

CHRISTIANITY AND HUMANISM

(A Re-thinking of the Supposed Affinity
of Their Fundamental Principles)

by
H. Evan Runner

Mr. Chairman,

Members of the Board of Directors of the Christian Freedom Foundation, Distinguished
Guests,

I deem it a great honor to have been invited here to participate with you in this annual meeting of the Christian Freedom Foundation. And I was particularly pleased with the suggestion your executive secretary made that I speak to you on this occasion on the subject: Christianity and Humanism.

That is certainly a timely subject. Five years ago the United Nations General Assembly designated 1968 as the year in which it and its members would emphasize human rights, and the history of that concept of human rights is irrevocably tied up with the development of modern humanism. This year is thus the International Year for Human Rights, and what is presumably to be the highlight of the year is the three-week conference on human rights which opened in Teheran just the day before yesterday.

In our own country, we are hearing a great deal about the tension that is frequently thought to be felt between states' rights and human rights, and between existing civil rights and human rights. These are polar tensions that arise from the peculiarly humanistic way of thinking. But we live in a society that has been largely shaped by humanism and we have inherited the problems. In keeping with the international celebration and anticipated discussion, President Johnson on January 30 established the President's Commission for the Observance of Human Rights Year.

The discussion of human existence in terms of human rights has been very much in the foreground of our life since the eighteenth century Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, and in the political and socio-economic revolutions that have characterized the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Especially since the second World War the further question of the relation of humanism to Christianity, and particularly with reference to the points mentioned, has forced itself into the central focus of men's attention and interest. But for still much broader and deeper reasons than any I have yet enumerated I believe that no more important or fundamental subject could possibly engage our attention here this afternoon.

Our modern western society and civilization, which today displays everywhere, and nowhere more clearly than in our own beloved country, its terribly diseased condition, was driven and given direction in its development through the modern centuries by humanism. Today the 'drive' is gone, and a clear direction and forward movement is not discernible. Things appear to have arrived at some sort of a standstill, and men flounder helplessly about. For some time now, in the world of the theatre, of politics, and education, of the arts, the words heard most frequently are: crisis, malaise, loss of meaning, lack of direction. In just about every sphere of cultural life one can hear the question repeatedly being asked, Where do we go from here? But an answer is not forthcoming. No answer that is able to gain wide acceptance and support in action is apparently to be found. A consensus is lacking. Walter Lippmann's appeal for a return to the public philosophy seems to have come out of season. Might it be unhistorical?

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Through faith Christian men know that the world was created by the Word of God. (Hebrews 11:3) The Word of God upholds (constitutes) and directs the world. At this point we may not make the common mistake of separating 'world' and 'man'. God's creation is integral, and man is at its center. The word of God is thus also a law-word of life for man. "My son, give me thy heart." "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart." Man was created to live "before God" -- coram Deo -- by cleaving with his whole being -- "in singleness of heart" -- to every word that proceeds from the mouth of God, the Reliable One. (Psalm 119:89-96; Proverbs 8; Psalm 147; Isaiah 45:18-25) And the word of God, Isaiah tells us, is directed to the future: it accomplishes what the Lord purposes and prospers in the thing for which He sent it. (Isaiah 55:11) The word of God is thus not only a law-word, but also promise. It is the promise of shalom, the harmony and peace, the concord and blessedness of perfect obedience, perfect subjection, perfect love, the integrality, wholeness, fundamental soundness, health (salus) of all things together, a creation which, originally very good, has, in the light of man's rebellion and alienation, become a perfectly redeemed and reconciled creation. (Isaiah 11; Luke 2:14) The Old Testament 'covenant' of God with the earth and with man becomes the New Testament 'kingdom' with its more pronounced eschatological orientation.

Summing all this up, we may say: 1) that this whole integral creation of God's is dynamic, being driven steadily onward to the Culmination, and 2) that the word of God is the svamis (dynamis) or driving-power of all created reality. The word of God provides the Order for the creation, in a dual sense: the structural Order of created reality is rooted in the word of God repeatedly spoken in the first chapter of Genesis ("Let there be ..."); the marching Order for all mankind in their generations is the eschatologically directed command to seek the city which hath foundations, the kingdom of God and his righteousness, to look steadfastly for our Lord out of heaven, to look for a new heaven and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness. Man is free to give form to the world, but under the law-word of God; subjection to the Law is the a priori condition of his freedom.

Thus, man was created to rely upon, and to be directed by, the word of God for his life. When he is in fact in subjection to that word, which is the real driving-power of the creation, a state of shalom is present. When, on the other hand, by his disobedience, man alienated himself from the true and faithful God and sought to free himself from the dynamis of the word of God, all that miserable effort in no way changed the creation situation into which man had been placed. The law-word of God continued, and still today continues, to uphold, drive and direct the creation. With this created reality man simply finds himself at variance. In his heart he imagines to himself a world structured otherwise than in truth it is; he imagines himself in a world of relations that is other than the world that really is. He has been caught up in that other spiritual community at whose head is the devil, who is a liar and the father of lies. (John 8:37-47) He believes, i.e. is committed to, the Lie, and in its light, instead of by the light of the word of God, he proceeds to analyze his daily experience and to give form to his world: (All human analysis proceeds within the context of a commitment and never occurs 'pure'.)

In falling away from God, man did not sink to a lower, so-called 'natural' level of reason, simply lacking faith, lacking a God-relatedness and a relation to the word of God, as Thomism has for so long claimed. In the Scriptures, unbelief is not a lack of belief; it is a form of belief: it is misdirected belief. The worship of Moloch or of the Baalim is, structurally, belief just as much as belief in the living God. Directionally, however, it is belief which terminates upon something other than God, upon Whom alone faith was made to terminate. Man is ineradicably a believer though he may believe the Lie. Either he attaches to the word of the living God, which is indeed the dynamis of the cosmos, and is then the possessor of shalom, or within his

unbelieving heart he finds it possible to bring up a pseudo-faith in a pseudo-revelation in order to be able to assign pseudo-meaning to experience. A faith of some sort is always necessary, -- that is the important point. It is a structural necessity, in this world God created, that man commit himself to something he takes to be the dynamis, the guide to the future, the way to the abundant life and meaning, the 'Torah'. He must possess, and be possessed by, a faith in something, in order to be provided with a driving-force in his life, including his analytical life. A man has got to believe something in order to be able to go on analyzing his life and life-milieu (world).

