der natuur.¹²¹

In reply to Martinus, who Diemer feels makes temporal ordering separate from the root of nature, Diemer says,

Maar God werkt nimmer buiten de wortel der natuur om. Hij schiep de ordeningen door zijn woord en besloot ze in dit Woord als in hun wortel, waaruit Zijn Geest de verscheidenheid der individuele schepselen in het tijdsverloop doet uitlopen.¹²²

The fall is the fall in the root and man now wanders in a world of "schijn"¹²³ because he has lost sight of the root. In re-creation the root again becomes visible because the Word becomes flesh. The fall has its determined place and task in God's plan.¹²⁴ Here appears a very strong supra-lapsarian tendency to make the goal and unity of God's plan the glory of God as a result of redemption. The created totality "in the beginning" contains potentially all that will appear and spring up as new

121. Ibid., p. 28

122. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

123. Ibid., pp. 30-32.

124. Ibid., p. 33.

in world development.¹²⁵ Dooyeweerd's totality of meaning which is at the same time the consummation of meaning, comes out clearly when Diemer says,

Een ontzaglijke rijkdom van planmatige betrekkingen wordt van oogenblik tot oogenblik onderhouden tussen allerlei soorten van schepselen in alle rijken der natuur en ook tussen de onderscheiden functies van ieder individueel schepsel. Alles wijst uit boven zichzelf en is gericht op een komend geheel, van waaruit de processen hun zin, en bestemming ontvangen.¹²⁶

In order to avoid a supra-naturalistic understanding of God as a deus ex machina in time, he substitutes his idea of the becoming visible of a totality of re-creation in the new root. He says,

Betekent nu de erkenning dat alleen God wonderen kan werken, dat Hij bij die gebeurtenissen op een bovennatuurlijke wijze in de loop van het natuurgebeuren heeft ingegrepen? Wie deze opvatting is toegedaan gaat uit van een op zichzelf gestelde natuur en laat hierin van tijd tot tijd van buiten af God als een deus ex machina handelend optreden. Deze gedachtengang is echter volkomen onschriftuurlijk, God heeft in Christus als nieuwe wortel der natuur de kosmos herschapen en daarmee de oorspronkelijke orde van het koninkrijk weer zichtbaar gemaakt voor het oog van de gevallen mens. In de genoemde wortel liggen reeds vóór de val de krachten besloten, die van af de val tot aan het einde der tijden de macht van Satan bestrijden en tenslotte zullen vernietigen. Dit fundamentele en centrale wonder der herschepping is in Christus voortdurend present en werkzaam. De volheid van dit wonder wordt als een proces van heilsgeschiedenis door de Geest Gods uitgedreven in het kosmisch tijdsverloop, als één groot en samenhangend geheel van 'tekenen en wonderen'. Het wonder van het nieuwe zijn openbaart zich in de wonder-tekenen van het nieuwe leven en streven in alle rijken der natuur.

Tekenen en wonder kunnen dan ook niet van elkaar worden los gemaakt. De Schrift noemt ze op vele plaatsen in één adem. Teken en wonder verhouden zich als periferie en centrum, als buiten- en binnenzijde van één-en-dezelfde werkelijkheid der Openbaring.¹²⁷

He speaks of the fact that the Biblical writers in describing the

125. Ibid., p. 34.

126. Ibid., pp. 34-35.

127. Ibid., pp. 41-42.

miracles or wonders held to naive experience and simply communicated what happened without in the least trying to give an explanation of the causes of these wonders. This is the task of science.¹²⁸ This is the emphasis throughout the whole book. Science, and especially philosophy and theology, must lay bare and interpret the revelation given in the language of naive experience. It would appear that here we have a scientism at work, a so-called religious hermeneutic which can get to God's point of view.¹²⁹ It is a religious hermeneutic which only can be found in one who advocates the Calvinistic philosophy. That his position represents a grace-nature supra-lapsarian bringing together of creation and re-creation in one root in which creation is made simply into a preamble of the perfection or consummation in Christ, seems to come out quite clearly. He says,

Maar God heeft deze orde niet op zich zelf gesteld, zodat zij het feitelijk is door middel waarvan God de gewone loop der dingen tot stand brengt. Deze orde is de vaste wet, waaraan, God-Zelf zich - in Zijn verbond! - heeft willen binden bij de uitvoering van Zijn raadsplan. Dit moet niet zo worden verstaan, dat God aan deze geschapen orde zou zijn onderworpen, doch aldus, dat Hij nu Zelf de geschapen volheid dezer orde uitwerkt 'om te volmaken' in Christus wat Hij begonnen is te scheppen en te herscheppen in Christus. Het is God-Zelf die alles werkt in de natuur, die alles drijft uit de wortel, uit het Woord; het is Zijn Geest die alle dingen voortstuwt naar hun bestemming in de dienst van het komende koninkrijk. Alle geordende natuurverschijnselen op stoffelijk, organisch, psychisch en geestelijk gebied, wonderbaarlijk of niet wonderbaarlijk genoemd, zijn door het Woord en de Geest in de wortel der natuur besloten en worden uit deze wortel gedreven in het tijdsverloop.¹³⁰

He relates all sign and wonders to the root when he says, "Christus' natuur, mens en God in-één, is de wortel waaruit al zijn wonderdaden

128. Ibid., pp. 41-42.

129. Ibid., pp. 103-104.

130. Ibid., pp. 53-54.

voortkosen.¹³¹ A clear similarity to Dooyeweerd's idea of the concentration point in Christ is to be found in Diemer, as well as his emphasis on the idea of ground-motive.¹³² Diemer sums up what would appear to be a grace-nature supra-lapsarianism when he criticizes Spinoza.

Maar zijn critiek betreft alleen dit supra-naturalistisch wondergeloof; niet echter het schriftuurlijk geloof in het centrale wonder van Gods openbaring in Christus, waar in alle wonderen van schepping, voorzienigheid en herschepping, m.a.w. de gehele wereldorde en derhalve de ordeningen van alle dingen en gebeurtenissen in de kosmos, zowel voor als na de val, als in hun wortel zijn besloten. De wondertekenen van schepping, voorzienigheid en herschepping, die zich afspelen in het kosmisch tijdsverloop, zijn dan ook van schriftuurlijk standpunt niets anders dan natuurlijke gebeurtenissen, die binnen de geschapen en herschapen wereldorde plaats grijpen en door de Geest Gods uit hun ordeningen binnen de wortel der natuur worden gedreven.¹³³

The similarity of this view with Dooyeweerd's view comes out clearly when he writes,

Het is duidelijk, dat in deze beschouwingwijze het wonder volkomen is gerationaliseerd. Wij zijn hier wel ver verwijderd van de reformatorische opvatting van het wonder als de openbaring van Gods genade in Christus Jezus, zoals we bij Luther aantreffen. Leibniz heeft de orde der natuur losgemaakt van de wortel van het genus humanum, in verband waarmee zij in de aanvang is geschapen. Het menselijk geslacht is van oorsprong een wortelgemeenschap, waarin ook de orde der natuur mede is opgenomen. Voor de val was deze gemeenschap religieus geworteld in de Wet Gods; na de val is in Christus deze wortel opnieuw in zijn oorspronkelijke volkomenheid geopenbaard. In hem ligt dan ook de totaliteit der natuurlijke werkelijkheid, die niet van het menselijk geslacht kan worden geïsoleerd. De tegenstelling natuur - bovennatuur valt hier geheel weg, want in Christus is de naar haar subjectszijde gevallen natuur hersteld in haar oorspronkelijke staat en zijn dus schepping en herschepping één.¹³⁴

From this extensive survey of quotations certain points which we have been discussing in Dooyeweerd come clear. Before these points

131. ibid., p. 56.

132. ibid., p. 74.

133. ibid., p. 131.

134. ibid., p. 145.

are discussed in greater detail let it be said that there seems to be a grace-nature neo-realism in Diemer's thought. It will be shown that there is a clear supra-lapsarian tendency to get all of the creation and redemptive history into a unity and a totality view.

In order to accomplish this, Diemer begins from a clearly scholastic view of God's eternity as an eternal present. The plan of God, as we shall see also in Kuyper's supra-lapsarianism, is centered in the Word of God, the Son, who is given the Augustinian title of the first words of Genesis, "in the beginning." "In the beginning" means in the Word, i.e., the Son; God made heaven and earth and therefore creation is supra-temporal and does not end in cosmic time. There is a constant emphasis on the "spiritual eye," by which one sees all diversity as one. Faith and naive experience follow the succession of the faith order of time, but there is another way of looking at the diversity which faith sees. When we take God's point of view we see that all miracles are natural and normal. When we have the point of view of the spiritual eye which is really, it would seem, the point of view of God's eternal counsel, all diversity is one. Creation and re-creation are one. God sees all in one eternal glance in his counsel, his Son. God acts once, and all that is, unfolds, according to a fixed order in rich diversity, which is known by the spiritual eye to be the becoming visible of what already existed in the root of nature, or what is almost identical, the eternal plan of God. This spiritual eye, which sees things as one, that is, that sees things as they really are for God and not as they appear to naive experience and faith which are bound to the order of time in the faith aspect, proves in the last analysis to be the scientific eye. An implication from this viewing of God's eternity as a perfect possession of

infinite life, all at once, in an eternal present, is the scholastic idea that God's knowledge is intuitive, that is, one eternal present glance where there is no movement, no transition from future to past, and in which all events are synthetically present. In contrast to this, we would say that we can get no clear concept of God's eternity. We must as simply as possible repeat the manifold ways in which Scripture speaks of God. If we were to try to conceptualize this, there would be far more evidence that God should be conceived as simply older than the creation, that his eternity is a long line rather than an eternal now. But neither of these analogies can be said to grasp what the Scriptures are revealing to us. Diemer clearly works with the idea that for God all things are present. As we have seen in chapter 2 of this dissertation ("global oversight"), this view of eternity always has extreme difficulty relating God to the cosmos. This comes out in Diemer's speaking of the root of the cosmos. God works with the root and only with the root. But by working with the root he works immediately on the whole of creation in its unfolding toward the kingdom because all of reality is in this root as a totality and fullness. For God there is no distinction between creation, fall, and redemption. They are one in Christ, in the Word, the root. The succession of events is due to time and the unfolding of what is contained all at once in the root. He tries to avoid a Christomonism¹³⁵ by speaking of a new root replacing the old root, but then the stress is placed so completely on grace and the new root that the new root is regarded as the more original root, the one in which the creation always existed. The historical reality of creation

135. For the use and meaning of this term see Velema, De Leer van de Heilige Geest bij Abraham Kuyper, p. 237.

and fall before the intervention of Christ cannot receive full justice and proper emphasis. Historical events and temporal unfolding are constantly spoken of as a "becoming visible" of what takes place in the new root where all is one and undifferentiated. The idea of a supra-temporal root¹³⁶ is viewed as analogous to the unity of all in the eternal present of God's counsel. In the eternal, whether in God's plan or in the created, transcendent, supra-temporal root of the cosmos, all is one, is unity and undifferentiated, is not spread out, and has not yet partaken of succession. In the transcendent root there is concentration, undifferentiation, and this must mean that all is present. Therefore there is no succession and therefore no future and past. The created totality in the root is eternal and the only meaning that can be given to this created eternity, both in Diemer as well as in Dooyeweerd, is the thought of a present containing all, and then all at once, since it is always a unity. What confirms this is that Diemer, as well as Dooyeweerd, regards this totality of meaning to be the created realization of the eternal plan of God. It is the whole plan concentrated in Christ. The whole of creation and re-creation are in this totality, and its eternity necessarily must resemble the eternity character of God's plan or will. The key to the idea of an Archimedean point is the scholastic view of God's eternity as an eternal, perfect possession of life all at once. This is the pattern for the created totality, fullness, and unity of the creation. This is why it must be eternal, transcendent, supra-temporal. To be the created, immanent reduplication of the eternal will and world plan as a totality, fullness, and unity, it must be all at

136. Diemer, Natuur en Wonder, pp. 115-116, 121.

once; that is, an eternal present like God's eternal plan is assumed to be.

There is a slightly different emphasis in Dooyeweerd concerning the nature of the totality of meaning, and this brings with it an insight into the type of neo-realism which we are seeking to describe in Dooyeweerd. It seems that from Dooyeweerd's polemic against neo-Platonism and Augustine's idea of creation in the Word, i. e., "in the beginning" in the Son,¹³⁷ that he might be somewhat hesitant to accept Diemer's formulation of this. However, Dooyeweerd does show a similarity with Kuyper's and Diemer's idea of creation in the Word. Dooyeweerd emphasizes that Christ, in his divine nature as the Word, created the world.¹³⁸ He also stresses the fact that creation is supra-temporal and takes place "in the beginning." He nowhere explicitly says that the phrase "in the beginning" refers to Christ so that "in the beginning" would mean in the Son, as Diemer would say. However, there is a strong presumption that this is what Dooyeweerd means by stating that God's created acts are not temporal but supra-temporal and "in the beginning." His emphasis that God created the cosmos through the Word is quite typical of Kuyper's view of the Word as the concentration point.¹³⁹ Rather than emphasizing the agency of all the persons of the Godhood in creation,

137. See p. 101, footnote 85, of this dissertation.

138. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, p. 175; II, p. 563.

139. Dooyeweerd, "Schepping en evolutie," pp. 115-116. Notice the stress on the creation of God through the Word and also the "in the beginning" emphasis. If we correlate this with the quote found in A New Critique, II, p. 563, then we have a strong presumption that creation is in the Son, i. e., "in the beginning" meaning in the Son. In any case we have a strong case for the mediatorial role of the Son in creation which shows a strong affinity to Kuyper's idea of Christ as creation Mediator. For development and critique of this idea see Velema, op.cit., pp. 71-97, 219-225. See also p. 101, footnote 86, of this dissertation.

which Scripture does, the Word is singled out as the unity of God and cosmos. Dooyeweerd's stressing of the creation in the Word shows strong connections with the supra-lapsarian position of Kuyper.

It might seem like a sudden shift to describe Dooyeweerd as grace-nature after describing him in terms of having nature-grace influence on him. By nature-grace is meant the older designation which then can develop into grace-nature. Dooyeweerd has shown that nature-grace is a dialectical ground-motive with basic poles. This means that either the grace pole or the nature pole can have the emphasis. The more modern thinkers, especially since Barth, have shifted to the grace pole.¹⁴⁰ Nature-grace then is used as the broader, older designation, so that within this general rubric Dooyeweerd can be considered nature-grace, having the emphasis on grace rather than nature. This grace-nature influence is centered in his idea of the Archimedean point and in the idea of Christ as the new root. Without a root creation, the earthly temporal world would fall into nothing.¹⁴¹ When he says, Christ is the new root of the creation, it seems that he is saying that the creation only has existence in him, that Christ is the ontic ground of creation, the only possibility for the continued existence of things. Diemer and S. G. de Graaf have the same emphasis.¹⁴² For Dooyeweerd the old root

140. For the distinction between grace-nature and nature-grace see Zuidema, Inleiding in de Filosofie, pp. 2-7, 9-10, 61; also Zuidema, Konfrontatie met Karl Barth (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1963), pp. 195-207. The whole book contrasts Thomas' nature-grace with Barth's grace-nature.

141. This is tied to the semi-contradictory feature of the ontology type. For the importance of the supra-temporal focus which guarantees the meaning character of creation see A New Critique, II, p. 30.

142. S. K. de Graaf, "De genade Gods en de structuur der gansche schieping," Phil. Ref., I (1936); Christus en de Wereld (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1939). There is an important chapter in this book, "Genade

of the creation and fallen human race is supra-temporal, transcendent, and continues to exist until the consummation. In the supra-temporal realm there is the central battle, and it is a dynamic sphere of occurrence from which the struggle in time takes its issue.¹⁴³ But the old root is no longer the ontic ground. The new root takes over completely the ontic foundation for existence. Grace holds creation in existence. Existence is in Christ.¹⁴⁴ The key reasons for this grace-nature view are to be found in the theo-ontological tradition. In the definition of God's eternity as an eternal present, scholastic and Greek theo-ontology tried to get a totality and unity view. All of diversity and succession could be seen as one if the point of view of God was gained. This speculative lust for a totality view or a unity view was embodied among the supra-lapsarian scholastic Reformed theologians of which Kuyper reigned supreme.¹⁴⁵ To see creation and redemption in one root, as one in the plan of God, to fit the fall into the unity of God's plan, and to vindicate the sovereignty of God over evil, was a great motivation of the supra-lapsarians.

The problem of unity was Dooyeweerd's basic problem until 1930. This comes out in various ways. He started with the idea of sphere sovereignty and spoke of the fact that the sovereign spheres were all in a cosmic organism of law sphere. The unity of these diverse law spheres

in natuur," pp. 72-113, where he deals with the root idea and the concentration point. For an interesting critique on de Graaf's view of common grace and his views see Popma, "Algemene en bijzondere genade," Corr. bladen, XXI/2 (1957).

143. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, p. 32.

144. Ibid., pp. 522-523.

145. See Berkouwer, Divine Election (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1960), pp. 254-277, for a sympathetic discussion of supra- and infra-lapsarian. See also Velema, op. cit., pp. 49-69. For a critical view of Kuyper's supra-lapsarianism see J. Douma, Algemene Genade (Goes: Oosterbaan & Le Cointre, 1966).

was not then thought to be in a created totality, fullness, and root unity, but directly in the eternal counsel of God à la Kuyper. The reconciliation of the diverse spheres was in the mystery of God's eternal providential world plan. This formulation did not satisfy Dooyeweerd because it did not enable the thinker to be a participant in the totality of meaning of the cosmos which was needed if a totality-unity-view of the earthly diversity was to be gained.¹⁴⁶ The great discovery¹⁴⁷ was the idea of the new root, which was a strong emphasis in Kuyper.¹⁴⁸ Man could not participate in the new root of the cosmos and this new root was the totality, fullness, and unity of God's eternal counsel in the creation. Before this discovery Dooyeweerd could hardly speak of man as participant in the eternal counsel. After, however, he could speak of being participant in Christ. The new root takes over the place that the eternal counsel had in former years. The new root, as we have seen, because it is totality, fullness, and unity in one, must have an analogous eternal character to God's eternal plan which is unity, fullness, and totality. Man must have an eternal heart to be a participant in this created, eternal, transcendent root of the cosmos. In this way the creation cannot be fully temporal because room has to be made in it for a created

146. This need for unity was paramount for Dooyeweerd. For a few of his references before 1930 see "Vraag en antwoord," Anti-revolutionaire Staatskunde, I (driemaandelijksch orgaan) (1927), p. 292; "Het oude probleem der Christelijk staatkunde," Anti-revolutionaire Staatskunde, II (1926), pp. 64ff.; "Leugen en waarheid over het Calvinisme," Nederland en Oranje, VI (1925), p. 90; "De oorsprong van de anti-these tusschen Christelijke en humanistische wetsidee...", Anti-revolutionaire Staatskunde, I (driemaandelijksch orgaan) (1927), pp. 77ff. and especially p. 88. This is a very important early systematic work; many of the problems discussed are already present in this article. See also "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee."

147. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, pp. v-ix ("Foreword abbreviated to the first edition").

148. See Velema, op. cit., passim.

totality and fullness of creation. The only way this can be done is to concentrate this totality and fullness of the creation into a concentrated and undifferentiated point or root unity. This means that it is also not temporal but resembles God's eternal counsel. The creation has two sides always in strict correlation (created eternity and earthly cosmic time) and these alone give one an integral and meaning-full cosmos.

The scholastics' idea of the unity of God follows the same pattern as their idea of God's eternity. The nature-grace idea of the "eternal present" carries with it a notion that God always works in the present of his eternity. Time is often thought of as moving nows, restlessly imitating the fullness of God's eternal now. Dooyeweerd views it as completely impossible to regard God as subject to the temporal laws.¹⁴⁹ By this he means that to speak of God as creating different things in succession is to subject him to time, and to make him into a Greek demiurge. His view of the immanence of God's coming into time is rather unique. With Kuyper he would rather speak of God as acting immediately on the root. In this way God is not subject to time because the root of the cosmos is eternal like God. The root of the cosmos is the image of God, and it is integral or radical, i.e., central or eternal.¹⁵⁰ God acts directly on the root, the heart of the cosmos, and from there to the temporal branches.¹⁵¹ By regenerating the root he regenerates the whole. By creating the root he creates the whole. Revelation in the root must penetrate into the temporal, so God's revelation always has the central transcen-

149. Dooyeweerd, "Schepping en evolutie," pp. 113-120 (especially 118); "De oorsprong van de anti-these tusschen Christelijke en humanistische wetsidee," p. 78; "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem..." pp. 26-27.

150. Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, III, p. 69; II, p. 307.

151. *Ibid.*, I, p. 175.

dent-eternal sense, and the immanent-temporal sense in strict correlation.¹⁵² This idea of the immediate working of God on the root is a carry-over from Kuyper's regeneration theology.¹⁵³ Because God is an eternal present he can never be subject to succession and, in this sense, in time. There must be an eternal root which is an eternal present through which God works on the whole of the temporal world in one eternal act. Notice the stress in Diemer and Dooyeweerd on the oneness of God's acts. This is the supra-lapsarian tendency to see all the creation and its history in a unified totality view. In order to do this creation and fall are reduced to re-creation. The standpoint is taken in redemptive grace, in the new root. The center of grace is in Christ. Christ as center is eternal, therefore at death man can be fully like the angels. Becoming spiritual like the spiritual root,¹⁵⁴ he becomes aevum. He does this by leaving the temporal. The idea of created eternity means an implicit depreciation of time.

The neo-realism of Dooyeweerd comes out precisely in the fact that the eternity consciousness is the consciousness of totality, fullness, and unity by which all time with its rich diversity is judged. There is here a participation idea. By participation in the eternity of the creation the diversity of the temporal is understood, thought is given its transcendental direction. The fullness of meaning is the foundation for all the temporal refracted functions of meaning.¹⁵⁵ Because of our po-

152. Ibid., II, pp. 561, 563.

153. Popma, Wijsbegeerte en Anthropologie, p. 44; see also the index to Levensbeschouwing (vol. VII), p. 303, under wedergeboorte and wedergeboorte theologie.

154. It would be an interesting study to trace Dooyeweerd's many uses of the term "spiritual" and its Kuyperian background. See Velema, op. cit.

155. This comes out clearly in A New Critique, II, pp. 53-54.

sition in the created eternal side of the creation in which we have eternity consciousness, we get God's point of view, the point of view of the angels, the point of view of the eternal counsel. We get distance from the temporal earthly cosmos, or as Kuyper said, a standing in a non-cosmos; we have an Archimedean point ($\pi\tau\omicron\upsilon \sigma\tau\omega$) from which to get an overview.¹⁵⁶ This distance is a created analogy to God's point of view. It is however, a point of view of the theo-ontological tradition. From this point of view, nature and grace are one, common grace is rooted in Christ, and creation is consummated in redemption, the goal of creation according to the eternal counsel. The new root eclipses the old root which proved to be only temporary.

Some of this description Dooyeweerd would probably not allow in virtue of his transcendental critical method. It has been pointed out that it masks and hides the grace-nature construct at the root of his world view. The neo-realism comes out in the fact that the law for the temporal cosmos is supra-temporal and transcendent and behind the temporal cosmos. The law of love for God and man is always regarded as strictly supra-temporal and transcendent. By this transcendent law to which alone the root is subject, alone with the hearts of all men in the root, the temporal is judged. All law holding for the temporal is temporal¹⁵⁷ and time itself is a law order, a boundary. Dooyeweerd definitely has two boundary ideas.¹⁵⁸ The one is the boundary between God and heart and the other is the boundary between the temporal functions and the heart. All diversity is only known by participation and obedience

156. Kuyper, Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, II, p. 59.

157. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," p. 99.

158. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, II, p. 552.

to the transcendent central eternal law. This law is the fullness, totality, and unity of all diverse law, which is simply the refraction of this transcendent law.

We have tried to show that both corollaries 1 and 2 described in chapter 2 of this dissertation are present in Dooyeweerd. Now it will be shown that the 3rd corollary found in nature-grace thinking concerning God's eternity and created eternity and time is also present in Dooyeweerd.

In chapter 2 of this dissertation it was emphasized that it is almost a standard conception of nature-grace thinking that time is thought to be for a time, i.e., that time is regarded as coming to an end. We tried to show that time is thought to cease in order that another order, that of created eternity, might exist. Created eternity, as was mentioned before, is generally thought to be present already in heaven, so it might be more accurate to say that these thinkers think of time ceasing so that the higher order or created eternity might exist alone without the double existence of time and created eternity. Perfection is viewed as becoming eternal, as opposed to the temporal, with which corruptibility is associated. In contrast to this we have noted the importance of distinguishing time from corruptibility which is not necessarily related to time, since time is a good creature of God. We noted the importance of the new earth as the central goal and horizon for all God's future dealings as well as man's endless temporal life after the judgment day. We emphasized the importance of God dwelling on the new earth so that given with the new earth is the idea of heaven on earth. We pointed to the importance of world history as moving to this reconciliation of heaven and earth, to the day when paradise would be regained, when God in his Son would walk and talk with the new human race upon the new

earth through all the periods of time and history, after the judgment. We noted the importance of seeing that heaven as it exists now is not the final abode of departed saints, but is a provisional place. We mentioned the imperfection of this place and the great perspective of the resurrection of the dead as preparing for everlasting life on the new earth, i.e., this earth restored and renewed.¹⁵⁹

On the other hand, when time is thought to cease or when there is any thought of leaving the temporal at death, this perspective is lost and another takes its place. We have seen that Dooyeweerd's idea of aeuum, the supra-temporal, is very important to his position, and that it is in accordance with the nature-grace tradition. It has been shown that the idea of eternity as a unified existence is opposed to temporality with its refraction, diversity, and succession. We have tried to show by a comparison with his disciple Diemer, that this idea of created eternity is demanded because of an implicit idea of God's eternity as an eternal present.

When time is thought to cease and eternity is thought then to exist alone, without time, eschatology is bound to be verticalized and shifted to another order. We showed how Dooyeweerd applies the terms "eternal" and "supra-temporal" to the idea of the eschaton and to the consummation.¹⁶⁰ We will now survey some of the evidence to be found in Dooyeweerd in order to confirm what has been already surmised when we dealt with his idea that man, at death, becomes participant, like the

159. On this point Diemer has a healthier emphasis than Dooyeweerd. See Natuur en Wonder, pp. 88, 108.

160. See p. 182, footnote 86, of this dissertation.

angels, in the condition of created eternity (aeuum-toestand), and can be said to glide over into eternal life; that is, that for Dooyeweerd time is regarded as ceasing and that the eschaton has become eternity in nature-grace fashion. After showing this we will try to sketch how this view of time as ceasing involves a verticalization of eschatology and influences his construction of the directions of cosmic time. This will be only dealt with in sketch form and will be taken up along with the problem of the concentration point in chapter 4.

In Inleiding tot de Encyclopaedie der Rechtswetenschap Dooyeweerd discusses the general importance of the pistical aspect.

De Heilige Schrift (vgl. 2 Cor. 5:7; Rom. 8:24; I Cor. 13:12) wijst ons duidelijk op het tijdelijk grenskarakter ook van het waarachtig Christ-geloof hier op de aarde, dat zal worden vervuld in de volle religieuze aanschouwing, in het 'zien van aangezicht tot aangezicht'. Althans de modale geloofs-functie blijft van tijdelijk karakter. De vervulling van het geloof, de volle geloofs-aanschouwing daarentegen is eerst in de eeuwigheid in uitzicht gesteld. En de ware Vaste Grond van het geloof is uiteraard in volstrekte zin boven de tijd verheven, daar hij slechts in God zelf, als de Absolute Bron der Waarheid, te vinden is....

Deze modale structuur der pistis wordt volstrekt miskend, zo men het karakter van het geloof als laatste grensfunctie, d.w.z. zijn onmiddellijke betrokkenheid op de transcendente wortel en de Oorsprong der schepping, niet gevat heeft.¹⁶¹

In a similar vein he says,

And in both cases it is obvious that the function of faith cannot be identified with the religious root of temporal existence or in the words of the Ecclesiastes, with the heart from which spring the issues of life. Believing, logical distinction, feeling, etc. are temporal functions delimited from one another in law-spheres of mutually irreducible meaning-modalities. But the religious root of our entire existence is not a function; religion is not enclosed in a temporal law sphere.

Holy Scripture clearly points out the temporal limiting character of true Christian faith, which will find its fulfillment in the religious 'vision face to face in the βλέπειν πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον .

161. Dooyeweerd, Inleiding tot de Encyclopaedie der Rechtswetenschap, p. 88.

Only in the 'heart' does the function of faith find its religious concentration, and from this spiritual root of our existence the direction of our believing is determined. True Christian faith is directed to the religious fullness of God's Revelation in Christ Jesus, to the invisible, super-temporal wealth bestowed on us in the Redeemer. But, as a function, it is not super-temporal itself, since it is interwoven with the whole temporal coherence of our existence.¹⁶² [Underlining mine in this series of quotations]

Dooyeweerd points to a similar idea in a paragraph entitled "The eschatological aspect of cosmic time in faith."

To be sure, cosmic time has its limiting aspect in faith and there is a temporal order and duration in the special meaning of the latter. The modal meaning of faith, as we shall see in the second volume, is by its nature related to divine revelation. In this eschatological aspect of time, faith groups the eschaton, and in general, that which is or happens beyond the limits of cosmic time. In this special sense are to be understood the 'days of creation', the initial words of the book of Genesis, the order in which regeneration precedes conversion, etc.

Theology will always need this limiting aspect of time in which the cosmic temporal order is indissolubly connected with the revealed supra-temporal realm. However, I cannot agree with the tendency of some modern Christian theologians, who identify the eschatological aspect of time with the historical and reject the supra-temporal central sphere of human existence and of divine revelation.¹⁶³

When speaking of the church he says,

However, the organization of historical power on which the Church-institution is based, directly expresses the transcendental limiting character of this societal relationship. This character does not even offer a provisional resting-point to thought but directly points beyond time to the transcendent root of the ecclesia visibilis, i. e. to Christ's Kingdom in the hearts of men. The whole temporal Church-institution is founded in the historical power of Christ as the incarnate Word. It is the historical power of 'the sword of the Divine Word' by which faith is directly grasped as the revelation of Christ's transcendent fullness of power, of His kingship over the whole world....

According to its transcendental limiting character, the ecclesiastical organization of power does not allow of territorial boundaries like that of the State. Its historical

162. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, II, pp. 298-299.

163. Ibid., I, p. 33.

task revealed by Christ himself, is to gain the spiritual dominion over all nations and peoples. As will appear later on, this does not exclude the formation of local churches. But through its limiting position between time and eternity the Church's historical world-dominion is radically distinguished from any other meta-historically qualified organization of power. Its sole qualification is the unshakeable power of Christ's Word and Spirit.¹⁶⁴

In speaking of the internal deepening of the marriage bond by the formation of a family, he says,

The central religious interweaving of the human egos is independent of temporal bonds, although the converse is not true. There is no doubt that the selfhoods of the conjugal partners are for all eternity interwoven in the new root of life, Christ Jesus, if they are really united in Him. This is the religious fulness of meaning of marriage. But in this religious inter-wovenness Christian marriage partners become aware of belonging to one another, not as husband and wife in the temporal marriage bond, but as children of one Father in Christ Jesus. Here on earth they may only belong to each other 'as though they did not'. For temporal ties, even the most intense in this life, are perishable; the invisible union with Christ is eternal.¹⁶⁵

To be brought into correlation with the preceding quotation is another in which the connection of the anticipatory or transcendental direction of cosmic time with the idea of eternity is brought out. In speaking of the family, he says,

In this natural community, the normative tie of love between the members of a family cannot be identified with the religious meaningfulness of love in the corpus Christi, notwithstanding its ultimate reference to the latter in the anticipatory direction of cosmic time.¹⁶⁶

At the end of the third volume he has this to say,

In the radical community of the human race according to the divine order of creation, man is not qualified as a 'rational-moral being', but only by his kingly position as the personal religious creaturely center of the whole

164. Ibid., III, p. 537.

165. Ibid., III, p. 322.

166. Ibid., III, p. 269.

earthly cosmos. In him the rational-moral functions also find their concentration and through him the entire temporal world is included both in apostasy and in salvation. All things, beings, and factual relations qualified by a temporal modal function are transitory, the temporal bonds of love included. But man has an eternal destination....¹⁶⁷

The accuracy of our description of Dooyeweerd's views concerning aeuum, the supra-temporal, and God's eternity is given striking confirmation in these quotations. The phrases upon which we will concentrate our analysis have been underlined.

At an earlier point in this chapter we discussed the statement of Dooyeweerd in which he described death as a gliding over out of the temporal into eternal life.¹⁶⁸ There was at this point in the analysis a strong presumption that the eschaton was the eternal as opposed to the temporal which will come to an end. There was a presumption that he regarded time to be for a time, yet it could have been possible from this quotation for someone to contend that perhaps at the resurrection of the dead Dooyeweerd could say that time was resumed, i.e., when the heart was rejoined with the body. From these quotations we are now considering it is quite clear that he has the very ancient notion of eternity, which is definitely a constitutive feature of nature-grace. K. J. Popma has laboured long and hard to show precisely the deeply pagan and speculative character of this notion, and it is one of the contentions that reoccurs throughout all his writings. It could be said to constitute a central theme in his thinking.

Dooyeweerd speaks very clearly concerning faith in terms of the contrasts, "here on the earth," and "seeing face to face in full re-

167. Ibid., III, p. 783.

168. See pp. 131ff. of this dissertation.

ligious sight." We have seen that for Dooyeweerd the full religious sight is always supra-temporal. For faith "here on the earth" is also placed in contrast to "in eternity." Dooyeweerd is obviously speaking about the eschatological context which is connected with the seeing of God at the coming of his Son to earth. It is interesting to note that the religious fulfilling of faith is identified with what is first fulfilled in eternity. The modal faith function is only of a temporal character, and Dooyeweerd underscores the word "temporal." It would seem that he means that this temporal modal faith function is only for a time, that is, while we are "here on the earth." That he views the modal function of faith in this way was confirmed in my mind after a personal interview with him.¹⁶⁹ It is clear, however, that this temporal-faith-function is temporal, i. e., it holds while we are "here on earth" and it will not be necessary when we have full religious sight face to face "in eternity." Temporal faith is, as it were, sublimated in the religious. With the idea that the temporal-faith-function is temporal, that is, for a while, it is also implied that all temporal functions are for a time.¹⁷⁰ Dooyeweerd gives the same answer to the question of what would be the functional law coherence of the resurrected body on the new earth as he gives to this question when it is addressed to the angels. In our opinion, there is much more room for hesitation concerning angels,¹⁷¹ but with the resurrection body there can be no hesitation. It is given with the scriptural ground-motive of Word-revela-

169. See p. 6, footnote 6, and p. 85, footnote 59, of this dissertation.

170. See an interesting discussion on this point, "Enkele losse grepen uit de discussie ter jaarvergadering 1956," Corres. bladen, XX (June 1956), pp. 41-43.

171. Popma, Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte, pp. 84-85.

tion that there is identity between the body raised and the body buried. To draw a radical discontinuity between these bodies is to do violence to the idea of resurrection as restoral, re-creation, and renewal. To say that in eternity there will not be our temporal bodily functions is exceedingly dangerous. To plead ignorance concerning the problem or to say that it is a speculative question, is not the exercise of a believing, transcendental critical thinking, but is skepsis. To replace the temporal order with an eschatological eternity of perfection is not only to have two world orders and time orders, it is in one stroke to make us ignorant of what the Scriptures portray concerning the glorious inheritance of God's people. As mysterious and unspeakable as this future is, faith is not left in ignorance of the prospect that awaits. This is another example of how, on one hand, Dooyeweerd is not willing to allow himself any room for a believing perspective towards the future via his transcendental critical thinking, and yet he employs an eminently pagan idea of eternity, taking it over for his idea of time. If the fulfillment of faith only is "first in eternity placed in prospect" and the modal-faith-function is only temporal, for a time, then we are left wholly in the dark as to the future as the Scriptures speak to us. The modal functions for Dooyeweerd are eminently of a temporal nature. He underscores this when he writes,

Wanneer de modale aspecten zelve tijds-aspecten zijn, dan is ook hun onderlinge volgorde in den tijd een wezenlijke tijdsorde. En deze volgorde moet zich dan ook in de modale structuur van ieder aspect uitdrukken. Wanneer men de vroeger uiteengezette onderscheiding en correlatie tusschen tijds-orde en tijdsduur goed in zich heeft opgenomen, zal men met het inzicht in het wezenlijk tijds-karakter dezer volgorde geen moeite meer hebben. Al is de orde der modale aspecten zelve constant in den tijd, evenals deze aspecten zelve naar hun modale structuur, zoo doet dit aan het tijdelijk karakter dezer orde als zoodanig geen afbreuk. Zij is immers een be-

standdeel van de tijdelijke wereldorde, in Gods scheppingsplan vervat, en mag op geenerlei wijze als van eeuwigheidskarakter worden beschouwd, of althans als een orde, welke den tijd zou transcendeeren.¹⁷²

Time as an order and the modal functions with it are clearly thought of as being left behind, as running their course when man enters the eschatological perfection which is described as "in eternity."

Eschatology, for Dooyeweerd, is mostly seen as the beatific vision, of a seeing God face to face which is of a religious supra-temporal character, and which is first possible "in eternity." This idea of the beatific vision is clearly not free from the beatific vision as it is central in nature-grace thinking.¹⁷³ Dooyeweerd tries to set himself off somewhat from the idea of an intellectualistic view of the beatific vision as it is found in Thomism. This vision is religious in nature for Dooyeweerd. Dooyeweerd is a strong opponent of rationalism and intellectualism, but the real similarity to Thomas, i.e., the idea of the eternity character of the beatific vision, is left unchallenged. Dooyeweerd has not reformed his eschatology nearly enough.¹⁷⁴

The other quotations given simply confirm this exegesis, and put it beyond reasonable doubt. He speaks of the conjugal partners "being for all eternity interwoven in the new root of life, Christ Jesus." This

172. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," p. 199.

173. Dooyeweerd tries to set himself off from any view of the beatific vision which stems from the form principle of the form-matter ground-motive. See "De idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch substantiebegrif," *passim*. For an interesting survey of this subject see Berkouwer, De Wederkomst van Christus, II, pp. 154-192.

174. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," pp. 180-181. Here he mentions aeuum in Thomas and Boethius with no criticism. There is almost completely uncritical acceptance of it. See also "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën..." pp. 68-69. Notice here the term "created eternity" which is seldom employed but warrants our labeling of boventijdelijk as the supra-temporal.

is the religious fullness of marriage. The marriage relation is sublimated in the religious fullness of marriage as we saw that faith was sublimated in religious seeing face to face. Dooyeweerd quotes from Matthew 22:30 and Mark 12:25 in this connection,¹⁷⁵ where Christ speaks of our similarity to angels in the respect that there will be no marriage situation. Nature-grace thinking has used this text to show that men will become angels since they will become eternal and no longer temporal. The phrase in this quote, "for all eternity interwoven" definitely must refer to the final eschatological eternity because he quotes texts which speak of the time of the resurrection and the final stage of the kingdom.

Dooyeweerd goes further and makes the point that "all temporal ties are perishable," but "the invisible union with Christ is eternal." What could "eternal" mean here other than lasting as opposed to temporal ties which are perishable. In the context, the perishability of the marriage tie is illustrated by the references to Matthew 22:30 and Mark 12:25, and are we not to think that he is saying that all temporal ties pass away (not only marriage), and only the religious central interwovenness lasts forever, that is, "for all eternity." Popma has shown that these texts in no way imply that family ties will cease, but rather they will be continued, friendship relations and social relations will be restored and furthered, and there will be differences in offices and positions, along with differences of reward on the new earth. This whole passage is symptomatic of how he views eschatology and last things. The same feature comes out when he speaks of the church, as an institute being

^{175.} Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, III, p. 332.

"in a limiting position between eternity and time." Dooyeweerd often speaks of faith as the "open window to eternity."¹⁷⁶ By eternity he does not only mean the eternity of God, which of course is involved, but he has in mind the idea of created eternity also. Faith immediately points to the religious supra-temporal root. Faith is the open window to created eternity as well as the eternity of God. It is through this open window that God's eternity shines into the temporal world. Faith is the open window to the eschaton and in general that which takes place above time in "the central realm of occurrence," the supra-temporal.¹⁷⁷ The whole of the eschaton is verticalized. Dooyeweerd nowhere makes mention of the new heavens and new earth, which is, to say the least, a striking omission in the light of his mammoth corpus. But it is not striking when we see that for him the religious consummation, the fullness of meaning is transcendent, eternal, religious, supra-temporal, and is only achieved "first in eternity." The horizontal direction of history toward the new earth is blocked and history and meaning is verticalized. The future is sublimated in the religious transcendent eternal supra-temporal consummation, and this is an eternal present where all succession does not apply, because even our faith function is only temporal, and all ties "on the earth," "in this life" are temporal, i.e., for a while and perishable. This view of eternity is completely controlling for his view of the transcendental direction as well as the foundational directions of time. As we have seen from these quotations, the transcendental direction is the vertical direction towards eternity, towards the

176. Ibid., II, p. 302. See also "De crisis der humanistische staatsleer..." p. 95.

177. Ibid., I, pp. 32-33.

supra-temporal, towards the religious central realm, and towards the transcendent. The transcendental direction is the direction to perfection, and perfection is eternity, and eternity is fullness, fulfillment, consummation, actualization, unity, and full possession. Temporal meaning is restless because it lacks eternity, that is, fullness and root unity. Created eternity is restless because it did not call itself into existence, and therefore it stands not in itself but stands out of itself and points to the $\dot{\alpha}\rho \times \eta'$ of all meaning. This is why the created eternal or supra-temporal is dynamic and not static.¹⁷⁸ It points to the fully-at-rest Origin. God's eternity is the place of rest for all meaning, and this notion of eternity and time is based on the whole theo-ontology speculative tradition.¹⁷⁹ In contrast to temporal meaning, the created eternal, the supra-temporal, which is full and unified, does not perish, but nevertheless dynamically points to the eternity of the $\dot{\alpha}\rho \times \eta'$. The structure of temporal meaning disappears in its transcendental direction. It perishes as temporal and survives as religious fullness in the transcendent, imperishable religious consummation which is "in eternity." Structure goes up in direction and is reduced to direction. Reality is reduced to religious pointing towards that which is at rest. The real and lasting meaning of the temporal is in the eternal supra-temporal fullness. All temporal societal relationship ties perish but the union with Christ is eternal. That the eschaton is vertical is clear when Dooyewaerd speaks of "faith as grouping the eschaton and in general, that which is or happens beyond the limits of time." The supra-tem-

178. *Ibid.*, I, p. 32.

179. See pp. 107-124 of this dissertation.

poral central sphere of human existence and divine revelation which Dooyeweerd says some theologians reject, is, contrary to Dooyeweerd, rightly rejected by them because it is clearly nothing other than the created eternity of the scholastics and is a pistical fantasy which veils the Word of God concerning the future and makes void the Word of God by its strong power of tradition. It would seem that the reformational line in Dooyeweerd can only be continued when his speculative idea of eternity, taken over undoubtedly unconsciously from his early years, is abandoned. Due to his great intellect he has been consistent and has so well protected this foundation from critical analysis that it threatens as a Fremdkörper the existence of the W.d.W. as a philosophical school.¹⁸⁰

Assuming that these ideas of eternity are to be rejected, let us scan what also is most vitally connected with this notion of created eternity. One thing is extremely clear, and that is that the idea of time as a prism is intrinsically connected with his notion of created eternity. The supra-temporal totality and unity of meaning are refracted. What is above the prism is eternal, what is below the prism is diverse and temporal. If there is only God's law and the temporal cosmos, and there is no created eternal realm or contrast to the created cosmos,

180. Maarten Vrieze in a lecture given at the First Annual Conference for Reformational Higher Learning, at Trinity College, Jan. 1969, in speaking about the philosophy of sociology, came to this conclusion: "To speak of man transcending in his heart the temporal reality is not only dangerous, it is wrong." (Trinity Christian College mimeo, p. 18) See also Zuidema, "Vollenhoven en de reformatie der wijsbegeerte," Phil. Ref., XXVIII (1963). Here he makes interesting comments on Vollenhoven's rejection of Dooyeweerd's idea of any "bestaanddeel in de menselijke structuur, dat boventijdelijk zou zijn." On p. 136 there is a description of Vollenhoven's view of transcendence which would be acceptable to our way of thinking.

then the idea of time as a law of refraction (brekingswet) must be rejected. Along with this the nuclei of the time order which guarantees the sphere sovereignty of each modal function and sphere are called points of refraction (brekingspunten) by Dooyeweerd, something like the old pagan adage, "the teeth of time," and must be modified. The two directions of time are determined by these points of refraction.¹⁸¹ What breaks to the left, one might say, is the foundational direction, and what breaks to the right (one could use above and below) is the transcendental anticipatory or eschatological direction toward the eternal.¹⁸² Consequently, if one rejects the idea of created eternity and the idea of the prism, he rejects cosmic time as a time order of before and after of modal aspects, with points of refraction. The whole dynamics of meaning, the opening process, disclosure, positivization, etc., must all come under review. To speak about the value or lack of value of the transcendental critical method in Dooyeweerd is not to the point, since this whole method hangs from top to bottom upon his idea of created eternity. The problem of states of affairs, intermodal synthesis, and intuition are all affected by this notion of eternity and supra-temporality because the transcendental direction is intrinsically involved in all these other problems. More basic is the meaning character of created reality as Dooyeweerd describes it. Temporal earthly existence is only for a time and this is speculation in the extreme. Structure is bound to be reduced to direction, the eschaton is bound to be realized in a successionless eternity,

181. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W." This article is of supreme importance for Dooyeweerd's whole systematics, because his development is most complete in it. Much of our criticism comes from analysis of this article. For points of refraction (brekingspunten) see pp. 197-201.

182. Ibid., for transcendental and foundational directions see pp. 201ff.

and the eschatology is bound to be verticalized. When the possibility is allowed for time to cease, the believer has stepped away from under the ground-motive directing Word of God because God's Word restores and renews the temporal cosmos; and God holds himself faithful by oath to the prospect that the meek shall inherit this earth. A nihilism results when time is thought to cease. This nihilism obviously is not Dooyeweerd's intention, but is an unmistakable consequence of the notion that time ceases and eternity exists alone in a created sense.

It is possible that when one begins to study Dooyeweerd's thinking one feels that he resembles modern theology with its geschichte-historie split. Dooyeweerd, however, does not want to be confused with modern theology on this point. One of the few times that it is possible to detect aggravation in his writings is when it is suggested that this might be the case.¹⁸³ It is not accurate to say this concerning Dooyeweerd. His view of religious transcendence and supra-temporality is much more in the Reformed scholastic tradition, and then of the neo-realistic grace-nature wing. Since his view of religious transcendence and the supra-temporal is grace-nature, it is quite supra-lapsarian, like Kuyper's before him. Although one cannot think that Dooyeweerd employs a geschichte-historie type dualism or duality, this dualistic split historically is

183. Dooyeweerd, "De wetsbeschouwing in Brunner's boek 'Das Gebot und die Ordnungen'," Anti-revolutionaire Staatskunde, III (1935). Here he makes an attempt to distinguish himself from dialectical theology. Dialectical theology makes an absolute chasm between "Christ the Word made Flesh" and the historical Jesus figure and between the "tijdelijke gestalte en eeuwige inhoud van het Woord Gods" (p. 364). Here we see that Dooyeweerd, although he makes this unwarranted distinction between temporal and eternal, nevertheless, always insists on strict correlation between the temporal form and the eternal content of the Word of God (pp. 336-339). See also, "Van Peursen's critische vragen..." p. 114.

related to the nature-grace dualism. It is a complicated and more dangerous stepchild of the grace-nature wing of nature-grace thinking. Bart is strongly supra-lapsarian and has a Christomonistic type of grace-nature thinking. Velema has shown that this Christomonism is present in Kuyper,¹⁸⁴ that S. G. de Graaf did not wholly escape this, and that Dooyeweerd¹⁸⁵ also fits this general mold. From a wholly different direction we have tried to confirm this analysis of Velema.

What seems to be a basic cause for Dooyeweerd's construction is his view of the relation of God to the cosmos. God relates to the temporal earthly cosmos via the created eternity of the transcendent religious root. In this way God's revelation enters the whole cosmos via the root. The branches are not an sich, do not stand in themselves, but need the root as the root needs God. This way he shows the dependence of all individual, diverse, temporal, earthly meaning on its transcendent, spiritual, religious, supra-temporal root unity. He stresses from the beginning that God cannot come into the diverse and temporal, because somehow this means for Dooyeweerd that one is making God subject to his own laws, which for Dooyeweerd, as for any Christian, is absurd.¹⁸⁶ These problematics which Dooyeweerd sets up are not unique to him, they are the problematics intrinsic to thinking of God's eternity as an-"eternal now." It comes out in the aeuum doctrine of the scholastics in which man was elevated above temporality in order to have confrontation with

184. Velema, op. cit., p. 233.

185. Ibid., pp. 237-238.

186. Dooyeweerd, De Betekenis der Wetsidee voor Rechtswetenschap en Rechtsphilosophie, p. 66; "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem..." p. 27; "Schepping en evolutie," pp. 117-118.

God, as well as in men like Kierkegaard with his "incognito, king and the maid" paradox problem. The notion of the "eternal now" is common to both.

Why then does one hold to this "eternal now" notion? The deepest reasons are rooted in the fact that this notion is a unity, totality, and fullness perspective by which one can judge succession, diversity, time, and change. It is deeply rooted in the pagan theo-ontological tradition, going back before Parmenides and even into primitive religions with their holy-prefane dualism.¹⁸⁷ It is this "eternal now" idea which is the basic tool of all the Christomonistic grace-nature thinkers. It has been employed by all neo-Platonistic neo-realists, and six types of Monarchians who were also neo-realists.¹⁸⁸ It is involved in the supra-lapsarian concern with the unity of the counsel of God. It is really trying to take an Archimedean point out of the created world. This is why Dooyeweerd divides the creation into earthly temporal and eternal contrasts, because he clearly sees that the neo-Platonic point of view of the eternal ideas in the mind of God, held also by Kuyper and Bavinck, is part of the metaphysical theo-ontological speculative tradition. But it is only a slight degree better and far harder to detect when one takes the point of view of created eternity. This eternity consciousness is the old speculation of an "eternal now" in new garb. The "sense of divinity" and the "seed of religion" of Calvin is also not free from this speculation.¹⁸⁹ Dooyeweerd is very fond of Calvin's idea but

187. See pp. 108-114 of this dissertation.

188. Vollenhoven, "Nieuwe filosofie (1961-1962) Monarchianisme."

189. See the first chapter of Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, where he speaks of an innate idea of God and an innate sense of divinity. The whole idea of innate ideas is of pagan inheritance as Vollenhoven has shown. See p. 42, footnote 4, of this dissertation. See also my book review in The Westminster Theological Journal, XXXI (Nov. 1968), pp. 101-109.

goes much further than Calvin here. This point of view of the supra-temporal, that of an eternity consciousness because "eternity is laid in one's heart," is just simply the point of view of God involved in the "eternal now" of the scholastics, only now pared down to a creaturely size. The image of God as centered in the eternity of the heart of man (which makes it an integral, radical analogy or image of God) is an undue restriction of the image of God to the heart. This image idea is also not a complete break with the analogy of being (analogia entis) despite Dooyeweerd's protestation and efforts to the contrary, simply because the point of similarity is in the "eternity laid in man's heart" which is central to this idea of analogy of being.