One further thing needs to be said. When the word of God no longer has a grip on a man's heart, there is no end to the variations of imaginings that can be conjured up by the foolish heart. None of the pseudo-faiths, however, is like true faith. Like the idols, they are nothing at all. Whatever semblance of being they have derives from the creation of God itself, structured by the word of God. The Lie of Satan has to live from the Truth of God. God's word remains the only true dynamis in the creation, and a faith in something, no matter what, which is not truly the dynamis must sooner or later collapse.

The hearts of men are thus in fact possessed by more than one faith. In other words, the human race is divided in its heart, in its heart-commitment. There is, as John Courtney Murray has put it, "a plurality of incompatible faiths" in the world, and this fact undoubtedly constitutes what we may call the most fundamental problem for human society. For if there is to be a decided direction in any culture or society, some one controlling force or driving-power is a necessity. A makeshift, something like a mechanical balancing of such forces, as the Religious Peace of Augsburg of 1555 and the Peace of Utrecht or Westphalia of 1648, which latter remained the basis of European public law until the outbreak of the French Revolution and the public victory of the modern humanist mind, actually impedes the development of a civilization. After the Wars of Religion it was not until the breaking out of the revolutions therefore that western civilization again began to pick up momentum (though in an opposite direction).

Since the Renaissance, the faith of humanism has occupied the commanding position in western life and thought. In its peculiar modern form it rose quickly to this position of leadership, conquering one area of modern life after another in its limitless self-assurance.

It has never been the sole driving-force in the modern world. Roman Catholicism and, since its appearance, the Reformation movement have never been eliminated as constitutive root-forces in the historical development of the West. On the contrary, these movements remained indestructibly at work, partly in antithesis with the newly emerging view of life and the world, but in many quarters in an apparent synthesis with, or accommodation to, the skein of ideas and problems of the new humanistic faith which had now come on the scene as history-forming. As distinct from humanism, however, these movements were not in a position, as medieval Christianity had been, to set their stamp on western civilization. In the historical struggle for control of the spirit of culture, they were increasingly put on the defensive as the drama of the modern centuries unfolded. The controlling role passed to humanism.

In this way humanism became the dominant culture-forming belief of the modern centuries. As such, it has imparted both the drive and the direction throughout this period of time to the western societies and our western civilization. When we speak of modern western civilization we mean the gargantuan, multi-faceted cultural effort to give form to the creation which arose from men's being driven by the faith of this dominant humanism, an effort only slightly affected, and less and less as time went on,

by the forces of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. Christian thinkers and movements, to the extent that they set themselves in antithesis to the movement of humanism, were forced out to the periphery, or, to change the figure, into the isolated ghettos, of modern life. Unfortunately, it must also be said that for the most part, at any rate, they were found willing to purchase a bad bill of goods and accept the assignation of such a place -- 'private', it was called -- within the whole arrangement of western civilization.

Since the last decades of the nineteenth century, however, a general process of disintegration of the humanistic life-and-world-view can be observed setting in, and the movement which had carried modern civilization along finds itself since that time in a state of crisis. This crisis is a fundamental one, a crisis literally of the foundations. Prof. Sorokin's thesis about it, developed in his little volume The Crisis of Our Age, is well known. Another Russian writer (Shestov) wrote about it in a little book with a title we would translate into English as The Crisis of the Certainties. Certain developments in the world of science and philosophy of the nineteenth century have shaken the humanist's belief in his ultimate and absolute certainties, the certainties to which he had attached his faith. The result has been a collapse of humanistic faith.

This is the momentous event that has brought our cultural development to a kind of standstill. To be sure, the knowledge of the real state of affairs has not yet reached every practicing humanist. Moreover, some who are sufficiently aware of the facts of the case attempt to re-pristiniate the past simply because, not knowing where else they might turn, they reveal themselves to be humanists in spite of the facts. Yet salvation is never to be attained by turning back, on the horizontal plane, to the past. Only reconciliation with God and living in terms of His law-word will provide the human race with salvation. But such conversion to the God of life appears not to be considered a viable option. Within these circles, and they are still considerable, the old order thus extends itself. But the power of the humanist faith, which alone would enable it to carry our cultural development, has been broken in principle.

Further, the Roman Catholicism and Protestantism which had accommodated to it, as a consequence of their accommodation have nothing distinctive to say, but go on trying hard to make Christianity sound 'humane' after the humanistic model. They become increasingly irrelevant in a world where humanism shows more and more signs of being involved in irreconcilable contradictions and where anti-humanistic forces are organizing, and they are thus impotent to save us out of our predicament.

As for the more antithetical forms of Christianity, they have only recently begun to emerge from their ghetto-like existence and still find it extremely difficult to get over the defensive stance which has so consistently characterized them during the modern period. The further fact that these Christians had withdrawn themselves from the struggles of the modern world and allowed these to be dealt with by men of the humanist spirit meant that they not only often lacked a disciplining and an educating in a Christian sense relevant to man's entire cultural and societal existence, but were in the beginning of their 'return to the world' quite generally deprived of insightful leaders. Yet there is now a noticeable change. Since they began to emerge into the daylight of public life, at about the same time that humanism first began to be aware of its critical condition, i.e. during the last decades of the previous century, they have moved to equip themselves with an arsenal of modern weapons in order to defend the Christian foundations of our civilization and once more to demand for themselves the leadership in the battle for the still so obscure future of the West.

With regard to Roman Catholicism, I am referring, in the first place, to the revival and up-dating, especially since the encyclical Aeterni Patris of Pope Leo XIII in 1879,

of a Thomistic frame of reference for thought, and to his and his successors' many encyclicals dealing with the political, social and economic problems of the modern age, We have in our own time learned much -- from the writings especially of Sidney and Beatrice Webb and of Prof. G. D. H. Cole -- about the unity, in their rationalist-humanist foundation, of all the distinctive modern social and economic movements, and in the encyclicals of Leo XIII we see most of them -- liberalism, modern democracy, nationalism, socialism, communism, the condition of the working classes, the rights and duties of Capital and Labor -- being treated in a Thomistic-Christian light. This revival of Thomistic criticism of modern social problems brought the Catholic Church out of the slump in which it found itself at the beginning of the nineteenth century when the powerful surge of the up-coming humanism had all but drowned distinctively Christian ways of thinking within its bounds. And, in the second place, I am referring to the more recent turn, at least in certain quarters of the Roman Church, to more biblical studies and ways of thinking which preceded and accompanied the second Vatican Council and which now render even the older Thomistic philosophy problematical.