Although there is a difficulty in expressing God's relation to the cosmos and time if one tries to determine it theoretically by using transcendental critical thinking, one has no difficulty if one holds closely to the Scriptural way of representing God in his dealing with the creation. All formulations of this problem in terms of immanence and transcendence of God, in time, yet not only in time but above time, are all rather dangerous. Dooyeweerd is guilty of a kind of demythologizing of Scripture when he speaks of God's dealing with the cosmos immediately through a supra-temporal root and only from thence to the temporal branches. As Dooyeweerd once advised me in respect to theology, that "theologians should stick to the texts," it seems as if he has definitely violated that rule with his construction of aevum or created eternity. This is an attempt to get a unity view by going behind the text, and it involves a construction of the way God must deal with the cosmos. This created eternity point of view is not separated from his idea of the religious central ground-motive of Word-revelation. This idea has great

value if it is divested of Dooyeweerd's scholastic view of eternity which definitely structures and influences what he means by a ground-motive.¹⁹⁰

This created eternity idea as root and as concentration point for God's dealing with the cosmos as well as the cosmos' relation to God, is involved very closely with Kuyper's regeneration theology. Dooyeweerd corrects Kuyper's idea of regeneration without the Word to a regeneration in the supra-temporal created eternal root through the central transcendent Word as power (dunamis). This precedes all temporal expression or refraction of the Word in the incarnation, or in Scripture, or in preaching, which are only temporal expressions of what happens in the mystic root of the cosmos. As in Kuyper, there is a central listening of the heart, a knowledge of the heart, and this only in the transcendent heart of the world and of each man, that is, in the eternity laid in the heart. This is why the supra-temporal is the central realm of confrontation and revelation, why it is the central realm of occurrence. This, however, does not stay in the root or heart, but this root is stirred, moved, and must express itself in the temporal branches which are never separate from their root. It is from this transcendent root that the whole dynamics of temporal meaning are instigated and directed. We have seen that there is most probably a doctrine of priority at work here. If Kuyper is to be called semi-mystic¹⁹¹ then Dooyeweerd cannot escape this classification either, since he is almost identical to Kuyper on these

190. The same problem of eternity and time is involved in Dooyeweerd's idea of Word-revelation. The relation of ground-motive and Scripture is set in terms of supra-temporal and temporal which brings with it duality, which is confusing to say the least. See p. 225, footnote 183, of this dissertation.

191. Popma, Levensbeschouwing, IV, pp. 202-203, 219, 245, 343-391; also the index, vol. VII, under mystiek.

points.¹⁹²

With this we conclude this section, our basic critical work is completed. If our analysis concerning time and eternity in Dooyeweerd's thought is correct, it brings with it a need for disentangling the influence of this grace-nature construction from the predominating reformational ground-motive at work. In the next chapter some areas will be suggested where the influence of this view of eternity is most felt, and by means of the proposed ontology type an attempt will be made to gather together some of the more problematic areas. The key for a program of disentangling these strands of synthesis from the reformational emphasis has already been presented, although a detailed outworking of this program far exceeds the compass of this dissertation.

192. Dooyeweerd, "Kuyper's wetenschapsleer," passim, and "Wat de W.d.W. aan Dr. Kuyper te danken heeft," De Reformatie, (1937) pp. 63-65.

CHAPTER 4

SPECIFIC EVIDENCE OF THE ONTOLOGY TYPE AND A FINAL PICTURE OF OUR CRITICISMS

In this chapter we will present a coherent picture of the specific form which synthesis takes in Dooyeweerd's system. We will try to gather our criticism into a whole, emphasizing the features of the ontology type outlined in chapter 2. We will try to show how the grace-nature motive is specified in the particular features of the ontology type. If our analysis in the previous chapter is correct then the consequences for the total systematics could not be fully shown since these criticisms are foundational and affect all the branches of his system. All we hope to do here is present a thesis for deeper investigation by others.

In recent years¹ the differences between Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven concerning the problem of time have come to the forefront. Vollenhoven takes exception to Dooyeweerd on a number of crucial points. They will just be mentioned now and later we will go into them in some detail. First, the problem of where we first find time in the modal scale. If time is found in the first aspect, in the function of the arithmetical, as we find in Dooyeweerd and even in the early Vollenhoven, then, according to Vollenhoven, we have to contend with the modalizing of time. A second main point of difference might be said to be concerned with the scope of cosmic time. For Dooyeweerd time is related to the cosmos, but the soul or heart is above the cosmos. The scheme in Dooyeweerd looks like this: God-soul or heart-cosmos. For Vollenhoven man is completely

1. Vollenhoven, "College systematiek - het probleem van de tijd."

in the cosmos and completely in time. The scheme in Vollenhoven looks like this: God-law-cosmos. Both of these points are of essential importance for the evaluation of Dooyeweerd's thought. The third major point of difference is concerned with whether the order of functions is to be conceived of as a time-order.

We will deal with this third point of difference first. There seems to be quite a fundamental difference between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd on the nature of structural law. Vollenhoven suggests that the law is certainly supra-temporal, but it also has the character of temporality in so far as "het slaat op de subjecten aan de subjectzijde."² That this is a fundamental difference with Dooyeweerd comes out most clearly in Dooyeweerd's discussion of cosmic time. One point of clarification is in order, however. In respect to the religious fullness and unity of the law, Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven seem to agree that the law is supra-temporal. Dooyeweerd says, "De zin-totaliteit van onzen tijdelijke kosmos, die de wezenlijke eenheid en volheid aller modale aspecten van den zin der schepping is, kan in der tijd niet gegeven zijn. Zij is van transcendent, boventijdelijk karakter."³ The difference seems to come in respect to the structural law. Vollenhoven says, "De liederwet en de structurele wet gaan niet in de tijd op (vs. Gebot der Stunde), daarentegen de positieve wet wel (gaat in de tijd op)."⁴ For Dooyeweerd the fact that the structural law is completely temporal is tied in with his notion of cosmic time. Temporal reality is divided into a law side as

2. Ibid., p. 14.

3. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," p. 197.

4. Vollenhoven, op. cit., p. 14.

order and a subject side as duration. He says, "Al is de orde der modale aspecten zelve constant in den tijd, evenals deze aspecten zelve naar hun modale structuur, zoo doet dit aan het tijdelijk karakter dezer orde als zoodanig geen afbreuk. Zij is immers een bestanddeel van de tijdelijke wereldorde, in Gods scheppingsplan vervat, en mag op geenerlei wijze als van eeuwigheidskarakter worden beschouwd, of althans als een orde, welke den tijd zou transcendeeren."⁵ It appears quite clearly from this that there is an essential difference between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd concerning structural law. The law side, as Dooyeweerd calls it, is an essential time order, and the modal aspects even on their law side as law-sphere are essentially time aspects. He makes this very clear when he says, "Zijn nu alle aspecten gelijkkelijk door den kosmischen tijd omsloten en dus van intrinsiek tijdelijk karakter, dan kan het concentratie-punt van het menselijk bestaan, waar all tijdelijke aspecten als in een brandpunt samentreffen, niet zelve van tijdelijk, maar slechts van boven-tijdelijk, transcendent karakter zijn."⁶

It is interesting in connection with this discussion that to say that the structural law is not covered by time or does not go under in time (niet opgaan in de tijd) and that the order of functions is not a time order as Vollenhoven now says, is apparently for Dooyeweerd to fall into the error of ascribing an eternity character to the structural law. It means that constancy and eternity have been confused. This distinction of constancy and eternity (eeuwigheid) concerned Dooyeweerd very early in his thought. Dooyeweerd has been jealous to protect the correlation of law and subject. This is one of the chief emphases in his early work,

5. Dooyeweerd, op. cit., p. 199.

6. Ibid., p. 179.

"De structuur der rechtsbeginselen en de methode der rechtswetenschap in het licht der wetsidee." He stresses that principles of legal life (rechtsbeginselen) are not transcendent but "immanente gelding hebben in den kosmischen zin-samenhang." He is trying to eliminate a misunderstanding. He continues, "Het misverstand van hen, die aan ware beginselen den eisch stellen, dat ze van eeuwigheidswaarde zijn, boven den tijd verneven."⁷ He is fighting the metaphysical view of principles of legal life in which ideas of reason are abstracted out of their cosmic temporal meaning coherence and are at the same time absolutized to eternal values. Over against this he is emphasizing the "tijdelijk organisme der wetskringen." He is stressing that "Ieder normensysteem toont in haar eigen soevereine zin-structuur een onlosmakelijke vervlechting van goddelijk beginsel en menschelijke positieveering."⁸ The question which he places is whether the divine principles show a dynamic character. He says, "Aan iedere zin-functioneële na-logische norm is het positiviteits-element inhaerent, maar de menschelijke positieveering is nimmer een willekeurig scheppen, maar een vorming van goddelijke beginselen. De vraag is nu, of in de na-historische wetskringen, waartoe ook de rechtskring behoort, de goddelijke beginselen zelve onafhankelijk zijn van de historische ontwikkeling, dan wel of ze op het substraat dezer historische ontwikkeling een dynamisch karakter vertoonen."⁹

Vollenhoven also stresses the correlation of structural law and positive law by saying that structural law has temporal character in its relation to the positive law, but he would seem to say that it neverthe-

7. Dooyeweerd, "De structuur der rechtsbeginselen en de methode der rechtswetenschap in het licht der wetsidee," p. 241.

8. Ibid., p. 243

9. Ibid., pp. 236-237.

less is supra-temporal. The question then is not whether the structural law is temporal in the sense that it is related to positive law, but in what sense it is supra-temporal.

Dooyeweerd would not agree on this with Vollenhoven as appears quite clearly from this quotation which we used previously, but in another context.

Het grootste gevaar, dat de gewraakte metaphysische opvatting der rechtsbeginselen voor de rechtsbeschouwing met zich brengt is dit, dat men met een devote kniebuiging voor de eeuwige beginselen 'die niet in den tijd ingaan' het tijdelijke rechtsleven beginselloos meent te kunnen vatten en een au fond utilitaristische houding tegenover de rechtsvorming inneemt. Het begrip 'boventijdelijk rechtsbeginsel' is intusschen in zichzelf tegenstrijdig. 'Beginsil' beteekent 'begin' en alle begin is in den tijd.

Niet het beginsel is boven-tijdelijk, maar alleen de eeuwige, religieuze zin der wet en alle normatieve beginselen, ook die van logisch, historisch, sociaal- taal-, aesthetisch, economisch, moreel en pistisch karakter zijn een tijdelijk zinbreking van dien eeuwigen zin der wet, gelijk die ons door Christus is geopenbaard. De zonde in haar boven-tijdelijken religieuzen zin, is niet een zin-functioneele normovertreding, maar raakt het hart, den wortel van het menschengeslacht, zij beteekent een verwerping van den eeuwigen zin der wet, den dienst van God. Doch ze openbaart zich in den tijd in een opstandige houding tegen de zinfunctioneele ordiantisch, die God de Heere voor iederen wetskring gesteld heeft.¹⁰

From this it appears that for Dooyeweerd the structural law as norm-principle (norm-beginsel) is completely temporal as opposed to Vollenhoven who speaks of the structural law as supra-temporal in some sense.

To say that the norm-principles (norm-beginsels) for Dooyeweerd are temporal does not imply that they are variable. In discussing the idea of the horizon of human experience he says of that horizon, "It is rather the a priori meaning-structure of our cosmos itself in its dependence on the central religious sphere of the creation and in subjection to the

10. Ibid., pp. 242-243.

Divine Origin of all things. The horizon of human experience is that of our earthly cosmos as it is given in the Divine order of the creation. This is a truly supra-individual and law-conformable cadre which is constant [underlining mine] in contrast with all change in actual subjective experience."¹¹

Dooyeweerd again stresses the constant character of this meaning structure or horizon of human experience when he sets off his idea of the a priori character of this horizon from the Kantian notion of the a priori, as non-empirical. He says, "If we had no experience of this horizon, how should we ever be able to know of it, and how could we give account of it philosophically? It can only be called an a priori structure insofar as it is the constant meaning-structure of all human experience and of all temporal reality."¹² Here we see Dooyeweerd's stress on the constancy of the meaning structure as horizon of human experience. Structural constancy, however, does not mean that the horizon is not of a temporal character. This is clear because temporal reality has a meaning (zin) character. The restless, pointing character of created reality is revealed in the very structure of cosmic time. The meaning dynamics show this temporal character. Consequently the very order of functions is a temporal order. The transcendental anticipatory direction of cosmic time expresses this meaning character of created reality. Constancy of structure is a characteristic that is within the meaning characteristic of created reality. This is made clear when one sees that all modalities of meaning both on the law side as subject side are temporal refractions of supra-temporal fullness, totality, and unity of

11. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, II, p. 548.

12. Ibid., II, p. 550.

meaning on the law and subject sides. Even their structural constancy is taken up in the meaning dynamics of the opening process and of cosmic working in general. The constancy structures themselves are interlaced in such a way that their meaning is only indicated fully when this interlacement is understood.

It would seem that when Vollenhoven calls the structural law supra-temporal he has implicitly broken with the notion of structural law as temporal refraction of a supra-temporal fullness. When he denies that the order of function is a temporal order he is also denying the meaning dynamics on the law side and consequently the whole meaning character of created reality as Dooyeweerd has articulated it.

The term "constancy" has still another shade of meaning for Dooyeweerd. Here the distinction is concerned with the nature of the principles of legal life (rechtsbeginselen). Dooyeweerd says, "Eerst thans, nu wij de groote differentieering in de zin-structuur der rechtsbeginselen kosmologisch hebben opgeklaard, zijn we in staat de vroeger opgeworpen vraag te beantwoorden, of alle rechtsbeginselen een in de historische ontwikkeling gefundeerd dynamisch karakter dragen, dan wel of er ook constante, statische rechtsprincipia zijn."¹³ He explains these constant, static principles of legal life (rechtsprincipia) further when he says,

Heben wij deze kosmische structuur der juridische zin-individualiteiten in ons opgenomen, dan zien wij in, dat in den rechtskring inderdaad van een natuurrecht in den vollen zin des woords kan worden gesproken, een natuurrecht n.l. in den zin van in voor-historische (van de historische ontwikkeling als zoodanig niet afhankelijke) (natuur) wetmatigheid gefundeerde rechtsbeginselen, die als zoodanig een statisch-constant karakter dragen, een natuurrecht intusschen, dat slechts een deel der rechtsbeginselen, n.l. de constante, omvat.¹⁴

13. Dooyeweerd, "De structuur der rechtsbeginselen...", pp. 250-251.

14. Ibid., p. 255.

That the term "constant" used in the sense of principles of legal life (rechtsprincipia) grounded in the pre-historical (voorhistorische) (natural) in no sense signifies a supra-temporal character is clearly seen when he says, "Vast staat reeds thans, dat ook voorzoover het bestaan van zulke constante, statische rechtsprincipia, kan worden aangetoond, het toch immer gaat om tijdelijke beginselen, beginselen in den kosmischen zin-samenhang gegeven."¹⁵

Vollenhoven, it would seem, is not willing to immerse the structural law (including the norms, given as principles) in time as Dooyeweerd does. Time for Dooyeweerd expresses itself on both law side and subject side. It is not just that time on the law side is the constant structural order and framework in which changing variable things come and go, but also that this constant structural order and framework unfolds in a temporal order. In a certain sense this means that constant structures come into existence and make their appearance and then remain. That this presents a problem is seen by Peter Schouls when he writes, "A number of questions most of which have been raised by others as well, will have to be answered or dismissed as speculative if we are to get further clarity on the relationship between God and the law. Among these are the following...: To what extent does the dynamic character of reality apply to the law-order of creation?"¹⁶

G. E. Langemeijer seems to see the same trouble spot when he writes,

Immers aan de stelling is toegevoegd: 'in onze gedifferentieerde samenleving'. Dus de individualiteitsstructuur doet zich slechts gelden in een bepaalde situatie. Het zou ook moeilijk anders kunnen zijn. Echter, dan komt bij de buitenstaander ook terstond de vraag op, hoe dan filosofisch valt uit te maken, dat de individualiteitsstructuur zodanige

15. Ibid., p. 251.

16. Schouls, Man in Communication, p. 65.

vastheid heeft bereikt. Ook voor wat betreft de modale aspecten schijnt. Dooyeweerd bereid een dergelijk, men zou geneigd zijn te zeggen; slechts potentieel aanwezig zijn van de onderscheiding aan te nemen. Zo waar hij opmerkt, dat in vroegere stadia van beschaving normen van maatschappelijk verkeer, van recht en van zedelijkheid nog niet gescheiden zijn.¹⁷

A third notion of constancy in Dooyeweerd is mentioned throughout the third volume of A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. It is the relative constancy or identity which individual things possess for naive experience even despite the changes of a thing. To explain this given, classical philosophy developed the notion of substance, but, as is well known, Dooyeweerd has substituted his idea of individuality structures for this.

Now that we have seen that there is a rather clear difference between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd on the most important philosophical question, namely, the place of the law, it remains to specify how this neo-realism manifests itself in Dooyeweerd's philosophical system. We must keep in mind that for Dooyeweerd law and subject are always correlated, as they are for Vollenhoven also. The categories of law, subject, and meaning are those which have the most breadth and the widest application in Dooyeweerd's thought. We have seen how Dooyeweerd constantly refers to the central law, i.e., the law of love and service to God and man with the whole heart, as the eternal, incorruptible, transcendent meaning of law. It is this central law which is the boundary between God and man as well as cosmos. This central law is the unity, totality, and fullness of all diversity of law. It is not these three things, however, as a unity within diversity, but as a unity above, before, beyond, and behind

17. Langemeijer, G. E., "De betekenis van Dooyeweerd voor de wijsbegeerte van niet-kerkelijken huize," Perspectief (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1961), p. 15.

diversity. Dooyeweerd very definitely speaks of all diversity of law as contained in this one law and as proceeding from it by way of refraction through time.¹⁸ There is a splitting up of this undifferentiated unity and fullness of law. Without this splitting up or refraction, the root unity of law does not bear fruit.¹⁹ It remains a root, but has no expressions, no diversity. It does not grow into an organism of diverse law spheres of which it is the root unity, fullness, and totality.

This eternal central law must be correlated to a subject, for as we have seen, law has no meaning without subject, and subject no structure of existence without law. Therefore, there must be a corresponding subject which is subjected to this central supra-temporal law.²⁰ The corresponding subject must be the unity, fullness, and totality of subject on the subject side of the creation. No individual man can meet this qualification because this root unity on the subject side must be a fullness and totality of all diversity of subjects. The individual is only the root unity, fullness, concentration point, and consummation of his individual functions and existence.²¹ If the central eternal law is

18. Dooyeweerd, "De wetsbeschouwing in Brunner's boek 'Das Gebot und die Ordnungen'." On p. 370 he says, "Naar het Goddelijk scheppingsplan waren alle kringen van tijdelijke ordeningen slechts een onderling gelijkwaardige tijdelijke uitdrukking, en een tijdelijke differentieering van den vollen religieuzen zin der wet, die door Christus, als Wortel der herboren schepping, vervuld is." (underlining mine) The term differentieering is not often used by Dooyeweerd in later years. See also "Wat de W.d.W. aan Dr. Kuyper te danken heeft," where he quotes Kuyper's idea of differenzierung with favor (p. 65). For discussion and critique of this idea in Kuyper see Velema, op. cit., pp. 84ff.

19. The most important development of the refraction idea is in "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," pp. 193-212, and A New Critique, II, pp. 3-8.

20. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, III, p. 525.

21. Ibid., I, p. 59.

to have meaning there must exist such a root unity on the subject side which is subject to it. This root unity is therefore of a supra-individual character.²² The root unity on the subject side was Adam, but because of his fall into sin, which is therefore a fall in the root unity of the creation, he is substituted for by a new root, Jesus Christ.²³ He only fulfills and obeys the central transcendent law. He is the spiritual (geestelijk) root, the last Adam. The first Adam is the natural root.²⁴ In the root the participants are a human root community of hearts. This is a religious, central, supra-temporal, transcendent community, existing because created, but not yet differentiated. This root community of mankind is created in its first root or head, Adam, and in him it falls. In the new root or head, Christ, this root community is restored. In Christ the creation reaches its destination, its fullness, and consummation of meaning. In Christ the fallen root is overcome and finally eliminated.²⁵ Nothing of the creation is lost because it is all restored and preserved in the new root. There is nothing in the class of adiaphora in the cosmos because all lives out of this new root.²⁶ Nothing can be thought of in itself because it only exists in its root, because only in its root is it related to its Origin. Because of election not all individuals who were in the old root, Adam, and who participated in him in the creation and fall, are fully restored in the new root. All those in the new root are not to be thought of as so many individuals gathered together. Rather, in the new root mankind is restored. Those not elected in the new root are cut off as dead branches. They will not partake of

22. Ibid., I, pp. 12, 59.

23. Ibid., I, p. 60.

24. Dooyeweerd, "De leer van den mensch in de W.d.W.," p. 143.

25. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, p. 175.

26. Ibid., I, p. 507.

eternal life of consummated, fully restored existence. They are preserved in time by the new root but their transcendent hearts are dead and not rooted in the new spiritual root. Special grace is the root of temporal conserving grace which holds the apostate members of the human race under the meaning structure of the cosmos.²⁷ As long as there is an anti-thesis in the root of the cosmos, warfare in the root between the new root and the old fallen root, there is still opportunity for fallen members of mankind to be engrafted into the living spiritual root.²⁸

The only law which this root community is subject to is the central eternal law. This is the significance of the word "root." As root it is not subject to diversity of laws, but is above the diversity of laws and subject to the unity, fullness, and totality of law. If it is truly subject to this law it is subjected to all diversity of law, since all diversity of law is present in this central law. One point must be made clear, all individual typical laws, all modal laws, even time as law order is present in the central law before it unfolds or becomes. Becoming is clearly distinguished from creation. Creation is total and finished and becoming is the becoming of the finished total creation. All subjects which are always individualized, i.e., things, plants, animals, and all institutions and communities are all present in the root. In the first root everything that ever was to exist in time already was created. In the central law every law which was ever going to unfold

27. Ibid., III, pp. 507, 522.

28. Ibid., III, p. 506. Here common grace is limited to time as opposed to the eternal root. The supposition seems to be when time ends, common grace ends. This is another pointing in the direction of our main thesis. See also the evangelical purpose of anti-thesis in Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte, p. 52.

already existed. Out of the root the whole cosmos on the subject side, including the human race, unfolds. From the central law unfolds the whole organism of diverse laws which govern this cosmos. These unfold together according to the divine Creator's will.²⁹ The creation is an organism. This organism has a root and branches. The root has two sides: the law and subject sides. This root bifurcates into two basic contrasts: the eternal, transcendent contrast and the temporal contrast. There is a generation in both contrasts. There is a spiritual generation of the root community into many individuals in the transcendent eternal contrast and a temporal becoming of these same individuals in their bodies along with all of the other temporal kingdoms which have not a transcendent root except as they are related to mankind via their structures.³⁰ Their structures are interwoven via the cosmic temporal coherence by subject and object relations and by enkaptic bonds.³¹ Within the supra-temporal root there is a supra-temporal, created, eternal generation of individual roots. Within the supra-individual concentration point there is a generation of individual concentration points.³² The higher contrast, the central religious sphere, the supra-temporal, is subject to the supra-temporal law. All diversification of this transcendent root community in the lower contrast is subject to the temporal diversity of constant structural orderings or laws guaranteeing the rich temporal diversity of expression. The root on both sides of the cosmos must be characterized as being of a dynamic, eternal character. This dynamic eternal character is the result of God's creation "in the beginning" or

29. Dooyeweerd, "Schepping en evolutie," passim and "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," pp. 197-198, 207-208.

30. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, III, pp. 87-90.

31. Ibid., II, p. 53.

32. See p. 44, footnote 6, of this dissertation.

through the Word. The finished creation comprehends in it the whole created temporal result which only needs to unfold itself according to the cosmic time order which is also comprehended in the creation of God "in the beginning." Dooyeweerd says, "De gehele tijdelijke orde met het gehele wordings proces dat zich daarbinnen zou voltrekken was ongetwijfeld in de schepping begrepen, maar slechts als creatuurlijk resultaat van Gods voltooid scheppingswerk."³³ From this statement we can better approximate what Dooyeweerd means by the dynamic character of the supra-temporal. The Word creates the root but the root is the root of the cosmos. The creation of the root comprehends all that will grow, refract, and unfold from out of the root. The Word that calls the root on both its sides into existence drives the root to unfold, refract, and grow. The root unfolds or bifurcates in two generations which indicate the two basic contrasts. There is the community which must develop or generate from the root. This is a generation in the transcendent created eternal contrast. Many hearts unfold from the root or head of the root community. They do not unfold in time or according to the order of time, however. The order of time governs the bodily generation of this unfolding, transcendent community of hearts in their first and second heads or roots. The created eternity of the total created bifurcates and unfolds according to the order of time and according to the central transcendent law which governs the higher contrast. The created eternity of all of the created in the root has in view this double generation. The Word of the Creator is a driving power or dunamis which drives the finished created to unfold in a supra-temporal community and into a rich

33. Dooyeweerd, "Schepping en evolutie," p. 116.

temporal many-sided cosmos.³⁴

All that is contained in the root empties itself through development and generation as it is moved and driven by the Word. The temporal cosmos becomes and develops according to the order of time and is the becoming of the creaturely result of the created root. The temporal cosmos with its rich diversity never becomes or is refracted without the generation of the supra-temporal human community. The becoming, dynamic, temporal cosmos needs a dynamic, supra-temporal generating mankind. As temporal cosmos it only exists in correlation with this spiritual, generating, unfolding, transcendent human community. When the rich structural diversity of laws is unfolded via the order of time, through its anticipatory moments in the transcendental direction of time, the time order has served its usefulness. When the rich potential of diverse orderings are fully unfolded, it simultaneously means that the rich diversity of subjects are fully individualized and realized. The law side is only realized in changing individual subjects although it forms the constant structural framework for all changing individual and developing creatures. When the fullest and richest individualization is reached in time, the consummation has been reached. The cosmic temporal order governs this individualizing process and structures it in an anticipatory direction. This anticipatory direction is the direction to the goal or consummation of the temporal cosmos. The consummation is sometimes called the fullness of the temporal cosmos. Sometimes the fullness is used in the sense of potentiality, sometimes in the sense of actuality or perfection of development. The term "consummation," sometimes referred to as the kingdom of God or heaven, always refers to the goal. The transcendental direction

³⁴. See diagram on p. 67 of this dissertation.

of time is always founded. The order of time always lays a basis for the unfolding of totality toward consummation.³⁵ The breaking points of the law spheres provide the criteria for determining the direction.³⁶ Only in the first sphere is there no further foundation necessary. The totality is refracted into temporal unities and typical individual wholes. The diversity is never unrelated. It is a refracted diversity in temporal coherence. The transcendental condition for this is cosmic time itself. Cosmic time is not only a law of refraction bringing cosmic diversity into expression,³⁷ but it also provides for coherence in this diversity. Nothing is unrelated to anything else in the temporal world. The principle of sphere sovereignty has its cosmic corollary in sphere-universality.³⁸ The breaking points in the nuclei of the order of law spheres are bridged over by the inner laws of individual things which bind and realize the modal law spheres in concrete wholes and totalities.³⁹ This realization is so total that every concrete thing, event, or act has every sovereign function present in it and typically groups them together. The inner law of concrete things does not destroy the sphere sovereignty of the modal spheres, but the modal spheres and functions are realized and unfold according to the inner laws of these concrete constellations.⁴¹ This fact gives clear expression to the fact that cosmic time guarantees the continuity and coherence of what it refracts into rich diversity.⁴² Dooyeweerd lays great stress on this idea of cosmic

35. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," p. 197.

36. Ib.d., pp. 201-205ff. On p. 198 he says that the individuality structures lack the prismatic character of the modal aspects.

37. Ib.d., pp. 201ff.

38. Ib.d., pp. 207ff.

39. Ib.d., pp. 213ff.

40. Ib.d., p. 216.

41. Ib.d., p. 219.

42. Ib.d., pp. 164, 175.

temporal coherence and continuity. Often this is forgotten by students of Dooyeweerd, since most of them are introduced to this system via the modal law spheres and often the principle of sphere sovereignty is over-emphasized. If one fails to keep this idea of cosmic temporal coherence and the cosmic continuity of time in mind there can be no clear understanding of Dooyeweerd's system. The integral character of naive experience gives testimony to the continuity of time and temporal coherence.⁴³ Ordinary experience knows no theoretical problems. Temporal experience and reality are so continuous and coherent that it resists theoretical analysis. The anti-thetical gegenstand relation is a breaking asunder of temporal experience. It is setting up oppositions intentionally where there is no opposition. It is performing a theoretical ἐποχή in respect to the continuity of time in which the structures which are being viewed are deeply embedded. It is a lifting of these structures out of the stream of time. This continuity is a transcendental presupposition for the theoretical attitude.⁴⁴ Cosmic reality is given as a systasis of meaning and this is the condition for theoretical analysis and synthesis.

Cosmic temporal continuity and coherence is still not root unity. Cosmic coherence is not cosmic unity. There is no root unity to be found in the lower contrast.⁴⁵ Even integral naive experience has no root unity in the temporal horizon. The foundational direction of time, therefore, cannot be the ultimate direction. It is not the direction towards the unity, totality, and fullness and consummation of created

43. Ibid., pp. 160, 175ff.

44. Ibid., p. 176.

45. Ibid., pp. 178-182, 197, 216.

meaning. It only founds or lays the foundations for the realization and unfolding of the totality and unity in the most basic direction, the transcendental direction. The temporal world has no rest because it has no root unity.⁴⁶ The transcendent fullness, unity, and totality are driven through the refraction medium by the Word of God and cannot be fully given in time.⁴⁷ It can only be given or realized in the transcendent root itself. Therefore all temporal reality is of a pointing character.⁴⁸ It points to its transcendent, converging consummation and concentration point. This transcendent root does not stand in itself. It is not its own origin but was created, and so it is dependent on the Origin.⁴⁹ The root points beyond itself to the Origin. There is a tendency towards origin (oorsprongs-tendens) in the transcendent created eternal. It is the consummation and unity of temporal meaning only when it is directed by the Origin. Only when it is concentrated on the Origin does it come to rest. Only when the transcendent central law is fulfilled is the Origin satisfied, and only when this takes place does the dynamic supra-temporal realm find rest. There is no rest in the created eternity of the heart or of the root community until it finds its rest in the divine eternity of the Origin. There is no rest in the temporal consciousness of man and in the temporal cosmos until it finds its root unity in the transcendent higher contrast. There is no rest in the root, or in the transcendent contrast until it finds its Origin. All creation is meaning. All temporal reality points to its Origin and transcendent root unity. All temporal reality must point in the trans-

46. Id., p. 208.

47. Id., pp. 197-198.

48. Id., p. 208.

49. Id.

cendental direction of time, for the transcendental direction is the direction towards its consummation in the root and its rest in the Origin. The transcendental direction of temporal reality can only be approximated in ideas. Theoretical thought can only approximate the transcendent horizon via limiting concepts, because the transcendental direction is the direction toward root unity, totality, fullness, consummation, and meaning, and finally toward the Origin.⁵⁰ Because the transcendental direction is the direction to the root unity, it is the concentric direction. The becoming process of the temporal earthly cosmos can never be stopped within time.⁵¹ The consummation can never be realized in time because time itself is an order which points beyond itself to the fulfillment of history. Time will not permit the eschaton, the consummation, to be given in it because it refracts whatever enters it into rich diversity. The transcendental direction is the eschatological direction to the eschaton which is eternal. Only in eternity is there rest because created eternity is full, actualized, and perfected in unified possession of life all at once vis à vis the secure ground of the cosmos. We can see that temporal meaning cannot stand in itself, for when the consummation is reached, cosmic time is completely left; the cosmic order has served its divinely ordained purpose. Cosmic time is for a time and this is already implied in the fact that it is an order of before and after, of modal law spheres. The prism of cosmic time

50. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, II, pp. 186-188, 190, 192.

51. Ibid., II, p. 180. The transcendental direction of thought is gained by looking into the temporal from the transcendent center. It is from our participation in the totality and root of meaning that our thought is given its true transcendental direction. Here is where eternity consciousness determines the whole transcendental method and critique. See also, Ibid., II, pp. 53-54.

diversifies and because it diversifies, it points beyond itself. It points beyond itself simply because diversity is meaning only by regaining root unity. Time, therefore, is structured so that diversity will automatically be led back to root unity.⁵² This structure of time is held in check by God's grace in Christ, and cannot be avoided even in apostasy. The transcendental direction and the dynamics of meaning in the last analysis prove too much for apostasy. It is forced to deepen itself in apostasy.⁵³

But, what in the last analysis, is causing this unrest in the temporal cosmos? What is directing the becoming process with its historical disclosure in the transcendental direction? It can be nothing in the temporal earthly cosmos that directs itself or moves itself, simply because there is no root unity. Direction and movement are only exercised from a center of direction or movement. Rich diversity comes into existence and is expressed by being forced through the prism of time. The created eternity of the totality is expressing itself through the prism of time. It was created to do this, it was given unrest until it is refracted and it is restless until it regains its fullness. But the totality can never go under in its refraction simply because it is totality. Because of this it stands above and redirects its own diversity towards itself and is directed beyond itself by its Origin. The dynamics of meaning are started in the root of the created by the Word of God. This root is totality and fullness, but it is unrealized. It must move and develop according to the Creator's plan. Therefore, created eternity is given a dynamic unrest until it refracts itself through

52. Ib.d., II, pp. 275ff.

53. Ib.d., II, pp. 298ff.

the diversifying time order. In Christ the beginning and end are one, creation's totality and creation's consummation are fulfilled. The temporal earthly cosmos has many individual concentration points in the hearts of men, but all these concentration points participate in the concentration point. This concentration point is the Archimedean point. The eternal law refracts and moves back towards itself. The eternal root under the law refracts and moves back to itself. The consummation of meaning is realized when the central law is fulfilled. This is done in principle in Christ as the root of the new human race.

Just as the creation in the root, the fall in the root must reveal itself according to the order of time, and in like manner the re-creation in the root. The new root directs the created totality as it unfolds itself toward consummation. It accomplishes this by overcoming the effects of the fallen root. The created root community in its root goes through the transcendent fall and redemption. It does this because it is driven by the Word of God. The Word of God is the creator's will, his world plan in realization. In Christ, the Word of God becomes flesh in Jesus of Nazareth. The Word of God is also refracted in Scripture. Nothing in created eternity can stay in eternity unless it is expressed through the prism of time, and nothing in time can find fulfillment in time unless it transcends time and reaches the eternity of the root and the Origin. But that which is transcendent and of the nature of created eternity can never be fully given in time. It is not diminished by its refraction simply because it is a root which has the totality and fullness of meaning contained in it. Because of this, eternity can call back its expressions to itself, and it can direct its lower to itself. This is the priority theme in Dooyeweerd. This comes out quite clearly when he

saye.

Deze kosmische duur binnen de tijdsstructuur kan slechts ervaren worden door den mensch, die een boven-tijdelijk centrum van zijn tijdelijk bestaan heeft, in wiens hart de eeuwigheid gelegd is! De tijd wordt slechts ervaarbaar in betrekking op de geschapen eeuwigheid (het aeuum gelijk de scholastiek het noemde, in tegenstelling tot de aeternitas increata, de ongeschapen eeuwigheid Gods).

Alle immanent tijdelijke tijds-meting b.v. naar uren, minuten en seconden blijft tenslotte uitwendig en kan ons als zoodanig geen tijdsbesef schenken. Onze tijds-intuïtie, die zelve niet in begrip is te vatten, is onafwijsbaar in de identiteit onzer zelfheid, in ons transcendent existentiecentrum geworteld. Alle onrust in de tijdservaring stamt, gelijk reeds Augustinus van echt Christelijk standpunt heeft gezien, uit het hart, uit de beroering van tijd en eeuwigheid in het diepst innerlijk van onze existentie.⁵⁴

All unrest in temporal experience is caused by unrest in the heart. No experience of time is possible by a creature that is wholly in time. It is only because of the created eternity in our hearts that we know ourselves as temporal. It is because we are rooted in the transcendent concentration point that individual hearts can be individual concentration points. Our temporal body and our temporal consciousness is only possible because our cosmic intuition is rooted in our eternal hearts.

The central law is a religious concentration law, it is the law of love, and therefore it is the central law of revelation. It is the central law for all meaning.⁵⁵ It means that the eternal root must direct its temporal earthly cosmos above itself to the Origin. This happens because the root, by virtue of this law of concentration, does not stand in itself. Otherwise the root would direct the lower to itself as origin. But the higher religious realm is ex-sistent, it stands outside itself in dependence on the eternal Origin. It is the concentration

⁵⁴. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën...", pp. 68-69.

⁵⁵. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, II, pp. 293, 322-323, 356, 365.

law that structures the root and the central community participant in it. As concentration law it governs the concentration point. This concentration law means that diversity is only fulfilled when unified and only unified when directed.⁵⁶ It moves by being moved from above. Just as the individual heart is the actor in all its functioning in time, so the root directs all the temporal cosmic diversity beyond itself. This law of concentration is the eternal law by which all diversity of law is governed. Here we have the neo-realistic view of Dooyeweerd. The eternal law is the real and lasting law which is the measuring rod (maatstaf) for all temporal law. The central law for the earthly world is in the eternal world. Even within the eternal world the community is under this eternal law. If this were not true the countless individual hearts would not be concentrated into a root community, but would be an innumerable multitude of individual concentration points.

The eternal root uses the temporal lower as its instrument.⁵⁷ The temporal lower is the expression field of the concentration point just as the human body is the perfect instrument and expression field of the soul. The church is the instrument of the central religious transcendent root community, the body of Christ. The faith function is the perfect instrument whereby the unfolding and normative disclosure and positivization process is led by the heart. Cosmic time as the temporal order of modal aspects is an order of temporal reality which directs temporal reality beyond itself. But time is not just a law order, it constitutes the ordered path or track by which the root expresses itself and directs its expressions back to and beyond itself. Nothing temporal lasts, all

56. Ibid., II, p. 156.

57. Ibid., II, pp. 88, 310, 364, 533, 538.

that is temporal perishes because it is subject to duration. Even cosmic duration is for a duration, it comes to an end when the meaning disclosure is fully realized. All temporal things perish, events pass, ties are discontinued. All of the temporal diversity on the law side is only realized in the subject side. When the individual subject perishes, the diversity of laws fulfill their constant governing natures. All, however, are fulfilled in the transcendent eternity of the consummation.⁵⁸ Here all the diversity is fulfilled. Here is the rest from the struggle and the disharmony caused by the fallen root. The structure is in structured direction. Its structured direction is towards the eternal. The eternal is the root unity, fullness, and consummation. The structures are cancelled as diverse structurations, but fulfilled in concentrated fullness and unity. There diversity is consummated, finished, ended. The structure is reduced to the direction. The eternal order is the lasting order. The eternal law is the fullness and end of all temporal diversity of law. The background of eternal law governs and regulates the temporal law. The eternal law is not the lex aeterna of Augustine, Thomas, or even Kuyper which is found in the eternal counsel of God. It is rather a created lex aeterna, a created counterpart of the neo-Platonic lex aeterna of the scholastics. It is the created expression of the eternal counsel. But as concentration law it is the created eternal counsel and it is the created eternal root which directs the whole of the lower as its instrument, and moves the lower as it is moved by the creative Word of the Origin. There is no movement in the root except as it is moved by the Word of the Origin in highest eternity.

⁵⁸. Ibid., II, pp. 335, 337.

There is no impetus or movement or life in the lower unless the impetus is received from the higher. There is no direction in the lower temporal unless it is directed by the root, as the root is directed by the eternal Origin. This is the priority theme with impetus.⁵⁹

The semi-contradictory feature is seen in the fact that the fallen root influences the new root community in the central realm of occurrence. The refractions of this central realm and the appearance in time of this struggle means that there will always be a disharmony in the opening process. The fallen root continues to express itself. Its expressions tend toward meaning privation, loss of meaning, robbery of meaning, nothing, and meaninglessness. The new root in Christ saves the cosmos from this by fulfilling the central transcendent law in the death and resurrection. The effects of the fallen root in time come to an end with that which perishes, but the creation is fulfilled in the eternal kingdom and eternal life, the higher eternal destination. There is a tension toward privation by concentration on time and toward eternal destination and consummation through concentration on the eternal. This tension continues in the root of the cosmos and in the branches till the "end of time" and the judgment.

In seeking to answer the individual and universal problem, a few things can be said.⁶⁰ First, Dooyeweerd is definitely not an individualist. Second, he has waged a long campaign against all universalism.⁶¹ It seems, however, that he is a partial universalist. He is not a par-

59. This discussion brings out the relation of Dooyeweerd's neo-realism and the priority theme with impetus.

60. For explanation and information concerning the individual-universal problem see pp. 42-43 of this dissertation.

61. One has only to recall Dooyeweerd's struggle against the universalistic view of society and the state throughout vol. III of A New Critique.

tial universalist with a higher-lower scheme though. He completely repudiates the problem of a principium individuationis as a false problem.⁶² Cosmic time is the law for cosmic diversity and it governs individuality, but there is a generation in the higher contrast of individual transcendent hearts. The individual heart is not to be related as part to the communal whole, not even in the religious root community. The individual hearts participate in the cosmic heart of the creation. They are not reduced to it. The individual concentration points participate in the cosmic supra-individual concentration point of the creation. The individual root participates in the supra-individual root of the cosmos. There seems to be a macro-microcosmos theme in Dooyeweerd. Dooyeweerd is well aware of this theme and will not sanction it,⁶³ but it seems nevertheless to be present. The terms "root," "heart," "concentration point," "focus point," "image" can all be applied to the cosmos as well as to the individual man. There is a contrast of created eternal and temporal running through both the macrocosms and microcosms. Both have a created eternal and temporal contrast. In both the higher is unity, fullness, and totality, and the lower is diversity and coherence in diversity. Because he is a neo-realist the macrocosms and the microcosms are subject to a created eternal or supra-temporal law in their higher contrast. It is characteristic of a macro-microcosm theme that the universal, as well as the individual element, is preserved without the reduction of the one to the other. The eternal central law of the created eternal world means that the microcosms must participate in the macrocosmic root. This is the neo-realistic unity

62. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, II, pp. 417ff.

63. Ibid., II, pp. 592-593.

tendency in which individuals are dissolved in the eternal present. The macro-microcosm breaks this neo-realistic supra-lapsarian tendency to view the created cosmos in its unity and totality.

According to the central created lex aeterna the monistic, macro-cosmic root bifurcates into microcosmic eternal microcosms and into a temporal cosmos. The temporal cosmos unfolds itself so that the microcosms have a temporal bodily or cosmos generation. On the other hand, the temporal creation is an organism or body of the macrocosmic root.⁶⁴ Out of the root comes the temporal branches and the temporal organisms with their diversity of law and subject. Man's bodily functions are cosmic functions, and one is tempted to say that the cosmos' functions are bodily functions. Cosmos and man are so integral that most of the terms applied to one are applied to the other.

The terms of impetus, priority, semi-contradiction and instrumentalism apply to the world and the individual man in analogous fashion.

This classification, which we have been trying to fit more or less to facets of Dooyeweerd, is of a provisional nature. It could very well be that he is a Monarchian. All Monarchians are dualists stemming from the last period of Aristotle. If this were the case there would be a dualism with a dichotomy in the anthropology. This would fit well with the duality of the created eternal heart and temporal body. It is a point in favor of this hypothesis that Dooyeweerd does speak of the eternal as transcendent. All dualists have a transcendent and non-transcendent. In Monarchians there is generally the idea that the higher actualizes the lower. This would also be a way of accounting for what I

⁶⁴. Kuyper, Encyclopaëdie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, II, p. 13, for use of macrocosm and a clear similarity to Dooyeweerd.

have described as a theme of priority.

In addition to this the higher-lower scheme of partial universalism seems to fit Dooyeweerd's thinking better in certain respects than does the macro-microcosm theme or scheme of partial universalism.

Vollenhoven entertains some real differences with Dooyeweerd concerning the relation of the individual and the universal. Vollenhoven does not use the term individuality structures and stresses, rather, kingdoms (rijken) and interregal subject and object relations.⁶⁵

65. For a fuller discussion of these important differences see Vollenhoven, "College systematiek - het probleem van de tijd," pp. 4, 5, 6, 10, 13.

PART II: AN ATTEMPT AT RECONSTRUCTION

CHAPTER 5

A GENETIC-HISTORICAL STUDY OF DOOYEWEERD'S LINES OF DEVELOPMENT

First of all it would be helpful to put together some of the more emphatic stresses and lines of development in Dooyeweerd's thinking so that our reconstruction will be better understood.

From the beginning Dooyeweerd saw that historicism was a tremendous foe of reformational thinking and life.¹ In particular, he felt that the thinking of the leaders of the Anti-revolutionary Party had capitulated to a modified historicism. In many places and in different connections we see his critique of Groen van Prinster and especially Stahl.² Another

1. Dooyeweerd, "Het vraagstuk der gemeentemonopolies in het belang der volksgezondheid, hoofdzakelijk beschouwd in het licht van de nieuwe opvattingen in zake de bedrijfsvrijheid," Themis, LXXXI (1920), pp. 126-151. Dooyeweerd, "Het Calvinistisch beginsel der souvereiniteit in eigen kring als staatkundig beginsel," Nederland en Oranje, IV (1923), pp. 98-99, 185-189; V (1924), pp. 8-15, 27-31, 71-76. In these two articles the enemy is Socialism, but the features of historicism are present. Later he goes deeper into the historic basis of the "general welfare" cultural state. In Calvinisme en Natuurrecht (Amersfoort, W. van Wijngen, 1925), Dooyeweerd shows a clear awareness of historicism especially as it relates to Stahl. In "Tweërlei kritiek," Anti-revolutionaire Staatskunde, II (1926), pp. 12-13, he speaks of anti-revolution and relativism. See also Dooyeweerd, De Beteekenis der Wetsidee voor Rechtswetenschap en Rechtsphilosophie (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1926), pp. 12-46; "De universaliteit der rechtsgedachte en de idee van den kultuurstaat," Almanak van het Studentencorps aan de Vrije Universiteit (Amsterdam: 1928); "De zin der geschiedenis vanuit de openbaring," Vox Theologica, V/5 (1934); De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer (Amsterdam: W. Ten Have, 1931), pp. 111-136.
2. For Dooyeweerd's critique of Stahl see Calvinisme en Natuurrecht; De Zin der Geschiedenis en de 'Leiding Gods' in de Historische Ontwikkeling (Publicaties van de Reunisten - Organisatie van N.D.D.D., V, 1932); "De universaliteit der rechtsgedachte en de idee van der kultuurstaat," also, "Leugen en waarheid over het Calvinisme," Nederland en Oranje, VI (1925), pp. 81-90.

stress relating to historicism is Dooyeweerd's evaluation of the importance of Von Savigny in the German historical wing of law. Especially when the historical school focused on the problem of positive law, legal forming, sources of law, historical foundation of the state, etc., and relativized structural law, Dooyeweerd felt compelled to give a broad foundation, systematics, and critique of these problems.³

Dooyeweerd has great natural ability to live into others' positions and he believes that critique involves accounting for the traces of truth in another's position in terms of one's positive systematics as well as explaining why the position falls into absolutizations and wrong stresses both at the level of ground-motive, theoretic presuppositions, and details. Dooyeweerd did not drop the problem of historicism, but one finds an increasing stress on the working out of the systematics of the historical aspects.⁴ Dooyeweerd's increasing stress on immanent and trans-

3. Dooyeweerd, "De bronnen van het stellig recht in het licht der wetsidee," Anti-revolutionaire Staatskunde (driemaandelijksch orgaan), IV (1930), pp. 1-68. Here is the most extensive treatment of the historic school of law, especially pp. 36-73. See also "De theorie van de bronnen van het stellig recht in het licht der wetsidee," Handelingen van de Vereeniging voor Wijsbegeerte des Rechts, XIX (1932-1933); Encyclopaedie van de Rechtswetenschap, vol. III, "De bronnen van het stellig recht," (Amsterdam: mimeo, 1962).

4. Some examples are: A New Critique, II, pp. 180-365; De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, II, pp. 126-300; Recht en Historie (Assen: G. F. Hummelin, 1938); "De zin der geschiedenis vanuit de openbaring;" "De vooronderstellingen van ons denken over recht en samenleving in de crisis van het moderne historicisme," Themis, CX (1949), pp. 193-248; "Perikelen van een historistische rechtstheorie," Themis, CXV (1954), pp. 25-54; Wijsbegeerte en Geschiedenis, Referaat gehouden op de conferentie van de Organisatie van studenten in de geschiedenis in Nederland te Arnhem, 1957; Maatstaven ter onderkenning van Progressieve en Reactionaire Bewegingen in de Historische Ontwikkeling (Amsterdam: Noordhollandse Uitgevermaatschappij, 1958); Vernieuwing en Bezinning, pp. 39-110, 180-192, 240-280. See also critique on Groen van Prinster in Vernieuwing en Bezinning, pp. 240-280.

cidental critique as opposed to a transcendent critique and his emphasis on the philosophia perennis show the high sense of development of the element of fairness in theoretical thought (ethical anticipatory moment) and theoretical living into or empathy (inleving)(social anticipation or psychical retrocipation) which characterize Dooyeweerd from the beginning. His realization of his solidarity within the western thought-community underlies his sympathetic concern to do justice to the other's position as well as his grateful appreciation of the insights and discoveries of those before him and his passion to positively continue this development.