As for Protestantism, I refer, in the first place, as most significant (though the whole history is still but little known in countries of Anglo-Saxon tradition), to the developing insight, in the mind of the nineteenth century Netherlands historian, king's secretary, archivist of the House of Orange, Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer, into the essentially humanistic structure of our western political life, to the developing battle against humanistic liberalism in political-economic thought and in institutionalized education on all levels that is associated with the name of the great Christian statesman and prime minister of the Netherlands Abraham Kuyper, his great deed of faith in organizing the masses of Reformed Christian believers, who at the time were at the mercy of leaders educated in the great humanist universities, behind the founding of the Free Reformed University of Amsterdam in 1880, and the development, in the second generation of this university's students, of a radically biblical philosophy, to which the names, first of all, of Herman Dooyeweerd and D.H.T. Vollenhoven are attached.

As a result of the collapse of humanistic faith (which, as we have just seen, has been the dynamic of modern civilization) and of the situations we have briefly touched upon in which the various Christian parties find themselves, there is at the moment no distinctive 'faith' possessing sufficient historical power to give drive and direction to our civilization. A vacuum has arisen in the western world -- a vacuum of conviction as to the way to meaning. I notice that James Reston in his section "Focus on the Nation" in the World Book Year Book for 1968 (p. 25) quotes Gov. Nelson Rockefeller's words in the January, 1968 issue of Foreign Affairs: "What is at issue is nothing less than whether life can be given meaning. The deepest problem before America is moral or psychological. Since much of the current uneasiness reflects a search less for solutions than for meaning, remedies depend for their effectiveness on the philosophy or values which inspire them. The student unrest is impressive, not because some of it is fomented by agitators, but because it includes some of the most idealistic elements of our youth". In the light of the loss of meaning these words and so many phenomena of our time forcefully suggest, it is instructive to observe that the nihilism and the flight to Hindu and Buddhist ways of thinking, which a century ago were attractive to a number of outstanding European intellectuals in a society still largely aristocratic, are now, in a mass society which those intellectuals foresaw, making a claim upon much larger numbers.

We find ourselves, I believe, at one of the historic turning-points of mankind's journey through time. Humanism, which has largely determined the structure and nature of our institutions, of how we live and think together in communities, is bankrupt. But in general, discerning men are not attracted to the withdrawn or accommodated Christians they encounter, nor to Christians whose orientation is almost

exclusively theological and ecclesiastical.

Yet Christianity, in spite of much in the apparent history of the movement, is not a matter merely of devoting a certain part of our life to some one or other church institution or of our giving our assent to this or that more or less orderly body of theological judgments. To be Christian is to live whole human lives in this creation of God's by the light of God's word and with the aid of His Spirit. The most fundamental and urgent battle of our time is not to be thought of in the first place as one for the preservation of some familiar and accepted church organization or of some system of theological propositions, -- though both of these may have their subordinate importance. The struggle of our time goes much deeper: it is a struggle for the religious direction of human society in its totality. The battle of our time is to determine which spirit is to possess our hearts and give direction to our civilization. A church organization or a world of Christian theological activity standing alone (as spheres in which the Christian spirit reigns) within a culture all the other activities of which are thought of as secular (and which have been surrendered to an anti-Christian spirit), -- such a church and such a theological activity must remain impotent, and by the very fact of their standing alone as proper spheres of Christian activity they have become distantiated from and irrelevant to that greater part of our life which is dominated by that other spirit to which we have surrendered it. In the long run such churches and such theological enterprises fade away (one form of which is to become 'traditional'). We are seeing such fading acts before our very eyes today. Even to preserve the organized churches and whatever of theology may be dear to us we shall have to fight for a more integral Christian society. Today, in our western world, there will either be a quickening of Christian faith to sense the religious unity of man's life in the world, or there will follow the last remaining steps, almost imperceptible in their advance, to a thoroughly secular way of life in which there is no place for the Good Shepherd's voice. It is not possible in the twentieth century for Christians to make a good confession only within the secure shadows of the institutional church.

That is why I am happy with the intention of a group like yours. The Christian Freedom Foundation, I take it, wishes to bring God's Good News, not biblicistically but really, to bear upon a major area of our contemporary life, an area which even many Christians unfortunately think of as belonging to the 'secular order', the world of economic life. In this way you are attempting to give the word of God once again the place which, as word of the sovereign God, it demands for itself in our lives. For this very reason it is important that we consider in just what way we regard Christianity and Humanism to be related, and, in particular, that we re-examine that view of the supposed affinity of their fundamental principles which has had such a long and influential history and has, in fact, made our western civilization possible. When we take upon ourselves the awful responsibility of bringing the word of God to bear upon an important aspect of our life, we must above all be certain that it is the word of God that we are speaking, and not a watering down of it to the point of ineffectualness by way of an accommodation of its meaning to something that humanism "finds acceptable. In very subtle ways the dominant humanist mind has, simply by its dominant presence, suggested possibilities of exegesis of the Scriptures, while these, in turn, are thus made on God's own authority to declare what humanism holds.

In a very much broader way too, I would like to suggest, it is desirable that there come within our western society a fundamental re-examination of the relation obtaining between Christianity and Humanism. I mean that not just Christians but men of all persuasions, that Christians and humanists together should engage in this re-examination.

In the preceding I have been presupposing the total incompatibility of these two faiths, that they are mutually exclusive, that the real relation obtaining between them is an antithetical one. And by the way, when I speak of antithesis, I am not using the word, as Hegel did, to refer to an antithetical relation in the dialectical movement of our analytical life which is 'overcome' in a subsequent synthesis. I am now speaking of the deeper religious antithesis, the opposition between the spirit and kingdom of Christ and the spirit and kingdom of the Rebel, the Resister. This opposition is never reconciled as two early and only partial insights into a later and more comprehensive Truth. According to the Scriptures, the Resister is the father of lies, and he goes on rebelling against the Truth as that is anchored in the divine law-word, until he and all who persist in following him are put down and cast out.

But now, in thus suggesting the incompatibility of Christianity and humanism I do not wish to be mis-understood. Not for a moment do I believe that it follows from the incompatibility of the two faiths that Christian and humanist have nothing to say to each other or must have no dealings with each other. The two can always in this life talk together, and they may repeatedly find ways of working together. But that talk and that practical cooperation will surely not be possible, as has so often been claimed, because the two faiths down deep somewhere share a common foundation before they diverge to two distinct and opposed movements. In other words, Christianity and humanism are not two specific differences of one genus, as the Law of Moses and Greek philosophy were both results, though in differing degrees, of the illumination of Wisdom for the Alexandrian Jews, or of the enlightening work of the Logos for a Justin Martyr. No; that Christian and humanist can contemplate meaningful discussion together, even about the relation obtaining between Christianity and humanism, is not because, down deep beneath the visible differences, even open hostility, there is a hidden consensus of some sort within the two systematic ways of viewing man's experience in this world, but solely -- I speak from the Christian point of view (one must speak from a definite point of view) -- solely because of the overwhelming, convincing testimony of the revelational creation-ordinances of God. The humanist, like the Christian, lives in the world God created, the world that is upheld and driven onward by His word, and by His Spirit, which convinces the world of sin, of righteousness and of judgment. All men respond to the one law-order. Right here every man, just in this central capacity of homo respondens, is more than his own subjective systematizing of the moment. There is an element of resisting, which speaks of more than is contained in the positive systematic position that is being developed. Men do, after all, have to account for the structure of the creation as it is taken up in their experience, and until they adequately account for it they are restless, driven on to new modifications or to still deeper turnings of thought. Discussion ought to drive a man to sense the disparity between his account of what he experiences and what he does in fact experience. Who can say when God will use just such pressure to open the heart of the unbeliever, so that he can believe the apostolic proclamation?

Having said that, we return to the incontrovertible fact that the two faiths themselves are totally incompatible, and it will be my purpose in the remainder of this paper to bring out some of the distinctive features of humanism bearing on the great difference which separates it from Christianity. All of us need this discipline so that we shall all be helped in extricating ourselves more certainly and more resolutely from the prevailing problematics of humanist thinking, in order that we and the community of men in Christ's Spirit may be more single-heartedly men of God, living valiantly before God in terms of His (express) word.

In order to accomplish our purpose we shall, I think, have to take a somewhat closer look at what we mean by humanism. For there is some ambiguity in the way the term has been used. In one sense -- and here we have the broader reference of the term -- there is a continuity of spirit in the Renaissance of the late 14th to the 16th

centuries, the Enlightenment of the 18th, the positivistic scientism of the 19th and the functionalism and operationalism of the 20th. This is the spirit of secularism, of man's losing himself, exhausting himself, in the creation itself, the here and now, not recognizing the hereafter, or the revealed law-word of God for the here and now, ignoring the places of authority God has put in man's life, the offices He has established for the proper exercise of man's task in the world. This secularist spirit is an express violation of Paul's admonition in I. Cor. 7 : 29-31 (see in vs. 31 the antithesis between *chromenoi* and *katachromenoi*). Only a seeking in true faith of the Righteousness of God's Kingdom can restrain such functionalistic madness. For this reason humanism does not know how to keep the economic passion in check. In Macchiavelli authority and office have disappeared, and only factual power remains. (Perhaps our current reference to 'violence' without distinguishing whether it is the police arm of the state or the private citizen is a direct descendent of this inadequately structured thought.) Montaigne gave pointed expression to this spirit of secularism in the words he had inscribed on the ceiling of his workroom: "Rejoice in the present life; all else is beyond thee". Again, it is the spirit of our own permissive society, so well symbolized in the program of Mr. Hefner, the editor of Playboy magazine.

For just a moment in history this secular spirit was powerfully stemmed in great areas of Europe either by the Reformation or by the Counter-reformation of the Roman Catholic Church. But the divisions ended in the Wars of Religion, and when the spiritual élan began to wane and Europeans generally turned in disgust from all the wrangling, the old spirit of the Renaissance, now reinforced by a marriage with the new, upcoming science of Galileo and Newton, emerged stronger than ever in the Enlightenment of the 18th century, sweeping up a much larger number of the leading spirits and capturing many of the great centers of learning and bastions of political power. The revivals of Whitefield and the Wesleys, the Great Awakening, and such like, again briefly offered resistance to the this-worldly spirit of those who thought of themselves as enlightened, but this resistance was less powerful, covered a smaller area, involved less persons than the Reformation and the Counter-reformation had done. The secularistic spirit was clearly and quickly gaining an all but undisputed sway in the life of western civilization. What did it matter that peasants continued to believe the old 'superstitions' (=Christianity) and beget many children. Whichever of those children would go on to acquire a higher education would soon be weaned away from all superstition and be won for the secularistic cause and the scientific method in the universities or by becoming a part of the political life which had received its organization and meaning from modern humanism. In the 19th and 20th centuries the movement continued to gain ground although at the same time the situation was importantly modified by the collapse of faith of which we have already given some intimation.

We all know what we are experiencing at the moment. We hear a great deal today about man come of age; yet Kant was saying the same thing when he described the Enlightenment as "the emergence of man from his self-imposed tutelage", and similar thoughts were expressed at the time of the Renaissance. Always, the idea in view is the throwing off of any external authority (as, for example, the Law of God) and the reliance on man's own resources, particularly his (autonomous) Reason. Charles Frankel has written that "the special effort of the Enlightenment was to find a foundation in every field, from the profane sciences to revelation, from music to morals, and theology to commerce, such that thinking and action could be made independent of speculative metaphysics and supernatural revelation. Religion was treated mainly as an appendage to morals and discussed as though it were a part of physics. History was written to place European life in balanced perspective among other ways of life, none of which enjoyed the special sanction of God. In politics, the conception of divine right and supernatural providence were replaced by 'the social contract', so that governments could be evaluated as instruments of human desire. In moral philosophy the effort was to

base moral codes on Natural Law or on the 'well-established facts' of human psychology..." And Peter Gay, in his new study of The Enlightenment, remarks that "the most militant battlecry of the Enlightenment, écrasez l'infame, was directed against Christianity itself, against Christian dogma, Christian institutions, Christian ethics and the Christian view of man.

So much for the Enlightenment of the 18th century. But now we must take note of the fact that the French historian Paul Hazard in his volume The European Mind (1680-1715) has pointed out that the struggle to find instruments to express this thoroughly secular point of view was engaging men in the later decades of the 17th century. And Robert Ergang in his recent study The Renaissance finds that "the unifying and elucidating factor is the secularization of life, thought and culture during the Renaissance period". "This secularization", he concludes, "is the essence of the Renaissance. Thus the Renaissance is the transition from a civilization which had the hereafter as its central idea to one which is rooted in mundane affairs."