In this sense one can easily find the whole history of western thinking reflected in his work in a way which reminds one of Hegel. As a result of these gifts the problem of historicism was not dropped in emphasis until Dooyeweerd had worked out in detail his own systematics to counteract historicism. This partly explains the stress of Dooyeweerd's first publications on the importance of an idea of law, especially sphere-sovereignty as a cosmological corollary of this idea of law.⁵ It was over against irrationalistic historicism which relativized the law side and destroyed norm consciousness that Dooyeweerd asserted the necessity of an idea of law for giving the Calvinistic life-and-world view a unique style and unitive direction.⁶

This stress on the importance of the idea of law as central ground-hypothesis cannot wholly be explained by his recognition of the impending danger from the side of historicism. Just as important for his emphasis on the idea of law from the very beginning is his reaction against

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5. See "Het Calvinistisch beginsel der souvereiniteit in eigen kring als staatkundig beginsel," Nederland en Oranje, IV (1923), pp. 98-99, 185-189, V (1924), pp. 8-15, 27-31, 71-76; "In den strijd om een Christelijke staatkunde;" Calvinisme en Natuurrecht, pp. 19-31; "De bronnen van het stellig recht in het licht der wetsidee."
6. See "In den strijd om een Christelijke staatkunde," pp. 7-10.

the mode of concept-forming found in the late rationalistic neo-Kantian movement.⁷ Dooyeweerd tried, particularly in his juridical theory, to overcome the generalizing, abstract character of norms in the rationalistic neo-Kantian legal theorists. Here he found a split between norm and fact, the lack of clear limits, fixing of terrains (terrein afbakening), the problem of causality, along with confusion in respect to the different kinds of causality, especially physical, juridical, and moral causality.⁸ In general, the necessity of pure concept formation, proper and critical restriction of use of terms, spur Dooyeweerd on to refine the meaning of norm and to spell out the importance of sphere sovereignty in the field of jurisprudence in terms of a law aspect.

The stress on the idea of law and particularly sphere sovereignty (although his emphasis on sphere universality is somewhat stressed even in his first writings)⁹ can only be properly understood, then, in his

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7. References to neo-Kantianism are to be found in almost all of Dooyeweerd's publications. Some examples are: Calvinisme en Natuurrecht; "Calvinisme contra neo-Kantianisme," Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, XX (1926), pp. 29-74; De Beteekenis der Wetsidee voor Rechtswetenschap en Rechtsphilosophie; "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee;" "Bereepsmaadaad en strafvergoeding in 't licht der wetsidee;" "De bronnen van het stellig recht in het licht der wetsidee;" "De structuur der rechtsbeginselen en de methode der rechtswetenschap in het licht der wetsidee;" De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer; "Norm en feit," Themis, XCIII (1932), pp. 155-211 (this article has extended coverage of Kant and his significance for the United Nations idea); "De theorie van de bronnen van het stellig recht in het licht der wetsidee;" "Boekbespreking: Pos, Philosophie der Wetenschappen," Vox Theologica, XII (1941), pp. 85-90; "Bespreking: Kranenburg, De grondslagen der rechtswetenschap," Themis (1950), pp. 89-98; "Over de methode van begripsvorming in de rechtswetenschap," Themis (1953), pp. 298-340.
8. See "Het Calvinistische beginsel der souvereiniteit in eigen kring al: staatkunde beginsel;" Calvinisme en Natuurrecht; "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee;" "Norm en feit;" "De medele structuur van het juridisch oorzakelijkheidsverband," Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, XIII/5 (1950).
9. See "Universaliteit der rechtsgedachte en de idee van den kultuurstaat."

reacting to historicism as well as neo-Kantianism.

It is very interesting in this connection to note that in a few areas Dooyeweerd's thought is still not developed at these early stages and, in particular, in noticeable respects: the stress on the unity of the subject side as being supra-temporal¹⁰ or in other words, the concentration point, his idea of cosmic time,¹¹ individuality structures,¹² and, tying in closely with the concentration point in its time transcending character, the transcendental critique.¹³ It does not take long for

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10. On p. 169, footnote 68, of this dissertation I said that in "De structuur der rechtsbeginselen..." was the first appearance of Dooyeweerd's mature vision of time as a prism and supra-temporal in its customary application. It is there that the concentration point is formulated and the unity of the law spheres is not thought of as being solved by a direct appeal to the providential world plan as an organism of law spheres. Another of the first expressions is to be found in the article "De bronnen van het stellig recht..." This article also dates from 1930. In "De bronnen..." we also find the full vision. See pp. 10-13 for the prism idea and for the transcendent concentration point on the subject side in "onvergankelijken transcendent-religieuze wortel in het menschengeslacht, waarin de religieuze zinvolheid onzer schepping..." On p. 12 he refers to our individuality structure as unity of subject (subjectseenheid) although he has all the essential ingredients of this soon to appear in the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee. Also on p. 12 is an interesting application of the term vergankelijk, in which it is applied to the whole cosmos, man excepted. He says, "All dingen, die een leidende functie in de kosmische werkelijkheid bezitten, zijn vergankelijk, begrensd tot het tijdelijke. De mensch heeft daarom als zoodanig geen 'leidende functie'. Heel zijn activiteit in deze wereld wordt bepaald door zijn stellingname in den onvergankelijken, religieuze, den kosmos transcendeerenden wortel zijner persoonlijkheid, 't zij in onderwerping aan God, 't zij in apostasie, in afval van zijn Schepper. Daarom is ieder vergankelijk ding begrensd door de soevereiniteit in eigen kring, doch de mensch als zoodanig gaat onzen vergankelijken kosmos te boven."
11. See p. 169, footnote 68, of this dissertation.
12. For an undeveloped idea of individuality structure see "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," p. 36. For more fully developed comments of Dooyeweerd see De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer.
13. It seems clear that this transcendental critique does not really develop until he sees the idea of the transcendent root on the subject side and the prism idea as in the two articles mentioned in footnote 10 (above).

these points to come into the picture, so that by 1936 when the Dutch edition of the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee appeared, all these points were present.¹⁴ On all these points there was further development but there needed to be a sharpening of the transcendental critique and a development of the systematics in respect to cosmic time.

The figure of the prism, so important to a synoptic picture of Dooyeweerd's systematics, occurs very early, but it is not related to cosmic time as a breaking law and the unity of the subject which then is refracted to its temporal function. It is restricted to its significance for the unity and diversity of law spheres or aspects.¹⁵ The diversity of law aspects in his early writings, before 1936, is not brought into direct relation to time as a breaking law with its breaking points in the modal nuclei, but rather to the organism of ordinances of the creation plan.¹⁶ There seems to be a more direct relation to the divine creation plan or counsel and the diversity of law spheres. This emphasis, however, does not last too long, as stated above.

Dooyeweerd's rediscovery of Kuyper's idea of the heart¹⁷ and with this the development of the centrality of religion as time-transcending

14. Dooyeweerd does not feel that his critique was sufficiently sharpened with the appearance of De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee. See A New Critique, I, p. 34.

15. See p. 179, footnote 82, of this dissertation.

16. This need for unity was paramount for Dooyeweerd. For a few references before 1930, see "Vraag en antwoord," Anti-revolutionaire Staatskunde, (driemaandelijksch orgaan) I (1927), p. 292; "Het oude probleem der Christelijk staatkunde," Anti-revolutionaire Staatskunde, I (1926), pp. 64ff.; "Leugen en waarheid over het Calvinisme," p. 90; "De oorsprong van de anti-these tusschen Christelijke en humanistische wetsidee..." Anti-revolutionaire Staatskunde, (driemaandelijksch orgaan) I (1927), pp. 77ff., especially p. 88. This is a very important early systematic work; many of the problems discussed by us are already present in this article. It is also good for his evaluation of Augustine. See also "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee."

17. See A New Critique, I, "foreword," p. v.

or supra-temporal, coupled with a rediscovery of the creational, cosmic importance of $\pi \iota \delta \tau \iota \varsigma$ as transcendental boundary function¹⁸ (grens-functie) comes in his struggle to overcome two extremely important problems for himself. Dooyeweerd saw from the very beginning that irrationalistic historicism and Lebensphilosophie (Bergson and Spengler)¹⁹ and rationalistic positivism and neo-Kantianism, could only be truly challenged if their common heritage in the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought was challenged. The importance of the time-transcending concentration point in overcoming the critical transcendental thinking of neo-Kantians with their dialectical polarity between subject and object with its consequent failure to overcome the anti-thetical relation of theoretical thought, and thus to arrive at synthesis, necessitated Dooyeweerd to find a point beyond the anti-thetical intentional relation of theoretical thought from which synthesis could be completed.²⁰ Because he already held to cosmic time as a breaking law which accounted for the basic genera of cosmic diversity and at the same time conceived of cosmic time as the principle of coherence (samenhang), as well as continuity between these aspects there was no room left for a concentration point within cosmic time. This concentration point, with its all-embracing diverse sovereign spheres, had to be sought beyond cosmic time.²¹

The inspiration for the supra-temporal time-transcending concentration point seemed to come from three directions simultaneously. In the first place, the immanence thinkers, upon whom Dooyeweerd was most de-

18. Dooyeweerd, De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer, p. 95; also "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," p. 174.

19. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," pp. 160-162.

20. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, "Prolegomena." Also, "De transcendentale critiek van het wijsgeerig denken...", Phil. Ref., VI (1941), pp. 1-20.

21. Ibid.

pendent elevated their concentration points through their absolutizing of the analytical function in their dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought above the time horizon.²² It seems that it was via an immanent critique of these thinkers that he recognized the necessity of the concentration point being supra-temporal.²³ This he recognized as a state of affairs of the inner structure of theoretical thought itself. Dooyeweerd never challenges the necessity of the supra-temporal character of the concentration point in these thinkers, but rather, focuses on the diversity of their pretended starting points and discredits them as being various hypostatizations of modal aspects due to the dogma of autonomy, and therefore, as false supra-temporal concentration points.²⁴ He strongly clings to what he considers to be an undeniable state of affairs in these thinkers; if totality-oversight and also time-consciousness is to be gained, it cannot be gained within the cosmic temporal horizon which precisely has the signification of being a refraction law for the fullness, totality, and unity of meaning, unless one takes a point outside and above cosmic time. The necessity of the time-transcending character of any concentration point is an undeniable feature in all theoretical systems. Dooyeweerd thus attributes the fact that the transcendental consciousness, transcendental-cogito, transcendental-ego, homo-neumenon, the Aristotelian notion of substance, all had this supra-temporal character due to the inner nature of theoretical thought.²⁵

This insight into the facets of these non-Christian theoretical

22. Dooyeweerd, De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer, pp. 84-117.

23. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomien op het immanentie-standpunt," pp. 66-69; also, "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," pp. 175-181 (included here is an important footnote concerning avium).

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

systems was, secondly, not understandable without the awareness of Dooyeweerd's rediscovery of the heart in Kuyper. It is the particular character of Dooyeweerd that he felt that the integral radically scriptural character of this view of the heart was that it stood on the boundary between eternity and time at a point at which life was undifferentiated, comprehended, unified, and unrefracted. This nature of the heart on the boundary between eternity and time attracted Dooyeweerd's immediate attention. It gave him what he thought was the Christian answer to the state of affairs which were involved in the inner nature of theoretical thought itself and which had been constantly recognized by immanence thinking. It is interesting in this regard that Dooyeweerd does not accept this boundary character of heart in a strict Kuyperian sense. In Dooyeweerd's system the pistical law sphere as boundary sphere with its correlated subjective faith function, has mere the character of being on the boundary between time and eternity. The heart, religion, and the concentration point are given the status of being supra-temporal, that is, beyond or above the boundary, while the pistical points from the boundary to the concentration point beyond.

A third important impetus for conceiving of the concentration point as above cosmic time is the already-discussed problem of historicism. With religion as the supra-temporal sphere of occurrence distinguished sharply from the historical aspect of time, the domination of historicism could be broken. Dooyeweerd found a standing place for the selfhood elevated above the changing variable process of cosmic continuity and duration which had so pointedly and rightly been brought to the fore by historicism and a point of direction for the process of unfolding, positivization, becoming of historical time, with its key norms of differen-

tiation, individualization, and integration.

With one stroke Dooyeweerd had found a central and all-controlling Archimedeian point which enabled him to sharpen his transcendental critique and method, to unmask the autonomy of theoretical thought, to transcend the dilemma of historicism, and to give integral and radical expression to the reformational character of the problems of the unity of life in its meaning character.

With the discovery of this concentration point, which was always clearly present in Dooyeweerd, came new understanding of the Word of God in its integral, radical, re-forming central sense. Just as human life, and with it the temporal cosmos, had a radical, integral, unified center beyond cosmic time, so the Word of God could again be seen in its central redirecting sense as power ($\deltaύναμις$). The Word of God as central, integral, because of its supra-temporal, life-giving, re-creating, regenerating power, could again be seen. Word-revelation, ground-motive power, ground-motive driving force, the unifying key, could be brought into focus.

Dating from this development of his thinking concerning the supra-temporal character of the concentration point, we find Dooyeweerd developing his idea of central communal religious ground-motives as the directing powers in Western culture.²⁶ Along with this refinement of the apostate ground-motive with its dialectical character, comes the refinement of his expression of the reformational Christian ground-motive of Word-revelation. This development of the notion of ground-motives co-

26. Dooyeweerd, "De vier religieuze grondthema's in den ontwikkelingsgang van het wijsgeerig denken van het Avondland," Phil. Ref., VI (1941), p. 161. Also, Vernieuwing en Bezinning, passim; Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte, pp. 17-64.

incides with his sharpening of the transcendental critique of theoretical thought and the corresponding transcendental method which today is the dominating emphasis of his thought.

It would seem that the reason why this dominating emphasis has developed is that the rediscovery of the central ground-motive character of Word-revelation gave Dooyeweerd the fundamental insight into the way nature-grace thinking, especially as it was found in biblicism and scholastic theologians, could be overcome.

From his earliest development Dooyeweerd was unsatisfied with the biblicistic attempt of his teachers to find the Christian view of the state and jurisprudence in general. The relativity involved in theological exegesis of biblical texts, brought to the fore pointedly through historicism and higher critical theologians, the exaggeration of the proof-text method in appealing to Scripture, the rationalistic and objectivistic ways of conceiving of the Word of God as inscripturated, the use of Scripture involving problems of necessary inference, and the logicism in Reformed scholastic theology, all could be transcended, reformulated, and criticized now that the integral, radical, central supra-temporal sense of the Word of God had been rediscovered. The religious character of the ground-motive of Word was now seen as giving the unity to the diversity of scriptural books and themes and as the virtual key to knowledge.²⁷ The central religious character of the Word of God intends to make clear that man is driven to a central choice, a religious choice of position in the root unity of life. This meant immediately

27. Dooyeweerd, "Enkele losse grepen uit de discussie ter jaarvergadering, 1956," Corr. bladen, XX (June 1956), pp. 41-45.

28. Dooyeweerd, "De strijd om het schriftuurlijk karakter van de W.d.W.," Mededelingen van de Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte (Juli 1950), pp. 3-6.

that any subtle form of autonomy in theology could be unmasked and theology as a special science, and exegesis in general, could be seen to be dependent on a prior religious choice of position.

Thus biblicism, theologism, and nature-grace ground-motives were overcome. Positively, this meant that theoretical thought, both as philosophy as well as the special sciences, could be directed positively by the Word of God and be truly scriptural. Christian philosophy and theological thinking were possible.

It is important in this connection to remember that Kuyper had seen many of these same points, namely: the importance of regeneration and redirection of life in the root, the stress on the heart as the root of men, the stress on the heart as concentration point (pou stou) for God's regeneration of the human race and the world, its boundary, partly supra-temporal character and the important discovery of the increated function of faith as distinguished from religion and the heart. On one central point Dooyeweerd made a correction on Kuyper which enabled him to restructure Kuyper's insights somewhat.²⁹

Kuyper had separated regeneration as a work of Spirit without the Word, from regeneration through the Word. This is particularly seen in his idea of slumbering regeneration. Dooyeweerd, by closing this separation and seeing the Word of God as spirit and life, as regeneration power in the sense of I Peter 3:17-21, brought out the central regenerating, redirecting sense of the Word of God as power. A whole series of false problematics formulated by Reformed scholastic theology under the control of nature-grace ground-motive could be dispensed with in radical

29. Dooyeweerd, "Kuyper's wetenschapsleer," Phil. Ref., IV (1939), pp. 193-232.

manner. This enabled Dooyeweerd to correct Kuyper's overemphasis on theology, his biblicism, and other remnants of nature-grace thinking as well as to counteract the strong hold which German idealism had on Kuyper.

Before an attempt is made to summarize the development of Dooyeweerd there are two important emphases left to be discussed. The first, tying in closely with Dooyeweerd's struggle to break with biblicism in its various expressions and with theologism in its Reformed, Calvinistic form, is his rather negative attitude toward Reformed theologians. This attitude was occasioned in a large part by his struggle in early years with certain Calvinistic theologians, particularly in respect to the supposed substantial, rational character of the soul and the two natures of the Mediator. In this historic confrontation the entrenchment of Reformed theology in nature-grace thinking became evident to Dooyeweerd.³⁰ After this struggle he seems to have developed a unique aversion towards citing proof-texts in his works. This is particularly noticeable if one compares these works with works antedating this struggle. It is interesting that this phenomenon has occasioned critique from those still enamoured with a scholastic, biblicistic, and often fundamentalistic view of the Bible as the Word of God. However, one is increasingly impressed with the all-sided appeal of Dooyeweerd to Scripture for direction and authority. This comes out most in his earlier publications, but generally, the rich biblical emphasis is always present.

This trend in Dooyeweerd is more than a matter for curiosity, because this affects his exegesis of the Scriptures and results in what

30. Dooyeweerd mentions this conflict with the theological faculty of the Free University and is happy that it belongs in the past. "De verhouding tussen wijsbegeerte en theologie en de strijd der faculteiten," I, Phil. Ref., XXIII (1958), p. 1, footnote.

appears to be a failure to appreciate the revolution in the exegetical branches of theology, especially in Biblical Theology. This seems to be part of the reason for his failure to correct the influence of the nature-grace ground-motive in respect to God's eternity, time, eschatology, creation, man's eternity, etc., in his thought.

The second emphasis is Dooyeweerd's stress on the integral character of ordinary experience. Naive experience, as Dooyeweerd views it, played a key role from the beginning of his work. In many respects this Christian emphasis was inherited from Kuyper. Both Kuyper and Dooyeweerd felt a strong calling to defend Christ's little ones and the plain folk of the Christian community from attack by science which sought to undermine the simple Christ-faith of believers and their implicit trust in the biblical motive of the trustworthy character of the creation order and the meaningfulness of ordinary experience.³¹ This Kuyperian, biblical emphasis enabled Dooyeweerd to break with rationalistic scientism with its uncritical dogma of the autonomy of scientific, theoretical thought, which by its nature depreciated ordinary experience and falsified reality. In contrast to this, Dooyeweerd, like Kuyper before him, viewed thinking as one of the many functions of man's total life, and thus Dooyeweerd immediately saw the influence of Logos speculation on Reformed thinking.

Ordinary experience was seen to be integral in the sense of full and real. Ordinary naive experience and the continuity of time was seen to make it impossible for ordinary experience to view reality in dis-

31. For an early stage in his development of naive experience, in which he has not yet come to his definitive view see, "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," pp. 38-59. On p. 59 he refers to ordinary experience as populair.

tinguished modal aspects. Reality was experience as whole, total, and integral. This meant that the subject-object relation was part of this integral implicit experiencing and could no longer be hypostatized into a central polar dialectical opposition, as the autonomy of theoretical thought had done.

The primary datum for all theoretical thinking became the rich, integral, full experiencing of reality as actually given to, and ordinarily experienced by, man. In this sense naive experience knew no theoretical problems because the continuity of time related life integrally. Theoretical thought was seen to be of intentional anti-thetical character: in which real experience and reality is broken asunder into its structural components in analysis and viewed together again in theoretical synthesis. Theoretical results could never be identified with the full integral character of experience and reality as given but could now be viewed only as a theoretical account of reality. The gegenstand character of theoretical thought was now sharply opposed to the absolutized subject-object relation in dialectical humanistic thought which was now shown to originate in the autonomy of theoretical science, in which was the Faustian desire for domination of all reality.

These points of naive experience and the gegenstand relation are all important for Dooyeweerd, not only for understanding the transcendental method, but also for the understanding of Scripture, which for Dooyeweerd always appeals to the heart in the language of naive experience, which is the hermeneutical key for theology as a science. The importance of this emphasis is impossible to overrate not only in Dooyeweerd's development, but, more importantly, for its reforming power in the Christian life. This emphasis is in his writings from the beginning

and remained to a great extent unchanged.

This early view of the integral character of naive experience did not mean that he had clearly seen and formulated the nature of the concentration point of naive experience. The idea of the supra-temporal character of the root of all experience following this discovery of the time transcending concentration point postdates Dooyeweerd's emphasis on the nature of naive experience and the gegenstand relation.³² This discovery enabled him to sharpen his transcendental critique and also to unify and develop his work on individuality structures.

In summary now of Dooyeweerd's development we can point to two basic lines. The first to make its appearance was the idea of law especially with the doctrine of sphere sovereignty. This Kuyperian stress on the Lord's ordinances and the importance of sphere sovereignty³³ appears, however, with the important correction that sphere sovereignty is now used in a modal cosmological way and is no longer restricted to spheres of society as it was in Kuyper. This stress is used to evaluate the natural law tradition and to come to the clear knowledge of the true terrain and normative character of jurisprudence. Accompanying this is Dooyeweerd's stress of naive experience reflected in his concern with a Calvinistic world-and-life view which would reflect the uniqueness of the Calvinistic stress on God as sovereign creator and law-giver.³⁴ Involved inextricably with this use of his idea of law in respect to

32. Dooyeweerd, "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," passim.

33. Veenhof, In Kuyper's Lijn (Goes: Oosterbaan & Le Cointre, 1939), passim.

34. It is interesting to note the change in emphasis from world-and-life view after 1936 to theoretical philosophy, especially in contrast to Popma's emphasis on world-and-life view (Levensbeschouwing, all 7 volumes).

cosmological epistemological problems is the emphasis from the first on the gegenstand relation. The epistemological implications of sphere sovereignty are applied to the logos aspect of reality, especially in confrontation with concept formation as this had been developed by the neo-Kartians and phenomenology.³⁵

The second line comes to the fore when Dooyeweerd formulates the totality, unity, and fullness of meaning on the subject side as the supra-temporal concentration point. This brings with it a sharpening of his transcendental method and critique, a further bringing to focus of the gegenstand relation, cosmic time,³⁶ and the order of before and after of the modal aspects. Along with this second main line, the ground-motives come into focus with more critique on nature-grace thinking and theology, and, accompanying this from his side, his view of the Word of God.

As these two main lines develop side by side, we find Dooyeweerd characterizing his philosophy more and more in terms of the second main emphasis i.e., in terms of the concentration point, the ground-motive, and the transcendental critique. His emphasis on characterizing all systems as having an implicit or explicit idea of law recedes somewhat into the background and the emphasis is put on transcendental critique and ground-motives.³⁷ Along with the stress on ground-motives seems

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35. Dooyeweerd, "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," pp. 36ff., where he uses the term "logos" to describe the logical aspect.
36. With this second line the emphasis is placed more on sphere universality than sovereignty, so that the stress is on the transcendental direction, opening process, disharmony in the disclosure process and the dynamics of meaning pointing to the supra-temporal self.
37. Van Riessen deals with the problem of the shift of emphasis in Dooyeweerd in "Over de betekenis van de wetsidee in de wijsbegeerte," Phil. Ref., XXX (1965).

to go a lack of emphasis on a world-and-life view that was characteristic of his early writings.

These two main lines go on together and provide the total and unified theoretical vision by which Dooyeweerd then develops his theory concerning modal aspects and individuality (especially societal) structures in later years in terms, generally, of the first line, and dovetailing with this, his historical critique and evaluation particularly in the light of the three ground-motives. With the second main line comes the increasing ecumenical character of his work.³⁸ The first line as focusing on the law idea was thought of as providing leading ideas for a more distinct and unified Calvinistic life-style and world-view.

38. Dooyeweerd, "Het oecumenisch-reformatorisch grond-motief." p. 14. Here he speaks of his first period of philosophizing, i.e., before he discovered the transcendental critique. Instead of the emphasis on the wetsidee he would rather have the philosophy stamped as christelijke transcendentale filosofie. This is the point that is questioned by van Riessen (previous footnote). We begin to see the second period arise in 1930 with the discovery of the prism and the supra-temporal concentration point, and the root unity on the subject side. The transcendental character of his thinking quickly develops from this time.

CHAPTER 6

IMPORTANCE, SCOPE, AND METHOD OF RECONSTRUCTION

1. Importance of Reconstruction.

As one works through the corpus of Dooyeweerd's writings, seeking to analyze the significance and extent of the problems in his thinking, it becomes evident that there is more need for reconstruction on certain points of his thinking than is first expected. Stress on the systematic thetical reconstruction flows from the nature of Christian philosophy as developed by Dooyeweerd as well as Vollenhoven.¹ They have stressed from the beginning that an immanent critique is not sufficient, and that criticism, if it is to be done adequately, must be done in terms of one's own position on the points of criticism. To develop criticism on these points in Dooyeweerd it was increasingly necessary to work out our own position on these points, or at least new directions in general, and on some points, in particular.

It is a risky thing to attempt such a reconstruction. A really adequate reconstruction is the lifetime work of a team of scholars.² Part of the difficulty of reconstruction is that there are many facets of this philosophy which need development. Many of these facets are being developed with more or less rapidity. In these areas there is

1. Vollenhoven, Hoofdpijnen der Logica (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1948), pp. 18-19. Vollenhoven, Het Calvinisme en de Reformatie van de Wijsbegeerte (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1933), pp. 10-14.
2. Schouls, Man in Communication, p. 66. Here he suggests a team approach to various problematic areas.

hardly any need for reconstruction. This task is more concerned with drawing out the implications for different areas of work done. Besides this large task, there is the secondary task of reconstruction, especially as it related to Dooyeweerd's systematics. The task of reconstruction of certain areas is not nearly as important and as broad as the task of development. But the task of further development, of necessity, brings reconstruction and influences past attempts at reconstruction.