There is then a continuity, an identity of spirit. But there is also diversity and development. Modern humanism only gradually and as a result of historical events assumed its specific shape, and once it had attained its mature form it underwent not insignificant changes from time to time. In order to acquire a more precise understanding of the term 'modern humanism' we must take a look for just a few moments at how it grew to be what it is. To observe its development is to become convinced of its fundamental opposition to the Christian faith.

To get us started, let us consider for a moment the idea of secularism. I suppose that most of us, when we think of secularism, think of the modern world and of its beginnings at the time of the Renaissance. But of course the spirit of secularism does not enter human history for the first time then. Essentially, secularism is absorption in this world, and such an attitude, the apostle Paul tells us, characterizes all who are alienated from God: they exchanged the truth about God for a lie and worship and serve the creature rather than the Creator (Romans 1:25).

For instance, there is a subtle tendency in man to look to a golden age in the past. We find this tendency in the conservatism which tends to hold on to what has come to us out of the hoary past rather than entrust itself to recent innovations. We must remember that in the Christian view redemption is not attained by going back -- anachronistically -- to some point in man's primeval history. And so, in the history of Christianity too, we must resist the inclination to view the apostolic churches and the early church generally as somehow an ideal situation! Greek culture had certainly been secular if by secular is meant: not living in the creation before God by the light of His word, but rather accepting the creation as an independent self-existing reality. If man in his integral religious root-unity, what the Scripture calls the heart, images the integral glory of God, the Greek was lost in great darkness who, having lost a knowledge of the heart, looked upon man as both body (part of the 'physical world', which is just 'there', and is never 'mind') and mind or rational soul (part of the world of logical thought, which likewise is just 'there', and is no 'matter'). But the thinkers of the church in post-apostolic times in a very subtle way blended the revelation of God in Scripture with the teachings of the various Greek philosophical schools. To be sure, the Church Fathers opposed to the philosophy of the Greeks what they called 'nostra philosophia', our philosophy, meaning Paul, the N.T. generally, or the entire Scriptures of Old and New Testaments. But they 'read' the Scriptures with the 'aid' of Greek philosophical frames of reference, alien to the revelational universe of discourse and in which the driving-power of Greek secularism was to be found. And then, exegeting the Scriptures, they haul out, but now endowed with divine authority, the alien meaning they had -- often unintentionally -- read in. We call this the method of eisegesis and exegesis. Good examples of it are

to be found in the patristic understanding of body and soul, of the natural and the spiritual man as two parts of man, of the 'faculties' of the soul, of the relation of church and state, pope and emperor, and then always that strange logos-doctrine of Justin the martyr and others by which divine revelation came to be identified with the analytical-functional processes of the 'mind'.

Then, in the period of the High Middle Ages, a new way of accommodating the divine revelation to the thought-results of ancient paganism was found, a way which was suggested to the Christian thinkers of western Europe by the example of the Jews and Muslims. This new frame of reference we know as the structure of Nature and Grace. By means of it ancient paganism, with all its built-in lack of knowledge and distorted and reductionist ways of thinking, was made the ground-structure or foundation, regarded as correct or capable of being correct as far as it went, and the revelation of God in His Word was made the capstone, principally excluded from the realm of Nature and thus not reforming the 'natural' mind. The Germanic peoples who had broken into the territories of the Roman Empire came to admire the superior culture of the ancient Mediterranean world. The Germanic youth, educated by the monks in monastery and cathedral school, came to look up to the 'classical' auctoritates, authorities. The results of the Greek masters of thought, especially of Aristotle, were accepted as true for the (supposed) 'natural' world, and thus a pagan like Aristotle was assumed to be able to arrive at truth in the so-called 'natural' area with the aid of human reasoning alone, directed to 'natural' things. The word of God, as now contained in and known from the Scriptures, was taken to be a supernatural addition, a donum superadditum it was called, added, that is, above and beyond what could truly and properly be known about natural things by the natural reason unaided and supposedly unrelated to, and in that important sense independent of this covenant fellowship with God and intimate knowledge of Him.

The advantage of the method of Nature and Grace, it was felt, was that Christians could now approach Jewish and Muslim thinkers on a common rational basis, and on the basis of this rational consensus could argue the relative merits of what each party took to be God's word-revelation. But it should be observed that here for the first time in Christian thinkers a great, so-called 'natural' area of life was principally removed from the reforming influence of the word of God. And man was thought of as essentially a rational animal, in the Greek sense, with the added gift of an ability to hear the word of God, which, then, had only to do with a so-called 'supernatural' order. A distinctly Christian life, directed by the word of God, tended now more and more to be thought of as an other-worldly life.

Meanwhile, men were exploring in this life the capacities of what they called 'thinking mind' or 'reason', and since God has indeed given us the functional capacity to distinguish differences conceptually -- though man is not identical with this single functional capacity -- and has made the entire creation logically conceivable, thus objectively adapted to man's subjective analytical capacity, men's efforts to develop a logical life were crowned with a certain measure of success. But the degree of their orientation to the Greek and Roman philosophers led them into an attitude very close to a deification of 'logical thought'. When the medieval mind, after having learned what the ancient 'auctoritates' had said, began to discover conflicting views among these authorities, it turned to the rational capacity itself to decide issues, instead of asking itself whether the problems as put by the pagan ancient 'auctoritates' involved conflict and contradiction because the thinking of the ancients was not directed by the word of God. Enthusiasm for, and confidence in the rational capacity (called Reason) grew apace.

Thomas Aquinas still assumed that the laws of the natural world, knowable for the unaided natural reason, and the laws of the spiritual or supernatural realm, known only by faith in the received word of God as explained by the Church, were two constitutive parts of one harmonious universe of God's law since all law was taken by him to proceed from the one Law-giver, the Creator of the heavens and the earth. His ultimate structure is an extension of his master Aristotle's hylomorphic view that 'matter' and 'form' are the two constitutive principles of every existent thing. But after Aquinas men found it very difficult to go on accepting as established by natural reasoning those attributes of God which had constituted the substance of Thomas' theologia naturalis (that which could be known about God by the unaided rational faculty terminating upon natural things). In the course of time a great gap came to separate the rational, scientific enterprise of the 'natural' life from the beliefs of (supernatural) faith.

In the late scholastic period a movement arose which broke the artificial synthesis that had been formed between the Greek conception of nature and the Christian religion (necessarily reduced in meaning). This movement denied every point of contact between nature and grace. William of Occam thought of the natural order as a realm of law which rational inquiry could apprehend. But the supernatural order was the sphere of God's revelation and God is beyond law and capricious (deus exlex). In contrast with the natural order of law there now emerges the spiritual or supernatural realm of freedom. And, in this configuration or frame of reference, 'freedom' comes to mean 'freedom from law'. This development was to be of great significance for modern humanism.

Martin Luther, although initially overcome by his discovery in the Epistle to the Romans as well as in the Psalms of the righteousness of Christ which is imputed to men by grace alone through their faith, had been educated at the Occamist University of Erfurt and been a pupil of Gabriel Biel's. When he began to work out some views on the subject of christian freedom, he spoke of the fact that we, participants in Christ of the divine nature are freed by him in essence from the sphere and obligation of all earthly ordinances. Law, binding, coercion were thought of as 'worldly', while the 'spiritual' life of the Christian was a life of freedom. Here again, freedom becomes freedom from the law. Luther taught that though essentially we are freed from all such worldly ordinances, in fact, as long as we remain in this vale of tears, we submit externally to them, in order that we may all experience a quiet and peaceable life and the Gospel may continue to be preached. But the Gospel itself was the declaration of the essential freedom of the redeemed human spirit from all law. Thus, New Testament Gospel came to be placed over against Old Testament law. In his doctrine of the church, for example, Luther always considered the regulation of the affairs of the organized, so-called visible church a matter that might conveniently be left to the (secular) princes of the realm. For the real church, free from external ordinances, was the mystical congregation of believers (an inner spiritual community). The nineteenth century German philosopher Hegel is simply adjusting this Lutheran view to the modern humanistic way of thinking when he puts Geist over against Natur and sees the realm of the human Geist (ignoring the religious difference of direction between apostasy and redemption) as the realm of Freedom and Liberty.

I believe that Calvin saw the structure of biblical revelation much better at this point, and the point is significant for understanding the relation of Christianity and humanism. Calvin saw that though Christ frees us from the "law of sin" that is in our members and from all the external arrangements and ceremonies of the Mosaic dispensation, the cosmic law-order, rooted in the law-word of God, was the a priori condition of all creaturely existence, including our positivizing activity. Calvin therefore recognized the intrinsic subjection of the Christian to the decalogue, and saw no intrinsic antinomy between the central commandment of love as the religious root of all God's ordinances, and the spheres of juridical or economic law or the inner structural law of the state. The Anabaptists, on the other hand, losing sight of the religious root of the temporal laws, placed the Sermon on the Mount, with its doctrine of love, in opposition to civil ordinances.

But we have got ahead of our story. Almost simultaneously with the appearance of the 'nominalist' movement of the declining scholastic synthesis a movement of a wholly other kind began to emerge, which, though it is sometimes included in the concept 'Renaissance', is really of a quite different nature. I refer to a movement we can perhaps best designate as classical humanism. Classical humanism is not the same as humanism. By humanism in general I mean any movement which puts the 'humanum' in the center. Such a position is of a general philosophical nature, and is found throughout history, in a peculiarly modern form in modern humanism. Classical humanism, on the other hand, is a strongly paedagogically oriented movement, and has appeared intermittently in history. It began really among the Roman élite, the Scipionic circle, men who looked to Greek cultural ideals for their inspiration. There is a strongly repriming tendency in classical humanism. It appears again in the so-called renaissances of the eighth and twelfth centuries. In its modern forms, interest in the classics is no longer subjected to the theology of the church (the relation of being handmaid), but there is now an attempt to understand the ancients just for themselves. Petrarch is the big name here. In this modern sense we speak of a first, a second and a third humanism. The second is connected with the name of Winckelmann, the third with that of Werner Jaeger, recently of Harvard University, with whom I had the honour of working closely for a period of two years. But the first humanism, in which we are particularly interested here, went through an early and a late phase. These men had grown tired of the conceptual hair-splitting of the scholastic movement and attempted to get back behind it to the period of the patristic synthesis (the outlook of the church fathers). To the cry which was coming to be heard in wide areas in their time, How do we come by a new man? the reply of the men of the first humanism was, By putting him through a course of reading of the ancient Greek and Roman authors. Those ancients, so it was thought, had been really great men, and then had come the 'middle age' with the domination of the church-authority. Now, modern man would be restored to his glory by a return to the grandeur that was Greece and the glory that was Rome, at least as far as that grandeur and glory were expressed in their literature.

The men of the Florentine Academy, with Petrarca at their head, at first oriented themselves to Augustine, whom they admired as at once church father and citizen of the Roman Empire. There was something of naiveté in their attitude, something of a lack of historical sense, but at the same time it witnessed to their insight into the integral wholeness of life: these men attempted to restore ancient imperial Roman ways in the city of Rome of their day. Only after the failure of Cola di Rienzi did Petrarch come to deeper historical insight. "We", he now realized, are not Romani, but Italiani; the Longobards have come in between and polluted the situation. He began to sense historical distance.

Petrarca's allegiance shifted in later life from Augustine to Cicero, thus from a Christian church father to a pagan; and Petrarch's main pupil, Boccaccio, who led the second phase of the first classical humanism in modern times, became strongly anti-Christian. Drawing up a list of things which in the course of time had been imported into Italy and diluted her ancient glory, he placed the religion of Christianity from that obscure and unenlightened country of Palestine at the head of his list. It was this anti-Christian character of the later phase of this movement which enabled it, in certain figures (persons), to combine with a genuinely Renaissance position, assuming within the latter a subservient place. In Valla the humanist movement concentrated upon language, and began to resent the barbarisms of scholastic Latin. As time went on this movement became more and more empty (formalistic), and, unlike the Renaissance, which attached itself to the rising modern science, lacked a method for attacking problems and obtaining results. In his great historical novel The Romance of Leonardo da Vinci Dmitri Merejkowski dramatically presents -- in Book I sections V through VII -- the difference between a man of the classical humanist movement (Giorgio Merula) and one of the Renaissance (Leonardo).

To the crying need of the time, How do we get a new man? the Renaissance too had an answer, but it was not the answer of the classical humanists. The paedagogical orientation to the writers of classical antiquity is missing. The Renaissance is belief in the rebirth of man, not by way of an acquaintance with and appreciation of the achievements of the ancient Greeks and Romans, but immediately, from within man himself, by calling upon his own native resources. Man is grown up now, come of age, mature, self-reliant. All that he needs he has within himself. He has only to call it forth, to realize himself in the affairs of this life. He has within him all that he needs to guide him. This self-sufficiency or autonomy is his freedom. Here is the religious source of the Faustian urge of the 'Renaissance man'. He not only does not require any help from beyond himself; anything that might offer itself as such help is to be regarded as an imposition upon his freedom and a threat to it. He trusts himself, especially his scientific thought.