The reasons for what might seem to be a disproportionate amount of emphasis on the systematic and thetical part of this dissertation as opposed to the critical, analytical, and genetic historical are two-fold. First, the centrality of these problems means that they control the direction of development, and in line with this, their implications are felt in all facets of the system to a more or less extent. The problem of supra-temporality is intrinsically connected with religion, the character of the law, cosmic time and its directions, history and genesis, the nature of meaning, and the transcendental critique and method, etc. It cannot be completely dealt with in the lines laid down by Dooyeweerd for correction of his system, namely, via the law of the exclusion of antinomies, since the law does not bear directly enough on the problem; and via the transcendental critique, since it is in the center of reconstruction. Therefore, reconstruction and new direction is made extremely urgent. If critique and analysis of these problems are to be convincing, then they must be seen to proceed out of new directions on these points. Therefore, critical reserve is necessarily suspect, because it is not as thinkable that reconstruction is necessary or possible on these directive central points.

Second, during our study of Dooyeweerd it has become clear that

the development of the school is hindered and threatened precisely on these points. This is not, however, due to a lack of awareness of the problematic character of those central points, or of their centrality; but it is due to a lack of real grappling with the systematics of Dooyeweerd as a whole and a lack of concentration on the differing developments of the school as a whole on these points. The stress within the school has been on the further development of the facets of Dooyeweerd.³ That this development has reached a point of diminishing returns on these central problems is clear from two considerations. First, there is increasing diversity and disagreement on these central areas. Hardly anyone in the school works with supra-temporality as it is described by Dooyeweerd, and transcendence is thought of quite differently, if it is dealt with at all. Since there is almost total dissatisfaction with Dooyeweerd's construction of supra-temporality, created eternity, and, consequently, transcendence, there has been a great deal of individual reconstruction on these points. The result has been a lack of consensus of opinion and lack of a well developed account of this reconstruction which could provide a unified and more definitive school position. Discussion of these points is frequent, although often unrelated, and these occasion further division and even dissension, and, consequently, lack of development. So radical has some reconstruction and re-definition been on these points, that further discussion and delving into them is conceived of as too late and not fruitful. The consequences of this

3. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, pp. 541-545. Here Dooyeweerd presents a program for the school as a whole. Cf. Vollenhoven, "College systematiek - het probleem van de tijd," p. 1. He emphasizes that his method was to always go out of what was in common between himself and Dooyeweerd, e.g., but now some points of difference must be developed and settled since the school is established.

is that reconstruction and re-definition is happening in an individualistic manner. Individualization within a school of philosophy is good, healthy, and necessary as the school grows, but individualistic reconstruction leads to increasing division, lack of philosophic communication, and, eventually, to the unhealthy reaction of scholasticism which is an anti-normative attempt to restore basic agreement on foundational problems.

Second, lack of real grappling and attention on these central problems has meant unfruitfulness in other closely related major areas. For instance, the nature and task of theology, the position of the institutional church, creation and Genesis, history (particularly as it is concerned with its scope and direction toward eschaton and eschatology), and in general, a further development of the implications in our view of cosmic time have been neglected.⁴ These are the real problem areas for the school, not only because they are, by the nature of the case, vast, central, and difficult, but also because they have all been formulated in a more or less inadequate way by Dooyeweerd, and, most importantly, because the problems in all the various areas are related to a central problem which has not been dealt with centrally in a total school effort. Therefore, there is a great urgency that an attempt be made to focus the problem and gather together the diverse and differing thinking of the members of the school and that a general attempt at reconstruction be made in order for development to proceed properly and with more rapidity.

4. Vollenhoven, op. cit., in which he remarks that we (meaning the school) started too early with cosmic time, and ended too soon. It is interesting that particularly in respect to time, that he stresses the need for reconstruction, and presents a hypothesis in order to free one from Dooyeweerd's construction of time as a prism and the order of modal aspects (pp. 2, 13-14).

2. Scope and Method of Reconstruction.

Now that the importance of reconstruction has been dealt with in broad lines, it is necessary to present some general considerations in regard to the scope and method of reconstruction.

The first and most important fact is that our reconstruction is to be done in school fashion. By this we mean that almost all points of reconstruction have been suggested by other members of the school of Calvinistic philosophy. The suggestions have come from all quarters of the school, but no one has brought them together in a consistent picture except K. J. Popma. Our reconstruction is almost completely dependent on his work. In his works there is a coherent reconstruction of the major points of our difficulty with Dooyeweerd along with original reflections on many areas of concern which Dooyeweerd has not developed, e.g., the church, the nature of religion, the nature and task of theology, transcendence, the history of the relation of theology and philosophy, time, and created eternity.

The importance of Popma for our reconstruction is two-fold. First, one is more able to reconstruct since it has been done by Popma, in great detail in many cases. He has analyzed some of the same weak points that we shall focus on and has suggested and worked out new directions in these areas. Second, since he has spent so much of his life's work on reconstruction, one is not necessitated to attempt a reconstruction on many points already covered in Popma's works.

In summary, reconstruction can be attempted in a somewhat more systematic fashion by drawing together into a more or less coherent picture the lines of critique and reconstruction already present. An attempt will be made to pull together and systematize work done by the school

up to this time. Thus it will be done from within the school, in school-like fashion. In this way, even at an early stage in one's own development, one can attempt a reconstruction.

The scope of the reconstruction will be rather broad due to the centrality of the points dealt with and due also to the wide range of work already done. On many of the important points there will be made simply a reference to the work of Popma along with work done by other members of the school. On points where we differ with Popma our reconstruction will be in more detail. In these parts of the reconstruction Vollenhoven's work will be relied upon primarily.

The most important areas that need consideration are time, religion, and law and some of their inter-relations.

CHAPTER 7

A SYNOPTIC PICTURE OF OUR RECONSTRUCTION CONCENTRATING ON THE POINTS OF TIME, LAW, RELIGION, AND THEIR INTERRELATION

In order to facilitate the understanding of our reconstruction a synoptic picture or vision will be given of our reconstruction as a whole, especially concentrating on the points of time, religion, and law, and their interrelation. This synoptic vision will try to set off and show as clearly as possible the differences of our reconstruction from Dooyeweerd's views on these points.

In agreement with Vollenhoven, one must sharply distinguish between three modes of being: God, law, and cosmos.¹ This immediately implies that Dooyeweerd's construction of God, soul or heart, and cosmos must be radically reconstructed. This of course is not to suggest that Dooyeweerd does not see the law as the boundary between the sovereign Creator and the creation. On the contrary, Dooyeweerd stresses that man, in his heart as well as all his functions, is subjected to God's law. Nevertheless, Dooyeweerd reserves a rather unique place for the heart of man. As direction-giving center, the heart of man is not to be found in the temporal horizon. In Dooyeweerd's thinking the heart or soul of man must be seen to occupy a place between the temporal cosmos and the central law of love.

1. Vollenhoven, "College systematiek - het probleem van de tijd," pp. 2, 8. God and law cannot be taken up in an ontology along with the cosmos. Ontology is restricted to the cosmos. It is simply a designation of these three levels, not any attempt to have three modes of the existence of one being.

Therefore, Vollenhoven must be seen as being correct when he describes Dooyeweerd as possessing a scheme of God, soul or heart, and cosmos. The heart of man must rather be thought to be temporal, in time.²

In contrast to this unique place which Dooyeweerd gives to the heart or soul of man, the heart of man must be thought in some sense to be temporal and in time as man's functions are in time. This means that cosmic time, as Spier has pointed out, can no longer be conceived of as a law of refraction (brekingswet) with the nuclear moments of the law spheres as points of refraction (brekingspunten).³ As Vollenhoven has pointed out, the figure of the prism which Dooyeweerd loves to employ, must be abandoned because it brings with it this whole construction of Dooyeweerd.⁴

It is the unique place which Dooyeweerd gives the soul of man that necessitates a rather thorough revision of his idea of cosmic time and even, in some respects, his idea of law.

In the first place, it must be said that there is nothing in the cosmos that is not temporal. To put it still stronger, one could agree with Popma that there can be nothing created that is not temporal and nothing temporal that is not created. As Popma has emphasized, time must be regarded as con-created with the creation.⁵ Time itself is a creature. This means that time, like the creation, has a beginning. Before the creation there was no time. There is no way, of course, to express this fact other than in terms of time itself, but this does not

2. Ibid., pp. 2, 6, 8.

3. See p. 23, footnote 26, of this dissertation.

4. Vollenhoven, op. cit., pp. 5, 6.

5. Popma, Nadenken Over de Tijd, pp. 71ff.

at all take away from the fact that time must be said to have a beginning. This position must be maintained against dualists who, positing that time never begins, maintain time as an $\dot{a} p x h$ in the non-transcendent realm as opposed to eternity as $\dot{a} p x h$ in the transcendent; for example, in Xenophanes, Aristotle, Boethius, and Pomponazzi. On the other hand, the position that time is created must be maintained against all monistic temporalistic positions which would enthrone time as $\dot{a} p x h$ and see God and man as participants in this one Origin.⁶

Time and creation are cosmic corollaries, as Okke Jager has expressed it.⁷ Now these general remarks have several important implications. First, since there can be no creation without time and no time without creation, this means that any notion that time ceases, immediately brings with it the notion that creation ceases. This must be emphasized especially against the nature-grace tradition which has stressed the fact that time and history cease at the judgment day. This position always implies a breaking of the creator-creature relationship, since if time is said to cease and man and the cosmos are then said to become eternal, be it now in a created or creaturely mode, there can no longer be a clear distinction between God and man, Creator and creation.⁸ A

6. Vollenhoven, Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte, p. 276. Popma, "Tijd en religie," (chapter VI, "Het temporalisme van Critias") pp. 162-170; for the Thomistic view of time and eternity, pp. 149, 156. Some examples of temporalistic time theologies are Cullmann and Kuitert. See also Popma, Cursus ter Inleiding in de W.d.W. (Kampen: Copieërinrichting v.d. Berg, n.d.), passim. Also, Popma, "College inleiding - drie structuurmomenten," mimeo, 1965; and "College oecumene en wijsbegeerte - oecumene," mimeo, 1966, passim.
7. Jager, Het Eeuwige Leven, passim.
8. Stellingwerff, "Kritiek of K. Schilder als filosoferend dogmaticus," passim. Popma, "De eeuwigheid Gods volgens Boethius," passim. The phrase "man is eternal" or the "cosmos is eternal" is not wrong if one intends by this that it lasts forever, i.e., is subject to the endless time order, and therefore has endless succession and duration. As long as there is not involved in these phrases the idea

still more important consideration is the fact that Scripture gives no real pointing in this direction, but rather it points everywhere to the fact that the re-creation of man and the creation fulfills, restores, and renews the creation rather than destroys the creation⁹ by bringing an end to it. It is simply ridiculous to propose that created life on the new earth would be non-temporal. Popma has pointed out the nihilistic consequences of this supposition throughout his works. Cosmic time must be seen rather to be a created ordinance, eternally (that is, everlastingly, endlessly) holding, valid for all that is subjected to it.¹⁰ The precise sense in which time can be said to be an ordinance must be postponed until later, but it is of great importance for the reconstruction. It has great consequences, obviously, for the view of cosmic time as a whole. With this position it is obvious that time continues on the new earth. With this is implied that duration, succession, development, time measurement,¹¹ periodicity, history, cultural activity, and many other things are continued after the judgment day.¹² The very endless, everlasting eternal character of time provides a horizon for all of man's activity in the time of history before the judgment day.¹³ The whole idea

that time ceases and eternity begins. Involved in the word "eternity" is the idea of the quality of temporal existence, that is, the incorruptibility of the life lived endlessly, the power over time which comes through being in Christ.

9. This is seen by Berkouwer, De Wederkomst van Christus, I, pp. 266-299. See also Ridderbos, Paulus, especially his stress on the Adam category; index under beeld Gods (p. 631), begin Gods (p. 632), voleind-
ing (p. 638).
10. For time as Ordnung see Popma, Nadenken Over de Tijd, pp. 62-63, 76, 120, 134, 228-229.
11. For the question of time measurement on the new earth see ibid., p. 144
12. For information on these points see Popma, Levensbeschouwing, Vol. VII (index); also, Popma, Calvinistische Geschiedsbeschouwing.
13. This is a constant emphasis of Popma. For example, Wijsbegeerte en Anthropologie, pp. 241-244.

of the horizons of human experience as it is developed in Dooyeweerd must undergo modification. Popma has repeatedly spoken of the importance of the endlessness of time for man's perspective. This perspective is necessary for any scripturally healthy reflection about created reality.¹⁴ This perspective has importance in both directions, i.e., as man moves forward toward the future, new backgrounds open up endlessly as well as new horizons in his direction toward the future.¹⁵ This is also of importance for the relation of the categories, differentiated and undifferentiated, and of how these two are mutually related in respect to man.¹⁶ The importance of working with the distinction of the categories of the creational and lapsarian and their importance for formation of knowledge (kennisvorming) is brought to the fore by Popma.¹⁷ The healthy formation of knowledge must have the proper perspective, and any failure to do justice to the endless horizons of cosmic time in the direction toward the future as well as failure to see the importance of the pre-fall history of man involves one in substitute pseudo-views in respect to these directions of time.

Cosmic time seen as an eternally holding ordinance involving endless perspectives for man and the creation even after the judgment day on the new earth can be designated as the horizontal direction of time.

14. Popma, Nadenken Over de Tijd, p. 28, he says, "Nu is mij een verwijzing naar de nieuwe aard altijd hoogst welkom: wanneer wij in de moeite van ons werk hier-en-nu (velerlei moeite: werkstof, tijdnood, gezondheid enz.) niet dagelijks er aan denken dat we ons huidig werk op de nieuwe aarde die tevens hemel is mogen voortzetten in de zekerheid dan pas goed op dreef te zullen komen, is onze arbeid weinig Christelijk en weinig zinvol."
15. Ibid., pp. 22-23, 254-266.
16. Ibid., pp. 20-23.
17. Popma, Wijsbegeerte en Anthropologie, pp. 24ff.

In this sense we can speak of an endless linear time.¹⁸ The word "horizontal" has many significances in the W.d.W. and can be used differently in different contexts. Both the terms "linear" and "horizontal" are not without dangers which must be pointed out later in more detail. We are using these terms to designate cosmic time as an eternally holding ordinance, especially to set us off from any notion that time, history, and succession cease. Anyone who does not see the perspective which endless cosmic time opens for Christian thinking is forced, explicitly or implicitly, to verticalize cosmic time. This tendency is what seems to be present in Dooyeweerd's idea of the transcendental direction of cosmic time and to some extent in his idea of created reality as meaning, as pointing in the transcendental direction to its supra-temporal-totality, fullness, consummation, and root unity, and to its ἀρχή. In this view the future of the earth, of man, of history, and of time are not seen as running continuously on in time and under the ordinance of time everlasting, but as culminating, consummating above time in the supra-temporal consummation of meaning. This verticalizing results from a failure to see the reforming perspective of the Christian ground-motive of Word-revelation for the future of man, time,

18. Mekkes, Teken en Motief, p. 134. This is new terminology for Mekkes. Throughout this book there is a healthy emphasis by Mekkes on man's being bound to time and the dynamics of the creation. However, Mekkes still has not gotten out of the problem of supra-temporality as we find it in Dooyeweerd. Notice the stress on the transcendental direction (pp. 159-160). But even the transcendental direction is severely modified in this book. For his critique on the supra-temporal heart see pp. 214-215. For his earlier emphasis on the supra-temporal see "Beschouwingen naar aanleiding van de discussie rondom het recht van verzet," Phil. Ref., XVIII (1953), p. 152. See also the interesting discussion of transcendental and horizontal as they relate to history and time in "De tijd der geschiedenis," by M. C. Smit; mimeo, uitgave Het Filosofisch Instituut der Vrije Universiteit, 1968.

the earth, heaven, and the creation in general. This failure in turn results from the grip of the nature-grace ground-motive on Dooyeweerd.

A second consideration following from the position that there is no creation without time, and no time without creation, is the notion that all of the created is temporal. This means, for instance, that heaven and earth are subject to one cosmic time as an eternally binding ordinance. In contra-distinction to Dooyeweerd it means that his construction of God, soul, temporal cosmos cannot be maintained. The whole man is temporal in the sense of being subject to the ordinance of time. Man as the "creature with a heart" as well as man as body with all his functions, is subject to time. More than this, the angels, good and bad, are temporal and subject to the all-embracing cosmic time. This means, as Popma has shown, that demons (fallen angels) and angels in general, have time-consciousness,¹⁹ that heaven as the place of the ascended glorified human nature of Christ and the departed saints is subject to changes, succession, duration, development as earth because it is subject to the same cosmic time as earth is.²⁰ This means that there cannot be any speaking of that which is above time unless one has God who is eternal in mind. This means that heaven, to the extent we have revelation concerning it, must be brought within the scope of Christian thinking, and must figure in all systematic attempts to build up a view of the earthly cosmos.²¹ Anything within the creation is temporal, and,

19. See footnotes 114-117, on pp. 111-112, of this dissertation.

20. Schoonhoven, Wrath of Heaven, passim.

21. See Popma, "Zen sta stil," Corr. bladen, XXXII (April 1968), pp. 1-4, where he stresses the fact that positivism suffers from lack of true perspective because it does not see the interrelatedness of heaven and earth.

therefore, Dooyeweerd's speaking of "faith as grouping the eschaton and in general that which happens beyond cosmic time" can no longer be maintained. Heaven cannot be viewed as eternal in distinction from earth that is temporal, for this would mean that there would be two time orders. The heart cannot be thought of as possessing created eternity or aeuum in contra-distinction from its temporal functions. Rather, all that is in the universe in heaven and on earth is moving toward the future in one cosmic history which includes heaven and earth.

Instead of accentuating the supra-temporal and the eschaton as beyond time, as Dooyeweerd definitely does, the eschaton must be viewed as centered on the new earth with heaven on earth because Christ descends to earth at the judgment and there everlastingly abides as the last Adam with the new mankind. God's coming to dwell with his people, his walking among them everlastingly as fulfillment of covenant in his Son Christ Jesus in the future on the new earth, gives the history of the universe its direction and meaning. The future identity of heaven and earth, because of the presence of the Mediator in his glorified human nature with the angels, the servants of the new mankind on the new earth, show that the earth is the religious center of the universe.²² When this perspective is lost, biblicism must ensue, verticalizing, supra-temporalizing of eschatology results, and a skepticism in respect to the future perspective of the cosmos diverts Christian thinking about the cosmos from one of its vital orientation points, with the result that

22. Popna, Nadenken Over de Tijd, passim; Levensbeschouwing, VII (index), under fabrilisme, faber, fabrilisatie, fabriliteit. See also E. J. Young, "The Days of Genesis," Westminster Theological Journal, XXV (Nov. 1962, May 1963). He shows that it is addressed to man standing on the earth, and that a habitable earth and a habitable garden is the perspective.

all things before this period of time, starting with the new earth, are placed in distorted perspective. This skepticism uses the fact that scriptural Word-revelation concerning the future is often couched in apocalyptic figures to come to the conclusion that nothing at all can be known concerning the future which could be of real value for Christian philosophy and ordinary experience. In this way a veil is hung over the Scriptures which can only be taken away as Christ opens the Scriptures and one is again brought under the grip of the ground-motive of Word-revelation.

Not only must heaven not be thought to be of little importance for Christian philosophy and the Christian life because of our lack of knowledge about it, but it must be constantly kept in mind if one is to have the proper perspective and orientation for a view of the cosmos as a totality. The importance of the relation of heaven and earth throughout the various periods of the history (geschiedenis) of the creation must be seen as clearly as possible. Vollenhoven, and especially Popma, have brought this to the forefront in their thinking. The presence of God on earth in paradise before the fall of man, including the revelation to man after the fall, the leading of mankind through the Angel of the Lord or the Angel of his presence (face) accompanied by the presence of the angelic hosts (angels), all point to the importance of the relation of heaven on earth and the relation of heaven and earth for a Christian view of the cosmos. The presence of God through his appearances as Angel of the Lord to the Patriarchs, the epoch-making character of God's covenant-making through the Angel of the Lord, his deliverance from Egypt, his leading of Israel through the wilderness, his presence in the battles of the Lord, all again stress the interrelatedness of heaven

and earth. God's presence with man, his dwelling and appearances in the garden, tent, cloud, tabernacle, temple, and, finally, in the Word made Flesh show the plan of God to bind heaven and earth together again (reconcile them), to have man and God together. This plan is shown in his desire to walk and talk in their midst as Holy God in the midst of an equally holy people, forever abiding with them on the earth in his Incarnate Son made subject to the law and time, in his unlosable human nature, forever present with his brethren, the new mankind, throughout all the periods of time on the new earth. To see Jesus is to see the Father, to be with Jesus, the Incarnate Son of God, on the new earth is to be with the Father and all His angels on the new earth. It is to have a new heaven and a new heaven on earth. Heaven and earth have an identity never more to be lost.²³

Peepma points out that the original presence of God and His angels on the earth in paradise was lost because of man's sin. Heaven and earth became separated, but the unity is never completely lost because of God's gracious intervention. The original presence of God with man on earth points forward to God's everlasting presence on the new earth where heaven is on earth. All of the history of God's great acts of redemption and restoration points forward to this last and definitive period of world history which comes into its full realization only at the Great Appearing (*ἐπιφάνεια*, public appearance) of our great God and Saviour. In this line, Canaan is a foreshadowing of the new earth with God's presence in the midst of his people and is not, as much nature-grace theology sees it, a foreshadowing of heaven in distinction from the new earth.²⁴

23. See p. 111, footnote 114, of this dissertation.

24. Kline, Treaty of the Great King (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1963), pp. 124ff., 133.

In this line also, God's dwelling in His Son on earth in Canaan and his indwelling through the pentecostal Spirit in his people until the end of this age are strides forward to the finished and consummate dwelling with the new humanity on the new earth throughout all the periods of time in this last stage of world history inaugurated at the judgment day. The interrelatedness of heaven and earth in the Scriptures and the great perspectives which come from this are pre-conditions for a Christian world-and-life view and lay the foundation for any cosmology or anthropology, any theory of knowledge or theory of values as well as a view of creation history (to be distinguished from the historical formative or technical aspect of history) of Christian philosophy.

Popma has shown also the importance of seeing the fact that the "age to come" begins with the resurrection and ascension of Christ, for one's perspective on time, history, and heaven. The two phases of history which he entitles "spirit" and "flesh" were already laid down as a creational ordinance.²⁵ The "age to come," inaugurated with the coming

25. Popma, Calvinistische Geschiedsbeschouwing, passim; Nadenken Over de Tijd, pp. 256-257, 270-272; Wijsbegeerte en Anthropologie, pp. 225-311. See also G. Vos, "The Eschatological Aspect of the Pauline Conception of the Spirit," pp. 247-250; Pauline Eschatology, pp. 205, 304. Also, R. Gaffin, Calvin's View of the Sabbath, unpublished Master's dissertation from Westminster Theological Seminary, 1961. In I Cor. 15:45-46 the term $\psi\upsilon\chi\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$ in the phrase "first the natural then the spiritual" does not here refer to the fallen in his fallen state, but rather to man as he was at the creation. The phrase "living soul" refers to Genesis 2:7. Adam was created in a condition able to fall. He was to move via a probation to a state of confirmation. This confirmation affected the whole man. The Spirit is the consummated stage of history, that is, no longer able to sin. Christ as life-giving fulfills the original dynamics of history. In the rest of the context $\psi\upsilon\chi\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$ does refer to man as corrupted, but not in verses 45-46. See Vollenhoven, Het Calvinisme en de Reformatie van de Wijsbegeerte, p. 45.

of the kingdom of heaven to earth with the first coming of the King from heaven, the heavenly Son of Man, opens perspectives for a Christian view of the cosmos. The "age to come" is centered in heaven where the glorified Christ is enthroned. This "age to come" which broke into history does not mean that time ends or is destroyed, but that time is renewed. The "age to come," centered in heaven but present in Christ's people on earth, is dated and temporal. The stress on heaven in the New Testament underlies this fact. Time will not cease at the judgment day any more than it ceased at the first coming of Christ. The "age to come" has begun with the incarnation and resurrection of Christ, its center has shifted to heaven through the ascension, and its center again will shift to earth at the return to earth by our Lord. The center of the creation is where Christ dwells in his human nature, now in heaven, then on the new earth. The new age, the age to come, is ushered into full perfection at the judgment, with the resurrection from the dead of the new humanity, the purification and renewal of this earth.²⁶

It is from this heavenly, temporal center that life in this fallen age is directed and driven by the Word of the Redeemer. This earth is now His earth, His kingdom. His servants reign as suffering, persecuted, sojourning kings only waiting for the final redemption of their bodies and the new earth "where there will be no Canaanites in the land." Both ages are temporal, subject to the created ordinance of time. When one

26. The Lutheran theologians of the 17th and 18th centuries taught the annihilation of this earth and the creation out of nothing of the new earth. All apocalyptic figures which might seem to suggest the total destruction of this earth are countered by figures which suggest the opposite. The Reformed view rightly stresses the continuity and identity of this earth with the new earth as well as the continuity and identity of the buried and raised body. See Berkouwer, De Wederkomst van Christus, I.

dies and is with Christ, he does not therefore go into eternity and out of time as Dooyeweerd seems to think.

This whole stress on the importance of a proper understanding of the relation of heaven and earth, and their interrelation and the various phases, stages which they undergo in the history of the creation which is common to both, make it clear that heaven may never be conceived of as above time, supra-temporal, or eternal as Dooyeweerd does. The unity of the age to come in its two phases (between resurrection and the judgment day and from judgment day on the new earth onward), shows that time and history can never be said to cease at the judgment day. It is Dooyeweerd's loss of perspective on these two scores which distorts his philosophic vision.

Cosmic time can therefore no longer be conceived of as a prism since this presupposes that there is something created above the prism which is not temporal and which is expressed, refracted, and manifested through the prism. There can be nothing above time except the eternal God. All creation is temporal, and all the temporal is created. This means that cosmic time does not have breaking points which also for Dooyeweerd give rise to the diverse modal law spheres and modal functions. Time can no longer be conceived of as a law of refraction (brekingswet) for temporal diversity of functional aspects, all of which are functions of the supra-temporal created fullness of meaning which Dooyeweerd insists cannot be given in cosmic time. Cosmic time on its law side cannot be conceived to be an order of before and after of modal aspects containing breaking points through whose order the aspects come to successive temporal realization. Cosmic time cannot, as breaking law, be the reason for the diversity of functional aspects and also the reason

for the coherence of these functional aspects. In contrast to cosmic time as a law of refraction for the diversity of functional aspects of time, the diversity of laws must be seen to be the direct result of God's command. Vollenhoven, when speaking of three kinds of law, speaks of all these kinds of laws as command (bevel). He is recorded as distinguishing "drieërlei wet en de correlatie van drieërlei subjectiviteit. Drieërlei subject-zijn (1) onstaansbevel; modaal en structureel; dus een zijnsgebod; subject-zijn; raakt alles, i.e., alle schepsel. (2) liefdesbevel; alleen de mens, cf. het hart, subject eraan. (3) positieve bevel; alleen de mens, ook bij wetgeving betrokken hier dus de correlatie wet-subject zijn."²⁷ Diversity of structural laws and modal orderings are no longer to be seen as the result of the refraction of the religious root unity of law into a diversity of structural (in Dooyeweerd's terms, typical, individual laws) and modal laws. These, rather, are diverse commands of God.²⁸ The unity of the law is fulfilled within the temporal and is no longer to be thought of as above or beyond the temporal. The unity of the law is temporal in the sense that it holds for, and relates to, and is in correlation with the created tem-

27. Vollenhoven, "College systematiek - het probleem van de tijd," p. 1.

28. The work of Meredith Kline is as a whole a striking confirmation of the work of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd as philosophers. Kline's idea of law covenant, the importance of the covenant structure of the creation, the importance of the kingdom as creation, a covenant administration of law sovereignty imposed by a suzerain on a vassal creation finds its cosmological, philosophical, and anthropological outworkings in the philosophy of the W.d.W. The distinction of subject and law and Kline's work dovetail in lovely harmony. It is a confirmation of the Scriptural ground-motive of Word-revelation in the work of a Reformed theologian and in the work of Reformed philosophers without any dependence upon each other. Kline's work above all other theologians, that of Berkouwer and Ridderbos included, holds the most potential for Calvinistic philosophy. Kline's views can only have full significance in the outworking of Calvinistic philosophy. See Treaty of the Great King and By Oath Consigned.

poral heaven and earth and all subjects who are subjected to it. It is supra-temporal as it is thought of in relation to the law-giver, the sovereign, eternal God. This can also be said of structural law and modal orderings. They are temporal and supra-temporal in the same sense as the law of love. The unity of the law is a unity within the diversity of modal and structural laws. They all have a temporal and a supra-temporal side. The source of the diversity of the law, as well as the unity of the law, is the direct speaking of God. Therefore, the law of refraction of cosmic time cannot be viewed as being employed by God to bring into existence the diversity of law nor the functions subjected to these diverse laws. In this sense cosmic time cannot be thought to be a modal or cosmic order of time which gives rise to this diversity.²⁹

For this reason the pointing character of created reality as meaning must be modified. It can no longer be seen to point in a transcendental direction to a created supra-temporal root unity, fullness, totality of meaning on either law or subject side which is above time and eternal. Religion as a supra-temporal sphere of occurrence cannot be the central sphere from which temporal diversity of functions and structures are directed. There can no longer be a transcendental direction of time since time as a created ordinance is immediately related to the speaking of God.³⁰

29. Vollenhoven, op. cit., p. 6.

30. How the transcendental direction must be construed on our basis is not easily seen. The order of time is to be mostly seen in interregnal relations and in things. All creatures are related by subject and object relations and kingdom relations and this interrelatedness of all creatures is always related directly to the creature. It is not via a time order of modal aspects. God always cares for the creatures he has made and they all immediately

The anticipations in the law spheres do not open up in the anticipatory direction of time towards a consummation of meaning which is supra-temporal, but, rather, are directed horizontally according to the eternally, universally binding ordinance of cosmic time. All of creation is insufficient³¹ and relates immediately to God as its Creator. Its meaning character is its createdness. Its dependence is seen in its coming into existence through God's creative Word. All of created reality reaches out to God in dependence on him for its sustenance, direction, and maintenance. Meaning should perhaps not be thought of as ontically structural pointing out or to (uitwijzen), a pointing out of itself beyond itself.³² That created reality reaches out to God presupposes its created sufficiency, its being created good by God. Since it was very good by virtue of creation it lacks nothing which it should have as created, but its very nature as created means that it reaches to God for what it needs as created. Vollenhoven remarks in the words of Scripture, "All things have life and expect their food from Thee." Created reality is temporal and its created character is meaning. It expects, it waits on its faithful Creator and Redeemer for what it needs as created. This point is of great importance for reconstruction.

expect their food and substance from him. This expectation expresses the dependent mode of the created and the relation to God, or what Dooyeweerd calls the transcendental direction. The concentric character of this relation of all the created directly to God is never in abstraction from man for he is the only creature with a heart and the law of love is only given to him. But this law of love is realized in connection with all other kingdoms. There is no nature an sich.

31. Vollenhoven, op. cit., p. 5.

32. Ibid., p. 10. Here Vollenhoven distinguishes pointing to, out of (uitrijzen) which he speaks of as being Aristotelian, from transcending as reaching out (uitrijken). This reaching out is done by all creatures and certainly therefore by man who he speaks of as reaching out to the throne of God through prayer and who is heard by virtue of God's grace.

Our previous remarks have related to cosmic time and to law, and now it remains to show synoptically how both these in turn relate to religion and to the idea of transcendence.

As we have said before, man is a creature with a heart. The heart in man is what gives direction to man either toward God or away from God. It is either good or evil. The distinctions of good and evil are centrally religious distinctions and cannot be said to be moral or ethical since the moral or ethical aspect is only one aspect of man's religious service toward God, his neighbor, and himself. The unity of the law, the central law of love and service to God and neighbor, as well as love for oneself, is addressed to the heart of man. This service of love by man is expressed variously in his different offices and in his acts which are qualified by diverse structural law spheres. In all his differently qualified acts in which all his various functions are present but in which one or another predominates, man is living out of the central command of love and service given to his heart. Since all functions are directed by the heart of man and are expressions of his heart, the law of love is a command given to the whole man in his unity as man. There are diverse norms for the differing expressions of this central unifying command of love. Man in his heart is pre-functional,³³ undifferentiated, and pre-differentiated. He possesses a common human pre-functional office. This office brings with it a central task which can be said to be that man becomes a man coram Deo. His created human nature³⁴ must develop toward the fullness of manhood. This central religious

33. Ibid., p. 12.

34. This human nature is unloseable by virtue of creation and even in hell man is man.

office with its three sides is expressed in all man's various offices.³⁵ These are qualified offices, i. e., they have a predominant law sphere and modal function which guarantees their specialty. As history differentiates, and more and more spheres of society and life of the creation are realized and revealed, man acquires more and more qualified offices. The central religious, pre-functional office of being a man before the face of God is never dissolved in the diversity and speciality of his manifold offices. These offices are governed by the diverse commands of God, each having its own task, terrain, or zone, and each its delegated authority and competence from God.³⁶ In all his diverse tasks, man responsibly, obediently carries out in diverse ways the central unity of the law, the law of love and service to God, self, and neighbor.

Man is placed by God in a privileged relation to God first of all since God makes him in His image and likeness and takes special interest in the creating of man. Man is the only earthly creature with a heart, and this means that God created man for fellowship and partnership communion with Himself. Immediately after God had created man He spoke to man. Man became a Word-receiver. Man was expected to give an obedient answer to this Word of God spoken to him. Man is, therefore, first of all a listening being and not a seeing being as the theo-ontological tradition has claimed; nor is man therefore a questioning being as Martin

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35. Popma, "Eenheid en pluriformiteit van ons belijden," Phil. Ref. XVI (1951), pp. 178-189; XVII (1952), pp. 1-15. This is an extremely suggestive article of Popma. It deals with religion, differentiation, confession, and the unity within the diversity of man's office.
36. See K. Sietsma, De Ambtsgedachte (Amsterdam: S. J. P. Bakker, n.d.), and P. Schrottenboer, "Man in God's World," International Reformed Bulletin, X (Oct. 1967), pp. 11-29.

Heidegger has claimed.³⁷ Because man was created to be a Word-receiver and to be in fellowship with God, he was also created a re-sponsible and answering being.³⁸ In listening to the Word of God with his whole heart, man is given central religious knowledge. He is to answer the command of love given to his heart by the Father with the love and service of his whole heart. In listening to God and answering God in his center or heart, man receives central religious knowledge of himself. God in Paradise revealed to our covenant head, Adam, who he was, what he was to do, how he was created, the creation of the world, all of which he would not have known had not God spoken to him. This knowledge achieved through the speaking of God to man directly enabled man to know himself as created, to know his position relative to the rest of the created, and his central task. Man is given a central directive for historical development, as well as a goal, symbolized in the Tree of Life and in the Sabbath ordinance. To Adam was also revealed a pattern for activity and rest and with it the command to worship God, in a confessional cultic sense.

It must be said that man, by his being created to be a Word receiver, is enabled to have trans-cosmic knowledge.³⁹ He knows about the beginning of the world, he sees where he is to go, he has a goal set for him and a direction given him. Through Word-revelation his knowledge spans the cosmic horizon. He knows himself to be in a central relation to his Creator and Sovereign and knows also his other relations through knowing

37. For this emphasis on man being a Word-receiver and a listening but not a seeing being as the theo-ontological tradition says, or a question being à la Heidegger, see Popma, Levensbeschouwing, passim.

38. See A. Troost, "Verantwoordelijkheid," Mededelingen van de Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte (Maart 1967), pp. 1-5; (Sept. 1967), pp. 3-7.

39. Popma, "College inleiding - drie structuurmomenten," (no. 19, "Waarheid en religie") in which he deals with the trans-cosmic.

this central relation likewise. He sees through this central relation his proper position in respect to the kingdom of things, plants, animals, and also to his fellow man. Thus he gains self-knowledge. This self-knowledge is central, religious, undifferentiated, and pre-functional. It directs, inspires, and expresses itself in all of his qualified offices, tasks, functions, and acts. Through Word-revelation from God, man acquires self-knowledge, consciousness of cosmic time, and the knowledge that creation is subjected to Divine law or Divine command.

Word-revelation, especially after the fall, has the central intention of putting man back into his right place. The Word of God is a central re-directing power. The question of God to Adam and Eve, "Where art thou?" involves more than only a question as to "What tree are you hiding behind?" which might be involved, but it also has reference to the fact that man has lost his place as representative, his place coram Deo. When man is standing in the right place, he is coram Deo before the face of God, and this involves being rightly in the other proper, centrally religious relationships, that of the relationship to himself, to his fellow man, and to the world of which he is the crown. Since Calvin's emphasis in his Institutes on the correlativity of knowledge of God and self-knowledge, the relation of man's knowledge of the world as being immediately related to those two central knowledges, has not been emphasized. It should be stressed that man, put in his proper place by the redirecting, replacing Word of God gains knowledge of the world and of its lawfulness.⁴⁰

This brings us to a very important emphasis of Dooyeweerd and the

40. Pojma, Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte, pp. 7-15.

school of Calvinistic philosophy as a whole. It concerns their view of revelation. Over against all forms of biblicism a constant stress is laid upon the importance of creational revelation. The correlativity of Word-revelation and creational revelation has been emphasized from the beginning, especially against nature-grace thinking. From the early years there was a clear emphasis on the interrelation of deed revelation and Word-revelation and their correlativity. The whole stress on the cosmic character of God's ordinances and their revelatory character symbolized in the title Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (The Philosophy of the Law-idea) shows this stress. Only through Christ as the re-creating Word is a true knowledge of the creation structure possible. Word-revelation before the fall of man made it possible for man to understand the creational revelation, and Word-revelation has no meaning apart from creational revelation.⁴¹ Man sees the unity of the law through the central command of love given to him. He knows himself as the one identified and spoken to by God and is given unity of direction and consciousness towards his Sovereign. This knowledge that man receives through the Word of God is central religious knowledge and directs all man's qualified offices, relations, acts, and tasks as their foundation and presupposition. Through this revelation man knows himself to be different from the lower kingdoms with which he has his createdness in common. He knows that all creation, including himself, is governed and ordered by God as the law-giver who commands the different laws or ways for their existence. He sees that the obedience of each is governed by the command for its own existence and sees the faithfulness of God to

41. Mekkes, Scheppingsopenbaring en Wijsbegeerte (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1961), and Teken en Motief der Creatuur (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1965).

his commands and laws.

This knowledge of man changes and grows with further revelation and fellowship with God, and in all respects this knowledge is temporal. In a certain respect man can be said to transcend his present moment, or stage, and his life history is his knowledge of the future and his knowledge of the beginning of things. The reach of his knowledge is trans or across the cosmos. It reaches beyond himself toward past and future. He sees himself as created, which means he transcends or stands above the animal, plant kingdoms and the kingdom of things which do not know this in the same sense as man. Adam knew himself as head and representative of his posterity and also as individual member of the human race,⁴² with relations to these other members (e.g., his wife).

The Word of God addresses man in the language of ordinary experience, God reveals himself to man in the form and language of man who is his likeness and image. In revelation God comes into cosmic time, to man where he is, into the created world nearby man.⁴³ In his revelation to man God remains the sovereign, eternal, transcendent Creator and law-giver of heaven and earth. Through Word-revelation God discloses who he is. Word-revelation reveals God as man's eternal creator and sovereign law-giver, as well as man's friend and partner.

Man responds to God by thanking God, praying to God, worshipping God, and obeying God's commands. Man reaches out to God's throne beyond the creator. He seeks God's presence, he calls to God for help. In man's response, man reaches out to God beyond the cosmos. This can be called a

42. P. Fairbairn, The Typology of Scripture, pp. 197-207.

43. Појма, Levensbeschouwing, VII (index), under nabijheid van God, nabijheid van Christus, and nabijheid van Gods Woord. The "nearby-ness" of God is the condition for Christian philosophy and theology.

transcending, a religious transcending. Through these acts man directs himself to God, he concentrates himself on God, he unifies himself.

In the keeping of the Sabbath rest and the divine creation and rest pattern set for him, man on the Sabbath gains distance from his work and oversight concerning his own history. This day of rest gives man a certain transcendence or standing above his historical, genetical, and cultural tasks. He sees himself as master over his time and work. On the Sabbath, uniquely, he concentrates his time and work to God as a priest and through this consecration gains knowledge of himself as man before God's face.

In none of the senses mentioned above is man supra-temporal (boven-tijdelijk) or supra-creaturely. These designations must be considered as unnecessary, although in some sense justified. Man in his reaching out to God in response to God's Word to him, in his-calling upon God and seeking his uncreated throne, in his knowledge of the unity of the law, the scope and direction (backwards and forwards) of time and the genesis of the cosmos, in some sense has trans-cosmic perspective and knowledge. In all these senses, and in a few others not yet specified, man can be said to possess a religious transcendence. What does he transcend? In his knowledge of the creation of the world, and the creation of himself, and in his knowledge of himself as distinguished from the other non-human kingdoms in their natures and createdness, and the steadfastness or reliability (vastheid) of the creational plan, etc., he stands above himself as limited to his present existence. He sees beyond where he is in his own life history toward the future and in this sense transcends any limitedness of his knowledge to the smaller horizons of his immediate life in the present stage of his history. Through Word-revelation his

vistas are opened and his horizons expanded further than animals, plants, and fallen man, who has become truncated (cut off) from Word-revelation.

Through God's coming nigh to him in Word-revelation in time, where he is, through God's speaking to him in all his functions but especially to his heart in temporal language, man is enabled to know in created, temporal language about God, who is not created, about the origin of the world, of which he could not have known without revelation, about himself, which he could not have known without revelation, and, in the case of Adam, about the meaning, significance, and beginning of woman, his wife. This knowledge is temporal knowledge, it changes and grows, but it is also central, all directive and unifying knowledge. Popma especially has stressed man's transcendence through Word-revelation and man as being a word-receiver. He has also stressed that man in religion escapes (ontsnapt) cosmic time and his history and even gets distance from himself as created. This happens in virtue of man's created eternity. He is in closer agreement to Dooyeweerd than, for instance, Vollenhoven or Zuidema, despite the fact that he has brought critique of Dooyeweerd's notion of supra-temporality (beventijdelijkheid). Popma's views are very complex on these points and cannot be dealt with in greater detail. However, his constructions on some of these points must be modified. The trans-cosmic knowledge which man receives through being a word-receiver, which enables him to have a certain transcendence and distance with respect to time, history, and even creation, and which must be called religious transcendence, because of its central, unifying, and undifferentiated character, must be described as a transcendence of time, history, and creator within time, history, and creation. As Zuidema once described

it, a transcendence in immanence or in time.⁴⁴ No part, aspect, dimension, or point in man is ontically above time. Consequently, any structuration of man into supra-temporal soul or heart with a temporal function mantle must be rejected. The stress in revelation is God's coming to man in time, in history, his coming into the creation to fellowship and direct man and to disclose himself to man. This Word-revelation makes a history for itself. God reveals himself gradually, step by step. We see this gradual revelation in Biblical Theology in the idea of the history or revelation.⁴⁵ God's Word-revelation, in which he is nearby man, does not go under in its temporal, historical forms and embodiment.⁴⁶ It transcends the cosmos and is supra-temporal because he is the Lord of time,⁴⁷ the eternal creator, and sovereign law giver. The contact is made with man in cosmic time, in history, and in the creation. This comes out strongly in the biblical significance of the "Word made flesh." Therefore the biblical picture militates against a construction which pictures man in a central sphere of religion to which the central power of the Word-revelation is directed in distinction from the temporal embodiment and entering of this Word-revelation into the time horizon where it also then is directed to man's functional bodily life. Dooyeweerd pictures it this way consistently. He has stressed increasingly that these two sides of Word-revelation can never be thought of as separated from each other and that they are in strict correlation, but it

44. Zuidema, in a personal conversation in Amsterdam, described transcendence in this fashion.

45. Popma, De Vrijheid der Exegese, pp.5-61. Here is a good defense of paradise history and prolegomena for theology.

46. Zuidema, De Christus der Schriften en Oecumensiche Theologie (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1965), pp. 11-66.

47. For the idea of Christ as Lord of time see Popma, Nadenken Over de Tijd, pp. 207-211.

does not seem to be a satisfactory representation of this state of affairs. One can detect a note of aggravation in Dooyeweerd's reply to objectors who suggest that he does not do justice to the entrance of Word-revelation into the time horizon.⁴⁸ It does not seem that Dooyeweerd has distanced himself sufficiently from modern theology which employs a geschichte-historie, two-realm theory. There is some effort on Dooyeweerd's part to set himself off from modern theology, nevertheless, it would seem that he has not represented man's transcendence and his contact with Word-revelation satisfactorily.

Word-revelation, which comes into time and history, but yet is supra-temporal because it is the revelation of God, enables man to have a certain distance to time, history, and even creation. This does not mean that man has to get out of time to see cosmic time as a totality, or to get out of history to see history as a totality, or to get out of creation to see creation as a totality, but rather he remains within the time horizon. Word-revelation opens man's horizon because it reveals the meaning, unity, and structure of the whole creation. It does this in the language of naive experience and, therefore, in temporal terms. Man's believing reflection gains trans-temporal, trans-historical, trans-creational scope. But this is still in temporal terms and therefore man's transcendence is a temporal, changing, and developing transcendence. It is a standing away, above, and at a distance, but it is still with time. This is an ex-sistere, a standing-out-of, as Dooyeweerd would say it, a distance-taking; but it comes through man's listening with his whole heart to God's speaking in time about the unity, direction, full-

48. See p. 225, footnote 183, of this dissertation.

ness and significance of creation, history, and cosmic time. It is an ex-sistere, a standing-out-of time, in time. Time, which man stands back from, away from, and at a distance from, is time in its successive, on-going horizontal direction.

Man is at one place, so to speak, on a time line. He must see where the line has come from and started from, and he must orientate himself towards future points on the line. As a whole, man is in the horizontal on-going movement of time. Word-revelation comes into this horizontal on-going movement of time and shows him from where the line has come, to where it is proceeding. This gives man perspective about his present stage and point on the line. It is in this sense that he transcends. He knows more than where he is; he sees back and forward and beyond or above time, creation, and history. He is at all times carried forth in a horizontal linear direction by the "dynamic" of the creation. It was God's coming to him and not his standing out of time which enables him to view his present stage in time and history. This central knowledge, which comes through Word-revelation, is a central, temporal, religious knowledge. It does not mean that he stands above time in the sense of being limited to his present, in a trans-cosmic time or in a central religious time.⁴⁹ His being an overseer of time and his orientation in time is made possible through God's revelation to him while he is moving along in cosmic time, made possible because of what it tells man, because of what it informs man. Man's heart is not out of time, his selfhood is not beyond time, but it is directed within time. This is almost impossible to formulate because it is a boundary question (grenz-vraag).

49. Not as Spier says in his book, Tijd en Eeuwigheid, p. 147, a religious time.

In another sense, the sense in which we think of when man responds to God through prayer, man can also be said to transcend. Man's listening to God's Word in Scripture is often pictured in terms of God standing along side of, right next to man, as walking and talking with man. In contrast to this, man's crying out, his praying, is represented as God being at a distance, and prayer is then a reaching out to God in heaven or beyond heaven even, a calling out to his throne for his help. God comes to man's aid, to his side in time from a distance. Man's reaching out beyond time, beyond creation, does not mean that man is out of time but that God is the creator of time and is not, therefore, subject to it. When God hears and contact is made, man has made contact with the eternal God of heaven and earth, but the relationship is always between man wholly under and in time and God the eternal creator of time. Man has found his eternal resting point, the listening God, but the fact of this relationship does not mean that man goes up in the relationship or is reduced to the relation. The two beings are related. The relation brings knowledge to man, but man in no way has left time nor does the fact that he transcends in this relationship by virtue of his creation, Word-revelation, or prayer, mean that he, in his center or heart, is not subject to time. Because time, creation, and history are understood through this relation to the eternal God it can be said that man transcends certain limitations of history and time which hold for him in the horizontal direction. These limitations are due to the fact that cosmic time is an order for the successive unfolding, becoming, and genetic process of the creation as a totality. Through Word-revelation and prayer man has an orientation point to direct himself while he moves along in this process. He can oversee the process and the totality while moving

along with it and being completely within it. In the fact that only man of all the earthly creation has this unique relationship, especially in contrast to the other kingdoms of the earthly creation, is his transcendence above these others. He can know where he is, where he has come from, where he is going because of his covenant, religious relation to God through God's revelation to him. It is according to man's created nature that he is and should be in this relationship. This is the central law of his being: that he is related to God through covenant, by being a word-receiver. This central law of religion enables him to transcend the limitations he is under by virtue of his subjection to cosmic time. In this religious relation man gains knowledge of the nature of cosmic time as a divine creational ordinance which is binding on him everlastingly. In his religion man has power over time, he understands time, and he has consciousness of time. Through this relationship he can direct the developing world over which he has been given dominion. Man stands above time only in his knowledge of cosmic time and of creation while he is completely subject to the on-going succession of cosmic time as an order and eternal ordinance for his everlasting life and development as a created being.

Dooyeweerd, in speaking of the concentration point, is not thinking of the individual human heart, but is thinking of a new human race, or mankind, as participating in its new root, Jesus Christ, according to his human nature, in perfect subjection to the central law of love. The concentration point is supra-individual. The ground-motives drive mankind as a central community of individuals. This idea of a centrally religious root community, which is called the body of Christ and is characterized as supra-temporal, is very important for Dooyeweerd's view

of temporal societal structures. All societal relations are expressions and revelations of his unified, undifferentiated, pre-functional religious root community in its new head, Christ. It was stressed earlier that man's heart is pre-functional but in time, so also must this religious, central, pre-functional, undifferentiated mankind be wholly temporal. Cosmic time is not to be thought of as that which gives rise to the rich diversity of societal structures. Time can no longer be a refraction or breaking law bringing the rich diversity of societal relations, but this rich diversity is due to the rich diversity of laws. In cosmic time, mankind, in Christ, is subject to the central law of love, the unity of the law as well as the rich diversity of laws governing its rich possibilities of typical and functional expression. In time mankind is born undifferentiated and differentiated, a pre-functional, central root community and a functionally expressed and diversified community. Cosmic time does not diversify this root community because it is not a refraction or breaking law. Cosmic time must be described in a theoretical idea as an order of cosmic or creational unfolding and becoming which governs succession, change, and duration. It is not an order of before and after of modal aspects. The modal order is an order of complexity of law spheres. The order is not an order of time.