Francis Bacon is a fine example. Men, he once said, are not apes that walk upright, but gods. By that he meant to say, Man has his destiny in his own hands. He is self-determined. By his own (scientific) effort he can and will establish the regnum hominis, the sovereign sway of man, in the world. Man is cock-o'-the-walk.

Of course, Bacon lived in a world which had inherited the Christian religion and also the church as a powerful institution in human society. But Bacon made a sharp distinction, in the manner of late medieval nominalism, between belief and knowledge, between religion and philosophy. Wanting to make these as independent of each other as possible, he proposed the doctrine of a two-fold truth: philosophy makes no claim to penetrate into the mysteries of the supernatural world, while religion has nothing to do with knowledge of the natural world. Like the nominalists, Bacon laid more stress on philosophy or science than on religion. (This-worldliness) Let me quote you a few sentences from Prof. Rudolf Metz of Heidelberg University in his article "Bacon's Part in the Intellectual Movement of His Time", which is included in the volume of essays entitled Seventeenth Century Studies that was presented to Sir Herbert Grierson, an outstanding student of the seventeenth century.

"In the great process of setting learning free from the shackles of faith and secularizing it, which begins with the Renaissance... Bacon's teaching plays an important part, as in a certain sense he may be said to have brought the development to its conclusion. He was fully conscious of the radical consequences which the change would have,

and he discovered the clear, simple and impressive formula which from his time on has stood like a motto above the gateway of modern philosophy... In its essentials this formula is nothing other than a declaration of the coming of age and responsibility and autonomy of theoretic reason... Bacon wished to strengthen science by confining religion within its proper boundaries, and his efforts led to an essential strengthening of the secular at the expense of the spiritual. In spite of statements to the contrary, he himself was an agnostic, and the course which he adopted in religious matters led directly to the deism of the Enlightenment..."

It would not require too much effort, I believe, to trace a line from this position of Bacon's over John Locke -- who had such an overwhelming influence on Protestant 'orthodoxy' in Anglo-Saxon lands and whose influence has been so very destructive of Christianity because even when he was concerned to 'limit' his rationalism by admitting that the mind seems to possess a source of 'information' other than reason, in revelation he remains first and foremost a rationalist with a rationalist's understanding of what 'truth' is -- to Kant's "religion within the limits of pure reason".

When thus with the passage of time the classical humanist movement, because of its empty formalism and lack of a method, abandoned the field to the Renaissance-type mind (although, as I have intimated, the anti-Christian classical humanist often combined his outlook with, and subordinated it to, the Renaissance mind) and this latter was strengthened by the newly emerging methods of the natural sciences and by a revival of a Hellenistic philosophical (not merely Stoical, as is often stated) view of mind as possessed of innate or apriori ideas (i.e. the Reason) we are quickly confronted with the modern humanist mind, or what is sometimes called 'the mind of modernity'.

At the very heart of this modern humanism is the idea of freedom, but then of freedom in the sense of self-determination or autonomy. We feel the presence of it everywhere about us in our own time. The 'dashing' new premier of Canada, Mr. Trudeau, is reported to have stated: "I have never been able to accept any discipline except that which I imposed upon myself". Linda, the cohabiting coed of Barnard College is quoted as saying: "We are married in a way. People always consider us together. We just don't want something so personal to be governed by something outside us". And as a third example, I cite the words of Mr. Edward Schwartz, the president of the National Student Association, as quoted in our student newspaper when he submitted to an interview with a member of its staff last spring. Asked about the goals and objectives of his Association, he is reported as saying: "Control over student affairs, on the principle that he who must obey a rule should make it" (italics mine, HER). This is Bacon's thought that men are gods. Unless Reason is the same everywhere and always and a rational consensus of human wills is thus possible, this view makes for anarchy: everybody will do what his autonomous will dictates. Or else a majority will coerce the minority; or a minority, with the instruments of repression, will coerce the majority. And this is supposedly freedom!

For an understanding of our own time nothing requires our close examination more than this 'freedom' which is in the centre of the humanists' interest and which imparts the 'drive' to the humanist movement. It is at the heart of all our contemporary revolutionary movements and actions.

Freedom, in its modern humanist conception, is the deepest root of that deadly inner and irreconcilable dialectical tension which has so obviously characterized the development of the humanist movement through the more than 450 years of its history. (I say 'deadly' because such dialectical tensions speak in very clear language of a grave ambiguity or inadequacy -- actually a spiritual blindness -- at the heart of the movement displaying them.) Let me say what it is I am referring to when I speak of a dialectical movement within humanism.

The movement began with the assertion that man is Lord in the world. This assertion did not carry the scriptural meaning of the central position of man in the cosmos (e.g. Psalm 8) under the sovereign Rule of God. On the contrary, it was a very straightforward assertion of the ultimate lordship of man. Man is cock-o'-the-walk. As we saw, Bacon spoke of the regnum hominis, the reign -- actually, the sovereignty -- of man, and from the first emergence of modern humanism the religious elevation of human personality to the position of an Absolute (= a god), by which the very meaning of man as he really is by virtue of God's determinative law-word for the creation is destroyed, has been the driving force of the movement. The absolute freedom of man, of the human spirit, has been the cry always.

When man and his freedom are thus conceived, then Nature becomes an opposing Power which must be overcome if man's freedom is to be established. Consequently, we find already in Francis Bacon, alongside his proud regnum hominis, the recognition of the need of an interpretatio naturae, the scientific investigation of nature, and the two, as Rudolf Metz writes in his aforementioned article, "are blended [in Bacon] into one inseparable unity". Freedom in its humanistic conception, the central driving force of the modern religion of the human personality, calls forth from its own depths the motive to dominate nature by means of scientific analysis and technological application, and thus leads to a religion of autonomous objective science (the freedom of scientific investigation) in which there is no room for the free personality. Nevertheless, as Prof. Dooyeweerd has pointed out, the religious self-surrender to autonomous science is, in the last analysis, nothing but the religion of the autonomous human personality itself, which splits itself up into two opposite directions, not to be reconciled in a really critical humanistic self-reflection.