Cosmic time is to be found in all the law aspects and is manifested in each aspect differently. It is mostly seen in relation to changing things and kingdoms. There are three orders: the temporal, the modal, and the individual. Time does not modalize itself in the various functional aspects as in Dooyeweerd's idea of time. The law side of the modal function is an ordering which is constant and governs the modal functioning which is subjected to the modal order or ordering on the law

side. Time is manifested in the functions which are always embedded in concrete things, events, and acts. Functioning is characterized by duration and change because they are functions of concrete things, events, acts, and societal structures. Duration and change in concrete things, events, acts, etc., are expressed differently in the various functions which are bound together in these concrete things, events, etc. Cosmic time is an ordinance, it is a law-command of God. It holds everlastingly for the whole of the creation. As a law-command it is an ordering of succession. As a law-command it is supra-temporal because it relates directly to God, but as a command relating to creation it governs all succession in the cosmos. It is the law which governs cosmic genesis, becoming, and unfolding. As a law of succession, time is not only temporal, but it orders and governs the temporal. By the temporal we mean changing things, events, acts, which have duration and which develop, unfold, and become according to a law of cosmic succession. The modal aspects, if one uses the term "aspect" as Dooyeweerd often does to include law and subject side, are not to be thought of as aspects of time. They are not, as Dooyeweerd says, intrinsically temporal, that is, temporal functions of the religious supra-temporal fullness. Dooyeweerd, as we have already noted, uses the term "function" to designate the whole aspect on both law and subject sides as well as using the term in a narrower sense when applied to the subject side. The modal orderings, that is, the modal laws, govern the particular natures of the functions subjected to them. They are holding or governing orderings for the functional structures which are realized in concrete things, events, acts, and societal structures. As natural and norm, modal orderings, they are not as such through and through temporal. They can be only said to be

temporal in the sense that they are realized in concrete things, events, etc. They are constant, a priori, structural orderings,⁵⁰ which also, as all laws, are supra-temporal as well as temporal. They are supra-temporal because they relate directly to the law giving and creative speaking of God. The relation of the modal ordering or laws to one another is not itself a temporal order of before and after of succession and simultaneity. It is simply an order of complexity of differing orderings which govern the basic "hows" or "ways of functioning" in the cosmos. Because it is not an order of time it does not follow that it is a logical order as one might suppose. It is one of the conditions which makes logical order possible so that the order of complexity of modal laws is neither of temporal nor of logical character. It is simply the result of God's law ordering, and the diversity and relative positioning results directly from his commands. God must not be thought of as speaking or "putting" the modal laws to the cosmos one by one from less complex to more complex. Nor must we think of God arranging them in a logical order. The relation between the modal laws is best approximated as a direct result of his "putting" or law giving. He spoke and it was, and it was the way it is, and where it is, and how it is. As law it limits, places boundaries, grips reality, and holds it subject. God's law giving, his speaking, his putting or placing of the law to the cosmos accounts for the diversity of law as well as the unity of law. Typical structural laws of individual things, events, societal structures, and acts govern their different natures. Typical structural laws like the law of love and the modal laws are both temporal and supra-temporal

50. Pojma, Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte, p. 11.

in the same sense as outlined above for modal laws which govern the natural and normative functions of the cosmos. All positivization and the resultant positive law is strictly temporal since it is dependent on human formative activity.

Cosmic time as an order of cosmic succession cannot have its foundation in one of the modal aspects itself as van Riessen has proposed.⁵¹ Over against van Riessen one feels that Dooyeweerd is correct when he says that all modal functioning presupposes cosmic time as an order of succession. But cosmic time is not an order of succession of modal aspects because this notion, it would seem, is the result of abstracting the modal functions from their realization in concrete things and then treating these modal functions as if they were related in a temporal functional time sequence or order. Dooyeweerd, according to Vollenhoven, by speaking of specific modal time orders and functional expressions and then relating each of these in an over-arching time order of modal time orders in which the over-arching time order is said to express itself, is treating modal orders and modal functions as things.⁵² The whole reconstruction given here is an attempt to thread the needle between Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven, and Popma on these points. One has to definitely reject the idea that cosmic time is a prism because this carries within it two time orders, and Dooyeweerd's nature-grace construction. On the other hand, one can feel quite certain that time, as Vollenhoven speaks of it, is mostly associated with changing things and events, and

51. Van Riessen, Op Wijsgerige Wegen, pp. 82-83.

52. Vollenhoven, "College systematiek - het probleem van de tijd," pp. 2-4, 7, 13.

therefore with kingdoms. It is quite possible, as Vollenhoven suggests, that the first few modal law spheres are not temporal except as they are in changing things. At the same time, one must conceive that cosmic time is an ordinance, a law, which governs the whole of the creation, as Popma has emphasized, so that there is never creation without time and no time without creation. As Okke Jager has expressed it, time and creation are corollaries of one another and they are unthinkable without one another. Over against Vollenhoven one feels that Dooyeweerd's analysis of certain states of affairs concerning specific modal expressions of time accounts very well for these states of affairs. In Popma's recent work, Nadenken Over de Tijd, it has become evident that one cannot dispose of the idea that time has different modal functional expressions. Vollenhoven does not deny that time is present in the functions since functions are always present in things, and things change, but he has not developed fully, as yet, how he conceives this in respect to modal functions. To be added to these various emphases, is Vollenhoven's and Popma's emphasis on the wide scope of time. Time holds as ordinance for all periods of cosmic genesis and becoming of which history in its modal significance is only an aspect. This wide scope of cosmic time means that all creatures, angels, demons, and all realms visible and invisible, are subject to this ordinance. It also clearly means that time is in effect before man is created in the angelic world and in the genesis of the other earthly non-human kingdoms. It means that time as an ordinance will govern the re-created or renewed creation after the judgment day, as well as before, and that to say that time ceases is tantamount to saying that creation ceases.

It is impossible to combine these various emphases into one coherent vision or one leading idea, not only because time is undefinable and a supreme mystery, but because it involves having an answer to almost all the pressing problems at once. To summarize, it can be said, as Popma says, that there are three orders: the temporal, modal, and individual. The modal order is not itself intrinsically temporal and the result of refraction of an undifferentiated fullness and totality of law and subject, as Dooyeweerd contends. Cosmic time is an order and ordinance and also an order of cosmic succession. When we say succession, it is not a particular kind of succession that we have in mind, e.g., mathematical, geometric, logical. Succession, however, is found in all modal aspects only in their functional subject side as that is individualized and present in concrete things. This tends to account for Vollenhoven's stress that time can best be approximated in connection with change and in changing things and is first found in the physical, since all things are qualified by the physical aspect. On the law side of modal aspects we should not think of modal structural ordering as temporal orderings. In other words, law and time are not identical. With this Dooyeweerd agrees when he says that the central law of love is supra-temporal and eternal. But all law except positive law is supra-temporal and not just the central law of love, as Dooyeweerd insists. On the other hand, all law relates to that which is subjected to it. All that is subjected to the law is temporal and in this sense all law is also temporal, in that it is always related to, correlated with, holds for, grips upon, and is realized in things, events, acts, societal structures, and creatures which are governed by it. It is not, as Dooyeweerd says, that only the law of love is non-temporal. Popma says that dif-

ferent kinds of law ordering moments, time, modal, the individual, and these are all interrelated and always found together. The modal and typical laws are not, as orderings on the law side, temporal. Therefore the relations between the law spheres need not be a temporal order of before and after of succession of modal aspects. Dooyeweerd is somewhat ambiguous on his idea of constancy, since constancy is temporal. By this is meant that structures make their appearance as concrete things, become, and evolve, since they are only realized in concrete things and since they form the constant frameworks within which changing things come and go, rise and perish. But for Dooyeweerd these constant structures unfold and make their appearance according to the historical norm of periodization and according to the cosmic temporal order of before and after of modal aspects as the anticipatory moments in the higher law spheres are opened in the transcendental direction of time. Structures, as frameworks in which changing things take place, appear when it is their time and stop when their time of being constant framework is over. For Dooyeweerd structures which hold for a less differentiated stage of opening are annulled in a higher stage of differentiation or especially when they are consummated in the eternal supra-temporal kingdom. In this consummation all temporal differentiations are lost because they are concentrated. For Dooyeweerd, time ceases, and this shows that constancy is at least a very ambiguous term for him. Constancy means holding as a structural framework for changing things and events for a while or for a time and this, it would seem, is tied up with the fact that for him cosmic time is itself for a time.

In any construction the problem involved here is not easy to solve or to formulate. The time order is evident in kingdoms of things, plants,

animals, etc. One kingdom must come before the other kingdom. Kingdoms have object functions which show their relations to other kingdoms. The modalities on the law side do not change or come into effect when they appear in their realization in things. Differentiation will never explain the differences in kingdoms. Differentiation, change, and individual differences are realized successively in history within kingdoms. The modal orderings are constant and universal and under these supra-temporal and therefore constant and universal orderings, individualization successively realizes itself. Dooyeweerd brings time and modal law together in such a way that it makes it difficult to understand how he can solve the universal-individual problem without making the temporal individuality structure the universal and the concrete thing the individual. It could be that we are involved here with a partial universalism of the higher-lower variety as found in the late Aristotle. Instead of individuality structures one should speak of "structurations," conditioning complexes of laws which make individual and universal structures entwined in individual things and events possible. The individuality is closely related to the place it takes in the genetic development. One must avoid getting a separate law for each individual. The structures on the subject side are criss-crossed in individual things and events and are under constant supra-temporal structurations which are temporal insofar as they govern and condition the structures of things. The law of love and structural law relate to that which is temporal and subject to them, but time is not present in law. Since time is only present in things and the time order relates to interregal relations, to put time into the modalities is to tend to make modal functions into things.

This brings us into relation to a still deeper problem related

somewhat to what we have been discussing. Since we must reject, along with Vollenhoven and Spier and others, the notion of cosmic time order as a prismatic breaking law, since time is present everywhere in the cosmos, and since our cosmos is an ever-changing world, there is no place for a transcendent or supra-temporal heart. To speak of "the" heart as Dooyeweerd does is already an abstraction. The self is in its body and cannot be identified via consciousness with the soul as Dooyeweerd does. Soul and selfhood are abstracted from the body and set over against the body, so that Vollenhoven thinks of expressions like "I experience my body," and "I experience time" as already instances of abstraction. The self is in the body. Man is a creature with a heart and in correlation with man's heart is the law of love. The law of love relates other creatures without a heart via man's relation to these creatures. This means that man as a creature with a heart is completely in time, temporal, and subject to the ordinance of time. Man's heart is pre-functional; it directs, gives direction to the functions toward or against God. The heart is the direction-giving center, the religious center of man, and it is pre-functional. The question immediately arises, what sphere does this heart act in? Is there a separate sphere in the temporal where we can speak of pre-functional acts, that is, non-qualified acts, i.e., acts not qualified by one of the modal aspects? Or can we speak of religious acts having a religious qualification? Popma has always contended for a special religious work terrain (distinguished from the specifically modal terrains. He has clearly seen that all acts of man are religious in the sense that all qualified acts, i.e., acts in which all man's functions are present but in which one of the functions has the leading or predominates, are

expressions of and inspired by and directed by the heart. Nevertheless, since he thinks that the heart of man is temporal, he wants a separate terrain or sphere for the heart and speaks constantly of religious acts, meaning acts of a religious quality or unqualified acts. In recent years he has dropped the pistical aspect to make room for these so-called religious acts and for religion in time. In general, pistically qualified acts à la Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd have become religious acts, e.g., prayer, reading the Scriptures, etc.

Dooyeweerd also maintains a sphere for religion and the heart. It is a supra-temporal, central sphere. It would appear that not all man's acts are qualified acts for Dooyeweerd, since certain acts, for example, self-reflection, are said to be religious. Dooyeweerd speaks of religious self-reflection and also of listening to the Word of God in a central religious sense which goes in advance of faithful listening to the Scriptures, and controls the pistically qualified reading of the temporal Scriptures.

Spier rejected this supra-temporal sphere in Dooyeweerd along with the prism idea and speaks of the religious dimension of cosmic time. We have seen how Dooyeweerd in formulating his idea of the religious sphere as supra-temporal, rejected the designation of central trans-cosmic time. He accuses Spier of reduplicating, with his notion of central religious time, the problem he found in Dooyeweerd. Dooyeweerd feels that Spier has not gotten out of his problematics and one would tend to agree with Dooyeweerd at this point. Vollenhoven, in speaking of man's heart as pre-functional, does not view it as being in a separate sphere although man's heart is temporal. Man as a creature with a heart is present in all his acts which never take place without the body.

All man's acts are qualified acts, i.e., are qualified by one of the modal law spheres. Even self-reflection must be a qualified act. There is no act which is religious with modal qualification. Therefore there is no separate sphere for religion. The religious is the direction-giving, that which directs all man's functions in obedience or disobedience to God's central law of love. There is no supra-temporal body of Christ which is a root community of which all temporal societal structures are refractions. Time is not the principle of diversity as in Dooyeweerd. Dooyeweerd so structures the created world that the world is above the cosmos. We have seen that this is due to his neo-realism, and that it is a common feature of priority doctrine that the subject is above the cosmos. With the prism idea there can be no root unity in the temporal horizon since the modal horizon and the temporal horizon are so related that no root unity can be given in it. The universality in its own sphere tempts one to find such a unity, but there is only a rich diversity of aspects to be found under the time boundary. This construct of unity and diversity, as a root unity above diversity from which diversity proceeds, must be totally rejected. There is a diversity of modal law orderings and a central law of love which gives expression to the unity of these diverse modal laws. Man is subject to the unity and diversity of law in his heart and functions simultaneously. The unity is within the diversity and both are related to man in time with his heart and diverse bodily functions. The central law and the modal laws and norms, as well as the structurations which govern individuality, are not themselves temporal, but govern man who is completely temporal and subject in his heart and diversity of functions to these laws.

We have seen that Dooyeweerd views the diversity of laws and diversity of subjects as caused by the order of time as a law of refraction with its points of refraction in the nuclear moments which determine the two directions of time. Since we reject time as a prismatic law for cosmic diversity, we must account for the diversity of law differently than Dooyeweerd. We have seen that Dooyeweerd is very fond of the figures of light and root because both express the idea that diversity comes forth from a deeper root unity. When we try to answer the question how the central law of love relates to the different modal and typical laws we can no longer use this organistic idea. It is not as if God created the central law of love as a "concrete universal" which then differentiated into a diversity of law spheres and typical laws through the medium of time. As we have said, God speaks the central law which is the unity of all diversity of law and God also speaks or puts the "diverse orderings" or laws. The diversity does not develop out of the unity. It is to be brought into direct relation to God's law giving. In all the many diverse ways the central law is expressed and all of them are unified in the central law of love for God and neighbor. Just as God revealed the law of love to Moses, he also revealed the diverse ways and paths and orderings which service, i.e., love was to take. He did this in the covenant of the ten words which is a central law and in the various positivizations given by him to Moses during the eighty days on the mount, and also further positivized by the mediator Moses, who was not strictly a law giver.

The Word of God spoken to Adam and Eve, and the Word of God spoken at the creation of the world are one Word of God. There is not one law which diversifies itself, but God speaks many commands which bring a

rich diversity of spheres and natures into existence, and these commands structure and govern this rich diversity. There is a unity to this rich diversity of his law giving and creative speaking. God gives central commands to Adam and these central commands find their deepest unity in his command of obedience and service with the whole heart, and that obedience is expressed diversely according to God's diverse laws. The central command is one command among many commands, one law among many, but it is the central command and therefore the unity of the many speakings of God of his law giving. All law giving is covenantal. God consecrates to himself what he "puts the law to" and what he calls into existence by his Word or power as Sovereign or Suzerain. The creation is a sovereignly administered and regulated kingdom of God. The law order is commanded to things; it is sovereignly imposed as a Suzerain to a vassal. All kingdoms are consecrated to him. All kingdoms obey the sovereignly imposed laws for their natures. The idea of sphere sovereignty is simply a corollary of a law-covenant. Things have their unique natures which are due to God's diverse commands, although one must not think of a special law for each individual thing. That each has its boundaries, limits, competences, gifts from the Sovereign is expressed beautifully in Genesis 1, the Wisdom Literature (e.g., Job, Ecclesiastes 3, Psalm 104), and throughout the whole of Scripture in various ways.

The center of God's administration is found in man who is a creature having a heart. The central law is put to man's heart and it gives unity to man's life in all its expressions. Man's heart is directed to, or away from God, and through this central direction, direction is given to his diverse expressions or acts under the diversity of laws. Because of this centrality given to man in God's law administration, all other

kingdoms are affected by the direction of man's heart, for or against God. This administration of law imposed by God is an administration involving blessing and curses. God as faithful Sovereign is faithful to his commands whether man's response results in blessing or in curse. The whole of mankind in its corporate solidarity is represented in Adam as the covenant head. His own fall into sin brings with it God's faithful response of curse and condemnation. The Sovereign mercifully and mysteriously sends a second covenant head who substitutes for his people, who only by union with him pass through the covenant curses and receive the forfeited covenant blessing. In this way the second Adam fulfills the covenant kingdom administration of God's law or creation covenant. He makes it possible for man again to be in the right place in God's creation and covenantal kingdom administration. He restores and redirects man's central office back to God. Knowledge of God's law administration of creation is only possible through the mediator Christ. The redemptive grace is life giving and redirecting grace. God's grace in Christ gives man understanding concerning the creational law administration. The creational administration is a covenantal administration and it demands obedience to God's eternal command of allegiance and loyalty expressed in love with the whole heart toward God, neighbor, and self. The Mediator re-creates the cosmos by redirecting man from under the destructive power of the curse to obedient service. Without Christ the creational covenant administration is only continued in a cursed existence. God consecrates the creation to himself in curse. In Christ the curses lose their destructive power for He is the prince of life, the resurrection and the life. His Word is spirit and life. He is the way, the truth, because he kept the law obediently. He is the righteousness of God, the righteous branch. The only way back to God is the way of obedience

to the creation law administration. In his life he provides that obedience and therefore he is the way and the truth. The way of God's commandments is written in his heart and he gives this righteousness to all those who are Christ's brothers and children. This obedience means man is right with God and man. This right relation or redirection toward God means that man begins again to fear God and with that he begins to regain wisdom. This wisdom is a knowledge of God's sovereign law administration. It is standing in the truth, in the way, in the right place in God's creation and kingdom administration. It enables man to see the interrelations, the diversity of creation, the direction of the creation, to conserve and develop the creation. This wisdom is the result of the second Adam, the image and wisdom of God. There can be no natural theology because this involves not seeing the creation as covenantal, as religiously directed to the Sovereign. Because of the fall, the creational revelation can only be known by union with Him. In this sense, Christ is the concentration point. He enables the creation covenant to come to blessing fulfillment, everlasting fruitful development and consummate glory. However, on Christ's intervention as Redeemer the continued existence of creation does not depend. God carries forth the creation to covenant curse or covenant fruition. The ontic does not depend on the redemptive mediatorial work of Christ. God does not annihilate the creation even in the ultimate carrying out of his curse. He is faithful in carrying out his curses and this carries with it the certainty that God never annihilates the creation. God is perfectly free to redeem the world or to carry out the covenant curses. In either direction God is faithful to his law giving, either in curse or in blessing. In his mercy he choose not to forsake the work of his hands. In

Christ he redirects mankind back to allegiance to him and so brings the covenant administration to blessing and fruitfulness. Forsaking the work of his hands never means that creation would evaporate like a bubble. God holds the creation existence in his hand to fulfill the covenant curses as well as the covenant blessings. Life and death are directions and religious categories. Man can exist forever as dead, as directed away from God in disobedience and suffering the curses everlastingly, or he can live in everlasting, fruitful, abundant existence. All existence is under God's sovereign control and is the result of his creative speaking and law giving. To make the continued existence of the creation dependent on Christ as S. K. de Graaf does, is to fall into grace-nature. To make the continued existence of creation after the fall to be dependent on common grace as a prelude to special grace, as Kuyper does, is to fall under nature-grace. Dooyeweerd makes Christ the concentration point in a grace-nature fashion much like de Graaf, meaning that the ontic is dependent on Christ's intervention. Creation is bound to be depreciated when Christ is the concentration point in this ontic sense, that is, that existence of creation is dependent on him. Kline and Popma give healthy stress to the fact that the creation is primary, not redemption. But this primacy of the creation over redemption is the chief fruit of redemption. It is the result of redemption through the Mediator, Christ, which enables man to see and understand the faithfulness of God to his creational covenant ordinances, and that life is only through obedience to this faithful Sovereign and his laws. Christ enables the creation law order and sovereign kingdom administration to reach its Sabbath, for man to have abundant life everlasting. He enables this by redirecting and providing the power neces-

sary for this redirection in the life of fallen mankind. Therefore his life is given to many. His life is ground-motive and is redirecting power, his words are spirit and life, they give what they command, they redirect and cause man to stand up from death and to stand alive in the truth and way of God's commandments.

Re-creation is simply carrying out God's creational covenant law administration everlastingly in everlasting life as well as in everlasting death. Eternal life is not simply endless life and endless time. It is this very definitely, but it is more. It is power over time. It is obedience to God's ordinance of time in a renewed and incorruptible world in an incorruptible flesh. Time and corruptibility have to be sharply separated, otherwise to think away corruptibility is to think away time, and we have seen that to think away time is to think away the creation. Time and corruptibility are closely related in the life and history of man in his fallen history and state, but the beginning of wisdom in Christ is to distinguish them sharply. It is in general to distinguish between the creational and the lapsarian, although this is not always easily done. Sin seeks to distort all of the ordinances of the Sovereign's creation covenant law order, but it cannot succeed. All nature-grace and grace-nature thinking fails to distinguish the creational and the lapsarian, e.g., time as creational endlessly holding ordinance and corruptibility. They do not see re-creation as God carrying out the blessing of covenant by going through the curses. Re-creation provides for everlasting endless blessing and life in God's kingdom. Otherwise life and blessing would have ended and everlasting death and endless curse and condemnation would have prevailed according to God's covenantal creational ordinance of time. The center of God's creational

kingdom administration is the earth. Christ makes it possible for man and God to live on the earth together endlessly in a covenant walking and talking in the cool of the day. This was the promised horizon of the Sabbath and the tree of life of the law covenant with our first covenant head. To say that time ceases is to make God into the god of William of Occam, an arbitrary sovereign who can initiate a new world order of eternity where all the ordinances, including time, do not or perhaps would no longer apply. Any hesitation about this point is doubt about God's faithfulness to his ordinances, and is sin. Any other order, than the original creation covenant law administration which included every creature in heaven and earth, is the speculation of unbelief. Any aeuum or eternity in heaven as opposed to the earthly temporal, any eternity after judgment day which means that time will end, is nature-grace. Failure to affirm this central ground-motive of God's sovereign faithfulness to his commands and kingdom administration is tantamount to direct attack, although this is hardly intended by men. To say that we do not know what heaven is like or what the new earth is like, can be believing or disbelieving. To affirm that they will both be eternal as opposed to temporal, is to misconstrue the Christian faith. It is making grace, ontic and sin, ontic in some sense. It is making re-creation a new world order, i.e., making the new earth radically discontinuous with this earth rather than the renewed old earth. It is to make the spiritual body radically different and discontinuous with our present bodies, rather than the renewed old body. Re-creation is never creation out of nothing.

Dooyeweerd, centering the totality, unity, and fullness of meaning in the new root of the human race, makes the Christ the ontic ground of

the creation. Meaning, for Dooyeweerd, deals with creaturely existence. Creatures do not have meaning, they are meaning. His speaking of things tending to meaninglessness and nothingness is an indication of a grace-nature position. It is a carry-over from the Kuyperian supra-lapsarian attempt to get a unity between creation and redemption by taking the starting point in redemption in the Redeemer. In this way a totality and unity tendency tends to depreciate the historical and temporal reality of creation and fall, in the interest of the unity of God's plan and in the interest of his sovereignty. It is necessarily a form of theodicy. Supra-lapsarianism is grace-nature, and infra-lapsarianism is nature-grace, globally seen. Dooyeweerd does not appeal to the eternal counsel of God as Kuyper did. He has, as it were, an immanent counsel of God and this is found in the new root, Christ, the Archimedean point. Christ under the law of love is the Archimedean point, the eternal realized under the law. It is the fullness, totality, and unity and consummation. This Archimedean point can never be given in time because God's counsel is realized in time successively. All that transpires in time is refracted according to time. If one thinks of the older Reformed notion of the eternal counsel and plan of God and its temporal realization, and then looks again at Dooyeweerd, one sees a difference. In Dooyeweerd you have an eternal counsel as created totality and fullness of creation which is an immanent created eternal counsel in the transcendent Archimedean point. This created totality is realized in time the same way older Reformed theologians picture the eternal counsel as being realized in time. In Dooyeweerd you have God's eternal counsel realized in a created eternal counsel or totality of meaning in Christ, and from this the further temporal revelation of this created totality.

This view of Dooyeweerd is caused in its deepest foundation by an attempt to avoid ideas in the mind of God, as in logos speculation found in Kuyper and Bavinck, which was a neo-Platonic, middle Platonic theo-ontological speculation about God, on the one hand, and by the desire to get a totality and unity view via Kuyper's supra-lapsarian grace-nature construction, on the other.

Dooyeweerd has stressed that God is not subject to his own law, and this is true. However, it does not follow that God is not in his creation making history. He is in time and in the creation as God the creator and re-creator, and not as man the creature. Therefore, he is in the creation but not subjected to its laws. Because of this he performs wonders and miracles for his people and gets around all "road-blocks" in bringing many sons to glory. The biblical revelation of the Father in eternity and the Son of God in the creation, i.e., God nearby, the image of the invisible God, the Archimedean point in time, deliver one from the difficulties which are present in Dooyeweerd's system.

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