Put very simply, man's 'freedom', the original driving-force of the movement, called forth an unusually stubborn effort to understand the workings of 'nature', and the result was a scientific picture of the world (ultimately, the Newtonian world-machine) in which there is no place for human freedom. For a time men were able to give themselves to a supposedly 'free' or neutral scientific enterprise, but there came a time when the cry was again heard for the personal freedom originally craved (e.g. Rousseau; Kant's Critique of the Practical Reason). This, in turn, called forth a new scientific effort, now on the higher levels of history and the so-called behavioural and value-sciences, which effort then again finally gives way to the call for personal freedom (e.g. Sartre). This dialectical tension between an ideal of personal freedom and an ideal of autonomous science has expressed itself in numerous ways. In education, the conflict between a child-centered and a curriculum-centered education is an evidence of its deadly presence at the heart of humanist thinking.

Christians would do well not to choose sides here; for the very presence of the 'sides' indicates that something is wrong at a deeper level: in the very humanist conception of freedom. Freedom is not freedom from law. In the revelation God gives us in His Word man is also at the center of the universe, and he has dominion, that is, is lord. Yet he is subject to the divine law-order (the law put to the cosmos by God when he called it into being (Prov. 8:29; Ps. 147:15; Ps. 148:8; Ps. 119:89-96)). Man is not

ultimate Lord, not Bacon's cock-o'-the-walk, but rather vice-gerent, that is, one who acts (Latin, gerere) in the place of (Latin, vice) God and under God. As the whole creation reflects the integral glory of God, man uniquely 'images' God, under the cosmos-determining and preserving LAW of God, in an integral task (office, from Latin, officium): to dress and keep the garden. 'Dress' - that is to give new form. 'Keep' - that is to preserve what has been received from the past. But both 'forming' and 'preserving' are to be done under the LAW, that is, in conformity with its (religiously, in the heart) sensed demands. Man is thus free to positivize the demands of the divine LAW in the laws he formulates. He positivizes, for example, the demands he senses are laid universally and necessarily upon our thought-processes, and thus we acquire a formulated logical law with its several 'principia'. In the same way the statutory laws of states, the internal laws of all organizations, the laws for aesthetic life, economic life, etc. are produced. But here is no absolute freedom. Humanist view of freedom confuses the divine LAW with man's subjective (i.e. subject to that LAW) law-positivizing activity. A disastrous consequence of this confusion in our century has been that the relativities of our human positivizing task -- for various cultures are at various stages of development -- become confusedly interpreted by the humanist as a doctrine of Law-relativism, the view that there is no universally binding law, constant through all time. (The other side of the coin: we are the law-givers, and thus free. Nothing imposed from without. Present radicals speak of 'authoritarian' structure of universities and of our social structure.)

The points to be developed after p. 30 and attaching thereto are:

1. This confused humanist view of freedom, with the consequent confusion of the relativities of our various attempts at positivizing with the ultimate relativity of all law (relativism), was greatly strengthened in its historical dominance and significantly added to when it became attached to an ancient view of (pagan substitution for) the cosmic Law-order, viz. the concept of ratio, developed in Hellenistic times and revived at the beginning of the modern centuries. (See: Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State, ch. XIII "The Renaissance of Stoicism and 'Natural Right' Theories of the State") For this 'ratio' is not just our human capacity for understanding, but that ability directed by innate or a priori ideas which have the role of Law and yet constitute (the a priori) part of a man's subjective thought-process. In the Christian view there is the Law-word of God, and the possibility of a two-fold response on our part (obedience or disobedience). Here in rationalism the Law of God has been transmuted into the Law within, one's own deepest self, source of the self's activity, the deepest (innate) stratum of man's essential rational soul. 'Everyman' has the Truth and 'Light' within himself.

Note: Here you may quote from my CIAC address, Can Canada Tolerate the CIAC? beginning from the top of p. 27 (omitting next to last paragraph on this page) through the middle of p. 29 and really, if you wish to get my viewpoint for your own formulation, through p. 31. It is important to get into this present lecture the observation that the common Reason (Ratio) of early (17th and 18th cent.) rationalism became divided, in socialist theory, into a bourgeois and a proletarian reason, but there remained but one reason of the labouring classes! Especially what I said in the last nine lines of p. 30 is important at this point in the present lecture.

2. There are two important consequences from the above:
 - a. the Truth is in Everyman. We need only a universal system of education to bring that Truth out. In the Hellenistic age this explains Cicero's and Seneca's talk of equality and cosmopolitanism, whereas the classical Hellenic philosophers had recognized a difference between Hellenes and 'barbarians', and accepted the institution of slavery. In modern times this rationalistic view of Truth has given rise to a peculiarly coloured (abstract) view of the equality (equal rights) of all men, regardless of sexual difference -- emancipation of women --, colour -- anti-racism --, etc. It is an abstract view which does not deal with man as he is here, structured by the law of God's creation or with the historical realities of positivized (statutory) law. The result is the utter break-down of the office-structure (based on the law-order) which God has worked into human society, the levelling, thus, of the structure of human society, and a principial anarchism (each, speaking out of the Law which he discovers in his own deepest self, has no need of the other, and rejects any external imposition of authority and does what is right in his own eyes).
 - b. Rousseau, the critical figure here in the historical unfolding of the fundamental idea of humanism, distinguished two wills: (1) the volonté

de tous, or will of each and every person, which can be counted as so many ballots, and (2) the volonté générale, which is his (and rationalism's) postulated common will or consensus arising from the fact that all men possess Reason, and that Reason is always and everywhere the same. The consensus is external evidence of the common Reason at the deepest level of all our selfhoods. But what if men do, in fact, differ? How are the 'rights' of minorities or even of majorities, for that matter, to be guaranteed? Someone has to assume the authority of speaking with the voice of Reason. Thus, in the history of rationalism, there are two movements: the one (western), trusting that there will be a manifest consensus of men of good will, relies on counting the ballots of all to get at the voice of Reason; the other, collectivistically, assumes that a small elite committee, representing the toiling -- proletarian -- masses and the only authentic -- i.e. proletarian -- Reason, speaks authoritatively in the name of that Reason. Dissenters are thus enemies of Reason and of mankind, obstacles to the salvation of the race. They are destructive forces to be put down. This polarity of individualism - collectivism is a development of the underlying humanist idea. The Christian has another view of the relation of common structure or collective and individual, under the Law-word of God.

I ended my lecture with a quotation from Dooyeweerd which you will find on the last page of my lectures "Scriptural Religion and Political Task", in: Christian Perspectives, 1962 (brown cover).

